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Abstract 
This thesis deals with the theoretical and methodological development of the study of Regional-
ism in International Relations. It rests on the assumption of a dichotomy in Regionalism studies 
between Rationalist and Ideational approaches, hampering the understanding of the motives for 
and nature of Regionalism. The “Rationalist” approach focuses on material interdependency as 
the main driving force behind integration. Thus, Regionalism is seen as a consequence of rational 
calculations and bargains by rational agents. In contrast, the “Ideational”, or Social Constructiv-
ist approach, emphasizes shared regional identity and culture as driving forces that produce 
levels of “cognitive interdependence”. 
As will be demonstrated, however, neither approach alone provides a satisfactory explanation to 
the motives for and nature of Regionalism, including the process of enlargement. This thesis 
thus, aims to test, challenge and further develop explanatory models in the theory of Regional-
ism. In particular the thesis aims to add to the understanding of the process of enlargement, as 
well as its motives, through deploying those models to the problem of the ‘borderline states’. 
The problem of the ”borderline states” is demonstrated by the means of two case studies: Austra-
lia and Turkey in the context of their relationship with their respective regions - European Union 
and emerging Regionalism in East Asia, and in particular their position in European and East 
Asian Regionalism. They are labelled ‘borderline states’ not for their geographical properties, 
but for the permanent partiality of their inclusion within their regions. Such states are in constant 
flux, varying their degree of belonging depending on the criteria of enclosure 
As this thesis demonstrates, Rationalist approach has a particular strength in analysing the 
process of enlargement, whilst Ideational approach is required for analysing the motives of 
enlargement. Moreover, it argues that a potential point of converge between the two approaches 
is analysing the stability of enlargement. It then further argues that analytical eclecticism can be 
useful in terms of identifying and framing problems that are significant, but for ontological and 
epistemological reasons have a tendency to be ignored by the paradigmatic approaches. 
iv 
Finally, the thesis proposes new definitions of region and Regionalism to accommodate a more 
eclectic understanding of what constitutes a region, what drives Regionalism and in particular 
how a region’s membership is determined. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis addresses the theoretical and methodological development of the study of Regional-
ism in International Relations. It pivots on the assumption of a dichotomy in Regionalism studies 
between Rationalist and Ideational approaches, hampering the understanding of the motives for 
and nature of Regionalism. The “Rationalist” approach focuses on material interdependency as 
the main driving force behind integration. Regionalism is thus understood as a consequence of 
rational calculations and bargains by rational agents. In contrast, the “Ideational”, or Social 
Constructivist approach, emphasizes shared regional identity and culture as driving forces that 
produce levels of “cognitive interdependence”. As will be demonstrated, however, neither 
approach alone provides a satisfactory explanation to the motives for and nature of Regionalism, 
including the process of enlargement. This thesis, therefore, aims to test, challenge, and further 
develop, explanatory models in the theory of Regionalism. Specifically, this thesis aims to add to 
the understanding of the process of enlargement, as well as its motives, through deploying those 
models to the problem of the ‘borderline states’. The problem of the “borderline states” is dem-
onstrated by the presentation of two case studies: Australia and Turkey. They are examined in 
the context of their relationship with their respective regions – the European Union and emerging 
Regionalism in East Asia, and in particular their position in European and East Asian Regional-
ism. They are labelled ‘borderline states’ not for their geographical properties, but for the perma-
nent partiality of their inclusion within their regions. Such states are in constant flux, varying 
their degree of belonging depending on the criteria of enclosure. The following sections will 
present the motives, justification and aims for this research, as well as its claim for originality. 
Why focus on Regionalism and Enlargement? 
Even though the existing literature of Regionalism is no less than enormous in quantity, this 
thesis argues that the definitions related to Regionalism still remain contested, and that no single 
theory or approach, Rationalist or Ideational, adequately explains Regionalism. This is particu-
larly relevant to particular aspects of enlargement, such as the motives for states to join regional 
institutions, and the formation of criteria for membership and thus the factors of inclu-
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sion/exclusion. Finally, it establishes the need to empirically test and combine these approaches 
in order to expand upon our understanding of Regionalism. 
As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, the majority of the Regionalism literature focuses on the phe-
nomenon of Regionalism in the global context, and particularly the economic context. Essen-
tially this can be explained as how and why regional integration projects are implemented in the 
international system. Moreover, European integration has traditionally dominated the studies of 
integration and comparisons to other regions have usually been considered weak because of the 
highly institutionalised nature of the European Union (EU). Finally, this thesis argues that there 
is a shortage of systematic work on the issue of enlargement. The majority of the literature in this 
field is comprised of descriptive accounts of individual enlargement projects, principally those of 
past enlargements of the EU. The gap in the Regionalism literature in terms of enlargement and 
relations with ‘borderline states’ and the absence of workable definitions of a ‘region’ in relation 
to enlargement reinstates the question; how do we define a ‘region’ and how do we decide who 
belongs to the region and who does not? 
Why Australia and Turkey? 
The significance of the “borderline states” for the study of Regionalism 
The impulse for my decision to focus on Australia and Turkey owes its intellectual premise to 
Michael Wesley’s article “The politics of exclusion: Australia, Turkey and definitions of Re-
gionalism” (Wesley, 1997).1 Wesley argued that definitions of membership in regional organisa-
tions reflect competing political visions for the region2, in which Turkey and Australia were 
becoming candidates for a second-tier membership due to a perception of lacking in regionness 
but simultaneously being accepted as strategic partners. Wesley furthermore suggested that 
“Turkey’s present exclusion from EU membership and Australia’s possible future exclusion 
                                                 
1 Wesley, Michael (1997), “The politics of exclusion: Australia, Turkey and definitions of Regionalism”, The 
Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 523-555 
2 Wesley (1997), p. 523 
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from a future East Asian bloc show intriguing similarities in terms of how their candidacies have 
been advanced and rejected.”3 
This has also been evident in Turkey’s and Australia’s response to fear of exclusion, in Austra-
lia’s case motivated by its exclusion from ASEM and in Turkey’s case by the rejection of its first 
membership application. Both countries, commonly perceiving a deep economic dependency on 
their respective regions, have chosen to emphasise economic interdependence as the predominant 
criteria for membership.4 The equally deep and shared perception of the regions as their primary 
security environment, on the other hand, have resulted in an advancement of geographical 
credentials as a justification for inclusion; in Australia’s case this peaked in the advocacy for an 
“East Asian hemisphere” concept, whilst Turkey has emphasised its European geography based 
on its territory on the Western banks of the Bosporus. These aspects will be explained in more 
detail in chapters 5 and 7. 
Wesley also pointed out that regions and their criteria for membership and exclusion are seldom 
natural or obvious,5 a claim that since been supported by other scholars such as Peter J. Katzen-
stein and T.J. Pempel among others.6 As such, both countries can be seen as test cases for the 
idea of Regionalism in their respective regions, as well as for the outer boundaries of these 
regions; 
“...both Turkey’s and Australia’s relations with their adjacent regions can be 
seen in terms of a debate over the defining criteria of the region. Both countries 
contend their engagement and eligibility by defining the region in economic and 
geographical terms, but are countered by cultural definitions of Europe and East 
Asia”.7 
                                                 
3 Wesley (1997),  p. 525 
4 Wesley (1997), p. 527 
5 Wesley (1997), p. 525 
6 See Chapter 2 for more details on this aspect to  Regionalism 
7 Wesley (1997),  p. 524 
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Turkey has fulfilled the criteria of a “borderline state” for modern European Regionalism since 
its inception in the 1950s, whilst Australia (and New Zealand) stands as an example of a border-
line state for the competing definitions of the region: “East Asia” and “Asia-Pacific”. 
Moreover, although a decade has passed since Wesley’s article, the examination of Turkey’s and 
Australia’s position in European and East Asian Regionalism is an even more compelling case to 
examine now that Turkey is an official candidate for full membership of the EU, and Australia 
has gained access to the East Asia Summit and is likely to become a member of ASEM. These 
new developments notwithstanding, the challenges described by Wesley still remain. Despite its 
official candidacy Turkey still faces suggestions of being granted with a “Privileged Partnership” 
instead of full membership and its “accession” to the EU may still be stopped by potentially 
negative results of national referendums that are to be carried out in incumbent member states. In 
Australia’s case access to Regionalism appears to have been advanced, but its position in East 
Asian Regionalism may still be determined by how the “idea” for the East Asian Community 
develops. Thus, the two countries are still ideal vehicles in efforts to test the limits of these 
regions. The analysis of enlargement, within the context of the borderline states, can also tell us 
much about the expected and required levels of cohesion in regional institutions and the stability 
of enlargement with the increased heterogeneity, resulting from attempt to absorb such “border-
line states”. 
Contribution to Regionalism Theory 
As aforementioned, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that paradigmatic approaches do not provide 
satisfactory understanding of Regionalism, by testing these approaches within the problematic 
context of the borderline states in Regionalism. It also argues that enlargement essentially de-
fines the region by distinguishing between ‘the core’ and ‘the boundaries’, thus revealing what 
the predominant “idea” of the region is as it is perceived by the incumbent members. Thus 
analysis of enlargement provides a good test as to what really constitutes a region, and whether 
they are driven by “material interdependency” or “cognitive interdependency”, or more likely a 
combination of both. If confirmed, this assumption has potential implications for the broader 
discipline of International Research, in terms of revealing additional information about the 
interplay between interests, identity and structure. Regardless of the outcome, however, as Peter 
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Katzenstein has argued, paradigmatic research not only fails to understand the nature of Region-
alism properly, but carries costs for the discipline of international relations; 
“Beyond a certain point, however, such research traditions have clear costs for 
the entire discipline of international relations. They compartmentalize knowledge, 
overlook questions and causal mechanisms that do not fit comfortably into their 
analytical priors, and often lead to a degree of specialization that makes aca-
demic scholarship irrelevant to the concerns of a broader policy community”.8 
Thus, testing the boundaries of paradigmatic research should expand and improve our knowledge 
of international relations. Whilst, perhaps controversial to those who subscribe to these paradig-
matic approaches, as Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein illustrate, pushing these 
boundaries is both possible and necessary: 
“Up to a point, abstract debates can be useful in elucidating ontological, episte-
mological, and methodological controversies. But it is the identification of em-
pirical anomalies and the construction of disciplined, theoretically informed 
explanations with particular attention to the specification of causal mechanisms 
and multiple methods that pushes outward the boundaries of knowledge”.9 
However, whilst arguing that an improved understanding of Regionalism can be achieved by the 
application of both Rationalist and Ideational approaches according to their individual strengths, 
this thesis does not seek to establish a theoretical synthesis, but rather it aims to contribute 
towards the development of a methodological "third-way" – an idea advanced by Peter J. 
Katzenstein’s analytical eclecticism. This argues for identifying the strengths and weaknesses, as 
                                                 
8 Katzenstein, Peter J. (2007),  “Regionalism Reconsidered”, in Aggrawal, Vinod, Min Gyo Koo, Amitav 
Acharya, Richard Higgott, John Ravenhill and Peter J. Katzenstein,  “Roundtable: Peter J. Katzenstein’s Cont-
ributions to the Study of East Asian Regionalism, Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 7, (pp. 359-412), p. 397 
9 Hemmer, Christopher and Peter J. Katzenstein (2002), “Why is The No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, 
Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism”, International Organization, Vol ume 56, Issue 3, p. 577 (pp. 
575-607) 
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well as points of intersection, of Rationalist and Ideational approaches, that can be used towards 
such “problem rather than approach-driven style of analysis.”10 
Analytical Eclecticism as a possible “third-way” 
“Analytical eclecticism takes components of different research traditions and 
combines them to produce new analytical frameworks”.11 
Analytical eclecticism, advanced by Peter Katzenstein among others, focuses on solving specific 
complex problems, where paradigmatic research produces incomplete results, "by examining a 
broad range of plausible causal mechanisms drawn from competing research traditions.”12 
Significantly, Katzenstein has argued that ideas of Rationalism and Constructivism, which do not 
have moral implications, can be combined. Katzenstein himself combines Constructivism with 
liberalism and thus, for instance A World of Regions "operates within three definitions of regions 
– material, Ideational and behavioural" to analyse the different regional orders in Europe and 
Asia.13 Analytical eclecticism, however, does not seek to establish a new master theory by 
creating a synthesis of competing theories. It does not aim to solve multiple problems under one 
paradigm, but instead it aims to provide an alternative for pragmatic research. The approach has, 
however, been criticised for an alleged tendency to sacrifice analytical parsimony, as there is no 
clear definition of "dependent" variables and thus, it appears an unsystematic ad hoc approach.14 
Katzenstein, however, has responded to the concern over parsimony versus empirical vigour by 
stating that: 
                                                 
10 Hemmer, Christopher and Peter J. Katzenstein (2002),  p. 600  
11 Katzenstein (2007),  p. 397 
12 Katzenstein (2007), p. 398 
13 Katzenstein (2007),  p. 397 
14 Aggrawal, Vinod K. And Min Gyo Koo (2007),““The Evolution of Regionalism in East Asia”“, in Aggrawal, 
Vinod, Min Gyo Koo, Amitav Acharya, Richard Higgott, John Ravenhill and Peter J. Katzenstein,  “Roundta-
ble: Peter J. Katzenstein’s Contributions to the Study of East Asian Regionalism, Journal of East Asian Stu-
dies, Vol. 7, (pp. 359-412), p. 365 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
8 
“Analytical eclectisms thus can be helpful in detaching particular concepts, 
causal mechanisms, explanations, and prescriptions from particular research tra-
ditions and combining them in novel frameworks to capture a more nuanced un-
derstanding of a complex world. The potential benefits of analytical eclecticism 
are clear: more experimentation, better communication, and the promise of a 
consensus that may capture the attention of policymakers”.15 
Thus, in the language of analytical eclecticism, this thesis is focused towards a specific problem 
of the borderline states in Regionalism, aiming to establish what enlargement is informative on 
the motives and processes of Regionalism in Europe and East Asia. Moreover, it does so by 
means of examining the outcomes of Rationalist and Ideational analysis on the problem, in order 
to identify the strengths and weaknesses, as well as potential points of intersection that could be 
used for the purposes of eclectic analysis. In this regard it could be considered as analytical 
eclecticism. 
I do, however, recognise that analytical eclecticism has been criticised for lacking clarity and 
tightness of argument, as well as functioning as an exercise of triangulation. This is why I have 
chosen to conduct empirical testing of Rationalist and Ideational approaches in their own terms 
in order to test their explanatory power and subsequently use analytical eclecticism to report the 
findings. I hope this will contribute towards advancing the method, and simultaneously advance 
a more systematic application of analytical eclecticism, as well as add to the development of the 
tested approaches. Finally, chapter 8 will provide a suggestion for a new definition of re-
gion/regionness and thus suggest potential new areas of research for analytical eclecticism. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
This dissertation is divided into four parts, which are organised in the following manner; Part I, 
consisting of chapters 2 and 3, establishes the theoretical and methodological framework for the 
thesis. Parts II and III discuss the empirical research in relation to the two cases; Part II, consist-
                                                 
15 Katzenstein (2007), p. 398 
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ing of chapters 4 and 5, focuses on Turkey’s position in the European Regionalism and its 
membership prospects in the European Union, Chapter 4 from a Rationalist perspective and 
Chapter 5 from an Ideational perspective. Part III, in a similar manner to Part II, focuses on 
Australia’s position in the emerging East Asian Regionalism, Chapter 6 providing a Rationalist 
analysis and Chapter 7 an Ideational analysis of this complex relationship. Finally, Part IV 
provides a discussion of the findings, and argues the respective strengths and weaknesses of the 
Rationalist and Ideational approaches and where they possibly intersect. It also provides a 
suggestion for a new definition of region/regionness and potential new areas of analysis suitable 
for analytical eclecticism. The following section presents a brief review of the chapters and their 
aims. 
Review of the Chapters 
The objective of Chapter 2 – Regionalism in International Relations Theory is to review and 
analyse the theoretical literature on Regionalism in the context of International Relations (IR) 
theory, and in particular the body of literature that is relevant to the problem of “borderline 
states” and the dichotomy between the so-called “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches to 
Regionalism. The first section of the chapter consequently explores the development of Region-
alism in the field of IR, establishes the dichotomy between the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” 
approaches to Regionalism, and analyses the various definitions of “region”, “Regionalism” and 
“regionness.” It then goes on to argue that the definitions related to Regionalism still remain 
contested, and that no single theory or approach, Rationalist or Ideational, adequately explains 
Regionalism; neither does it adequately explain particular aspects of enlargement, such as the 
motives for states to join regional institutions, and the formation of criteria for membership and 
thus the factors of inclusion/exclusion. Finally, it establishes the need to empirically test and 
combine these approaches, as analytical eclecticism suggests, in order to expand upon our 
understanding of Regionalism. 
The second section provides a closer analysis of the Rationalist and Ideational theories that are 
most relevant to the research problem. These are Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neofunctional-
ism in the Rationalist approaches, and Social Constructivism (the power of ideas) and “Cultural-
ist” (identity, culture and religion) approaches - including Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” 
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- in the Ideational approaches respectively. Finally, the section explores possibilities to combine 
Rationalist and Ideational approaches towards establishing a multicausal framework for explain-
ing Regionalism. 
The third and final section reviews and analyses the contemporary literature on European inte-
gration, emerging Regionalism in East Asia (comprising North and Southeast Asia), and regional 
enlargement, specific to Turkey-EU and Australia-East Asia relations. It consequently argues 
that the literature on enlargement is still underdeveloped and mainly consists of descriptive 
accounts of individual enlargement projects, rather than providing systematic analysis of the 
issues. Similarly, the literature on Australia’s relationship with East Asia is descriptive and 
largely outdated as it mainly focuses on the late-1980s and early 1990s. Finally, whilst the 
literature on the Turkey-EU relationship has been expanding recently, its primary focus remains 
the provision of descriptive accounts that cover various areas of the relationship. Systematic 
studies are almost entirely non-existent. This section therefore establishes the need for further 
study in this area. 
Chapter 3 – Methodology and Research Design - presents the research methodology and design 
chosen in order to best achieve the goal of the thesis. It also states the rationale and techniques 
for the methodologies used for data analysis, limitations and delimitations of research and the 
selection of data sources and material. Chapter 3 is organised into two main sections. The first 
section introduces the research design, including; research questions, hypotheses, variables, 
justification for cases and the selection of data sources. The second section introduces the meth-
odology used in the chapters, starting with those utilised in the Rationalist and Ideational chap-
ters used in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, as well as a variant of Discourse Analysis: Foreign Policy 
Discourse Analysis (FPDA), which is utilised in ‘Ideational’ chapters 5 and 7. 
Chapter 4 - Rationalist Analysis of Turkey’s EU Accession Prospects - as the title suggests, is 
focused towards applying Rationalist approaches to the Turkey-European Union relationship, 
and particularly Turkey’s prospects of acceding to full EU membership. The Rationalist analysis 
on Turkish membership prospects in the EU tends to emphasise almost exclusively the material 
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aspects of the process, in particular the perceived material costs and benefits of membership for 
the EU and Turkey.16 Hence, much of the analysis concentrates on determining whether Turkey 
fulfils the economic and political criteria as defined by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, 
which states the political and economic criteria for prospective candidate countries (“the Copen-
hagen criteria”).17 The strict Rationalist thinking on Turkey’s EU prospects correspond with the 
official line of the EU: Turkey has been an official candidate since the 1999 Helsinki Summit 
and the December 2004 Copenhagen European Council decided to begin official negotiations 
towards accession with Turkey, following a positive assessment by the European Commission. 
As long as Turkey fulfils the requirements set out in the Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession 
Partnership it will eventually become a full member of the EU. Disagreement amongst Rational-
ists pivots on whether Turkey meets the set political and economic criteria. 
Another central theme in Rationalist analysis is the, often highly speculative, cost/benefit calcu-
lations modelled on Mattli’s logic of integration or the economic “club theory”. The most com-
mon topics for such analysis are assessments of the impact of Turkey’s membership on economic 
integration, trade, the EU budget, working of regional institutions, common foreign and security 
policy, and migration. This chapter aims to provide an analysis of these areas central to the 
Rationalist approach in order to estimate the potential costs and benefits of Turkey’s accession; 
since the Rationalist approach dictates that accession will only take place if benefits are higher 
than costs, this chapter also includes consideration of a successful accession. The basic assump-
tion of this argument is that the EU (and its member states) is a rational agent and thus, as long 
as the benefits of the Turkish accession are perceived to override the cost, Turkey will be permit-
ted entry to the Union. The debate about Turkey’s “Europeanness” and its conformity to Euro-
pean values is considered to be of secondary value in Rationalist analysis and is not given 
significant attention beyond questions such as democracy and human rights, which are part of the 
membership criteria. 
                                                 
16 The power of ideas is often recognised as playing a role in regional integration but is generally treated as a 
secondary factor, not as an independent causal factor 
17 The Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 was created in particular to accommodate the accession process of the 
former Eastern Bloc countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
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Chapter 5 – Ideational Analysis of Turkey’s EU Membership Prospects - challenges the Rational-
ist approaches by arguing that Rationalist analysis does not entirely explain the opposition, or the 
motive for, Turkey’s membership due to the fact that it does not account for “hidden agenda”. It 
has been argued that in the case of CEEC-10 enlargement material concerns were obscured by a 
“kinship based duty” to “reunify” these countries with Europe following a four decade long 
separation imposed by the Cold War. Much like in the CEEC-10 case Turkey’s membership is 
being justified by perceived Ideational benefits. It has also been argued that Turkey’s member-
ship would constitute "a Bridge between Civilisations”, i.e. Europe/the West and the Middle 
East/Islamic world, and prove that democracy and Islam are compatible and thus, prevent a 
looming “Clash of Civilisations”. On the other hand, it has been argued that the EU must honour 
its word and allow Turkey’s accession or else it risks “losing” Turkey to nationalism and Islamic 
fundamentalism. Significantly, unlike the CEEC-10 enlargement, Turkey’s “Europeanness” is 
contested, and consequently much of the opposition is Ideationally motivated. According to a 
2005 Eurobarometer survey 48% of Europeans would not permit Turkey’s entry even if it meets 
the Copenhagen Criteria and 55% feel that the cultural differences are too great to permit acces-
sion.18 Thus Chapter 5 argues that this is largely due to a process of “othering”, in which Turkey 
has become “Europe’s” significant “other”. Moreover, Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” has 
assumed a central role in the accession discourse and has explicitly served as an inspiration for 
arguments for and against Turkey’s membership, in particular for widely used catchphrases 
“Bridge between Civilisations” and “losing Turkey”. The fact that Turkey’s culture, identity, 
values and religion are seen as divergent is a serious hurdle for Turkey’s membership aspira-
tions. The negative public opinion, as well as partially elite opinion, may hinder Turkey’s entry 
as each enlargement treaty has to be ratified by each incumbent member state; these will subject 
to national referendums in countries like France and possibly others. Just one negative vote can 
thus prevent Turkey’s accession. Finally this chapter argues that the “othering” is part of EU’s 
soul-seeking process which, motivated by the prospect of Turkey’s membership, has produced a 
debate regarding the EU’s ultimate borders and its regional identity. This chapter seeks to ana-
lyse Turkey’s “Europeanness” and the discourse around it in the context of this debate. 
                                                 
18 European Commission (2005), Standard Eurobarometer 63, September 2005, Brussels, p. 161 
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Part III commences with Chapter 6 – Rationalist Analysis of Australia – East Asia Relations - 
which examines Australia’s economic, security and diplomatic relations with East Asia. The 
chapter argues that Australia has long-established and deep material interdependency with East 
Asia. This applies particularly to economic interdependency; since the early 1990s Australia has 
been more dependent on Asia trade than any other OECD country19and in 2007 two-thirds of 
Australia’s total external trade was with East Asia. Moreover, two-way trade with East Asia has 
been constantly increasing and the economically vibrant East Asian states have increasingly high 
demand for natural resources in order to sustain their continuous economic growth, especially for 
those minerals and agricultural resources that Australia offers in plenty. 
In terms of security interests the two situations are not unalike; arguably Australia has higher 
stakes in regional security than perhaps any other non-member country, a notion reflected in its 
security and defence policies. Australia’s security has historically depended on regional stability 
and when this stability has faltered Australia has felt obliged to intervene through military means 
in order to protect its security interests. 
Chapter 6 concludes, therefore, that Australia not only has extensive levels of material interde-
pendency with East Asia, but it has also played an active, even a pioneering, role in regional 
institution building. Moreover, the benefits of further integration into the region would appear to 
override the costs, for both Australia and East Asia; it is important to recognise, however, that 
predicting the costs and benefits of enlargement and deeper integration are always somewhat 
speculative by nature. Nonetheless, a Rationalist analysis would support Australia’s inclusion in 
the region beyond the extent that is the case currently, and certainly does not reveal any signifi-
cant reasons for Australia’s exclusion from regional institutions. Yet, this chapter also establishes 
that the path has not always run smoothly, and it illustrates how Australia has encountered 
significant opposition to its inclusion in regional institutions and cooperation by a number of 
regional countries, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. Some of this opposition can be ex-
plained by political differences and conflicting strategic interests between Australia and the two 
                                                 
19 Ravenhill, John (1997), “From Paternalism to Partnership: Australia’s Relations with ASEAN”, Working 
Papers, 1997/8, Australian National University – Department of International Relations p.2 
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neighbours, but a significant amount of this opposition has cultural and ethical motivations that 
argue that Australia is not an Asian country and is thus ethnically unfit to be “genuinely of 
region”. It would thus appear that the “Rationalist” approaches serve well for establishing the 
motives for inclusion, but that “Ideational” approaches may serve better for revealing the mo-
tives for exclusion. 
As in Part II, the Rationalist analysis is challenged by Ideational analysis. Chapter 7 – Ideational 
Analysis of Australia – East Asia Relations - argues that just as Turkey has been represented as 
forming a bridge between Europe and the Islamic civilisation, Australia has been presented as an 
example of forming a bridge between Asia and the West. Moreover, the main argument being 
used against their inclusion is Ideational: that they are not “genuinely of region”. In Australia’s 
case this has meant that it has been recognised as a valuable partner for material reasons, but not 
as a genuinely regional state for reasons of not being “Asian”. 
The objective of Chapter 7 is thus to provide an Ideational analysis of the main elements of 
Australia’s engagement with the region and the challenges it faces with regards to its inclusion in 
East Asian Regionalism. The analysis covers topics such as cognitive mapping, which has 
involved cultural geography, geopolitical positioning and cognitive mapping by the regional 
states and Australia itself in regards to Australia’s geographic position. It reaches a general 
conclusion that Australia is not considered Asian. Australia on the other hand has referred to the 
region as the “Asia Pacific” and the “East Asian Hemisphere” in an effort to justify its region-
ness without claiming to be Asian. Hence, in geographic terms, Australia is close but not quite 
there and thus, should be characterised as a “borderline state”. 
In cultural terms Australia also fulfils the criteria of the definition of a “borderline state”. An 
immigrant country by origin and nature, immigration was dominated by British and European 
settlers until the 1970s when Australia ended its racially based immigration program under the 
“White Australia policy” and replaced it with multiculturalism. Nonetheless, regardless of 
subsequent increased Asian immigration and multiculturalism, Australia still remains over-
whelmingly European and Christian in terms of heritage, ethnicity and culture. Moreover, due to 
anti-immigration debate created by the Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party phenomena, and the 
allegedly racially motivated attacks against Asian students more recently, the image of “White 
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Australia” has persisted in the region, contributing to resistance to Australia’s inclusion in the 
region. Finally, the Howard government was accused of sacrificing Australia’s relations with 
Asia in preference of its alliance with the United States, and rapidly earned a reputation of the 
“US Deputy Sheriff” in the region. 
Other central topics in Chapter 7 include an analysis of the relevance of immigration, people-to-
people contacts, education, identity and values and Regionalism discourses in East Asia and 
Australia, to Australia’s regionness. Education, for example, in addition to immigration and 
increasing people-to-people contacts, has been often referred to as one of the major vehicles for 
increasing Australia’s regionness, in particular through increasing Asian students studying and 
living in Australia and through a curriculum emphasis on Asian studies. The Australian govern-
ment has again promoted itself as an ‘Asian-Literate’ country, seeing this action as providing a 
competitive advantage for the Keating government, as well as further evidence that Australia 
could act as a ‘bridge’ between Asia and the West. Yet another significant factor in terms of 
Australia’s engagement with the region has been the issue of Australian values and identity, in 
particular in comparison to the allegedly universal ‘Asian values’. Whilst the ‘Asian values’ 
debate has been somewhat controversial, heavily contested and subject to considerable over 
generalisation, it has nonetheless been used as an argument against Australia’s regionness. 
However, Chapter 7 also considers the differences in political cultures as potentially a more 
significant challenge than questions over identity and values. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
an analysis of Regionalism discourses in East Asia and Australia in order to determine whether 
Australia is perceived as a regional state, and it assesses the importance of, and place in, Region-
alism of both areas. In terms of the Australian discourses, the chapter argues that support for 
Regionalism in Australia is high, but a battle in approaches (Rationalist versus Ideational) is 
evident in the context of “comprehensive engagement” and “pragmatic Regionalism” discourses. 
In its conclusion Chapter 7 argues that the main weakness of the Ideational approaches is that it 
downplays the rational (pragmatic) nature of Regionalism in East Asia and perhaps over-
emphasises the significance of elite opinion, which in terms of opposition to Australia’s region-
ness is limited to a handful of Asian patriarchs in the media, and the “Asian values” debate - both 
of which have now mostly retracted into the pages of history. Moreover, the analysis does not 
support a trend towards exclusive Regionalism and the so-called “Asian values” as being particu-
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larly prominent in the East Asian Regionalism discourse. In fact, the core of East Asian Region-
alism has been, and still continues to be, largely based on a rational choice, in that the primary 
motivation of Regionalism is an overarching objective to raise the levels of socio-economic 
development and maximise the benefits from trade, as well as to maintain peace and security in 
the region. Furthermore, EU-style civilizational project (uniting European peoples under the flag 
of shared identity and values) has thus far not materialised in East Asia. Instead, the civiliza-
tional, “Asians only” Regionalism promoted by Mahathir appears to have failed, as demonstrated 
by Australia’s admission into the EAS. Furthermore, Australia has also been regarded as a 
valuable partner in East Asian Regionalism, despite the fact that Australian identity and values 
derive from British and European heritage, and that the apparent differences in political cultures 
remain embedded. Moreover, public opinion in East Asia and Australia does not appear to 
support the view that cultural differences between East Asia and Australia would prevent future 
cooperation. Thus, rational choice as evidenced in the pursuit to maximise material interests 
appears to override questions of identity and culture. In terms of public opinion in Australia, the 
region’s importance is now rarely contested, and the anxiety referred to by Renouf20 seems now 
mostly dissipated. On the contrary, Australians appear to harbour relatively warm feelings and 
trust towards regional states. This sentiment is extends to the point that Singapore and Japan 
attract warmer feelings than the United States. Even China’s rise causes little anxiety in the 
minds of Australians, in comparison to the Western world in general, and even in comparison to 
some other regional states. 
However, past exercises of “othering”, within which context Australia has been presented as a 
“misplaced European country”, a ”deputy sheriff” of the United States and has been blamed for 
colonial attitudes in its regional conduct, have arguably hindered and slowed Australia’s access 
to regional decision-making and institutions. In this regard Ideational analysis has contributed to 
a more holistic understanding of the research topic, as Rationalist analysis tends to neglect such 
aspects. Moreover, Australian Regionalism discourses have emphasised, to sometimes opposing 
ends, a dilemma between the country’s geography and history, particularly in reference to its 
British and European heritage and the culture and values that it derived from this heritage. The 
                                                 
20 Renouf, Alan (1979), The Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne 
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result has been a battle between material interdependency with East Asia and an emotional 
connection with Europe and the United States; this battle has moved beyond rhetorical bounda-
ries and these speech acts have had real implications on foreign and trade policy towards the 
region. Moreover, the analysis here has shown that the focus on values appears to be increasing 
as integration deepens. 
Ideational analysis is also helpful in terms of assessing the importance and impact of “soft” 
aspects, such as immigration, people-to-people contacts, and education, on Australia’s accep-
tance as a regional state that deserves a seat in regional institutions. Australia’s Asia literacy, i.e. 
the understanding of Asian politics, business, cultures and languages, has also been acknowl-
edged as important to Australia’s regionness by its East Asian partners. Finally, the application 
of Ideational approaches is absolutely necessary for a holistic understanding of the nature of 
Regionalism in East Asia and Australia’s place in it. The significance of Ideational approaches 
also increases as the nature of East Asian Regionalism evolves towards political integration and 
community-building based on regional identity, values and norms. Thus, Ideational approaches 
can produce valuable insight into policy-making by providing a more holistic and realistic 
evaluation of the importance and impact of norms, values and culture on Australia’s access to 
regional decision-making. 
Finally, Part IV, consisting of Chapter 8 – Discussion of Findings - provides a discussion of the 
findings, establishes the respective strengths and weaknesses of the Rationalist and Ideational 
approaches, and where they possibly intersect. It also suggests a new definition of a region and 
potential new areas of analysis suitable for analytical eclecticism. 
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Chapter 2: Regionalism in International 
Relations Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review and analyse the theoretical literature on Regionalism in 
the context of International Relations (IR) theory, and in particular the body of literature that is 
relevant to the problem of ‘borderline states’ and the dichotomy between the so-called “Rational-
ist” and “Ideational” approaches to Regionalism. The first section of this chapter consequently 
explores the development of Regionalism in the field of IR, establishes the dichotomy between 
the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches to Regionalism, analyses the various definitions of 
“region”, “Regionalism” and “regionness.” It then goes on to argue that the definitions related to 
Regionalism still remain contested, and that no single theory or approach, Rationalist or Idea-
tional, adequately explains Regionalism, and in particular aspects of enlargement, such as the 
motives for states to join regional institutions, and the formation of criteria for membership and 
thus the factors of inclusion/exclusion. Finally, it establishes the need to empirically test and 
combine these approaches in order to expand upon our understanding of Regionalism. 
The second section provides a closer analysis of the Rationalist and Ideational theories that are 
the most relevant to the research problem. These are Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neofunc-
tionalism in the Rationalist approaches and Social Constructivism (the power of ideas) and 
“Culturalist” (identity, culture and religion) in the Ideational approaches. Finally, the section 
explores the possibilities to combine Rationalist and Ideational approaches towards establishing 
a multicausal framework for explaining Regionalism. 
The third and final section reviews and analyses the contemporary literature on European inte-
gration, emerging Regionalism in East Asia (comprising North and Southeast Asia), regional 
enlargement, specific to Turkey-EU and Australia-East Asia relations. It consequently argues 
that the literature on enlargement is still underdeveloped and mainly consists of descriptive 
accounts of individual enlargement projects, rather than providing systematic analysis of the 
issue. Similarly, the literature on Australia’s relationship with East Asia is descriptive and 
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largely out of date as it mainly focuses on the late-1980s and early 1990s. Finally, whilst the 
literature on the Turkey-EU relationship has been expanding recently, it also mainly focuses on 
providing descriptive accounts that cover various areas of the relationship, but systematic studies 
are almost entirely non-existent. Thus, it also establishes the need for further study in this area. 
2.2 International Relations Theories of Regionalism 
This section analyses the historical and current debates in the field of Regionalism in IR theory 
and establishes the dichotomy in the contemporary debate between the so-called “Rationalist” 
and “Ideational” approaches to Regionalism. It will then establish the prevailing divergence in 
defining key-concepts such as “Regionalism” (what the area of research is and how it is re-
searched), “region” (what is being studied) and argue that no single definition or theory alone 
sufficiently explains the problem of ’borderline states’. The majority of the Regionalism litera-
ture is focused on the phenomenon of Regionalism in the global context, and in particular the 
economic context, in other words how and why regional integration projects are implemented in 
the international system. Moreover, European integration has traditionally dominated the studies 
of integration and comparisons to other regions have usually been considered weak because of 
the highly institutionalised nature of the European Union (EU). Finally, this section argues that 
there is a shortage of systematic work on the issue of enlargement. The majority of the literature 
in this field is comprised of descriptive accounts of individual enlargement projects, principally 
those of past enlargements of the EU. The gap in the Regionalism literature in terms of enlarge-
ment and relations with ‘borderline states’ and the absence of workable definitions of a ‘region’ 
in relation to enlargement reimposes the question; how do we define a ‘region’ and how do we 
decide who belongs to the region and who does not? 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
20 
2.2.1 Theorising Regionalism: Beyond Europe 
“As it developed though the 1960s and early 1970s this form of integration theory 
became a model of impeccable Rationalist social science.”21 
The focus on Regionalism in IR theory started gathering force after the Second World War when 
the early stages of European integration inspired the development of Neofunctionalism by Ernst 
B. Haas. Haas based much of his early work on his personal involvement in the European Coal 
and Steel Community with the founding fathers of the early stages of European integration, as 
well as David Mitrany’s Functionalist theory. The sub-discipline then experienced a crisis in the 
1970s following the political crisis in the EC in the mid-1960s, and following the realisation by 
Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter that the European experiences of integration were not being 
successfully replicated elsewhere. Haas subsequently announced the failure of the theory and 
noted that the monopolisation of regional integration studies by the European experience and the 
limited applicability elsewhere rendered the theory obsolete.22 The revival of Regionalism, 
however, followed relatively soon with the global spread of what became known as a wave of 
“new Regionalism” starting from the 1980s, and the deepening integration in Europe. The spread 
of regional projects around the globe soon included NAFTA in North America, MERCOSUR 
and the Andean Pact in South America, APEC and ASEAN in Asia and many others such as the 
African Union. As a testimony for the resurgence of Regionalism in the 1990s, it should be noted 
that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has received 130 Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) 
notifications since its inception in 1995.23 In fact, a majority of the countries in the world are 
somehow engaged in regional cooperation, for instance the Regional Integration database main-
                                                 
21 Breslin, Shaun, Higgott, Richard and Rosamond, Ben (2002), Regions in Comparative Perspective, Center for 
the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick, Working Paper No. 107/02, 
p. 6 
22 Tavares, Rodrigo (2004), “The State of the Art of Regionalism: The Past, Present and Future of a Discipline”, 
UNU-CRIS e-Working Papers, W-2004/10, United Nations University Comparative Regional Integration Stu-
dies (UNU-CRIS), Brugge, p. 17 
23 In comparison GATT received 124 RTA notifications between 1948 and 1994. Statistics available at: “Re-
gional Trade Agreements: facts and figures”,  World Bank website, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm, Date accessed 22.11.2006 
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tained by the United Nations University’s Comparative Regional Integration Studies unit listed 
54 regional groupings with a total of membership of 188 countries in 2005. 24 
As a direct result of the resurgence of Regionalism the theoretical field expanded and diversified 
rapidly. The rapid resurgence of Neofunctionalism and emergence of other integration theories, 
such as Intergovernmentalism, a set of domestic theories and numerous economic theories has 
resulted to an enormous stock of theoretical literature on Regionalism. Besides large in quantity, 
Regionalism literature is also very fragmented due to the division to competing theoretical or 
conceptual models. Andrew Hurrell has pointed out that due to this divergence the literature is 
uneven and fragmented, and consequently the theoretical contributions have been relatively 
modest.25 Moreover, the debate has returned no consensus on definitions of key terms, such as 
“Regionalism” and “region”. This issue will be further examined in the “definitions of Regional-
ism” section. 
The diversity of approaches has meant that Regionalism projects have been analysed and as-
sessed based on a considerable number of variables, such as the degree of social, economic, 
political or organisational cohesiveness26, “with the majority of efforts having focused on intra-
regional economic and political integration,”27 “less attention has been paid to the larger histori-
cal and geopolitical contexts within which regional processes have occurred.”28 As Mark Beeson 
has argued, “most mainstream analysis on ‘new Regionalism’ has focused on economic aspects 
and in particular the effects of increased regional trade and economic integration, whilst much 
                                                 
24 Callow, Tom (2005) "If Regionalism undermines the sovereignty of states, why do so many states join 
regional organisations?" The Liberalist, 8 May, Warwick University, 
http://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/theliberalist/entry/if_Regionalism_undermines/, Date accessed 22.11.2006 
25 Hurrell, Andrew (1995), ”Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective”, in Fawcett, Louise and Andrew Hurrell 
(Eds.), Regionalism in World Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, , p. 37 
26 Hurrell (1995), p. 38 
27 Beeson, Mark (2005), “Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and East Asia in historical comparative historical 
perspective”, Journal of European Public Policy, 12(6), p. 969. 
28 Ibid 
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fewer analysts have focused on the origins of regional processes especially outside the European 
Union.29 
The numerous approaches to Regionalism have been categorised in an equally diverse manner. 
Andrew Hurrell for instance makes a distinction between what he calls as ‘systemic theories’, 
‘regional theories’ and ‘domestic theories’. Systemic, or structural, theories refer to approaches 
that focus on ‘the broader political and economic structures within which regionalist schemes are 
embedded and the impact of outside pressure working on the region.”30 Hence, within the con-
text of these ‘outside-in’ approaches, Regionalism is mainly seen as a reaction to external secu-
rity, economic and geopolitical threats and incentives. The main variants of structural theories 
according to Hurrell are: Neorealism, structural interdependence and globalization.31 These 
theories, however, are principally interested in explaining Regionalism as a phenomena in the 
“global economic and political structures within which regions are embedded”,32and are conse-
quently less interested in the internal workings of the region or enlargement processes. Regional 
theories, on the other hand, are theories that directly focus on Regionalism and emphasise the 
close link between Regionalism and regional interdependence (traditionally material, but increas-
ingly also cognitive). These include: Neofunctionalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism and Con-
structivism.33 The majority of these efforts are based on the observations on European 
integration, but there is also a growing stock of literature on East and in particular Southeast 
Asian Regionalism. These theories will be analysed in depth in the Rationalist theories section of 
this chapter. Finally, the third category of theories Hurrell categorises as domestic theories that 
emphasise the ’shared domestic attributes or characteristics’, which can be commonalities in for 
instance in values, regime type and political systems.34 The domestic approaches have suffered 
from the fact that most regional projects are quite diverse (also) in terms of regime types and 
                                                 
29 Beeson (2005), p. 970 
30 Hurrell (1995), p. 46 
31 Hurrell (1995), pp. 46-58 
32 Hurrell (1995), p. 46 
33 Hurrell (1995), pp. 58-66 
34 Hurrell (1995), pp. 66-71 
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political systems, for example ASEAN which compasses a variety of these ranging from democ-
ratic participatory systems to communist and authoritarian systems. However, it is also worth 
noting that the EU is an increasingly homogenous body in this respect due to the process of 
enlargement. 
Finally, Mattli (1999) has divided Regionalism theories into two main variants; political science 
approaches (functionalism, Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism) and economic ap-
proaches (customs union theory, optimal currency area and fiscal federalism). In effect his 
approach, comparative regional integration analysis, would be the basis for the third variant.35 
The variety of economic approaches on Regionalism are mainly based on the logic of Balassa 
Bela’s (1962) work that regional integration follows a linear increase in the level of regional 
economic interdependence and proceeds through a stage process that begins with a preferential 
trading area and develops further to a free trade area, followed by a customs union, common 
market, economic union and ultimately may develop into a political union.36 Much of the litera-
ture on economic integration, however, has mainly focused on technical aspects of Preferential 
Trade Agreements (PTAs), customs unions, Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and common markets and 
in particular on whether PTAs hinder or create trade,37rather than what drives Regionalism and 
enlargement. 
Moreover, the “new wave” has largely been born because of the United States’ decision to 
engage in a regional arrangement (NAFTA) in the 1980s following fears of waning economic 
power and the failure of multinational arrangements in trade (i.e. GATT).38 The political aspects 
                                                 
35 Tavares (2004), p.11 
36 See: Balassa, Bela (1962), Theory of Economic Integration, R.D. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois. 
37 Jaqdish Bhagwati coined the term “stumbling blocks” or “building blocks” to investigate whether regional 
trading blocs are trade diverting or trade creating. Bhagwati as a staunch defender of free trade Bhagwati has 
argued in his enormous pool of work that PTAs are “stumbling blocks” or “termites” of free trade and conse-
quently favours multilateralism over Regionalism. See for instance: Bhagwati, Jaqdish (1991),  The World 
Trading System at Risk, Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press, or; Bhagwati, Jaqdish (1992), “Re-
gionalism versus Multilateralism”, World Economy, Vol. 15, Issue 5, pp. 535-556 
38 Mansfield, E.D. and Milner, H.V. (1999), “The New Wave of Regionalism”, International Organization, Vol. 
53, Issue 3,  p. 608 
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of integration are largely seen as consequences or supporting economic integration and region-
alization and thus get relative little attention. Finally, it is hardly a surprise that the economic 
integration theories view enlargement processes largely determined by rational calculations of 
economic benefits/costs of inclusion/exclusion, as for instance in the so-called “Club theory”. 
Club theory argues that being left out of the ‘club’ entails costs due to lack of access to public 
goods (or Club goods), including economic, security and information resources. 39 A similar type 
of argument has been put forward by liberal theorists, for instance Mattli, which will be exam-
ined further in the corresponding section later in this chapter. 
Although categorising the various approaches to Regionalism under broad theoretical schools 
may help in conceptualising the Regionalism debate, this is also inherently superficial to a point 
and tends to become a process of rearranging the theoretical approaches under ‘brand names’ 
that serve the individual preferences and/or research agenda of the particular researcher. 
Moreover, in which ever way we prefer to categorise the variety of schools of thought, the 
majority of the literature in the Regionalism debate within IR, relevant to this thesis, has been 
traditionally dominated by what could be labelled as the ‘mainstream’ theories and a battle 
between competing IR schools. Much of the theoretical ‘battle’, which was a battle of competing 
IR schools in general rather than Regionalism per se, was dominated by the neo-neo-neo (neo-
liberalism, Neorealism and Neofunctionalism) debate.40 Neorealism, tends to be very sceptical of 
Regionalism and largely sees 41meaningful regional projects as some form or the other of alli-
ance building and argues that regional groupings are predominantly formed by states in response 
to an external security threat.42 As such Neorealism is not of critical relevance to this study. 
Neorealism, however, produced a regionalist offspring, Intergovernmentalism, an integration 
theory that assumes that states are in control of the process and regional institutions merely 
                                                 
39 See for instance: Fratianni, Michele and John Pattison (2001), “International Organisations in a World of 
Regional Trade Agreements: Lessons from Club Theory”, The World Economy, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 333-358 
40 That is until Constructivism challenged the ‘Rationalist’ main stream theories by claiming the middle ground 
between them and the radical schools. This dichotomy will be covered in detail in the next section. 
41 Mansfield and Milner (1999), p. 592  
42 See: Waltz, Kenneth (1979), Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., Reading Mass. 
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facilitate regional cooperation and decision-making and argues that the process of integration is 
driven by top policy elites that engage in high-level political bargains aimed at maximizing 
national power.43 Hence, Intergovernmentalism sees Regionalism as a direct result of “state 
driven cooperative projects that emerge as a result of intergovernmental dialogue and trea-
ties”,44and regional integration as the most advanced manifestation of this. Moreover, these 
processes are considered mostly economic; the removal of barriers to trade, services, capital and 
people that produce a shift of policy-making from the national to the supranational level.45 It is 
worth noting, and relevant to the technical aspects of Turkey’s EU accession, that Intergovern-
mentalism offers a rather limited framework towards the understanding of the phenomena of 
Regionalism, what drives it and in particular what drives enlargement and how membership 
criteria are set (i.e. “the problem of borderline states”). This is particularly evident in comparison 
to other Rationalist integration theories, such as Neoliberal Institutionalism or Neofunctionalism. 
Moreover, it also totally ignores the relevant Ideational factors that appear to play a significant 
role in the research problem. 
The competing liberal approaches emphasise the effects of a perceived increased interdepen-
dency, and see international regimes or institutions as a necessary response to the economic 
interdependency in the age of ‘globalization’, which has been accompanied by an information 
technology revolution that has caused a spread of ideas and increased contacts, essentially 
providing a material infrastructure for societal interdependence.46 Hence, these approaches claim 
that globalization creates ‘demand’ for international institutions, including regional institutions. 
                                                 
43 Classical Intergovernmentalism was inspired by the work of Stanley Hoffmann (1966). Andrew Moravcsik 
(1991, 1997, 1999) developed a liberal approach to Intergovernmentalism attempting to explain why sove-
reign states choose to transfer power to supranational regional organisations, linking the issue to domestic pre-
ference formation (mainly economic). 
44 Breslin, Shaun and Richard Higgott (2000), “Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing the 
New”, New Political Economy, Vol.5, Issue 3,  p. 344 
45 See for instance: Balassa (1961), Smith (1993), Mattli (1999) and Rosamond (2000)  
46 Hurrell (1995), pp. 54-5 
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Within this school of thought, liberal institutionalism is particularly interested in why states turn 
to institutions in order to solve cooperation problems.47 
Also, the development of Regionalism theory has been largely based on the study of European 
Regionalism. Many of the most respected theorists of Regionalism, such as Haas, Lindberg, 
Schmitter and Joseph Nye have used the European experience as the basis for the production of 
generalisations about the prospects for regional integration in other regions.48 Yet, as Schmitter 
has pointed out no single theory can possibly explain the dynamics and predict the final outcome 
of the European Union (EU).49 Hence, as long as the attempts are modelled on the European 
experience, it is not very plausible that one single theory could succeed in explaining regional 
integration on a more general level. Or as Moravcsik has stated: “….any general explanation of 
integration cannot rest on a single theory, …, but must rest on a multicausal framework that 
orders a series of more narrowly focused theories’.50 
In a similar spirit, an increasing number of Regionalism theorists point out to a need to carry out 
comparative work that goes beyond Europe and that can provide a path to methodological 
convergence and synthesis. For instance, a special edition of the International Organization 
edited by Alastair Ian Johnston urges the discipline to move beyond Europe and to compare 
regional institutions in Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East in order to discover 
similarities and differences, as well as taking the thrust towards mid-range theories.51 In the 
conclusion of the special edition, he argues that not only strict rational or Ideational approaches 
should be utilised, but also strategic “thin Rationalist” behaviour should be examined.52 In order 
                                                 
47 The two most recognised theorists in this regard are Keohane (1984) and Ruggie (1998) 
48 Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond (2002), p.6  
49 Schmitter, Philippe C. (2007) , “Neo-Neofunctionalism”, in Wiener, Atje and Thomas Diez (Eds.), European 
Integration Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press,  p. 69 
50 Moravcsik, Andrew (1998), The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and state power from Messina to Maast-
richt, Cornell University Press, Ithaca,  pp. 14-15 
51 Johnston, Alastair Iain (2005), “Conclusions and Extensions: Towards Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond 
Europe”, International Organization, Vol. 59, Issue 04,  p. 1037 
52 Johnston (2005), p. 1013 
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to initiate such a new thrust he suggests a number of dependent variables for empirical testing 
that include: foreign policies of states, the quantity and quality of interstate cooperation and 
integration in some functional areas and the variation of regional organisational/normative 
structures around the globe.53 Moreover, he points out that particularly Asia should receive more 
attention, as “the systematic study of institutions and socialization in the Asia-Pacific has been 
underdeveloped.”54 Thus, comparing the positions of Turkey in European Regionalism to that of 
Australia in the emerging East Asian Regionalism utilising a framework that goes beyond the 
constrains of the traditional paradigms may prove useful towards an enhanced understanding of 
Regionalism in general and in particular with regard to the limits of Regionalism. 
The next section will establish the dichotomy between the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” ap-
proaches to Regionalism and argues that this is the most suitable manner to categorise the litera-
ture relevant to the research problem. 
2.2.2 The Dichotomy between “Rationalist” and “Ideational” 
approaches in Regionalism Studies 
The Dichotomy Emerges: Challenge to the Rationalist Paradigm 
“No longer were realism and liberalism ‘incommensurable’ – on the contrary 
they shared a ‘Rationalist’ research programme, a conception of science, a 
shared willingness to operate on the premise of anarchy (Waltz) and investigate 
the evolution of cooperation and whether institutions matter (Keohane)55 
This section argues that the current mainstream literature on Regionalism can be divided into two 
rough categories: “Rationalist” and “Ideational”. The “Rationalist” approach focuses on material 
interdependency as the main driving force behind integration. Thus, Regionalism is seen as a 
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55 Wæver, Ole (1996), “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate”, Reprinted in Little, R. and Smith, M. 
(Eds.) (2006), Perspectives on World Politics, 3rd Edition, London, Routledge, p. 399 
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consequence of rational calculations and bargains by rational agents. In contrast, the “Idea-
tional”, or Social Constructivist approach, emphasises shared regional identity and culture as 
driving forces that produce levels of “cognitive interdependence”. Similar to the constructivist 
line (in conception if not intention) are the various “culturalist” approaches, in particular Hunt-
ington´s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis ,which stresses the cultural differences between various 
“civilizations” as a source for conflict rather than cooperation. Other researchers have chosen to 
focus on cultural aspect such as identity, culture and religion instead of civilizations. 
The dichotomy in International Relations between Rationalist and Ideational schools ‘officially’ 
started when Robert Keohane in a 1988 conference acknowledged the rise of a new approach 
that he at the time called ‘reflective’ and challenged the discipline dominated by the Rationalist 
approaches to reinvigorate itself and engage in ‘a vigorous program of empirical research’.56 In 
1999 Keohane, Katzenstein and Krasner57 acknowledged that Constructivism and Rationalism 
were the focal points of the future debate in the discipline.58 
“Rationalist” and “Ideational” Approaches to Regionalism 
Within the context of this dichotomy, the Rationalists base their core assumptions on rational 
choice theory of agent behaviour, which states that agents choose a course of action that pro-
duces the best conceived result, mainly in terms of material security and/or wealth.59 Wendt 
identifies the most fundamental material forces in IR for Rationalists: the nature and organisation 
                                                 
56 Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (2001), “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics”, Annual Review of Political Science, Issue 4, 2001, p. 391 
57 See: Katzenstein, Peter, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner (1999) (Eds.), Exploration and Contestation in 
the Study of World Politics, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press 
58 Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), p. 392 See also: Keohane, Robert (1998), “International Institutions: 2 
Approaches”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, pp. 379-96 
59 This assumes that agents correctly anticipate the results of their actions, or because a selective process ensures 
that only rational behaviour will be rewarded. See: Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane (1993), ”Ideas 
and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework”, in Goldstein, Judith and Robert O Keohane (Eds.), Ideas and 
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, p. 4 
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of material forces, natural resources, forces of production and destruction.60 In terms of Region-
alism, this has meant that Rationalists have tended to view Regionalism as a result of bargaining 
by calculating self-interested state actors that in the name of raison d’état and balance of power 
thinking attempt to maximize material gains within the regional institutional setting.61 Hence, 
European integration is largely seen in the light of scepticism after the two devastating and 
traumatic world wars, experiences that highlighted the importance of material and power gains.62 
In this spirit, the Neofunctional model assumes that integration is basically (but not exclusively) 
a rational process whereby actors calculate anticipated returns from various alternative strategies 
of participation in regional cooperation and decision-making, but at the same time conceding that 
shared values, culture and history may strengthen the process. This has been called the “soft 
rationality” assumption by Ernst B. Haas”.63 Neorealists and Neoliberal Institutionalists, on the 
other hand, see state interests as exogenous and argue that their behaviour depends ultimately on 
systemic variables.64 
The “Ideational” approaches, on the other hand, emphasise the impact of ideas rather than 
material forces and how identities and interests are perceived.65 Social Constructivists see Inter-
national Relations as “socially constructed” (Wendt 1999) and emphasise; ”how political actors 
define themselves and their interests, and thus modify their behaviour”.66 It rejects the idea of 
international relations being based on rational individual agents acting on purely material inter-
                                                 
60 Wendt, A. (2006). Four sociologies of international politics. Perspectives on World Politics. R. Little and M. 
Smith. New York, Routledge: 405-414., p. 407 
61 Kahler, Miles (1998), ”Rationality in International Relations”, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 
Autumn 1998, pp. 931- 932 
62 The counter-argument for this view would be that precisely due to those traumatic experiences, the Europeans 
wanted integration to remove the material incentives for war, which would make it essentially an idealistic act. 
Kahler (1998), p. 920 
63 Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond (2002), p. 12  
64 Wendt (2006), p. 412 
65 Walt, S. M. (1998), “International Relations: one world, many theories”, Reprinted in Little. R and Smith, M. 
(Eds.) (2006), Perspectives on World Politics, 3rd Edition, London, Routledge, p.392 
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ests and that institutions are a simple collective sum of individual interests.67 Regional coopera-
tion is thus seen rather driven by “cognitive interdependence” than material interdependence.68 
Hence, regional awareness and regional identity have a central role in how regional cooperation 
is shaped. Finally, Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington 1996) thesis stresses the 
differences between various “civilizations” as a source for conflict rather than cooperation. For 
example, Huntington has stated about Turkey’s relationship with the West that: “Turkey’s ties to 
NATO must inevitably weaken because the historic ‘civilization’ is Islamic rather than West-
ern”.69 In a similar vein he accused that the “push into Asia’ particularly under the Paul 
Keating’s ALP government in the earlier half of the 1990s (1991-1996) constituted an attempt by 
Australia to ‘defect’ its ‘true’ civilization motivated by a ‘short-sighted political ploy’. 70 Whilst 
Huntington’s views are largely rejected by Regionalism theorists, it has arguably inspired many 
to focus on aspects of identity, culture and religion as variables in researching regions. 
2.3 Rational and Ideational Theories of Regionalism 
The previous section established the prevailing dichotomy in the IR approaches to Regionalism 
between the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches. This section will follow-up on that task 
and provide a closer look at the theories in each approach that I argue are the most relevant to the 
problem of “borderline states”. These theories are Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neofunctional-
ism within the Rationalist framework, and Social Constructivism and “culturalist” approaches 
within the ideation list framework, mainly represented by Samuel P. Huntington’s “Clash of 
Civilizations” thesis. 
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2.3.1 Rational Theories of Regionalism 
“Rationalist” theories here refer to a broad set of theories that are not in agreement on a variety 
of aspects of International Relations (and hence, Regionalism), but nonetheless share some 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of international and regional cooperation. These 
theories can be labelled ‘Rationalist’ because they share a notion of agents (states, international 
institutions) in International Relations as being rational actors that engage in rational decision-
making and bargaining for some form of material gains (economic principally, but also security 
and political).71 The relevant mainstream theories in this group include Neorealism, Neoliberal 
Institutionalism, Neofunctionalism and International Political Economy (IPE). Neorealism is not 
covered in detail here because of its dismissal of ‘Regionalism’ as an independent phenomenon. 
According to Neorealism states only participate in regional integration to avoid relative losses 
that result from shifts in the global distribution of power. Moreover, it asserts that international 
cooperation is extremely hard to achieve simply because states are too preoccupied with survival 
and relative gains and hence, it does not concern itself with attempting to explain the problem of 
this investigation. Furthermore, IPE and other economic approaches have been for the purpose of 
this study incorporated in the larger category of ‘Rationalist’ approaches. This section conse-
quently investigates the main Rationalist approaches to Regionalism, namely Neoliberal Institu-
tionalism and Neofunctionalism. 
Neoliberal Institutionalism 
Neoliberal Institutionalism in general accepts the basic assumptions of Neorealism on the nature 
and agency of the international system. Like Neorealism, it considers the international system as 
being characterised by anarchy, i.e. lacking ‘an authoritative government that can enact and 
enforce rules of behaviour”. 72 Moreover, it also considers nation-states as the most important 
actors in the international system. Finally, like Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism is utilitar-
                                                 
71 Essentially corresponding to the ”rational choice” theory in political science and even to game theory ap-
proach in the most extreme format 
72 Keohane, Robert O., (1984), After hegemony : cooperation and discord in the world political economy, 
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, p. 7 
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ian and Rationalistic in its reasoning.73 Hence, it prioritises material over Ideational structures 
and borrows the concepts of wealth and power creation from neo-realists, whilst conceding that 
‘ideas do matter’. 74 
The core of the neoliberal institutionalist thesis is that international institutions/regimes mitigate 
the effects of international anarchy and reduce incentives to cheat by reducing the transaction 
costs of cooperation,75 and thus help states to address collective problems and achieve collective 
gains76. From the neoliberal institutionalist point of view states are concerned about absolute 
rather than relative gains, aiming at mutually beneficial cooperation in specific areas thus creat-
ing more demand for cooperation.77 
International institutions/regimes help states in dealing with collective problems in at least three 
ways: 
1 By creating a sense of legal liability 
John Ruggie (1975) defined a regime as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regula-
tions, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been ac-
cepted by a group of states”78. Stephen Krasner on the other hand emphasised norms, 
rules and procedures in his definition of a regime: “International regimes are defined as 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expecta-
tions converge in a given issue-area”79. Hence, regimes create rules of behaviour that de-
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fine what principles and behaviour are acceptable in international relations, making coop-
eration more desirable. 
2 By reducing transactions costs 
International institutions/regimes facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation by reducing 
the costs of making and enforcing agreements and by linking issues and providing focal 
points for cooperation80 
3 By providing transparency 
International institutions/regimes provide information about the distribution of gains by a 
principle of open disclosure of gains that alleviates the fears of unequal gains. This could 
entail for example the disclosure of military expenditures and capabilities. 81 
Neoliberal Institutionalism and Regionalism 
According to neoliberal institutionalists Regionalism essentially boils down to material interde-
pendence, the most important issue areas being the economy and security. Consequently regional 
integration is seen as mainly driven by regionalization that leads to economic integration. Re-
gional states consequently cooperate in these areas when collective regional problems emerge. 
This in turn spills over to other areas and regional institutions created to deal with these problems 
create and further develop regional cohesion.82 The technical processes of regional cooperation, 
however, are, on the other hand, seen as being driven by the most powerful states who aim at 
satisfying their self-interest through bargaining, rather than through the institutions themselves 
(as institutions are seen primarily as tools for states, where as states remain the principal actors). 
The EU is seen as an example where cooperation has developed from specific areas (coal and 
steel) and spilled over into other areas. 
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Walter Mattli in the Logic of Regional Integration (1999) attempted to establish a ‘logical’ 
framework for the analysis of Regionalism by combining aspects from economic and interna-
tional relations theory. In his work Mattli attempts to establish the main driving force behind 
regional integration83 and argues that neither the economic nor IR theories alone can fully ex-
plain the phenomenon of regional integration. Instead he constructs a model that takes into 
consideration the primacy of market factors as the main rationale for regional integration but also 
considers institutional factors.84 Mattli blames Neofunctionalism for neglecting the power of 
market forces, economic theory for neglecting the role of institutions, and Intergovernmentalism 
for discounting the impact of ‘defining events’ that “precede or follow interstate bargains.85 
Despite being considered as failing to reach his ultimate goal, Mattli established himself as one 
of the primary academics addressing widely neglected aspects of regional integration; the phe-
nomena of enlargement. According to Mattli, successful regional integration effects the external 
environment by turning positive (economic) gains for the ‘insiders’ into negative ones for ‘out-
siders’. As rational actors the ‘outsiders’ will seek to avoid these costs by either attempting to 
become ‘insiders’ or alternatively establishing a new regional organisation.86 Following the same 
logic, enlargement takes place only when it produces tangible gains for the integration process 
and current members (again this mainly refers to economic gains). This in turn assumes that the 
membership candidates are on a comparable economic and socio-economic level with the exist-
ing member states.87 The decision, then, whether to permit the entry of new members would be 
based on a rational cost-benefit calculation; a-b=x, where “a” signifies economic benefits of 
enlargement, “b” economic costs and “x” the sum total. If x>0, i.e. if economic gains are larger 
than costs, the enlargement process gets a green light. However, in some cases even if the x<0 
enlargement can still be deemed necessary if ‘negative externalities’, such as economic misman-
agement, political instability or social unrest threaten the “stability, security and prosperity” of 
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the regional organisation. According to Mattli such calculations may have played a role in the 
EU’s Eastern enlargement decision88 (probably due to the fact that the inclusion of Eastern 
European states into the union would not otherwise fit into Mattli’s logic). Mattli’s approach to 
regional integration, whilst mainly focusing on rather restricted economic aspects of integration, 
nonetheless remains one of the few serious attempts to explain the phenomena of enlargement 
(as opposed to analysing individual enlargement events in an ad hoc manner). Mattli’s ‘integra-
tion logic’ is also very representative of the “Rationalist” approaches where only utility matters 
and abstract deliberation about identity and legitimacy do not play any serious role in integration 
processes. 
An important offspring of Neoliberal Institutionalism is the Multi-Level Governance framework; 
“MLG can be defined as an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a multiplic-
ity of politically independent but otherwise interdependent actors – private and public – at 
different levels of territorial aggregation in more-or-less continuous negotia-
tion/deliberation/implementation, and that does not assign exclusive policy competence or assert 
a stable hierarchy of political authority to any of these levels”.89 MLG is useful for analysing the 
contemporary EU due to the poly-centric nature of its institutional structure. Philippe Schmitter 
has stated that Poly-Centric Governance, or PCG provides a useful insight into EU institutions: 
“A PCG can be defined as an arrangement for making binding decisions over a multiplicity of 
actors that delegates authority over functional tasks to a set of dispersed and relatively autono-
mous agencies that are not controlled – de jure or de facto – by a single collective institution”.90 
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Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism builds on the work of David Mitrany’s Functional theory91 and the works of 
Ernst B. Haas.92 Functionalism was developed as the “grand theory” of European integration 
largely inspired by Haas’ work in the European Coal and Steel Community with the European 
founding fathers Monnet and Schuman. Its grand goal was to explain the dynamics of European 
integration and to draw conclusions on how and why a political community was developing in 
Western Europe following the 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the European Community.93 
Haas observed a political community developing out of a process of political integration in 
Europe. He argued that the integration process was all about welfare maximization, not about 
regional high politics. In his view the process of political integration was an inevitable and self-
sustaining process. The main actors in the process were states, interest groups and political 
parties below them, and supranational regional institutions above;94“the process whereby actors 
in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and politi-
cal activities towards a new centre whose institutions posses or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states”95 
Neofunctionalism represents a revised and upgraded version of Functionalism. It accepts Func-
tionalism’s main assumptions, but shifts the emphasis from explaining integration on a global 
level (using the European model as the model) to more specifically explaining the phenomena of 
European integration per se.96 Moreover, it is essentially a utilitarian version of Functionalism 
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whereby states are completely self-interested rational actors that seek to integrate only when it is 
profitable and when the use of supranational institutions maximizes welfare creation.97 
The theory attempts to explain European integration as a result of high and rising levels of 
interdependence that led to an ongoing process of cooperation culminating in political integra-
tion.98 The process begins with low-key technical and non-controversial issues, spilling over to 
higher realms. Moreover, the process is seen as a self-sustaining phenomena; the cost of main-
taining national rules and policies acts as an additional incentive to increase supranationalism. 99 
The concept of “spillovers” entail two kinds of variations; 1) Functional spillover, which as-
sumes that small integration steps create new problems leading to demand for further integration, 
and 2) Political spillover “whereby the existence of supranational institutions would set in 
motion a self-reinforcing process of institution building”100Supranational institutions and techno-
crats are seen as superior to Intergovernmentalism in managing the complex interdependen-
cies.101 
Whilst Neofunctionalism has been credited as the ‘grand theory’ of (European) integration it has 
also attracted its fair share of criticism. In particular following the crisis in EC in the mid-1960s 
onwards, the theory was widely criticised for failing to take into account the effects of national-
ism and the states’ sensitivity over sovereignty. It was suggested that whilst member states were 
happy to surrender the control of ‘low politics’ issues to regional technocrats, they jealously 
guarded their control over issues of ‘high politics’ (as demonstrated by the 1965 ‘empty chair 
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crisis’).102 Neofunctionalism was also blamed for ignoring a number of intervening externalities 
in economic, political and security fields.103 
Schmitter in his 1976 “A Revised theory of Regional Integration”, published in International 
Organization, called integration theory a failure and admitted that he and Haas had failed in 
providing an adequate account of the integration process, and consequently suggested an over-
haul of the theory.104 Haas himself denounced Neofunctionalism in "The Obsolescence of Re-
gional Integration Theory" (1975), but regained his faith a year later in an article in the same 
journal, in which he stressed the paramount importance of interdependency over ‘functional 
policy linkages”.105 The theory experienced resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s with the devel-
opment of the single market and later the monetary union.106 
Nonetheless, Neofunctionalism’s obsession with the European experience, which has still not 
been copied elsewhere, despite the alleged supremacy of supranationalism, still renders the 
theory only marginally applicable elsewhere, especially in the case of ASEAN. As a technocratic 
integration theory, Neofunctionalism is not interested in enlargement, the role of identity or 
bilateral relations between a region and outsiders in general and in relations between countries 
that are closely associated but not members (’borderline states’) and the regional grouping. In a 
similar way to other ‘Rationalist’ theories, Neofunctionalism approaches the problem by address-
ing it as a technical process of economic and political integration driven by rational actors.107 
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2.3.2 Ideational Theories of Regionalism 
As opposed to “Rationalist” theories, which as it has been established give minimal attention to 
regional identity and culture, the so-called “Ideational” theories emphasise the effect of ‘Idea-
tional’ forces over material factors. On the positive side of the spectrum Social Constructivism 
emphasises a shared regional identity as a positive factor in regional cohesion, whereas the 
“Clash of Civilizations” thesis and various cultural approaches stress cultural differences as a 
source of conflict and separation. Of these two Social Constructivism has gained wide respect in 
explaining Regionalism, whereas the “clash’ is prominent in political rhetoric in the media, in 
politically motivated proposals such as the “privileged relationship’, and in particular recently 
also in religious dialogue. 
The inclusion of Ideational approaches in this analysis is vital because as Risse and Wiener have 
argued “material interests are really just our ideas about our material interests”.108 Moreover, 
they argue that it is possible to test whether actors are principally motivated by principled beliefs 
or norms of appropriate behaviour or simply engaged in instrumental search for power and 
material resources.109 Finally, it has been argued that the Rationalist theories have had consider-
able problems in explaining the EU’s “Eastern” enlargement, which brought in ten new Eastern 
and Central European countries that were (and mostly still are) well below the EU average in 
their levels of economic and social development, but nonetheless were invited by the considera-
bly richer EU-15 countries into the Union despite the cost of power sharing and the direct and 
indirect financial costs involved. Whilst it was foreseen that the enlargement process would 
produce long-term material benefits, the process nonetheless makes only a small amount of sense 
from a rational perspective. Hence, it is very likely that Ideational factors, namely the idealist 
urge to unite the continent after the decades of segregation during the Cold War probably played 
a critical role in the decision to spread the EU towards the East. 
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Social Constructivism’s one major contribution to Regionalism and IR in general has been that it 
has provided a credible and sustainable challenge to rational theories. The notion that regional 
integration is not primarily driven by rational/material interdependency or technical processes, 
but rather by a perception of collective identity that uses institutions as social vehicles and 
framework in which rational action takes place,110 is a powerful argument in ASEAN’s case in 
particular where institutions are ‘soft’, but also in European case where integration has reached 
such an advanced state that mere economic or institutional rationales may well prove short of 
acting as sufficient motivations for further integration (and enlargement). As Stephen M. Walt 
has argued; “ It matters if political identity in Europe continues to shift from the nation-state to 
more local regions or a broader sense of European identity, just as it matters if nationalism is 
gradually supplanted by the sort of ‘civilizational’ affinities emphasized by Huntington” 111 
The European Commission officials and the supporters of Turkey’s EU membership have on 
many occasions referred to the country’s membership representing a “bridge between civiliza-
tions”. According to this argument a successful accession to full membership by Turkey would 
serve as a positive example for cooperation between the “West”(Christian) and the Islamic world 
in particular, but also as countering the threat of “clash of civilizations” by proving that two 
distinct civilizations can work together and can be integrated into a new polity. In a more norma-
tive context, it would also allow the EU to expand the “sphere of peace, democracy and stability” 
in the wider “region”. 
As for the passionately contested and criticised ‘Clash’ thesis, both regions have seen their share 
of political rhetoric that either directly refers to it, or at least could be argued as reflecting such 
notions. In terms of political rhetoric, there have been a number of examples supporting caution 
in disregarding the possibility of the ‘clash’ as a viable explanation for some of the problems 
experience by ‘borderline states’. 
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For instance, Nicolas Sarkozy, the chairman of France’s ruling centre right Union for Popular 
Movement and a possible presidential candidate in the 2007 elections said he did not “want to 
see an Asian nation as part of the EU”.112, This emerging ”Euro-nationalism” has arguably 
inspired a number of European politicians, such as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel who 
has called for a ”privileged partnership” for Turkey as an alternative for full membership. In 
terms of religious rhetoric, Pope Benedict XVI, whilst still a Cardinal, spoke against granting 
Turkey membership in the EU arguing it “would be a mistake”, because “Europe is a cultural 
and not a geographic continent”.113 Moreover, his recent marks about Islam have sparked violent 
riots and openly hostile comments by Turkish leaders referring his comments being a sign of 
revival of the Crusades. Although such comments may in the end prove to be only political 
rhetoric, and in the end prove not to play a significant role in the relations between ‘borderline 
states’ and their respective regions, they nonetheless are a growing phenomena and may be 
acting as a motivation for denying membership. 
Social Constructivism 
Social Constructivism could be categorized as a social theory rather than a formative Interna-
tional Relations theory. It challenges the ontological and epistemological foundations of “Ra-
tionalist” theories114, whilst simultaneously claiming to occupy a ‘middle ground’ between 
Rationalist and radical theories.115 One major motive and justification for Constructivism came 
with the end of Cold War that Rationalist theory could not explain according to the constructiv-
ists. They argued that the changes that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
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subsequent ending of the Cold War took place in the political and normative environment before 
those in material environment. Examples of this were the Helsinki process and the Conference 
on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE).116 
Nicholas Onuf is largely credited for introducing the term “Constructivism” to international 
relations in his book “World of our Making” (1989). Onuf’s work, however, concentrated mainly 
on the fairly limited aspect of Constructivism by emphasizing aspects of international law, and in 
particular the role of rules and their impact on how actors behave and how their behaviour 
evolves.117 Alexander Wendt, on the other hand, has been credited for popularizing the approach 
in the wider field of international relations. 
Although there is no absolute definition of what Constructivism is exactly, the variety of ap-
proaches has much in common. They are knowledge-based theories (or approaches) that are 
interested in how Ideational factors, such as language, religion, moral norms and identity, influ-
ence social behaviour in international life.118 Or as John Ruggie puts it: “Constructivism is about 
human consciousness and its role in international life”.119 Alexander Wendt, on the other hand, 
argues that whatever the chosen particular emphasis different constructivist approaches may 
have, the all share the two basic tenets of Constructivism: “1) that the structure of human asso-
ciation are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and 2) that the 
identities and interest of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given 
by nature”.120 
It is worth noticing in terms of this study that much of the constructivist work does concentrate 
on offering an alternative to “Rationalist” approaches. Wendt in particular makes this point 
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several times emphasizing the ontological and epistemological differences between the “Ration-
alist” and constructivist approaches; 
“Perhaps the most common interpretation of the dispute between Rationalist and 
constructivists is about ontology, about what kind of ‘stuff’ the international sys-
tem is made of..[]. It also concerns how we should think about ‘what’s going on 
when actors interact, and in particular what it means to take identities and inter-
ests as ‘given’”.121 
Wendt specifically opposes the neo-realist approach which argues that actors’ (states’) interests 
are based on the material structure of anarchy and its neglect of identity.122 He, however, also 
places together the ‘Rationalist’ approaches as theories that “are interested in how incentives in 
the environment affect the price of behaviour” and criticizes the treatment of interests as a given. 
By contrast the constructivist approach of finding how identities and interests shape actors’ 
behaviour and vice versa, is incapable of producing a balanced and accurate account on how the 
international system works (Wendt also subscribes to the structural approach to IR, only empha-
sizing the role of identity and its social nature instead of material).123 Moreover, the neoliberal 
institutional approach that sees institutions as states’ tools for managing and mitigating anarchy 
is criticized by Wendt, who argues that international institutions are social constructs that are 
based on shared ideas, rather than technical vehicles of states’ material interests. Instead, Wendt 
argues that it is not the material forces of structure that primarily influence the actors’ behaviour 
but rather the ‘intersubjective’ structures that are constituted by collective understanding and 
meanings. Actors then form identities that stem from these collective meanings. Finally, identi-
ties are subsequently refined in the process of intersubjective interactions. Interactions on the 
other hand are shaped by identities of actors, thus enabling change in the international system.124 
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Identities are hard to change but may be refined in order to manipulate the situation though 
repositioning.125 The overall emphasis on identity and its importance on how interactions and 
interests develop in international relations characterizes Wendt’s approach throughout his work; 
”interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it 
is….”.126 Moreover, since material factors acquire meaning through a social process, identity 
becomes a central variable in how the international system works: ”the daily life of international 
politics is an on-going process of states taking identities in relation to others, casting them into 
corresponding counter-identities and playing out the result”.127 
Finally, Wendt agrees with Adler that rather than being (or even aiming at being) a theory of 
International Relations per se, it is rather an approach that emphasizes how structure relates to 
agents, what the structure is made of and how those identities are constructed.128 The theory of 
International Relations is nonetheless systemic in the sense that it makes the international system 
either the dependent or independent variable, depending on the problem at hand and point of 
view.129 
John Ruggie’s work on collective consciousness, or a ‘we-feeling’, in what he titles as ‘security 
communities’ (mainly NATO) and the European Union130 relies heavily on concepts adopted 
from the Sociology of Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and Anthony Giddens. Like Wendt, he 
builds much of his work in opposition to the neo-realists’, in particular Kenneth Waltz’s material 
Rationalist approach that emphasizes power and anarchy and defends the approach which con-
siders ”Ideational factors that shape actors’ outlooks and behaviour, ranging from culture and 
ideology to aspirations and principled beliefs, onto cause-effect knowledge of specific policy 
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problems”.131.He argues that whilst an emerging “we-feeling”, or aspirations for a united Europe, 
have not caused European integration as such, they explain the reasons for causal factors that 
have done so.132In further criticism toward the neo-realist approach he asks why NATO has not 
collapsed due its irrelevance since the end of the Cold War, as some neo-realists would have 
expected, and argues that NATO has acted as a vehicle for an affirmation of “western” identity 
for Eastern European states (which explains its revival through enlarged membership that in-
cluded the Eastern and Central European States).133 134 
Emanuel Adler argues that focusing on ‘social epistemology’ i.e. the role of collective knowl-
edge in international relations, help to explain the origins of international relations and institu-
tions, as well as the formation of “communities of the like-minded”. 135He defines 
Constructivism as an approach that sees international reality as “the manner in which the mate-
rial world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative 
and epistemic interpretations of the material world”.136 Material reality depends on what mean-
ing individuals and social actors attach to it, hence, international relations consist of human facts 
and that these are facts only by human agreement.137 As opposed to “Rationalist” theories Con-
structivists see a structure that is both normative and material, i.e. consists of rules and re-
sources.138 The main value-added contribution by Constructivism then is that it challenges the 
“Rationalist” ontology and epistemology through its ”emphasis on the ontological reality of 
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intersubjective knowledge and on the epistemological and methodological implications of this 
reality”.139 
In his work with Michael Barnett on “security communities” Adler and Barnett depict ’cognitive 
regions’ for which borders are defined by where shared understandings and common identities 
end.140In these “transnational regions” where people “imagine sharing a common destiny and 
identity” there would be a convergence of Ideational forces with economic interdependency, 
institutions and security that would enable the exceeding of territorial space.141 Following this 
logic he sees the United States and the European Union as inhabiting the same cognitive space, 
which also includes Australia and Canada.142 Security communities, imagined by Adler and 
Barnett, are social communities based on shared values, norms and symbols that create social 
identity where this feeling of ‘we-ness’ combined with societal interactions and convergence of 
long-term interests create a mutual and dependable environment of trust.143 
Social Constructivism on Regionalism: Amitav Acharya on Southeast 
Asian Regionalism 
Constructivist approaches to Regionalism in general focus on the development of a regional 
awareness that leads to the formation of a ‘regional identity’, or a shared feeling of ’we-ness’, 
often is titled as ‘cognitive Regionalism’.144 According to this view regional cohesion relies on 
‘cognitive interdependence’ rather than ‘material interdependence’.145 
One of the most relevant accounts of Constructivism on the subject of Regionalism comes from 
Amitav Acharya’s work on ASEAN and its “soft and normative Regionalism” which the “Ra-
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tionalist” theories have had trouble explaining (Acharya 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2005). Acharya 
responds, like many Constructivists, to what he sees as the neo-realist neglect of identity and 
institutions as independent actors in Regionalism and the exclusivity of material forces in inter-
national relations.146 Instead he argues that the examination of the process whereby regional 
identity is built and fostered offers the best chance to ascertain what is going on in a particular 
region. He asserts that “ignoring identity as an analytical tool also leads to undue neglect of long-
term historical processes that go into the making of international and regional orders”.147 Whilst 
norms and identity are not the only variables that matter (thus also acknowledging material and 
institutional forces), they have played an especially important role in Southeast Asian Regional-
ism and the development of ASEAN as a regional institution.148 He argues that ASEAN elites 
have deliberately formed norms and identity, aiming to build a regional ASEAN identity, and 
that “region-building is a social and political act; like nationalism and nation-states, regions may 
be ‘imagined and constructed”.149 As evidence for this he demonstrates how the ASEAN elite 
engaged in a process of socialization within an institutional context (ASEAN) and that in this 
process they ‘imagined’ themselves to be part of a distinctive group.”150 “ASEAN’s self-
conscious attempt to imagine and build a regional order despite the intra-regional physical and 
political differences….” was probably one of the foremost examples of the importance of iden-
tity in region building.151 As a direct result of this self-conscious regional identity building 
exercise “ASEAN has rejected request for membership by countries such as Sri Lanka, espe-
cially under president Jayawardane, and the possibility of membership by India and Australia on 
the grounds of their lack of belonging to the Southeast Asia region”.152 Sri Lanka was invited in 
1967 during the formation of ASEAN, but was not interested at the time. Later it reversed this 
                                                 
146 Acharya, Amitav (2005), "Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in Southeast Asia's regional 
order", The Pacific Review, Vol.18, Issue 1, March 2005, p. 96 
147 Acharya (2005), p. 106 
148 Acharya (2005), p. 98 
149 Acharya (2005), pp. 102-103 
150 Acharya (2005), p. 103 
151 Acharya (2005),  p. 104 
152 Acharya (2005), p. 104 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
48 
policy but its application was turned down.153 Moreover, he notes that whilst ASEAN has not as 
of yet achieved any permanent identity, it is attempting to build one.154 Hence, Acharya empha-
sizes the importance of differences in identity as an empirical fact and as an analytical tool in the 
study of Regionalism. 
Throughout his work Acharya emphasises the role of Ideational factors (norms and identity in 
particular) and instigates the analysis of how local actors as agents and the transformation of 
Regionalism through socialization and institution building shape Regionalism. In this regard, 
Acharya’s work on norms diffusion, investigating how transnational norms have transformed 
regional institutions in Southeast Asia,155makes a significant contribution to the understanding of 
Regionalism. Finally, Archarya’s work on security communities has made a significant contribu-
tion to the study of regional security. In particular his study of ASEAN as a security community, 
and the relative success of the ASEAN way of conflict management, promoting cooperative 
behaviour through socialisation instead of a sanctions based system, practically established 
Constructivism as the dominant framework for the study of security communities.156 
Critics of the Constructivist approach to Regionalism argue that it is not sufficient to address the 
problem “what is a region?” Van Langenhove (2003) argues this point for two main reasons: 
“One, because it is not enough to state that a region is a social construct and that therefore 
different actors will produce different “definitions” of a region. Secondly, because the social 
constructivist approach in regional integration is really nothing more than some-lip-service paid 
to an approach that is now well developed in other fields such as sociology, psychology and 
linguistics.”157 Moreover, he argues that whilst Constructivism is no more an approach than a 
theory, a Social Constructivist theory is nonetheless required. More interestingly he also advo-
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cates a theory that would combine the two aspects; “physical” [material, rational] and identity 
[Ideational].158 
Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and the Rise of Culturalism 
In his 1993 Foreign Affairs article "The Clash of Civilizations?" Huntington introduced a thesis 
instigating a paradigm that could be categorised as “cultural realism”. His work almost immedi-
ately caused a flood of criticism, which perhaps unintentionally made it one of the most cited 
articles in the Foreign Affairs in recent times159, as well as prominent in a number of other 
academic journals. He later refined his thesis in a subsequent 1996 book “The Clash of Civiliza-
tions and the Remaking of World Order” that became a worldwide best seller. Huntington 
subscribes to the core realist assumptions of international relations being driven by states as the 
main actors in a system characterised by anarchy and considerations of power, but at the same 
time he introduces culture as a new variable. Huntington argues that states are, and must be, 
interested in power, but culture and values define their interests in the long run.160 In this regard 
his emphasis on culture and identity bears some resemblance to Constructivism, but presents the 
other side of the coin by making culture and identity negative variables as a source of conflict 
and separation rather than sources of cohesion. 
The core of Huntington’s argument was that with the ending of the Cold War global politics 
would be redefined along cultural lines as people started redefining their identities after the 
removal of the bipolar overlay that had dominated world politics. He argued that the main 
emerging threat to international peace would be a looming clash of civilizations. Throughout his 
book Huntington builds his case for the “clash” by establishing the importance of cultural iden-
tity, and how this ultimately leads into a world divided along civilizational lines. He argues that 
people are mainly concerned about answering the question “who are we?” in order to define their 
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place in the world. He goes on to argue that people associate themselves with tribes, ethnic 
groups, religion and nations in immediate terms, but at the broadest level their primary reference 
group is civilizations. This cultural association is partly defined by ancestry, religion, language, 
values, customs and institutions but ultimately self-identification requires enemies; “We know 
who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are 
against”.161 Hence the most dangerous conflicts would occur at the fault lines of civilizations, 
where two or more major civilizations meet and compete for power and control in a particular 
area.162 Huntington even argues that Sydney won against Beijing in the 2000 Olympics bid 
because voting was conducted “almost entirely along civilizational lines”163 
In terms of the new “civilizational order”, Huntington argues that the world is, or is going to be, 
constructed around seven or eight major civilizations around one or more core states: Sinic, 
Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American and possibly African (sub-
Saharan Africa with South Africa as the core state).164 Most countries in the world (with some 
few minor exceptions) would belong to one of these major civilizations and shifting from one to 
another would be dangerous and destined to fail.165 
Huntington’s contributions to the study of Regionalism are few and mainly dismissive. He 
begins with a statement that “Regions are geographic not political or cultural entities”.166 How-
ever, interestingly he also asserts that countries with similar cultures cooperate economically and 
politically and groups with most cultural cohesiveness are the most successful (EU the most, 
ASEAN among the least).167 Whilst acknowledging that political and economic alignments are 
not always aligned according to cultural and civilizational alignments, cooperation nonetheless 
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requires trust and real trust can only be established based on similar culture and values.168 More-
over, he blames ASEAN’s (alleged) failure to establish effective regional cooperation and 
institutions to its “multicivilizational” construct, reinstating that commonalities bring advanced 
cooperation and that a causal relationship exists between cultural commonality and successful 
economic cooperation.169 Depending on the depth of cultural communality countries (and re-
gions) can achieve four different levels of economic cooperation ordered from least to most 
advanced; 1) Free trade area, 2) Customs union, 3) common market, and 4) economic union.170 
The European Union, being the most advanced regional grouping supposedly demonstrates this 
point. Perhaps anticipating a plausible counter-argument underlining Turkey’s custom union 
with the European Union, Huntington dismisses this as a product of US pressure on the EU and 
nothing more. 171 
In respect to what I have chosen to title as the problem of “borderline states’, Huntington refers 
to “torn countries” that, not unlike confused children, are unsure of their place in the order of 
civilizations and consequently are in the process of redefining their cultural identities. He argues 
that this is dangerous because whilst during the Cold War countries were able to remain non-
aligned and impartial in the conflict, they “cannot lack identity”. Moreover, whilst he acknowl-
edges that countries in the civilizational fault lines can in principle redefine their cultural identity 
and thus attempt to join a civilization that is more attractive, three requirements must be met for 
a “torn country” to redefine its civilizational identity: 1) political and economic elite in the 
country must be enthusiastic in their support for the shift, 2) public opinion must be at least 
tolerating the move and 3) elites in the host civilizations must approve.172 This, according to 
Huntington, is destined to become a long and painful path that until now has always failed. 
Huntington lists four countries that he qualifies as torn; Russia, Turkey, Mexico and Australia. 
Significantly two of these are part of this study. Of these “torn countries” Russia, Turkey and 
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Mexico have attempted redefine their cultural identity to join the Western civilization, whereas 
Australia attempted to defect it. 
Whilst Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis has been accused of being simplistic in terms 
of its civilizational construct and offering perhaps overtly deterministic account of the effects of 
culture and identity in international relations, it does offer an interesting alternative account to 
the “Rationalist” theories and the more optimistic account offered by Constructivists. By bring-
ing in the possible negative effects of identity building (including regional), the “clash” thesis 
could provide a useful tool in investigating what drives and limits relations between ‘borderline’ 
states and regions, when combined with “Rationalist” and constructivist approaches. Moreover, a 
fair amount of political rhetoric against Turkey’s membership in the European Union by Euro-
pean political leaders and Asian political leaders against Australia’s inclusion in East Asian 
regional institutions refers to cultural and value differences, and even occasionally to the “clash 
of civilizations”. One example of the latter is Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 
warning to European leaders that a hardening “mutual lack of respect between cultures and 
religions…” would threaten to create a “Clash of Civilizations” that would “throw world peace 
into doubt”.173 He said that whilst criticism was acceptable, insults were not and the two parties 
should respect each other’s sensitivities in order to avoid such a “clash”. With an indirect refer-
ence to the cultural opposition in Europe towards Turkey’s membership he stated to Euro-
Parliamentarians that “We see Islamophobia - like Anti-Semitism - as a crime against human-
ity".174 Finally, the popular resistance in particular in Europe against Turkey’s membership175, as 
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well as elite resistance in East Asia against Australia’s and New Zealand’s attempts to further 
integrate into the region underline the fact that Huntington’s arguments at the minimum should 
be systematically excluded through analysis rather than dismissed at face value. On the other 
hand, Huntington’s thesis is clearly inadequate as the sole tool for explaining the dynamics of 
relations between a ‘borderline state’ and a region. 
It is also worthwhile noting that whilst Australia has in the past faced resistance that could be 
categorised culture and value based in its rhetoric, they nonetheless have increased their partici-
pation in the regional bodies, including the EAEC. Likewise, Turkey’s membership accession 
process has met both popular and elite resistance, but nonetheless the accession process contin-
ues with the European Union being committed to see the process through. It is also, regardless of 
Huntington’s comments on Turkish NATO membership, important to note that Turkey is ac-
tively participating in a number of important and influential regional and “Western” institutions, 
such as NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe and OECD. Ignoring, or discounting, the economic 
interdependency, political interest convergence and institutional participation does not provide a 
sufficient explanation of the problem. Placing too much value on political rhetoric that indicates 
culture and values as causes of conflict may also be too limited of an approach. Lastly, why can 
cultural identity and values not act as drivers for inter-civilizational cooperation rather than 
conflict? 
2.3.3 Combining Rationalist and Ideational Paradigms 
Interestingly, some theorists, such as Smith, see Social Constructivists as being “perhaps more 
“Rationalist” in character than they would like to concede.”176 Whilst probably true, this none-
theless does not nullify the dichotomy between it and the Rationalist theories. For instance Risse 
and Wiener argue that even the most uncommitted Social Constructivists do not share the “indi-
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vidualist ontology of rational choice”.177 A perhaps more constructive approach would be to 
work toward a theory that accommodates assumptions from both strands. Luke Van Langehove, 
for instance, calls for a theory of Regionalism that ”can be used to explain that regions are both a 
part of physical reality and the result of a process of social construction”.178 
In political science the possibility of synthesis between positivists and interpretist positions has 
lead into a vivid debate, whilst the position that a synthesis is not possible due to their ontologi-
cal and epistemological differences has a strong backing.179Mark Blyth, for instance, acknowl-
edges the challenge of incorporating Ideational variables such as ideas into the Rationalist 
paradigm: 
“But then, on a fundamental level, rational choice is no longer rational choice. 
When ideas are allowed to give content to interests, the sparse, elegant, predic-
tive, and parsimonious structure of rational choice theory becomes compromised 
since one can no longer assume transitive preferences, given interests, or a co-
herent methodologically individualist ontology”180 
Blyth, however, nonetheless argues that ideas, norms, identity and culture should not be ne-
glected in Rationalist approach and that Ideational approach can complement existing theories, 
leading into further development of political science; ”for it is only through a dialectic process 
that the field evolves”.181 An important part of this process, he argues, is the liberty to look 
beyond paradigmatic approaches and compare rival ontologies; “Slavish adherence to a single 
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position is useless for understanding of an ever-changing world since it is only through compar-
ing what rival ontologies produce that we can actually learn anything of substance”.182 
Some IR theorists, such as Miles Kahler have contemplated the possibility of combining Ration-
alist and Ideational approaches in order to explain international cooperation such as regional 
integration: “Whether rationality and collective identity can be combined within a modified 
rational choice framework is one of the central questions posed by the recent turn toward identity 
and norms”183. Kahler reaches the conclusion that the two are in fact not entirely incompatible 
and suggests that rational choice may in practice be constrained by social and cultural norms, and 
that the Ideational approaches are mainly concerned about what takes place prior to rational 
decision-making. Thus, he concludes that socially constructed identities may simply be ”an 
ontological issue prior to behavioural modelling along rational choice lines”.184 He points out 
that Ronald Jepperson, Peter Katzenstein and Alexander Wendt have developed two possible 
ways of identifying prior to interests: “states may develop interests linked to particular interests, 
or domestic identity politics may be reflected in foreign policy interests”.185 However, the pursuit 
of those interests may follow the rational model and on the other hand identity can cause non-
rational behaviour or even interests.186 Hence, it is quite possible that Turkish identity and 
domestic identity politics may cause behaviour that may well be against its national material 
interests. Similarly, domestic identity politics in the EU, in member states for instance in France, 
Austria and Germany may override or alter the material interests of the Union. In fact, Kahler for 
instance argues that it is the socially constructed identities that determine the material interests, 
which are allegedly the main driving force behind rational choice.187 
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Goldstein and Keohane, on the other hand, postulate that the Rationalist approaches often offer a 
valuable starting point for analysis, but challenge their explanatory power by stating that there 
are ”empirical anomalies that can be resolved only when ideas are taken into account”,188 whilst 
“even the most Rationalistic analysts agree that people have incomplete information when they 
select strategies by which to pursue their preferred outcomes.”189 Nonetheless, Goldstein and 
Keohane accuse the mainstream Rationalist research for ignoring the power of ideas, whilst 
condemning reflectionists “who assert that interests cannot be evaluated apart from ideas that 
constitute them” without first carrying out serious empirical evaluation. They then go on to 
condemn the constraints imposed by the dichotomy stating that ”thus a potentially rich debate is 
consigned to the purgatory of incompatible epistemologies.190 Instead of confining themselves 
into Rationalist or Ideational paradigms, Goldstein and Keohane urge the analysts to recognise 
that ”ideas as well as interests have causal weight in explanations of human action”.191 Finally, 
they argue that the power of ideas in international relations ”can and should be examined empiri-
cally with the tools of social science”, referring to an established tradition in utilising socio-
psychological approaches on group decision-making in analysing how cognitive processing 
affect foreign policy choices as an example.192 
Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond also see ample space for the development of both Rationalist and 
constructivist approaches in relation to regional integration.193 As Finnemore and Sikkink have 
concluded that “Neither Constructivism nor rational choice provides substantive explanations or 
predictions of political behaviour until coupled with a more specific understanding of who the 
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relevant actors are, what they want, and what the content of social structures might be.”194 Social 
Constructivism again can be useful in analysing regions and in providing counter arguments 
against purist Rationalist accounts and bring in identity and culture as variables to Regionalism 
research. Smith for instance has argued that“…the dominance of Rationalist approaches has 
restricted the development of the literature on European integration”, and that Ideational ap-
proaches can offer convincing alternative explanations of European integration”.195 Arguing for 
the incompatibility of the two approaches, moreover, would imply that Ideational factors cannot 
be treated in Rationalist way or the role of Ideational factors cannot be compromised by material 
factors, which is not realistic because the real world includes both material and Ideational incen-
tives . 
Moreover, even many traditional Rationalists would concede that regional organisations can be 
more effective due to communalities in culture, history, values that provide a convergence of 
political and security interests.196 Also, as Frank Schimmelfennig points out, Liberal Intergov-
ernmentalism (LI) is “itself a synthesis of traditional, realist Intergovernmentalism with a liberal 
theory of domestic preference formation and a functional theory of international institutions....” 
and thus, can be linked and synthesized with other theories considering their respective “domains 
of application.”197 One such areas would be enlargement, which he admits LI has trouble ex-
plaining;”...LI can also be complemented and synthesized with Ideational explanations borrow-
ing from social Constructivism”.198 
Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Eds.) in European Integration Theory also address the question 
of enlargement at a point of difficulty in Regionalism studies and seek to test and compare 
different theoretical approaches through asking them to present best cases for explaining the 
                                                 
194 Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), p. 393 
195 Smith (1999), pp. 684-5 
196 Hurrell (1995), p. 56 
197 Schimmelfennig, Frank (2007), ”Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, in Wiener Antje and Thomas Diez (Eds.), 
European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 92  
198 Schimmelfennig (2007), p. 92 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
58 
problem. The basis for such testing is the doubt of the existence of incommensurable paradigms. 
Wiener and Diez argue this would be the case “only because they differ in scope”;199 ”Epistemo-
logically, approaches would only be incommensurable if they claimed to have the same purpose 
and if they were directly related to reality”.200 However, Wiener and Diez point out that if the 
two approaches are assumed of having different purposes;”...then it is possible to see different 
approaches adding to a larger picture without being combined into a single, grand theory”.201 
Peter Katzenstein has on the other hand argued that Rationalism and Constructivism are not 
really paradigmatic theories but rather “content-less analytical languages dealing principally with 
beliefs”, whilst there nonetheless exists an interesting intellectual divide between the two.202 
Thus, he argues that breaking the paradigm barriers is not only possible but also necessary;”...but 
I am increasingly convinced that ’analytical eclecticism’ is at this stage a superior way of doing 
theory because we are so paradigmatic; had we been predominantly eclectic, I would’ve said we 
should be a little more paradigmatic – but right now we almost work in a monoculture, which 
intellectually is pretty unhealthy.”203 
Following a similar line of thought, Fearon and Wendt conclude that;”....Rationalism and Con-
structivism are most fruitfully viewed pragmatically as analytical tools, rather than as meta-
physical positions or empirical descriptions of the world.”204 
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In this regard, Katzenstein’s analytical eclecticism makes a significant contribution. Katzenstein 
argues Rationalist and Ideational both have weaknesses but may complement each other if an 
eclectic approach is applied. Disagreeing with the statement that the two approaches are incon-
sumerable, he also refers to the possibility of combining Rationalism with Constructivism: 
”You could also combine ideas of Rationalism and Constructivism which do not have moral 
implications. I myself combine Constructivism with liberalism, because my normative commit-
ments are largely liberal but I think it lacks the capacity to say anything about identity.”205 
Moreover, Katzenstein argues that considering the role of collective identities would also im-
prove Rationalist theories in terms of their explanatory powers: 
”Explicitly considering the role collective identities play in world politics can 
help advance our theoretical and empirical understanding of international rela-
tions. Collective identities matter because they help shape the definition of the ac-
tors’ interests. An eclectic stance suggests that Rationalist theories are more 
compelling when they are combined with constructivist insights into the impor-
tance of norms and identities, as is true of explanations focusing on great power 
status and the presence or absence of threat.” 206 
Finally, Emmanuel Adler also advocates a notion that Rationalist and Ideational approaches are 
complimentary, arguing that Constructivism should reconsider its approach to rationality; 
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“Within Constructivism, a dialogue that may soon turn into a full debate has been 
taking about how to approach rationality. In the background is the increasing re-
alization that Constructivism and Rationalism are complementary rather than 
contradictory” 207 
However, Adler, unlike many others, postulates the possibility of a new grand theory through 
synthesis: 
“A real synthesis, in my view, would integrate Rationalism and Constructivism 
into a theory that ultimately transcends both”208 
2.4 Definitions of “Regionalism” and “Region” 
“There are no ‘natural’ regions, and definitions of ‘region’ and indicators of ‘re-
gionness’ vary according to the particular problem of question under investiga-
tion” 209 
As will be pointed out in this section, key definitions in Regionalism, such as “region”, “Region-
alism”, “regionness” and “regionalization” remain, in Andrew Hurrell’s words “ambiguous and 
contested”.210 Instead of having established any credible measure of consensus on the definitions 
of these key terms, which guide us towards what is to be investigated and how, the field contin-
ues to be characterised by multiple approaches that give varying emphasis to material, institu-
tional and Ideational connections between the constituent parts of a “region”. However, one 
factor remains common to virtually all approaches: geography and geographical proximity as 
factors of unity/separation. Geography alone, however, helps us very little in understanding 
region formation. Rivers, mountains, seas and other geographical barriers do not provide accu-
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rate boundaries for regions as they are subject to interpretations based on various subjective 
factors, such as geo-politics, history, culture, and ethnicity and politicizing. T.J. Pempel, for 
instance, has argued that: 
“Contrary to such a largely unproblematized interpretation of regions and pre-
sumptions of geographic self-definition, the world for the most part is not, in fact, 
composed of ‘natural regions’. Almost no region in the world with genuine politi-
cal and economic significance is so essentialist in its makeup; rarely can any be 
understood as delimited by simple geographic lines on a map.”211 
A good example of the limited explanatory power of the geographical relationship is the NATO 
membership of the Mediterranean countries (including Turkey).212 Even the most enthusiastic 
and determined observer would probably find it very frustrating to link these countries geo-
graphically to the North Atlantic community. At the same time, one must acknowledge that some 
form of geographical definition or limitation of a region is required in Regionalism research, 
otherwise we are essentially speaking about non-geographical ”communities” (security, commu-
nities, communities of the like-minded etc). In this regard I completely agree with Andrew 
Hurrell, who has stated that ”without some geographical limits the term ‘Regionalism’ becomes 
diffuse and unmanageable”.213 
Most of the contemporary Rationalist definitions derive from Joseph Nye’s definition of an 
international region: “a limited number of states linked together by a geographic relationship and 
by a degree of mutual interdependence”.214 This is clearly a Rationalist definition of a region 
which implies that states are the main actors in Regionalism and that its borders are essentially 
defined by geography, material interdependence and institutional structures. 
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Ideational approaches, on the other hand, tend to emphasise regional identity and cognitive 
interdependency instead of institutional and material factors. Social Constructivism, however, 
avoids strict definitions of “region”. Peter Katzenstein, for instance, drawing inspiration from 
Karl Deutch, has argued that regions are not “natural”, “given” or “essential” and that because 
they are socially constructed that are subject to “reification and relativization”. He consequently 
defines a region as “a set of countries markedly interdependent over a wide range of different 
dimension”.215 This interdependency can be characterised “by a flow of socio-economic transac-
tions and communications and high political salience that differentiates a group of countries from 
others”216 T.J. Pempel, mirroring Katzenstein, also argues that regions are contested and not 
natural, concluding that; ” regions are fluid and complex mixtures of physical, psychological, 
and behavioural traits continually being re-created and redefined”.217 Hence, the Ideational 
approaches do not provide any fixed definitions of a “region”, but instead point out to the fluid 
nature of regions that essentially define themselves largely based on the Ideational connections. 
However, as Luk Van Langehove has pointed out this approach can be a source of confusion as 
if we do accept that a region is a social construct, and that different actors produce different 
regions, what kind of generalisations can we except to make in order to answer the question 
“what is a region?”218 (…and who belongs to it?). 
Other attempts to define a region have attempted mixing rational and Ideational elements by 
focusing on the internal cohesion of a region, covering areas such as regional social linkages, 
political linkages and economic linkages.219However, it is often unclear how these linkages are 
to be measured to a degree of reliability that is acceptable in the social sciences. 
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Tavares, on the other hand has identified four constitutive characteristics of a region: 1) geogra-
phy, 2) regularity and intensity of interactions, 3) shared regional perceptions and 4) agency.220 
Whilst this concept includes rational concepts, such as agency, it is essentially an Ideational one; 
“cognitive construction that spills over state borders, based on territoriality, with a certain degree 
of singularity, socially moulded by a body of different actors, and motivated by different (and 
sometimes contradictory) principles”.221 
Another issue of contestation is the role of Regionalism versus that of regionalization. Regional-
ism from Rationalist point of view is mainly seen as increasing regional institutionalised coop-
eration among states as a feature of global politics that ultimately creates a new polity, 222whilst 
regionalization refers to the growth of societal integration within a region to the often directed 
processes of social and economic interaction”.223 
Yet, as Rodrigo Tavares points out the Latin word regio generally has an administrative and 
geographical meaning and comes from regere, to direct, to rule.224 However, he also points out 
that; “The world ‘Regionalism’ contains the Greek Sufism ‘ism’, which means ‘the act, state, or 
theory of’. Consequently he argues that “Regionalism shall, therefore, be approached as the 
theory that investigates the process of regionalization”.225 This implies that it is the process of 
regionalization that should be the focus of study, and that Regionalism refers to the discipline 
that studies it. Another alternative approach to distinguish between “Regionalism” and “region-
alization” is Paul Evan’s definition that emphasises the transactional function of regionalization 
and emphasises the role of identity in the process of Regionalism: 
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“if regionalization is the expression of increased commercial and human transac-
tions in a defined geographic space, Regionalism is the expression of a common 
sense of identity and destiny combined with the creation of institutions that ex-
press that identity and shape collective action”.226 
However, Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum argue that Regionalism refers to the general 
phenomenon under study and regionalization to the process “that leads to patterns of coopera-
tion, integration, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographic 
space, as well as introduce another concept: regionness. Regionness refers to the “degree to 
which a particular area in various respects constitutes a distinct entity, which can be distin-
guished as a relatively coherent territorial subsystem (in contrast with non-territorial sub-
systems) from the rest of the global system”.227Their proposed approach, the New Regionalism 
Theory (NRT) seeks to evaluate this level of regionness and establishes five levels that “define a 
particular region in terms of regional coherence and community”.228 The first level, which they 
title as a “proto-region”, is defined by regional space and implies a level of regionness where “a 
region is firmly rooted in territorial space: a group of people living in geographically bounded 
community, controlling a set of natural resources and united through a certain set of cultural 
values and common bonds of social order forged by history”.229 The second level, which consti-
tutes a “primitive region”, is a regional complex that implies an increased level of social contact 
and transactions between groups that have been previously isolated. This is a fairly limited and 
undeveloped region where regionness is still unstable. The third type is a regional society that 
constitutes a de jure or a “formal” region where regionness is widely spread and multidimen-
sional. The fourth level is a regional community where a regional identity is developing and 
regional institutions are strong, absorbing an increasing amount of decision-making powers from 
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the nation-states. The fifth and final level, a region state, is the most advanced and still a largely 
hypothetical construct that presumes the creation of a new polity where sovereignty is pooled. 
Under such a system decision-making is layered to multiple levels, including the supranational 
level. As Hettne and Söderbaum conclude: “this is basically the idea of the EU as outlined in the 
Maastricht Treaty”.230 
Luke Van Langehove follows in similar line to Hettne and Söderbaum and introduces yet another 
concept in Regionalism: regionhood. His idea of regionhood has similar purposes to that the 
concept of regionness in that it also aims at distinguishing regions from non-regions,231 but 
differs in scope in attempting to combine Ideational and Rationalist elements: “Such a concept of 
regionhood can be used to explain that regions are both a part of physical reality and the result of 
a process of social construction”.232 The four-level conditioning of regionhood reflects this 
notion; 
1 the region as a system of intentional acts in the international and national arena 
2 the region as a “rational” system with statehood properties 
3 the region as a reciprocal achievement 
4 the region as a generator and communicator of meaning and identity233 
Finally, the United Nations Comparative Regional Integration Studies unit argues against at-
tempts to provide fixed universal definitions of region, emphasises the discursive patters within 
the transactional practices, and argues that in fact it is the process of regionalization that ulti-
mately defines the region: 
“The fact that there is a multitude of possibilities to approach the problem of "re-
gion" suggests that the best way to define it is in an eclectic and plastic way. If it 
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is crystal clear that regions necessitate a geographical dimension, the question is 
then, how to recognise a particular area as a region. The point is that regions de-
fine themselves; they are only identifiable post factum. There is no use in looking 
for one universal criterion that defines a region, nor to come up with a "catch-all" 
cocktail of criteria. It is the process of regionalization that eventually defines the 
region, or in other words regions become 'visible' by patterns of interaction, such 
as discursive practices occurring within geographical, historical, cultural, politi-
cal and economic variables”234 
In conclusion, the definitions of the key concepts in Regionalism remain contested and ulti-
mately are determined by the chosen theoretical approach and one’s research agenda. However, 
it would seem that in order to accommodate both Rationalist and Ideational approaches it is 
necessary to acknowledge certain critical features and characteristics that determine what we 
consider as a region and who we consider being part of it. In my view at least the following 
should be accounted for: 
1 A level of geographic proximity 
As noted before, geographic boundaries, such as mountains, rivers, lakes and seas are 
subject to interpretation. As the EU’s Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn noted in a 
public debate event in Helsinki, Canada would most likely (as would Australia and New 
Zealand) meet the technical criteria of the accession process, and yet it would be hardly 
justifiable to include it in a European regional organisation. Hence, regional projects can-
not be a collection of members across the globe and still be called regional. However, 
how the exact boundaries of these mainly continental or sub-continental constructs are 
determined depends on a number of factors. Some of these are; 
2 Material interdependency 
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A region probably has to have some level of material interdependency and complemen-
tarity in order to become a meaningful construct. What the required levels are and 
whether they become before or after cognitive interdependence and linkages is a matter 
of disagreement and remains an issue for careful testing. 
3 Cognitive interdependency 
Commonalities in history, culture, values and language increase the probability and effec-
tiveness of regional institutions. Since such Ideational factors also affect the working cul-
ture and norms of the regional institutions, members that do not sufficiently share these 
commonalities probably would not be able to contribute or benefit effectively to/from 
them. 
4 Agency 
A regional project without some form of effective institutions is not likely to be a rele-
vant one. Moreover, potential members that do not have the capacity to participate effec-
tively in regional institutions are unlikely to be included. Conversely if regional 
institutions do not have the capacity to absorb potential members they are likely to fuel 
calls for rejection towards member candidates. A good example of this it the controver-
sial ”integration capacity” (a.k.a. “absorption capacity”) in the EU. 
This thesis aims at producing a definition of a region that contributes to the understanding of the 
problem of ‘borderline states’, and thus regional enlargement. This, however, cannot be achieved 
prior to a careful analysis of the research and the conclusion and hence, will be addressed again 
in the chapter detailing the findings of the thesis. 
2.5 Regionalism in Europe and East Asia: The dilemma of 
enlargement 
This section investigates the relevant theoretical literature addressing the process of enlargement 
in general and in particular the relationships between Australia and East Asia and Turkey Euro-
pean Union. It then goes on to argue that whilst the current literature does not systematically 
analyse the problem of ‘borderline states’, or compare the two regions from this perspective, 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
68 
some of the literature covers individual parts of the problem. A growing body of literature is 
forming to study the theoretical aspects of EU enlargement. Turkish membership is also attract-
ing a growing body of literature. Likewise, some literature, albeit largely outdated, exists on 
Australia’s engagement with ASEAN and East Asia. Most of these accounts focus on the Austra-
lian ‘push into Asia’ in particular under the Keating government in the earlier part of the 1990s. 
Whilst the economic and security aspects have earned some level of coverage, this too appears to 
be largely outdated and/or focusing on a relatively narrow aspect of the problem. All in all, the 
current literature represents either “Rationalist” or “Ideational” accounts, whilst no attempts to 
systematically compare and incorporate both accounts on the problem exist. 
Enlargement of the European Union and the Turkish accession quest 
The current literature on EU enlargement according to Helen Wallace (2000) mainly treats the 
issue as a series of individual events rather than attempting a systematic study of the phenom-
ena.235 Theoretical and technical studies specifically focusing on the issue of enlargement in-
clude the works of José Torreblanca and Philippe Schmitter (Schmitter and Torreblanca 1997; 
Torreblanca 1997, 2000, 2005), who mainly focus on the issue of Eastern Enlargement, its 
technical management, effects, motives and the historical background. Others, such as 
Schimmelpfennig (1999, 2001 and 2003) focus on the strategic aspects of European integration, 
Friis (1997and 2000) and Friis and Murphy (1999) on the governance and bargaining process 
related to the Eastern Enlargement, whilst Woyke (2001) and Zielonka et al (2002) deal with the 
problems and consequences of EU enlargement(s). Philippe Schmitter has argued that misunder-
standings about European integration are largely due to the lack of attention being given to the 
process of enlargement; ”One reason for several of these misunderstandings was the completely 
“un-theorized” and, nevertheless, significant impact of enlargement to include new member-
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states whose entry inevitably imposed changes in decision-making rules and upset prevailing 
informal practices.”236 
Turkey’s EU membership is currently a hot topic and the literature on the topic is increasing 
constantly. The majority of the current literature, however, is generally descriptive in its nature 
and provides historical accounts of background of Turkey – EU relations, as well as technical 
analysis on various aspects of political, economical, societal and security linkages between 
Turkey and the EU and thus well within the Rationalist traditions. Some of the general back-
ground literature includes Akçakoca (2006), Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), Lake et al. 
(2005), Oyemen and Betts et al. (2000), Morris (2005), Wood and Quaisser (2005) and Togan 
and Balasubramanyam et al. (2001). Other authors have explored the issues of culture and 
identity in Turkey and compared it to an “European’ identity; Schilling (2005), Tekin (2005) 
Twig, Schaefer, Austin and Parker (2005), Welfens (2004). Kosebalaban (2002) approached the 
cultural aspect by analysing the compatibility of security cultures, whilst Lejour and Mooij 
(2005) have provided economic benefits/costs analysis of a possible Turkish membership. Harun 
Arikan237aims at providing a framework that would serve as a better option for the usual “indi-
vidual costs/benefits based analysis conducted in isolation from the other factors”, which tends to 
be the standard in the literature on Turkey – EU relations.238 Whilst Arikan acknowledges that 
Turkey’s failure to implement the necessary policy reforms is partially to blame for the prob-
lems, he nonetheless almost exclusively concentrates on establishing the EU’s scepticism to-
wards the country and the perception of Turkey as a ‘problematic’ and ‘different’ applicant. This 
has resulted in policy instruments that treat Turkey differently from other applicant countries, 
and that effectively mounts into a ‘containment strategy’ designed to stall its membership indefi-
nitely.239 To prove his point Arikan analyses a considerable quantity of EU official documents 
and carries out elite interviews to compare Turkey’s accession process to those of the Central 
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and Eastern European countries. He argues that whilst these countries faced most of the same 
problems often referred to in Turkey’s case (human rights, protection of minorities in particular), 
the EU policy instruments had better terms and facilitated the accession process more effec-
tively.240In support of Arikan’s argument, the European Commission has been criticised for too 
being too lenient towards Romania and Bulgaria and recommending accession regardless of 
meeting the relevant criteria, leaving ample space for Ideational arguments. 
Despite providing a thorough Rationalist analysis on accession instruments, as well as the main 
economic, security and political issues, Arikan’s work is nonetheless essentially represents the 
Turkish point of view, concentrating on proving that the accession process is not fair towards 
Turkey.241 Moreover, the Cyprus issue is treated as a bilateral issue between Turkey and Greece 
in Arikan’s analysis, which does not do justice to the issue. From the EU’s point of view the 
issue is considerably broader and deeper, as was demonstrated by the EU’s decision in December 
2006 to freeze eight of the total of 35 negotiation chapters over the issue. From EU’s point of 
view the critical issue is that Turkey has not recognised the Republic of Cyprus, which is a 
member state, nor opened its ports as stipulated by the customs union agreement. Finally, the 
culture/identity based popular and elite resistance is ignored in the analysis. Nonetheless, this 
issue is vital because Turkey’s membership accession treaty’s ratification will be subjected to 
referendums in many member states. 
Another topic gaining popularity is the issue of European identity and the borders of Europe 
reflecting the growing rhetoric using ’civilizational’ terms such as ’bridge between civilizations’ 
and ‘clash of civilizations’ in the European Union enlargement discourse. Beasley (2006), Smith 
(1992), Kockel (1999) and Kohli (2000) have explored various components that could be used to 
define European identity and the borders of the region. Jensen and Richardson (2004) explore the 
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spatial visions and imaginations of the European integration and establish the link between 
integration discourse and geospatial space. These include in particular geographic, historical, 
cultural and linguistic aspects of what constitutes ‘Europe’. A common theme in these accounts 
is that there is no universal definition of Europe, but that the various definitions reflect the 
emphasis given to the different variables under investigation. Moreover, the ‘Clash’ thesis and its 
implications to Turkey – EU relations are also covered by Marfleet (2003) who investigates how 
wars and conflict have contributed to the shaping of Europe’s ethnic boundaries. A working 
paper on various aspects of the European identity commissioned by the European Commission 
(Jansen et al 1999) also investigates the formation of a European identity using approaches that 
are based on a great number of theoretical standpoints, including; history, psychology, anthro-
pology and citizenship. The conclusion is that whilst Europe is firmly on a path toward develop-
ing a regional identity, one should expect it to be a long path in such a diverse region that 
encompasses various linguistic, ethnic, religious and cultural traditions and political and eco-
nomic systems. Virtually all studies on the topic, however, refer to ‘something in the common 
experiences’ that makes a ‘European identity. How that ‘something’ is constructed, varies 
depending on the author’s approach. Ahmet Hahn (2004), for one makes a good point in arguing 
that Europe should first define this ‘European identity’ before making it an entry requirement, so 
that a fair assessment can be made in terms of who belongs to Europe and who does not. 
European identity has also been analysed using discourse analysis, for instance by Thomas Diez 
(1999, 2001, 2004) who promoted the focus on discourse on European integration in his 1999 
article in the Journal of European Public Policy242 In his 2001article he utilised discourse analy-
sis to explain British European policy since World War II in order to understand the complexities 
of the British – EU relationship.243 Diez argues that the recent European identity construction 
process represents a return to geopolitics in terms of constructing geographic, cultural and 
political borders for ‘Europe’. Diez also sees the Eastern enlargement as a temporal return to 
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Europe’s past that emphasised the process as one of reuniting the continent, whereas Turkey 
serves as the Islamic ‘other’ for Europe in the larger process of constructing Europe.244 
‘Othering’, is important argues Diez, because identities are ultimately constructed against the 
‘other’, i.e. difference. He stipulates that identity would be unthinkable without othering and that 
“it would make no sense to say ‘I am European’ if this did not imply a difference from being 
‘Asian’, ‘African’ or ‘American’”.245Much of this ‘othering’ in the EU’s case has been against 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Russia and the United States in the post Cold War era, 
and increasingly Islam and Turkey.246 This is quite curios if one takes into an account that the 
‘Europeanness’ of Cyprus was never questioned, although many would categorise is geographi-
cally Middle Eastern, a view enforced by its Ottoman history and a large Muslim population in 
the north of the island.247 What makes it even more curious is the fact that the European Com-
mission has chosen to consider Turkey European as stipulated in the European Union Treaty 
(a.k.a. the Maastricht Treaty) that declares that all European states can join the Union.248 The 
rejection of Morocco’s application (submitted in 1987) in 1993 demonstrates that the EU is 
capable of turning down an applicant that is not deemed ‘European’. Hence, the fact that Tur-
key’s accession has been and continues to be questioned on this basis could well suggest that 
there are both rational and Ideational elements in the process that have affected the decision to 
allow Turkey to become a candidate country. Diez argues that Turkey’s accession process has 
been ambiguous and that the “discussion about Turkey’s membership operates on several lev-
els.”249 This is to say that on one level there are serious political and economic concerns, but, on 
the other hand, much of the discussion concerns cultural aspects. The othering can also be 
temporal, as demonstrated by the case of EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, 
which could be seen as an attempt to overcome the Cold War division and the history of warfare 
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in the continent.250 Turkey, however, as a staunch NATO member during the Cold War could be 
seen as being on the (Western) European side in temporal identity construction against the Soviet 
Union. Diez argues that these types of observations may indicate that the construction of a 
European identity increasingly relies on ‘geopolitical’ othering that combine elements of iden-
tity, politics and geography.251 Unfortunately for Turkey, the country could potentially be quali-
fied as a suitable ‘other’ in terms of all of these elements. 
Rainer Hülsse has also utilised discourse analysis to examine the Turkey – EU relations. He 
argues that Turkey has an image problem within the EU elite’s and public’s view and that the 
perceived cultural differences may well form a permanent obstacle for membership as they are 
much harder to overcome than political and economic (technical issues).252 It is notable that 
Hülsse emphasises perception and argues that Turkey really has an image problem rather than 
simply a problem of irreconcilable cultural differences with the European Union.253 His analyses 
utilise the Eurobarometer data on European public opinion and an analysis on German discourse 
on Turkey in both the media and the Bundestag to establish the public and elite opinion. Interest-
ingly the study revealed that not only the Christian parties and conservatives referred to the 
perceived insurmountable differences in culture and viewed Turkey as Europe’s ‘other’,254 but 
the same applied to the social democrats and greens that have generally been considered more 
receptive towards Turkey’s membership.255Moreover, the research concluded that the Central 
European countries were constructed as ‘us’ whereas Turkey was seen as the other, for reasons 
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that are not entirely clear.256Besides establishing the stereotyping of Turkey, Hülsse questions 
why Turkey gets special attention in Eurobarometer studies regarding cultural differences, where 
as the other candidates are not conditioned in this manner. Hence, he raises the European Com-
mission’s potential role in constructing the cultural gap.257 The same could be noted about the 
‘bridge between civilizations’ rhetoric that has become prominent in public (elite in particular) 
discourse on Turkey’s accession, as will be shown later in this thesis. The importance of these 
social constructs of Turkey as the ‘other’ and the civilizational rhetoric may well amount to 
becoming a critical problem for the country’s EU membership. As Hülsse points out regardless 
how Turkey handles the accession process, the ratification of membership will ultimately be 
subject to referendums in member countries and if Turkey is perceived as non-European the 
results are likely to reflect that perception.258 Finally, Hülsse observes that Turkish complaints 
about the EU being a Christian club and emotional outbursts to problems in the process create a 
perception of an aggressive political culture that hinders the progress of the negotiations. Instead, 
Turkey should become ‘cool’ and aim at responding to Europe’s snubs with more finesse, as the 
European political culture supposedly would dictate. Whilst Hülsse’s account is certainly an 
interesting one and contributes to the understanding of the cultural/identity aspects of Turkey’s 
membership accession, it is based on a fairly limited sample of one member country, and thus 
can only provide clues and signposts for further research. 
Australia in East Asia: The odd man in? 
One of the most common arguments about East Asian Regionalism is that it is different from the 
European model. Peter Katzenstein has pointed out that it would be a great mistake to compare 
European "success" with Asian "failure.259 Unlike Europe, East Asian ‘open Regionalism’ is 
characterised by informality and market-based de facto Regionalism rather than supranational 
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institutions.260 Peter Katzenstein has also pointed out that Regionalism in Europe tends to be 
legalistic, whereas Regionalism in Asia tends to be driven by the markets.261 Moreover, the East 
Asian mode of Regionalism includes few binding regional agreements or regional institutions 
with decision-making mandates. Even where binding agreements are in place, no sanctions for 
non-compliance are implemented, but compliance is rather achieved by peer pressure.262 Rather, 
the majority of East Asian regional cooperation relies on Track II type cooperation that includes 
unofficial issue based ad hoc groups that are often characterised as consultative forums, aiming 
at informal opinion exchange and research.263 
In terms of defining the East Asian region, Paul Evans points out that the majority of accounts in 
this regard consider the increased trade and investment since the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the 
psychological consequences of the 1997 financial crisis as vital in the formation of the concept 
of “East Asia.264 Evans also distinguishes between the terms “Asia Pacific” and Asia-Pacific” 
and argues that the hyphen is used as a “code” for defining the region based on the “Asian” 
component of East Asia that includes participants from outside as well.265In a similar line of 
argument, Tsunekawa points out that the “Pacific” in the term “Asia-Pacific” was originally 
intended to refer to the developed “high-income” countries in the wider region, such as Japan, 
the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.266 The various approaches to define the 
East Asian region according to Evans belong essentially in two main groups: ‘geographical’ and 
‘functional definitions’. “The functional argument is inspired by a pragmatic and materialist 
commitment to solving practical problems and sidestepping the thorny issues of history, values 
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and identity”, and would include for instance the United States, Australia and New Zealand.267 
The approaches emphasising the values and cultural perspective, on the other hand, can be 
divided into two main groups: 1). The “Asian values school” that emphasises the distinctive 
characteristics emerging from East Asia’s history and 2) “Cosmopolitan culture school” that 
emphasises the Asian consciousness and identity as a result of distinctive responses to globaliza-
tion and other universal issues.268The result of all this has been rather vague definitions of East 
Asia and its constituent parts: 1) Southeast Asia is the territory south of China and east of India 
(which was enforced by ASEAN’s rejection of India and Sri Lanka) and 2) East Asia is Asia-
Pacific minus Japan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (APEC comprises the Pacific Rim 
region, which an extension of Asia-Pacific). 
A new more fixed definition of the region, however, has emerged around the ASEAN+3 (APT), 
which is the most advanced state driven attempt to create institutional Regionalism in East 
Asia.269 Whilst the process only included ASEAN countries along with China, Japan and South 
Korea, it has since expanded into ASEAN+6 in the form of the East Asia Summit, which in-
cludes Australia and New Zealand. Interestingly, Evans notes that APT is founded on common 
commitment to internationalism, Rationalism, and economic liberalism.270 
Paul Evans has also pointed out the role of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in defining the 
Asian component, as well as creating an Asian perspective to the process.271 Tsunekawa, on the 
other hand, points out that Japan attempted counter the then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohammed’s vision of a racially exclusive East Asia and sought to invite Australia and New 
Zealand to an ASEAN economic ministers’ meeting in April 1995, but this never materialised. 
When Mahathir later insisted on excluding the two from the newly set up Asia Europe Meeting 
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(ASEM) in 1996, Japan had little interest in objecting as ASEM was inter-regional in nature.272 
Hence, ASEM has kept its exclusive Asian character and consequently has promoted such a 
definition of the region in general. On the other hand, the Boao Forum for Asia which intends to 
be explicitly Asian273 includes Australia. In fact, Bob Hawke, former Prime Minister of Australia 
was one of its founders. 274 
The work on ASEAN Identity and external relations tends to explain the emergence of the 
“ASEAN Way”, a type of ‘soft Regionalism’ as opposed to the more legalistic European Re-
gionalism. The development of regional values and an emerging ASEAN regional identity have 
been widely covered by Acharya (1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006), Haacke (2003), Johns-
ton (2003), Jones (2004) and Ganesan (2000). Australia is occasionally touched upon in these 
studies, but the relationship between ASEAN and Australia is not specifically addressed. Terada 
(2003) explores the development of a regional East Asian identity that is forming through re-
gional bodies such as ASEAN+3 and EAEC and the difficulties that in particular Australia 
experienced in its attempts to convince the other members that it is a regional state that should be 
included in the forum. 
Peter Katzenstein on the other hand observes that cultural and civilizational motivations are 
significantly less important in East Asia than in Europe, where regional identity is grounded on 
such notions.275 However, he also points out to the evolving regional identity in East Asia and 
suggests that Australia would be an ideal point of comparison in this regard; ”Australia is a 
promising place to start our analysis of the evolution of Asian identities. Cultural and political 
similarities in relations between the United States and Australia, as well as United States and 
Canada, permit us to isolate differences in the effects of geographical distance”.276 Katzenstein 
also points out the ”borderline state” problem of Australia, albeit of course not using the term; 
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”Think of a Canada that has been towed away from where it is, and moored off Africa, and the 
problem of Australia’s physical location become clear.” 277 Finally, Katzenstein observes that 
”comprehensive engagement” with East Asia is a difficult task to complete, as; ”....Australia is 
struggling to articulate regional universalism and to become simultaneously post-European and 
post-Asian, transcending both its own European racial and cultural heritage and any racially or 
culturally specific Asia.”278 This notion is further investigated in Chapter 7. 
The literature that deals directly with Australia’s attempts to be included in Asian Regionalism 
mainly concentrate in describing Australia’s ‘push into Asia’ in the 1980s and in particular first 
half of 1990s. A vast majority of this literature refers to the problem of Australian identity as 
compared to the ‘Asian identity’. In particular, the identity problem and its effects on Australia’s 
relations with ASEAN and East Asia have been covered by Ball and Kerr (1997), Beeson and 
Yoshimatsu (2006), Battersby (2004), Burke (2001), Fitzgerald (1997), Goldsworthy (2001 and 
2003), Mark and Smith (1998), Milner and Quilty et al. (1996), Paul (1998), Walker (1999) and 
Wesley (1997). Most of these accounts focus on the ‘push into Asia’ and the EAEC episode 
without attempting to provide a systematic account of the various aspects involved in these 
relationships. Finally, a PhD Thesis (published as a book in 2003) on Asian representations of 
Australia by Elizabeth Broinowski describes the historical and cultural dimensions of how 
Australians think Asians see them and how Asians really perceive Australians. Broinowski 
provides a historical survey of ten Asian countries and Australia in comparison and argues that a 
gap exists between how Asians really see Australia and how Australian opinion leaders see the 
country’s engagement with the region. 
Australia’s foreign policy and security towards Asia has been examined by James Cotton and 
John Ravenhill et al. (1997) and Gurry (2001). A PhD Thesis on Australian Foreign Policy and 
Contemporary Asian Regionalism by John de Somer (2003) and Mcdougall (2001) examine 
Australia’s regional engagement from historical point of view under different governments, 
mainly concentrating on comparing the Hawke, Keating and Howard governments’ approach to 
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Regionalism. Former Prime Minister Paul Keating’s (2000) account on Australia’s engagement 
with Asia predictably represents the approach favoured by his government. Pinkstone (1992) and 
Smith (1998) on the other hand examine the historical development of economic interdepen-
dency and trade relations between Australia and Asia, whilst Lloyd (2001) explores the motives 
for further engagement with East Asia. Finally, a recent account by Paul Kelly (2006) provides 
an appraisal of John Howard’s decade as a Prime Minister, in particular in comparison to his 
predecessors Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. The main question that it seeks to 
answer is “has Howard sought to downgrade relations with Asia?” and thus radically changed the 
Australian Foreign Policy from the Hawke-Keating era?279 Kelly argues that despite Howard 
being a novice in foreign policy, his scepticism towards ALP’s “Push into Asia” and multilater-
alism in general, coupled with a foreign policy approach that is curious mix of realist and cul-
tural traditionalist, he has scored some major victories in taking Australia into regional 
institutions. First of all, Howard’s government has taken Australia into the East Asia Summit (in 
2005) after years of resistance. Secondly he has established deeper relations with China than any 
other Australian prime minister. Thirdly, despite the emphasis on Australian identity and values, 
and an explicit refusal to accept that Australia should adopt Asian ones, as well as issues such as 
East Timor, Australia’s relations with Japan, China and Indonesia are at their highpoint.280 
Finally, Evans argues that Howard has not given up on engagement with Asia as such, he simply 
has very different ideas about what such engagement means. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the International Relations (IR) theories of Regionalism can be best 
understood as a dichotomy between the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches, and that 
neither approach alone can sufficiently explain the problem of “borderline states” in Regional-
ism. Moreover, it has argued that the literature on enlargement and on the Turkey-EU and 
Australia and East Asia relations is even more underdeveloped and non-systematic, thus estab-
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lishing the need for further study. Finally, it established that the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” 
approaches could be tested and applied to the research problem in order to establish which 
provides a more satisfactory answer to the research problem. The next chapter will establish the 
methodology for completing this task. 
M E T H O D O L O G Y  A N D  R E S E A R C H  D E S I G N  
81 
Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design 
3.1 Introduction 
As laid out in Chapter 1 this thesis aims to test, challenge and further develop explanatory 
models in the theory of Regionalism. In particular the thesis aims to add to the understanding of 
the process of enlargement through deploying those models to the problem of the ‘borderline 
states’. Chapter 2 established that a dichotomy between “Rationalist” and “Ideational” exists in 
International Relations and Regionalism literature, as well as the lack of theoretical literature on 
enlargement and the need for further theory development in this field of research. Furthermore, I 
have argued that neither approach alone is sufficient and that consequently both approaches need 
to be deployed in order to provide a satisfactory answer to the research problem. Consequently, 
the thesis utilises an analytical eclecticism approach to accommodate for this dichotomy between 
the two approaches, as laid out in chapters 1 and 2. This chapter presents the research methodol-
ogy and design chosen to reach that goal, as well as stating the rationale and techniques for the 
methodologies used for data analysis, limitations and delimitations of research, case studies and 
the selection of data sources and material. 
This chapter is organised into two main sections. The first section introduces the research design, 
including; research questions, hypotheses, variables, justification for cases and the selection of 
data sources. 
The second section introduces the methodology used in the chapters, starting with those utilised 
in the Rationalist and Ideational chapters used in chapters 4,5,6 and 7, as well as a variant of 
Discourse Analysis; Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis (FPDA), which is utilised in ‘Ideational’ 
chapters 5 and 7. 
3.2 Research Design 
This section introduces the research design for the thesis; the research questions, hypotheses, 
variables, justification for cases and the selection of data sources utilised. 
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3.2.1 Research questions and hypotheses 
Research Questions 
This thesis aims to answer the following research questions: 
1 What is the current level of interdependency (material and cognitive) between the 
case countries and regions? How are these measured? 
2 What should the level of interdependency be according to each approach (rational vs. 
Ideational) to accommodate further integration? 
3 What are the benefits and costs of inclusion vs. exclusion in each case? 
4 Which set of theories (rational vs. Ideational) provides a better explanation to the 
problem in terms of greater explained variance? 
5 What constitutes regional identity? What impact do notions of regional identity have 
for the problem? How do the identities and cultures of “borderline states’ compare 
with those of the respective regions? 
Given the results of the study, what policy and further research options should be followed? 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were made in order to guide the analysis of the problem of the border-
line states: 
1 Material or cognitive interdependency alone cannot explain the problem 
2 If material interdependency is high between the case countries and regions and the 
benefits from full integration are high, it would seem reasonable to assume that if 
such integration is not taking place then this is because of a lack of cultural 
similarity. 
3 Emphasis on regional identity increases with further vertical (deepening) integration 
and successful regional identity building creates further boundaries for horizontal 
integration (enlargement) 
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The primary variables for the analysis and the rationale for these are: 
1 Dependent Variable: Borderline state – region relations 
What is the nature of the relationship between Turkey and the European Union and Aus-
tralia and East Asia? Are these two borderline states considered as credible candidates for 
a full membership in their respective regions? 
2 Independent Variables: Material Interdependence, Cognitive Interdependence 
What is driving the above? Which one is more important for the borderline state – region 
relationship – material or cognitive interdependency? 
3 Other Variables: Regional institutions, Horizontal and Vertical Integration, Regime 
type, domestic politics, geography 
Do other factors, such as the nature of the regional institutions, the maturity of integration 
(is the emphasis on deepening integration or enlargement of the region), regime type of 
the borderline state versus the prevailing type in the region (if there is one), domestic 
politics in the borderline states and/or the incumbent members or geography, have a sig-
nificant impact on the relationship and Turkey’s and Australia’s inclusion in their respec-
tive regions? 
Case Studies 
This research utilises a comparative case study approach by analysing two exceptional test cases 
in order to discover significant differences in cases that appear similar, as well as towards com-
paring the utility of the Rationalist and Ideational approaches and to demonstrate the problem of 
the borderline states and its significance to the study of Regionalism. The utility of comparative 
methodology in advancing theory in political science and International Relations, in particular in 
establishing points of converge between competing approaches and accommodating analytical 
eclecticism, as explained in chapters 1 and 2. 
The two borderline states chosen for this purpose are Turkey and Australia. While Australia and 
Turkey are very different countries in many respects, they share a fundamental commonality; 
both struggle to identify and define their place in the international system. This tension pervades 
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their relationship with their respective regions; ASEAN and East Asia for Australia and the 
European Union for Turkey. Yet, these two countries also have a long and established history of 
intimate strategic relations with their neighbours, examples being economic interdependency, 
interest convergence in political and security affairs, as well as involvement in at least some 
central regional institutions. 
In terms of ‘Rationalist’ criteria, Australia has actively participated in regional economic rela-
tions through the AFTA-CER process, taken part in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and re-
cently (despite fierce resistance by a number of other participants) joined the East Asia Summit. 
Australia is also a founding member and active participant of a wider multilateral organisation, 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organisation. Turkey, on the other hand, signed 
an Association Agreement with the European Community (precursor to the European Union) in 
1963 and began accession talks for full-membership to the European Union (EU) in October 
2005. In addition, it has a customs union with the EU, and is a member of OECD, OSCE and the 
Council of Europe. During its long (and rocky) road to membership, Turkey has implemented 
numerous relatively radical economic, political and social reforms in order to satisfy the 10000 
page EU membership requirements, the acquis communitaire. 
Despite such efforts, both countries have met resistance in their attempts to gain further integra-
tion through full-membership in regional bodies; Australia in terms of ASEAN and East Asia 
and Turkey in terms of the European Union. Often resistance or rejection has been based on 
claims that these countries are not “genuinely of region”. 
Opponents have put forward the argument that Australia is not “Asian” but rather a geographi-
cally displaced “European” country. In contrast, Turkey is often labelled Asiatic by Europeans. 
These types of arguments have been persistent and prominent in political rhetoric. They underlie 
politically motivated concepts such as “absorption capacity” and “privileged relationship”, and 
more recently, they have begun to permeate religious discourse. For the purposes of this research 
I have chosen to term these states ‘borderline states’. They are labelled ‘borderline states’ not for 
their geographical properties, but for the permanent partiality of their inclusion within their 
regions. Such states are in constant flux, varying their degree of belonging depending on the 
criteria of enclosure. These particular aspects or conditions also separate Turkey and Australia 
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from other states that could be potentially also considered as borderline states within a more 
limited context, for example Russia. Russia, however, has no significant interest in joining the 
European Union, nor is it locked in state of partial inclusion in Europe. 
In the larger theoretical context the cases of Turkey-EU and Australia – East Asia also represent 
a fundamental paradox in the study of Regionalism and this raises a number of important ques-
tions. Does material interdependency define the perception of cognitive interdependency or vice 
versa? Is the “of regionness” criteria defined on material or on cognitive basis? What forces, 
“rational” or “Ideational”, drive regional enlargement, and integration? 
 Data sources 
The selection of data sources reflects the dichotomy between the two approaches deployed in 
separate chapters. Both primary and secondary sources were used in the main empirical chapters. 
In chapters 4 and 6, which are based on a ”Rationalist” approach, the data sources selected 
reflect the preferred methods in that framework, i.e. data that facilitates cost versus benefit 
analysis on the economic, political and security aspects of the relationships, largely inspired by 
economic ”Club Theory” and Mattli’s “Logic of Integration”. Consequently the main data 
sources for these chapters consist of trade statistics, trade documents, official texts, political 
treaties, reports, white papers from the governments involved and regional and international 
organisations and analysis and reports by third parties, such as international organisations, think 
tanks and academic research institutes. The main foundational texts in these chapters include 
official texts that establish the memberships requirements, criteria for evaluation for meeting 
these and the legal and institutional basis for the relations between the borderline states and the 
regions. These include the founding treaties of regional organisations and trade, political and 
security treaties. 
In the Turkey-EU case the foundational texts are the founding treaties of the EU, such as the 
1992 Treaty of the European Union (a.k.a. the Maastricht Treaty), the Copenhagen Criteria 
established by the declaration of the Copenhagen European Council of 1993, The Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001). Secondly, the agreements and treaties that 
regulate the relationship between Turkey and the EU are also used as founding texts; the Asso-
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ciation Agreement of 1963 (a.k.a. the Ankara Agreement), the Additional Protocol (AP) of 
November 1970, the Customs Union Treaty of 1995, the Declaration by the 1999 Helsinki 
European Council and the Accession Partnership (2001, 2003, 2005). The main sources used to 
assess how Turkey is meeting the relevant EU criteria are the annual Turkey Progress Reports 
since 1999. These are produced by the European Commission and progress reports and analysis 
are provided by the Turkish government, the EU and third parties. 
In the Australia – ASEAN/East Asia case the foundational texts are the ASEAN and East Asia 
Summit founding treaties/declarations and treaties/agreements/declarations regulating the rela-
tionship between Australia and ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. The founding documents of 
ASEAN chosen for the purposes of this research were: the ASEAN Declaration (a.k.a. the 
Bangkok Declaration) of 1967, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (a.k.a. Bali Concord) of 
1976, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976), ASEAN Vision 2020 
(1997), the Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation (1999) and the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord II (Bali Concord II) of 2003. These documents were chosen because they established 
the guiding principles for ASEAN, as well as broader regional and international cooperation in 
the region. In addition to these, documents directly relating to relations between ASEAN and 
Australia and the country’s role in the region were examined. 
These included official texts relating to Australia’s Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN, the 
AFTA-CER Closer Economic Partnership, Australia’s participation in the ARF and the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which Australia signed in 2005, the ASEAN-Australia Compre-
hensive Partnership (1 August 2007), ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program and 
the guiding negotiation principles for ASEAN—Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement 
(expected in 2007/2008). The potential implications of the planned ASEAN Charter to Austra-
lia’s relationship with ASEAN were also examined. Finally, a number of white and strategy 
papers by the Australian government, major academic texts and independent analysis were 
analysed. 
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Table 1. Main Categories of Sources in “Rationalist” Analysis Chapters 
Source Type Explanation Data 
Foundational documents Regional foundational treaties, 
charters and texts 
Founding principles 
Institutional framework 
Code of conduct for members 
Membership criteria 
Accession process 
Trade statistics Trade between case countries 
and regions 
The level of trade & economic 
interdependency 
Trade agreements Trade agreements and treaties 
between case countries and 
regions 
Framework for economic 
relations between case 
countries and regions 
Official Reports Reports relating to economic 
and political relations 
The status of economic and 
political relations between case 
countries and regions 
Third Party Reports Reports relating to economic 
and political relations 
Alternative view to the status of 
economic and political relations 
between case countries and 
regions 
White Papers Policy challenges, objectives 
and solutions for bilateral 
relations between the case 
countries and regions 
Aspirations for bilateral 
relations, challenges in 
reaching them and policy 
solutions to improve the 
situation 
Official Statements Official statements by 
governmental and regional 
officials 
Official positions regarding the 
status, objectives and 
aspirations regarding bilateral 
relations 
 
These sources are listed in Appendix A. 
Chapters 5 and 7 investigate the research problem from the “Ideational” perspective, i.e. ap-
proaches emphasising the role of identity, culture and values in Regionalism. Much of this 
research adheres to the framework provided by Social Constructivism. However, Samuel P. 
Huntington has argued in his “Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order’ that 
both countries are "torn”. According to Huntington both countries belong to one civilisation but 
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have in effect attempted to “defect” it in order to join a regional grouping that represents another. 
This proposition has been utilised by both the proponents and opponents of borderlines states 
joining their respective groupings, as will be shown in these two chapters. Whether one believes 
in the broader thesis of civilizational conflict or not, it is true that Turkey and Australia are 
perceived as not being genuinely of that region and that the civilizational – or culturally or 
religiously motivated opposition are real and serious hurdles in these relationships. Hence, these 
chapters will examine the development of emerging regional identities and their use for or 
against borderline states. Consequently, the question of identity and regionness are examined 
from a variety of viewpoints, including; geography, history, religion and public opinion. Fur-
thermore, Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis is utilised in order to determine the role of material 
and Ideational factors in the dominant discourses of Turkey’s and Australia’s roles in their 
respective regions. Consequently the primary data for these chapters comes from texts, princi-
pally speeches, interviews and statements by officials and other authorised speakers. 
Other data includes the Eurobarometer surveys since 2000, following the 1999 Helsinki Euro-
pean Council decision to recognise Turkey as an official candidate for full membership, com-
bined with European Values Survey and PEW Global surveys and other public opinion polls to 
analyse the public opinion in the EU and Turkey regarding the support for and opposition to 
Turkey’s EU membership and its “Europeanness”. In the Australia – ASEAN/East Asia case the 
data selection is designed to identify and evaluate the compatibility of Ideational concepts such 
as the controversial "Asian values”, designed to bind the proposed ASEAN Community and its 
regional identity. This will be compared to perceived Australian values, and their relevance and 
impact upon the research problem will be assessed. In addition to these, discourse analysis also 
considers the foundational texts covered in the “Rationalist” chapters, as well as texts produced 
by major political figures, such as the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn’s book 
Europe’s Final Frontiers and the former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating’s book En-
gagement. Data on public opinion was collected on Australian foreign policy priorities and 
Australia’s place in the region and the world, as well as Australia’s image in Asia. The primary 
sources included Lowy Institute Polls; Australians speak 2005: public opinion and foreign 
policy, The Lowy Institute Poll 2006: Australia, Indonesia and the world and Australia and the 
World: public opinion and foreign policy (2007). Other data included Australian Elections Study 
M E T H O D O L O G Y  A N D  R E S E A R C H  D E S I G N  
89 
surveys, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ 2006 Chicago Council Public Opinion Survey, 
PEW Global Attitudes Project and various public opinion polls. The main sources exclusively 
and specifically utilised in the Ideational chapters are listed in Appendix B. 
Table 2. Main Categories of Sources in “Ideational” Analysis Chapters 
Source Type Explanation Data 
Rationalist texts Foundational texts, official 
reports, white papers and 
official statements 
Discourses referring to 
Ideational factors 
Foundational texts Foundational regional treaties, 
declarations and visions 
Texts constructing the idea of 
the region, regional identity, 
culture and values. Official 
discourses 
Speech acts Speech acts by officials and 
influential thinkers/thought 
leaders in format of speeches, 
statements, interviews, books 
and articles 
Elite opinion in relation to the 
idea/purpose of regional 
integration, enlargement and 
membership. Elite discourses 
Public opinion surveys Public opinion surveys/polls 
regarding regional identity, 
culture and case countries 
Regional citizens’ views 
regarding the idea of the 
region, its identity and culture. 
Public opinion in the case 
regions and countries regarding 
the membership of case 
countries. Public discourses 
Values surveys Surveys regarding citizen’s 
values in regions, countries and 
“civilizations” 
Compatibility of values in case 
regions and countries. 
Existence and significance of 
“universal values” 
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3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This section introduces the primary methodological frameworks used throughout this thesis. 
As already stated the various chapters in this investigation follow the frameworks provided by 
two conflicting approaches; “Rationalist” and “Ideational”. Chapters 4 and 6, which utilise the 
"Rationalist” approach, prioritise primary material factors as the main drivers for regional inte-
gration and hence, also for regions to integrate new members and for countries to seek member-
ship in regional organisations. Consequently the methodology in these chapters utilise 
cost/benefit analysis of regional integration influenced by club theory from economics and 
Mattli’s logic of integration from Regionalism studies. In addition to this, chapter 4 pays addi-
tional specific attention to whether Turkey meets the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria 
and the milestones set in by the formal accession process. 
Chapters 5 and 7, on the other hand, employ the "Ideational” approaches to the research problem. 
Hence, these chapters mainly follow the Social Constructivist framework in order to establish the 
roles and explanatory powers of Ideational variables such as identity, culture, values, geography, 
history and religion. This will allow us to see the impact of such variables upon establishing a 
shared feeling of ”we-ness”, a sense of community and regional identity, as well as the implica-
tions of a notion of “regionness” upon the attempt of borderline states to integrate themselves 
into the region or at least establish a close “privileged” relationship with their respective regions. 
On the other hand, a counter-argument has been established by the Clash of Civilisations thesis 
and those arguing the prevalence of civilizational or cultural geopolitics in Turkey-EU rela-
tions.281 Interestingly it has also been used to support Turkey’s membership by arguing that this 
would significantly contribute towards avoiding such a clash and instead establish a bridge 
                                                 
281 See for instance: Diez, Thomas (2004), “Europe’s others and the return to Geopolitics”, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 17, Issue 2, pp. 319-335 and Bilgin, Pinar (2004), “A Return to ‘Civilisational Geo-
politics’ in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-
Cold War Era”, Geopolitics, Vol.9, Issue 2, pp. 269-291  
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between civilisations. Thus whilst considered controversial by many, the clash thesis is a useful 
tool for examining the culturally (or civilisationally) motivated opposition to the prospects of 
borderline states joining their respective regions. Finally, Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis is 
utilised to establish the presence and importance of Rationalist and Ideational factors in the 
dominant discourses in the two sets of cases. This method is explained in detail later in this 
chapter. 
3.3.2 Discourse Analysis 
Providing one universally accepted definition of Discourse Analysis is an impossible task. This 
is because it is not an empirical or scientific method but rather a means whereby one can think 
critically about a particular research problem. As such it does not aim to produce scientifically 
verifiable results, in either in quantitative nor qualitative sense, but rather is a tool for question-
ing the basic assumptions of such research. Moreover, it can be applied to any topic in virtually 
any field and has consequently been deployed in numerous fields with varying ontological and 
epistemological foundations. In this thesis the most relevant applications of Discourse Analysis 
have been deployed in foreign policy and Regionalism analysis. Such research is still relatively 
rare, but is starting to have an impact following the work by Lene Hansen, Thomas Diez, Reiner 
Hülsse and others. Lene Hansen established poststructuralist discourse analysis in foreign policy 
analysis in her 2006 book282 analysing Western intervention in the Balkan War, whilst Diez and 
Hülsse examined Turkey’s “Europeanness” and the role of “othering” in the process of con-
structing the European “Self”.283 Following the example of Hansen, Diez and Hülsse I am using 
discourse analysis as a tool for questioning the basic assumptions of the ”Rationalist” and “Idea-
tional” approaches through a critical examination of what role rational (material) and Ideational 
concepts play in the dominant discourses. The reasoning for this is the assumption that processes 
                                                 
282 Hansen, Lene (2006), Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, Routledge, London 
283 Hülsse, Rainer (1999), “The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference – Turkey as Europe’s Ot-
her?”, Discussion paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop, Mannheim, 26-31 March, 1999; 
Diez, Thomas (2004), “Europe’s Others and the Return to Geopolitics”, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004, pp. 321, 324 
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of ”othering” towards Turkey and Australia in their respective regions would appear to have a 
central role in the opposition whilst material interests appear to be mainly used for justifying 
further integration. Yet the Rationalist approaches tend to exclusively emphasise the material 
factors, whilst the Ideational approaches tend to argue that these material interests only have a 
meaning in the context of that assigned to them by the social actors involved. This thesis argues 
that this dichotomy between the two approaches limits a proper understanding of the problem of 
borderline states, and in the broader context the true nature of Regionalism. Discourse analysis is 
a useful tool to objectively test those assumptions and determine the strengths and weaknesses of 
the two approaches with the hope of establishment a synthesis of the two approaches that would 
equip us to acquire a more complete understanding of the problem. 
3.3.3 Approaches to Discourse Analysis 
Discourse Analysis (DA) has become a well established practise in many social science fields of, 
more recently becoming also in International Relations (IR). In IR research DA is most closely 
associated with Social Constructivism, although its use is not limited to this framework. The 
framework, in the context of the dichotomy presented in this thesis, is nonetheless “Ideational”. 
As Thomas Diez has pointed out carrying out Discourse Analysis makes little sense “if one 
believes that politics is essentially about the realisation of structurally determined economic 
interests,”284 i.e. if one subscribes to the “Rationalist” framework. Social Constructivism (and 
DA with it), on the other hand, has gained popularity with the elevation of the importance of 
Ideational concepts such as culture, identity and values motivated by the emergence of new 
research agendas such as globalization. This has also had an impact on the study of Regionalism 
where Social Constructivism and DA have explored the impact of the construction of regional 
identities and the use of language in identity building. Discourse Analysis is an important part of 
this research agenda and is mainly interested in the use of language, in this case in particular 
                                                 
284 Diez (2001), p. 18 
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political language, to justify policies and advocate political ideas into practice and the building of 
common identities around these policies.285 
The basic assumption behind DA is that material objects do not have a meaning separate from 
one given to them by social actors. Social actors, on the other hand, give “things” meaning by 
assigning relationships and “sign systems” to them in order to make sense of them.286 Discourses 
then are social constructs of knowledge about a particular topic: “A discourse is a group of 
statements which provide a language for talking about –i.e. a way of representing – a particular 
kind of knowledge about the topic. When statements about a topic are made within a particular 
discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the 
other ways in which the topic can be constructed”.287 It is thus interested in the organisation of 
language, used beyond a sentence, and based on the idea that language is structured according to 
different patterns that people use when acting in different domains of social life. Discourse 
Analysis is the analysis of these patterns.288 Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) propose a definition of 
“discourse as a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the 
world). Thus in philosophical terms it is above all about epistemology relating to a particular 
topic or issue in the society”. DA is thus a useful tool for testing such assumptions. 
The use of Discourse Analysis has developed into different schools. Foucauldian discourse 
analysis, based on the work of the French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault, has be-
come particularly well established in research areas that concern identity, subjectivity, personal 
and social change and power relations in society.289 Discourse Theory by Ernesto Laclau and 
                                                 
285 Burnham, Peter, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry (2004), Research Methods in Politics, New 
York, Palgrave Mcmillan, p. 247 
286 Milliken, Jennifer (1999), “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
Methods”, European Journal of International Relations, London, SAGE Publications, p. 229 
287 Hülsse (1999), “Looking beneath the surface – invisible othering in the German discourse about Turkey’s 
possible EU accession”, Paper presented at the Ionian Conference, Corfu, Greece, May 19th-22nd, 2000, p. 3. 
Hülsse is quoting Stuart Hill (1992, p. 291) 
288 Jorgensen, Marianne W. and Louise J. Phillips (2002), Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, SAGE 
Publications, London, p. 1 
289 Burr, Vivienne (2003), Social Constructivism, New York, Routledge,,  p. 63 
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Chantal Mouffe relies on a notion that discourses construct the social world in meaning, and thus 
are ‘real’. Moreover, it believes in a ‘discursive struggle’ where discourses are not fixed entities, 
but rather discourses conflict and influence each other producing new discourses.290Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) on the other hand, following the work of Fairclough, Wodak, Van 
Dijk and others, treats discourse as only one of many aspects of social action rather than being 
‘real’. Also, in terms of focus, CDA is mostly interested in change, as well as reasons and mo-
tives for social change.291 
To political scientists, discourse has a specific narrative in terms of signifying a public discourse 
about a certain political topic or theme. Hence, it is not exclusively linguistic in nature, but also 
implies a behavioural dimension. The use of language is an action used by social actors and such 
actions have consequences for the society in which they are spoken. Besides constructing prob-
lems, objects and subjects, policy discourses also need to construct solutions to them.292 Thus a 
discourse can also be seen as a form of social practice.293 Moreover, as Rainer Hülsse has ar-
gued, “discourse does not take place in a vacuum; it is embedded in a specific context”.294 
Consequently, a proper understanding of the context in which discourse takes place is crucial. 
DA alone tells us nothing conclusive. The rationale behind the use of DA is therefore the as-
sumption that political texts and acts of speech have at the very least some intention or objective 
underlying their use. .295 Thomas Diez has argued that the history of European integration can be 
understood as history of speech acts, comprising an extensive collection of treaties, declarations 
and other speech acts aiming to establish a regional system of governance.296 Yet, the historical 
                                                 
290 Jorgensen and Phillips (2002), p. 6 
291 Jorgensen and Phillips (2002), p. 7; the method for CDA was established by Fairclough, van Dijk, Wodak and 
Myer: Fairclough, N.  (1995), Critical Discourse Analysis: the critical study of language, London, Longman; 
van Dijk, T. (1993), “Principles of CDA”, Discourse and Society, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 249-283; and, Wodak, R. 
and M. Myer (Eds.) (2002), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, London, SAGE 
292 Hansen (2006), p. 21 
293 Hülsse (1999), pp. 4-5 
294 Hülsse (1999), p. 7 
295 Diez (1999), p. 601 
296 Diez (1999), p. 601 
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background of European Regionalism, as well as the changes in the international system that 
influenced and accelerated Regionalism in Europe from 1990s onwards have influenced the 
development of the EU and the discourses within, in particular in terms of enlargement, a central 
topic in this thesis. 
3.3.4 Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis 
The use of discourse analysis in International Relations is generally used to “illustrate how 
textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific contexts, the 
implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world”297 In the 
context of foreign policy making, the suggested policies are required to meaningfully construct 
solutions to the situation at hand and construct the topics within these policies, thus both drawing 
from and constructing identities, whether these are national, regional or institutional.298 One of 
the main tasks of foreign policy makers is to construct foreign policies that are perceived as 
consistent with these identities. 299Identity building, on the other hand, is not viable without 
juxtaposition against alternative identities.300 As Thomas Diez has pointed out it makes little 
sense to say I am “European” unless it somehow differentiates me from someone who is 
“American”, “Asian” or “African”.301 Hence, the process of “othering”, even when not articu-
lated explicitly is a central component of identity building. Consequently, the efforts of regional 
identity building are problematic to ‘borderline states’ if they are perceived and constructed as 
the “Other”. DA can equip us with the tools to expose and objectively analyse this problem in 
regionalist theory. 
                                                 
297 George, Jim quoted in Milliken, Jennifer (1999), “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A 
Critique of Research and Methods”, European Journal of International Relations, London, SAGE Publications, 
p. 225 
298 Hansen (2006), p. 6 
299 Hansen (2006), p. 28 
300 Hansen (2006), p. 19 
301 Diez (2004), 321 
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Lene Hansen (2006)302 introduces poststructuralist discourse analysis in foreign policy research 
by the example of her analysis of the Balkan war and how it was constructed by the West. Her 
work reveals for instance how the United States constructed the discourse over Western interven-
tion in the Balkans as primarily a European responsibility referring to the region being part of 
Europe’s “turf” as well arguing that the US had no available resources, thus combining material 
and Ideational discourses.303 Secondly, she shows how Slovenia was simultaneously constructed 
as part of Europe, and thus rightfully returned to European “Self”, whilst yet sufficiently Balkan 
to constitute the “Other”. Consequently, it was argued that the inclusion of Slovenia to Europe 
constituted a "bridge” between the two.304 
Hansen argues that poststructuralist discourse analysis, “built on Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva and 
Laclau and Mouffe, can be used to theorise the constructive relationship between representations 
of identity and foreign policies as suggested by heads of states, governments, opposition politi-
cians, the media and academics”.305 By ‘constructive relationship’ Hansen implies that discursive 
constructions of identity are both constitutive and product of foreign policy at the same time.306 
Moreover, foreign policy discourses (just as all policy discourses) are social in their nature 
because policymakers have to consider and address political opposition and public opinion when 
formulating these policies.307 In epistemological terms Hansen’s poststructuralist position con-
siders the relationship between identity and policy as discursive, but not causal. She argues that it 
is not possible to separate material and Ideational factors in foreign policy because they are 
inextricably linked and analysing discourse does not provide a tool for testing explanatory 
powers of these. However, DA can “expand upon as well as question causal scholarship”.308 
Hence, whilst DA is not a tool to test the relative explanatory power of the two approaches in 
                                                 
302 Hansen, Lene (2006), Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, Routledge, London 
303 Hansen (2006), pp. 31-32 
304 Hansen (2006), pp. 39-40 
305 Hansen (2006), p. xvii 
306 Hansen (2006), p. 23 
307 Hansen (2006), p. 28 
308 Hansen (2006), p. 18 
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comparative terms, it is a suitable tool for questioning the basic assumptions of Rationalist and 
Ideational frameworks. Lack of causality does not mean lack of scientific rigour. Thus, DA is 
well-suited and contributes to the aims of this thesis as one tool in a set of methodologies 
through testing the two approaches from various points of view. This contributes to the process 
of triangulation and through that process to the goal of testing the explanatory powers of the two 
approaches, as well as the possibility to build a synthesis that encompasses parts of both. 
In terms of methodological and epistemological focus poststructuralist DA prioritises primary 
texts produced by authorised speakers in foreign policy; heads of states, foreign ministers, 
representatives of regional institutions and other political actors with formal authority to initiate 
and implement foreign policy. However, echoing Hansen I argue that primary texts are the 
priority, specifically in the sense that they represent the official and actionable foreign policy and 
thus, best reflect what is going on in the ‘real world’.309 However, as Rainer Hülsse has argued 
foreign policy making does not take place in a vacuum, but rather is a product of and is itself 
shaping the discourses around it.310 Consequently I believe that primary texts should be analysed 
in context of the wider discursive terrain.311 Moreover, whilst secondary texts bring in added 
objectivity to the study, they can also at times become primary texts.312 For instance Samuel 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations is so prominent in the Turkey-EU discourse that ignor-
ing it would not be wise. 
3.3.5 Research Design 
My discourse analysis follows a narrative of discourses relating to the Rationalist (primarily 
material) and Ideational themes, conditions and criteria of Australia’s and Turkey’s participation 
in regional integration in their respective regions. In the Rationalist framework these are primar-
ily references to economic, political, institutional and strategic (primarily security) conditions, 
                                                 
309 Hansen (2006), p. 5 
310 Hülsse (1999), p. 7 
311 Hansen (2006), p. 7 
312 Hansen (2006), pp. 82-83 
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criteria and above all costs and benefits in these categories. Within the context of the Ideational 
framework the focus of interest is in discourses built around the “regionness” of Australia and 
Turkey in the context of regional identities, cultural, religious and value differences. The primary 
texts are those produced by the authorised speakers in these topic, mainly official documents 
produced by the regional institutions and governments involved, as well as treaties, agreements, 
memorandums of understanding, evaluation reports and white and strategy papers. Secondly, the 
analysed material includes speech acts by authorised speakers – officials and respected commen-
tators – in forms of speeches and statements. At this point I would like to point out that the 
samples are by no means exhaustive, or even particularly extensive, but also that these are 
analysed in the context of much more extensive secondary materials covered in the literature 
review and the empirical research chapters. 
FPDA Research Process 
The FPDA analysis in chapters 5 and 7 proceeds in stages, beginning with the selection of texts 
based on a wider reading of materials in the context of the empirical research carried out prior to 
FPDA, then proceeding to the identification of the dominant discourses relevant in the selected 
key texts. These are subsequently systematically analysed using the NVivo qualitative analysis 
software package utilising coding of key words and phrases, which are then identified and 
located in the selected primary texts and then subsequently organised into thematic nodes. The 
research then proceeds to testing and modelling relationships between these in order to reveal 
patterns within the dominant discourses. All this is done in the context of the background pro-
vided by secondary texts and empirical research. The analysis also considers the intertextuality 
of the primary texts, i.e. that texts never give their full meaning, but rather build on other texts 
through explicitly or implicitly referring to other texts through direct quotes or borrowing key 
concepts and catchphrases. 313 Consequently, in order to properly accommodate for intertextual-
ity and the nuances of the wider discursive field I have chosen to utilise analytical coding, i.e. 
                                                 
313 Such as “Clash of Civilisations”, “avoiding a Clash of Civilisations”, “Bridge between Civilisations”, “losing 
Turkey”, “train wreck”, etc. Intertextuality is a concept first introduced by Julia Kristeva (1988). It relies on 
the notion that all texts make references to past texts, explicitly or implicitly. Hansen (2006, p. 57) points out 
that texts can claim legitimacy differently; some from quoting others and some from being quoted by others. 
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analysing the material while coding. Analytical coding equips the researcher to go beyond 
content analysis by not only considering the occurrence of a certain term or phrase in the mate-
rial but also deconstructing the meaning of the text in the wider context. This approach will also 
facilitate avoiding over-coding and organising the material into thematic nodes.314 
 
For instance the analysis of Ideational forces considers not only direct references to ”clash of 
civilizations”, but also the broader context of cultural differences as a factor in the case country – 
regional relations, in particular the process of ”othering”, such as emphasising the importance of 
dialogue between cultures in the context of Turkey-EU or Australia-East Asia relations. More-
over, in addition to traditional “othering” which tends to differentiate in a negative context, in 
both cases discourses building ”positive othering” were examined; for instance suggesting that 
the case countries would be establishing a ”bridge between civilizations”, e.g. implying that 
Turkey and Australia either belong into another civilization or that they are located along the 
borderlines of two intersecting civilizations. In the Turkey-EU case there is also the need to 
provide proof for the compatibility of Islam and democracy. 
                                                 
314 Richards, Lyn (2005), Handling Qualitative Data, SAGE Publications, London, pp. 94-95 
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In a similar manner the analysis of Rationalist forces, whilst focusing primarily on arguments 
built around the costs and benefits of enlargement in particular but also Regionalism in general, 
also considers extentions of the Rationalist agenda beyond the issue of “club benefits” and the 
process of integration by including the sometimes rather speculative arguments based on per-
ceived long-term benefits. These long-term benefits supposedly override short-term costs and so-
called negative externalities and therefore override the prevailing cost-benefit calculations 
altogether. Thus, in addition to the strict rational choice approach, a “thin Rationalist” approach 
promoted by mainly liberal and secularist actors in the regions are also accounted for. I anticipate 
that in this regard the rational and Ideational approaches will intersect in a variety of topics under 
discussion.. In order to accommodate for such instances the chapters utilising FPDA (5&7), 
whilst distinctive in coding, have an identical structure of nodes, and in fact many free nodes are 
the same. 
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Figure 1. Common Nodes for Chapters 5&7 
 
Further details regarding nodes and coding are provided in Appendices C, D, E and F. 
In terms of further limitations it should be pointed out that only English language texts are 
utilised. This decision was made based on a judgement that texts using the same language are 
simply more comparable, whilst when using two or more the dangers of missing or misinterpret-
ing nuances of meaning from one language to another are great in translating, even if the re-
searcher is somewhat fluent in those. 
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3.3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the research design for this thesis, as well as the rationale for the choice 
of a methodological mix that not only accommodates the two alternative approaches – the 
Rationalist and the Ideational-. Crucially it also facilitates the testing of their explanatory powers 
and the possibilities for establishing a synthesis of these that would enhance our ability to under-
stand the drivers and limits of Regionalism through a critical examination of the ‘problem of 
borderline states’. 
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Chapter 4: Rationalist Analysis of Turkey’s EU 
Accession Prospects 
4.1 Introduction 
We have already shown in the course of this thesis that a clear dichotomy exists between the 
Rationalist and Ideational approaches to the concept of Regionalism. This also applies to the 
analysis of Turkey’s relationship with the European Union (EU). Whereas some of the work in 
this field concedes the importance of the other position, the majority of the analysis exclusively 
emphasises one approach. The Rationalist analysis on Turkish membership prospects in the EU 
tends to emphasise almost exclusively the material aspects of the process, in particular the 
perceived material costs and benefits of membership for the EU and Turkey. 315Hence, much of 
the analysis concentrates on determining whether Turkey fulfils the economic and political 
criteria as defined by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, which states the political and 
economic criteria for prospective candidate countries (“the Copenhagen criteria”).316 The strict 
Rationalist thinking on Turkey’s EU prospects correspond with the official line of the EU; 
Turkey has been an official candidate since the 1999 Helsinki Summit and the December 2004 
Copenhagen European Council decided to start official negotiations towards accession with 
Turkey, following a positive assessment by the European Commission. As long as Turkey fulfils 
the requirements set forward in the Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession Partnership it will 
become a full member of the EU. The disagreement amongst Rationalists is thus mainly over 
whether Turkey meets the set political and economic criteria. 
Another central theme in Rationalist analysis is the, often highly speculative, cost/benefit calcu-
lations modelled on Mattli’s logic of integration or the economic “club theory”. The most com-
mon topics for such analysis are assessments on the impact of Turkey’s membership on 
                                                 
315 The power of ideas is often recognised as playing a role in regional integration but is generally treated as a 
secondary factor, not as an independent causal factor 
316 The Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 was created in particular to accommodate the accession process of the 
former Eastern Bloc countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
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economic integration, trade, the EU budget, working of regional institutions, common foreign 
and security policy and migration. This chapter aims at providing an analysis of these areas 
central to the Rationalist approach in order to estimate the potential costs and benefits of Tur-
key’s accession, and since the Rationalist approach dictates that accession will only take place if 
benefits are higher than costs317, also the prospects for a successful accession. Again the basic 
assumption is that the EU (and its member states) is a rational agent and thus, as long as the 
benefits of the Turkish accession are perceived to override the cost Turkey will be permitted 
entry to the Union. The debate about Turkey’s ”Europeanness” and its conformity to European 
values is considered to be of secondary value in Rationalist analysis and is not given significant 
attention beyond questions such as democracy and human rights, which are part of the member-
ship criteria. 
4.2 Turkey’s Accession to Full Membership 
Turkey’s path toward EU membership has been a long and rugged one. Turkey first expressed 
interest in joining the European community in the very beginning of the European integration 
project in the 1950s and consequently applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) 
in 1959, only a year after its inception. Instead of being granted full membership Turkey was 
offered an association agreement and consequently ”the Ankara Agreement” was signed in 1963. 
After a long period of cooling relations, Turkey and the EU signed a Customs Union treaty in 
1995 thus taking Turkey closer to full membership. Subsequently in 1997 Turkey again applied 
for full membership in the EU, which was accepted by the 1999 Helsinki European Council after 
a favourable assessment by the European Commission, thus making Turkey an official candidate. 
In December 2004 the Copenhagen European Council took the process to the next step by 
deciding to open membership negotiations with Turkey (negotiations officially opened in 2005). 
This section focuses on examining the EU membership criteria and in particular how Turkey 
meets these requirements. The analysis thus covers Turkey’s progress towards meeting the 
                                                 
317 However, as established earlier in the thesis, Mattli argues that in some cases the existence of negative 
externalities resulting from turning down a candidate can override this logic even if costs are deemed higher 
than benefits 
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Copenhagen Criteria, the objectives set in the formal accession process and specific contentious 
issues that must be solved prior to accession, such as the thorny Cyprus issue. The data primarily 
used for the analysis comprises the annual progress reports by the European Commission and 
other EU institutions, as well as independent analysis by think tanks, international organisations, 
research institutes and advocacy groups. 
4.2.1 The Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession Process 
The EU’s criteria towards new members are best described as a three tier system. Firstly, the 
most basic condition for membership is stated in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht Article 49318, 
which sets the geographic and general political criteria by stating that membership is open to any 
European state that respects the principles of the EU. The treaty does not, however, in any 
detailed manner define what the borders of Europe are and what qualifies as ‘respect’ for EU’s 
principles. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) clarified the founding principles of the EU by 
stating that:”the Union is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights, and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
member states”.319 Compliance criteria for the candidate states were established in the 1993 
“Copenhagen Criteria”. However, as to the “Europeanness” of the candidate countries the deci-
sion is ultimately made on a case-by-case basis, based on the recommendation by the European 
Commission, and decided by the European Council. The results of this process, however, have 
been somewhat inconsistent. For instance Morocco’s membership application was turned down 
in 1993 after 6 years of consideration on the basis that the country was not ‘European’, where as 
the ‘Europeanness’ of Cyprus was never questioned, although it is widely considered Middle 
Eastern or Asian. Whilst Cyprus thus is not European geographically, it was nonetheless consid-
ered such due to its historical, cultural and political links with Europe. Thus, whilst arguably 
vague, the first tier is nonetheless important as negotiations are started only with states that fulfil 
                                                 
318 The Treaty of the European Union, a.k.a. “The Maastricht Treaty”, full text available at: 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichteu.pdf, date accessed: 12 February, 2007 
319 Available online at http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf, date accessed 14 February, 2007 
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this basic condition. Turkey has passed this milestone test, in fact many times; notably, first 
when Council of Europe in 1949 admitted it to the organisation, thus qualifying it as a European 
state, and then when it was approved as a candidate country by the European Council in the 
December 1999 Helsinki Summit. The last major milestone was passed when on 31 October 
2005 the EU officially confirmed the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. 
The second tier is slightly more specific and intended to provide a framework for more detailed 
membership criteria. This so-called ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ was initiated when the 1993 Copen-
hagen European Council decided that to join the EU, a new Member State must meet three 
criteria: 1) Political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) Economic: existence of a functioning 
market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union; 3) Legislative: acceptance of the Community acquis (acquis communitaire), ability to 
take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic 
and monetary union. The Council’s conclusions also established a fourth de facto condition for 
enlargement, i.e. The Union's capacity to absorb new members without losing the momentum of 
European integration. In this spirit the Council concluded that: "The Union's capacity to absorb 
new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important 
consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries”.320 The 
concept has created much debate on what this "absorption capacity” precisely means in practice 
and how it relates to Turkish accession. Consequently, it has raised strong suspicions that it may 
be used as a pretext to deny Turkey's membership, regardless whether it meets the Copenhagen 
Criteria and fulfils its Accession Partnership requirements. Moreover, it has also opened doors to 
suggestions that offering Turkey a “privileged partnership” instead of full membership would be 
a viable option that the EU should consider pursuing. For instance, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, a Christian Democrat and sceptic of Turkish membership, has been one of the most 
influential and vocal advocates of such an arrangement. These positions reflect a climate of 
                                                 
320 European Council in Copenhagen 2003, “Conclusions of the Presidency”,  Available online: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf 
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enlargement 'fatigue' and scepticism that formed after the 'big bang' CEEC-10, and was further 
reinforced after the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in the Union.321 
A report by the European Parliament chaired by a Finnish member of the European Parliament 
Alexander Stubb in November 2006 sought to clarify what 'absorption capacity' is and recog-
nised that the EU currently has difficulties to honour its commitments towards South-East 
European countries. The report goes on to argue that the EU should honour its commitments, but 
that it currently has trouble doing so due to the fact that the institutional, financial and policy 
structures of the EU are unsuitable for maintaining what it calls “integration capacity” in the EU. 
It reinstates the January and June 2006 resolutions of the European Parliament to have 'a period 
of reflection' to clarify the 'structure, subjects and context for an assessment of the debate on the 
European Union' and calls for the European Commission to clarify the principle on which 'ab-
sorption capacity' is based upon. Furthermore, it proposes renaming it 'integration capacity', 
which in its view reflects more accurately the spirit of the concept. According to the report 
integration capacity presupposes three major conditions: 1) The European institutions will be 
able to function properly and take decisions efficiently and democratically in accordance with 
their specific procedures, 2) the financial resources of the union will be sufficiently adequate to 
finance its activities, 3) the Union will be able to successfully develop its policies and attain its 
goals, in order to pursue its political project.322 The report proposes institutional reforms in order 
to attain this goal. It subsequently correctly points out that these reforms were already part of the 
proposed Constitutional Treaty that was rejected by the French and Dutch referendums.323 
Finally, the report stresses that ‘integration capacity’ is not a new condition for membership, but 
that rather the responsibility falls on the EU to maintain such capacity, not the candidates. Hence, 
in principal level at least integration capacity should not have adverse implications for Turkey’s 
                                                 
321 Durand, Guillame and Antonio Missiroli (2006),  “Absorption Capacity: old wine in new bottles?”, ECP 
Policy Brief, September 2006, European Policy Centre, Brussels, p. 2 
322 European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs (2006), “Report on the institutional aspects of the 
European Union’s capacity to integrate new Member States”, Rapporteur Alexander Stubb, Brussels, p. 6 
323 Consequent to this setback an amended “Reform Treaty” was proposed in June 2007, which was signed under 
the name The Treaty of Lisbon in the Lisbon European Council in December 2007. However, an Irish referen-
dum in June 2008 rejected the Treaty of Lisbon thus putting its future in doubt too. 
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membership aspirations. The European Parliament, however, has stressed the importance of 
institutional and financial conditions for Turkey’s membership that need to be met before acces-
sion is allowed. 
Turkey’s quest to meet the Copenhagen Criteria has been a challenging, but not impossible task. 
An analysis of European Commission progress reports (1998-2006)324 for Turkey reveals that 
meeting the economic criteria is not the primary problem, but rather the major areas of contesta-
tion are in the areas of politics and human rights. Albeit concerns remain in particular in relation 
to macroeconomic stability, Turkey receives a mainly positive assessment from the European 
Commission in terms of economic criteria. This is mainly due to the existence of the Customs 
Union, which has resulted in Turkey having deeper and broader trade integration than other 
candidates (with the exception of the 1995 enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden) in the 
past. Moreover, the Turkish economy has the basic characteristics of a market economy and has 
the potential to cope with market pressures. Turkey also remains closely aligned to the European 
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) framework and has actively taken part in field 
missions in Europe and the Middle East. However, whilst Turkey now, according to the Euro-
pean Commission, sufficiently meets the political criteria, major problems remain in the political 
aspects of the accession process that fall under the larger umbrella of Copenhagen political 
criteria. Hence, the main challenge in achieving successful accession for Turkey is to rectify 
these critical problem areas. 
The Accession Process 
The third tier is the actual accession process which sets out a number of mandatory technical 
requirements that must be implemented prior to accession being allowed. The basic principles of 
the accession to EU membership were set by the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 in 
preparation for the CEEC-10 “Eastern enlargement”. The primary instrument for preparing 
candidate countries towards full membership was to be an “Accession Partnership” agreement, 
                                                 
324 Regular progress reports on Turkey by the European Commission started in 1998 and they have been carried 
out annually since then. 
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which would contain a pre-accession strategy and technical and financial assistance to guide 
candidate countries towards membership.325 Turkey’s accession to the European Union member-
ship is guided by an Accession Partnership originally introduced in 2001, and later consequently 
revised in 2003 and 2005 (entered in force in January 2006). The revised Accession Partnership 
(AP) sets priorities for the reform process in Turkey and the progress of these reforms is moni-
tored and measured against implementation of the AP. This task is assigned to the European 
Commission, which produces regular progress reports (annual) to the European Parliament and 
the European Council. The main priority set for Turkey was meeting the Copenhagen criteria 
with short- and medium-term priorities detailed in the AP. As part of the process Turkey is 
expected to develop a time schedule within a given framework that sets the timeline for short-
term goals to one to two years and for medium-term goals to three to four years. The short-term 
priorities in the current AP include democracy and the rule of law, human rights and the protec-
tion of minorities, civil and political rights, economic and social rights and the ability to assume 
the obligations of membership. The medium-term priorities are related to the economic criteria 
and ability to assume the obligations of membership (for instance financial services, social policy 
and employment).326 
In terms of comparison to other candidate countries the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, 
which granted Turkey candidate country status, decided that it would be treated the same as other 
candidates, in particular the CEEC-10 countries.327 The Helsinki European Council meeting 
concluded that: 
“Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same 
criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing Euro-
                                                 
325 The Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 decided that Turkey would be offered an Accession 
Partnership (AP) to guide it towards membership.  
326 The European Council, “Council Decision of 23 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions 
contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey (2006/35/EC)”, available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkey/key_documents_en.htm, date accessed: 23 March, 2007. 
327 Akçakoca, Amanda (2006), “EU-Turkey relations 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment?”, ECP 
Issue Papers, No. 50, European Policy Centre, Brussels, p. 8 
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pean Strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-
accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.”328 
Harun Arikan, however, has argued that Turkey did not initially receive the same package of 
accession instruments as the CEEC-10 did within the context of the Europe Agreements329, 
arguing that the lack of accession instruments are designed towards containment and a final goal 
of a “privileged relationship”, rather than granting Turkey a full membership.330 Moreover, the 
package of accession instruments offered to Turkey was simply inadequate for post-Maastricht 
integration331, and neither Turkey nor the EU were able to meet their obligations.332 
Then again, original agreements never worked, including the Athens Agreement with Greece or 
Europe Agreements with the CEEC-10. However, these were upgraded to meet the demands of 
the candidate countries and always aimed towards a fixed accession goal of ultimate full mem-
bership.333 In Turkey’s case no such commitment exists, but instead the process is defined as "an 
open-ended process of accession, outcomes of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand”, i.e. no 
guarantee of membership is given even if all conditions are met.334 As Arikan too admits, how-
ever, the instruments for Turkish accession were updated in 2005 in the revised Accession 
Partnership agreement to a point where the whole process now is more genuine, even though it 
remains open-ended.335 
In terms of tackling the chapters, Turkey has opened and closed only one so far. The first chap-
ter, Science and Technology, was concluded in June 2006. In addition to the eight chapters that 
                                                 
328 European Commission (2003), “Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession”, Brussels, p. 4 
329 Arikan, Harun (2006), Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?, 2nd Edition, 
Aldershot, Ashgate,  p. 53 
330 Arikan (2006), p. 49 
331 Arikan (2006), p. 50 ; a view supported by the EP’s ”Stubb Report” on integration capacity 
332 Arikan (2006), p. 54 
333 Ibid 
334 Arikan (2006), pp. 227-228 
335 Arikan (2006), p. 238 
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have been frozen, it has also been impossible to open five other chapters – agriculture and rural 
development, social policy and employment, economic and monetary policy, financial control, 
and enterprise and industrial policy due to blocking by the Republic of Cyprus, demonstrating 
the problem for Turkey deriving from the fact that opening and closing chapters requires an 
unanimous agreement by all member states.336 
Table 3. Chapters of Acquis Required for Turkey’s Accession 
1. Free movement of goods  
2. Freedom of movement for workers  
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services  
4. Free movement of capital  
5. Public procurement  
6. Company law  
7. Intellectual property law  
8. Competition policy  
9. Financial services  
10. Information society and media  
11. Agriculture and rural development  
12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy  
13. Fisheries  
14. Transport policy  
15. Energy  
16. Taxation  
17. Economic and monetary policy  
18. Statistics  
19. Social policy and employment1  
20. Enterprise and industrial policy  
21. Trans-European networks  
22. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments  
23. Judiciary and fundamental rights  
24. Justice, freedom and security  
25. Science and research  
26. Education and culture  
27. Environment  
28. Consumer and health protection  
29. Customs union  
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30. External relations  
31. Foreign, security and defence policy  
32. Financial control  
33. Financial and budgetary provisions  
34. Institutions  
35. Other issues  
 
In addition to this, and in support of Arikan’s argument, it appears that different priorities were 
given to Turkey than the CEEC-10 countries in terms of satisfying the acquis and closing chap-
ters. The following table demonstrates that the priorities of the CEEC-10 countries were very 
much geared towards closing the income disparity with the EU by tackling issues that contrib-
uted to economic growth issues and integrating these countries into the common market. As 
already shown, Turkey’s priorities place far more emphasis upon the political criteria, in particu-
lar human rights and fundamental freedoms and the treatment of minorities. This, however, is not 
wrong as such, as accession strategy needs to be tailored to country specific needs in order to be 
successful, but nonetheless it again demonstrates that Turkey is a ‘different’ candidate with 
economic and other ‘rational’ benefits weighting less than political criteria, in particular issues of 
political culture and values. Nonetheless, as the World Bank 2006 report on Turkey has correctly 
pointed out, despite the different starting position Turkey has in comparison to the CEEC-10 
countries, the efficient handling of the acquis is instrumental for a successful accession proc-
ess.337Moreover, given its starting position, Turkey may need to think and work beyond the 
acquis in terms of carrying out structural reforms if it intends to be in accession condition by 
2015.338 
                                                 
337 World Bank (2006), Turkey Country Economic Memorandum (2006) – Promoting Sustained Growth and 
Convergence with the European Union, pp. 13-14, available online at: 
http://www.worldbank.org.tr/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TURKEYEXTN/0,,contentMD
K:20835932~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:361712,00.html. Date accessed: 8 March, 2007 
338 World Bank (2006), pp. 13-14 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
114 
Table 4. Negotiation of the Acquis – CEEC-10 Priorities 
 
Source: World Bank, Turkey: Country Economic Memorandum (2006): Promoting Sustained Growth and Conver-
gence with the European Union, p. 14 
Political Criteria 
Turkey has progressively turned into a functioning democracy following a long period of re-
forms since the establishment of the republic. The political system in Turkey could be best 
described as a secular parliamentary representative system, largely similar to the Western Euro-
pean models in its characteristics. In fact the political system and institutions have been tradi-
tionally (in the post-Ottoman era) modelled after the French system, further strengthened by the 
recent reforms intended to align the political system even further with the EU. Turkey, like any 
young democracy, has certainly had its share of setbacks and challenges in the forms of military 
coups339 and military interference in politics, political instability and crises. Despite such politi-
cal problems Turkey is not substantially different in this respect from many European countries, 
especially the new members from the East of Europe such as Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover, 
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the reform process in Turkey has sustained itself for a number of years and is likely to continue, 
if not intensify, towards accession. Some analysts have optimistically concluded that the political 
changes are too deep and broad to be reversed.340 Hence, it would be reasonably safe to assume 
that Turkey will continue the reforms and eventually fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. The 
country has certainly made considerable progress in particular over the last four years. However, 
whilst the European Commission concluded in its 2006 progress report that Turkey ‘sufficiently’ 
fulfils the political criteria341, it is still to reach that milestone to the level required for accession 
due to persistent shortcomings in critical areas. 
Measuring Turkey’s Progress toward meeting the Copenhagen Criteria 
This section consists of analysis of the European Commission 2006 Turkey Progress Report, the 
European Parliament Turkey Progress Report 2006 and various secondary sources. The basis for 
this analysis, however, is the report by the European Commission, which concluded that whilst 
the basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, it still falls short in its efforts to uphold 
the rights of the individual and freedom of expression to EU standards. Moreover, there are still 
major shortcomings in the treatment of minorities, persistent human rights violations and civilian 
control over the military is not yet satisfactory. 
First of all, it needs to be recognised that progress has been made in many areas of the Copenha-
gen political criteria, including in human rights, respect for and treatment of minorities and the 
respect for individual freedoms. Some of the most important reforms towards this goal include; 
the government has adopted a zero tolerance on torture, significantly reducing the occurrence of 
torture in official detention centres; the implementation of moratorium on death penalty, which 
has led to the abandonment of implementation of death penalty during times of peace; the ban on 
using other languages than Turkish in public broadcasting has now been lifted and broadcasts in 
Kurdish language are now permitted; the new penal code introduced in 2005 improved women’s 
                                                 
340 Akçakoca, Amanda, Fraser Cameron and Eberhard Rhein (2004), “Turkey – Ready for the EU?”, ECP Issue 
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rights and established new controls on torture; a law for the establishment of an ombudsman was 
also passed; the National Security Council, traditionally beyond civilian political control, is now 
under civilian leadership and stripped of its executive powers, making it mainly a consultative 
body342. 
However, despite these positive developments, considerable shortcomings still persist in a 
number of critical fields, in particular concerning the practical implementation of otherwise 
progressive reforms. Firstly, whilst the cases of torture have been declining in detention centres, 
cases are still reported outside these facilities, as well as to a greater extent in the country’s 
troubled southeast. Secondly, the use of minority languages, primarily Kurdish, in media and 
education is seriously hampered by restrictions regarding length and content of broadcast, as well 
as technical requirements such as demanding the use of subtitles (in Turkish) in all programs 
except songs, thus making live broadcast cumbersome. Consequently, the use of Kurdish lan-
guage in public broadcasts remains limited. Also, the private institutes teaching Kurdish lan-
guage have been banned from operating. Finally, only Turkish language is allowed in political 
life, including accessing public services. 
The treatment of minorities in general in Turkey, also remains questionable due to the govern-
ment’s state of denial regarding the extent and nature of ethnic minorities in Turkey. The Turkish 
government has based its position on national minorities on the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, argu-
ing that minorities in Turkey consist exclusively of non-Muslim religious communities, namely 
Jews, Armenians and Greeks. The minority Muslim sects, such as the Alevis and Yezidis are still 
not recognised, nor are other minority religious groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses. More to 
the point, this position, in practice, ignores Kurds that form an estimated 20% of the total Turk-
ish population and many other minorities such as the Roma that number about 2 million in 
Turkey. 
Thirdly, Article 301, which penalises insulting “Turkishness”, the Republic or the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, continues to seriously limit the freedom of expression and the formation of a 
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European style political culture in Turkey. According to British MEP Richard Howitt there are 
currently 80 cases pending for prosecution based on Article 301.343 The best known cases in the 
past have included such authors as Orhan Pamuk, 2005 Nobel Prize in Literature winning novel-
ist who wrote about the Armenian genocide and the Kurds in Anatolia (an issue that has gained 
additional attention, and caused additional friction, after the French law making the denial of the 
Armenian genocide a crime, in 2005) and Hrant Dink, who wrote about Armenian identity. The 
charges against Pamuk were dropped after extensive international pressure in January 2006. 
Dink, on the other hand, received a six month suspended sentence, but was tragically shot dead 
in January 2007 by a lone gunman. Moreover, despite some progress made in comparison to 
previous years the freedom of the press in Turkey still remains considerably lower than in the 
EU-27 according to the Worldwide Press Freedom Index by the Reporters sans Frontières. 
Turkey ranked 98th in the 2006 index (in comparison to previous years; 98th in 2005, 113th in 
2004, 115th in 2003 and 99th in 2002), whereas Poland and Romania, the worst ranking countries 
in EU-27, shared the 58th position. Otherwise the EU-27 countries were located in the in top 
40.344 Fourthly, labour unions are still not able to organise themselves to an extent that would 
meet the ILO standards. 
Finally, the military is still intervening in politics with senior officers making strong comments 
about domestic politics, reflecting its unwillingness to give up its traditional role as the guardians 
of secular Turkey. Moreover, the Chiefs of Staff maintain a special role, reporting directly to the 
Prime Minister instead of the Minister for Defence, and there is no civilian control of the military 
during times of war.345 
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The European Parliament’s Report on Turkey’s Progress: Voices of 
Discontent 
The European Parliament’s report on Turkey’s progress towards accession,346which angered the 
Turkish government (and public), is somewhat more critical towards Turkey and the progress 
reported by the European Commission. Firstly, the European Parliament expresses its concerns 
over the new anti-terror law, which has reintroduced certain elements already removed by past 
reforms that undermine the progress made in fundamental rights and human rights. Some of 
these elements include the extension of crimes that fall under the law, creating fears that the new 
law could be used as a pretext to crack down on other ‘undesired’ elements.347 In the same spirit, 
the new Penal Code receives criticism due to articles allowing arbitrary interpretation by judges 
and prosecutors relating to cases of freedom of press and expression.348In relation to torture, the 
report points out that whilst there may have been considerable progress on this issue, it cannot be 
sufficiently monitored and confirmed due to the absence of a viable and functioning independent 
monitoring system in the detention centres.349 The status of reforms on human rights receives an 
even stauncher condemnation: [The European Parliament] “Deplores the fact that only limited 
progress has been reported over the last year as regards fundamental rights and freedoms; con-
demns violations of human rights and freedoms and constraints on the exercise of those rights 
and freedoms”.350 The same tough line applies to the status of freedom of religions, where the 
European Parliament also ’deplores the absence of progress’.351 Moreover, the European Parlia-
ment has demanded that Turkey acknowledges the Armenian genocide and states that it consid-
ers such a move as a precondition for accession.352 Finally, it demands the suspension of 
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negotiations in case of serious and persistent breaches relating to the principles of democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law or the principles of interna-
tional law in Turkey.353 
The Cyprus Issue 
The division of the island of Cyprus since 1974 to two isolated communities in the north and 
south (Turkish in the north and Greek in the south) following the occupation of the northern part 
of the island by Turkey has been an issue of contestation between Turkey and several EU mem-
ber states for decades. However, the issue has gained further impetus since 2004 when the 
Republic of Cyprus (the southern Greek part of the island) joined the EU and the Greek Cypriots 
rejected the UN plan for reunification the same year. Moreover, whilst Turkey signed the Addi-
tional Protocol, a.k.a. the Ankara Agreement, in July 2005 in order to accommodate for the then 
looming official candidate status, it has since refused to ratify it, as well as acknowledge that it 
obligates Turkey to recognise the Republic of Cyprus.354 This refusal immediately raised strong 
condemnation from the EU that Turkey was in breach of the protocol and the Customs Union, 
which included the extension of the Customs Union to the new EU member states, now including 
the Republic of Cyprus. The EU sternly demanded that Turkey meet its obligations stated in the 
protocol in full and open its air and seaports to Greek Cypriot planes and ships by the end of the 
year, or risk driving the negotiations to a stalemate. Despite the attempts by the Finnish Presi-
dency to find an acceptable compromise, including promoting a proposal to open the Turkish 
Cypriot port of Famagusta under EU or UN control in exchange for Turkey opening its ports and 
airports to Greek Cypriot traffic, the situation came into a deadlock and in December 2006 the 
EU suspended 8 of a total of 35 chapters. Whilst a major setback in the negotiations, at least the 
feared total ‘train wreck’, i.e. the suspension of accession partnership in totality as advocated by 
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the opponents of the Turkish accession, did not happen and the accession process continues, 
albeit with decreased speed and increased uncertainty. 
A lasting settlement of the issue, however, is unlikely in the near future. This is in part due to the 
persistent hostilities between the parties involved, political realities and at least on the surface 
completely opposing understanding between Turkey and the EU on how to approach the issue. 
The Turkish side has alleged that the whole Cyprus issue is an excuse to deny Turkey accession 
and that it is the EU that has defaulted on its promises. 355The Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah 
Gül, for instance, has stated that; “It is not possible for us to accept the EU acting in a way that is 
contrary to the core and spirit of our relations by hiding behind various excuses such as the 
Cyprus issue”356 Ali Babacan, the Minister of State for Economy and Turkey’s Chief Negotiator 
with the EU, has also speculated that the real issue was EU’s preoccupation with ‘domestic’ 
issues such as unemployment, fading competitiveness and social problems357.Turkish prime 
minister Recep Tayyip Erdoĝan has also alleged that the EU has not done its part and has not 
ended the isolation of Turkish northern Cyprus. Moreover, he has stated that Turkey will not 
change its policy stance on Cyprus.358 These claims have some merit to them, at least in the 
sense that the problem is now decades old and Turkey’s position has certainly been well known 
to the EU decision-makers, and yet Turkey was granted candidate status in 1999 and accession 
process started officially in 2005. The sceptics would then ask why the issue then ‘suddenly’ 
became a deal breaker only as late as July 2006. Yet, Turkey was unequivocal about its refusal to 
recognise the Republic of Cyprus, a position that in 2006 became serious enough to threaten the 
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suspension of the accession partnership.359 Why the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus was 
not made a precondition for the accession partnership? 
Whilst it is clear that the issue must be resolved prior to Turkey’s accession, the implications of 
the Cyprus issue on Turkey’s accession process in the short-term have apparently been some-
what exaggerated, at least the gloomy predictions of a “train wreck” or a “deadlock” did not 
materialize. This is also evident from the level of EU’s ‘punishment’ towards Turkey. First of all, 
the process is not one of negotiations but rather a process of adopting the acquis unilaterally as a 
given. Hence, there is actually no immediate need for EU participation in the process but instead 
Turkey can continue unilaterally working on reforms. Secondly, even if eight chapters concern-
ing trade and external relations are now frozen, and as such cannot be open or closed, there are 
still 27 chapters that Turkey could in principal complete regardless. Hence, the ‘punishment’ 
placed on Turkey does not impede the continuation of reforms, nor does it necessarily even delay 
accession. Turkey’s chief negotiator Ali Babacan has indicated that Turkey will do just that and 
will continue with reforms that are of benefit to Turkey with or without EU membership.360 
Moreover, judging from recent media reports, the ‘deadlock’ did not last long with the enterprise 
and industry chapter having been opened in March 2007 and three more chapters likely to be 
opened by the end of June.361 The issue, however, would by default need to be solved eventually, 
prior to the accession. The fact is that a country that does not recognise all member states cannot 
become a member itself. 
4.3 Economy and Trade 
As noted earlier in this chapter meeting the economic criteria should not be a major hurdle for 
Turkey’s accession. The country in general terms has a functioning market economy and its 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union has been 
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strengthened through economic integration with the EU, in particular through the Customs 
Union. Turkey’s economy, however, has historically been subject to volatility and its per capita 
income levels are substantially below EU averages. The opponents of Turkey’s membership 
have thus argued that the economic costs may be substantial due to the level of financial assis-
tance required to stabilise and sustain economic growth in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey’s 
economy has great potential and may become a source of growth and vitality for the EU. Conse-
quently, this section will focus on examining the strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish econ-
omy, whilst the next section will more specifically address the question of financial cost of 
Turkey’s membership. 
Turkey’s Economy: Great Potential and Persistent Volatility 
Turkey’s economy can be characterised as a fundamentally young market economy with a 
history of problems, challenges and crises, but also considerable potential for sustained rapid 
growth. On the one hand, the volatility of the Turkish economy is high in international compari-
son with major endemic economic crisis taking place numerous times during the past 50 years, 
the last one in 2001 causing a 7.5% decrease in the GDP362 and inflation to reach around 70%, 
interest rates reaching 400% and a public debt above 90% of GDP.363 On the other hand, Turkey 
recovered rapidly from the crisis and was one of the fastest growing countries in the world in 
already in 2004 with annual growth reaching up to 8 percent in recent years.364 This recovery has 
been possible due to radical economic reforms that have resulted in a new more constructive 
policy mix that has included tight fiscal and monetary policies and the adoption of a flexible 
exchange rate regime. In addition, The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey that has been 
independent since 2001 has engaged in targeting inflation in order to lower and stabilise it.365 
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Assuming increasing macroeconomic stability and the continuation of the reforms Turkey could 
plausibly become a 'tiger' economy on par with those in East Asia. This would assume that 
Turkey could utilise its tremendous demographic potential of a young population towards gener-
ating economic growth, with some 30% of the total population being under the age of 15 and 
20% belonging in the 15-24 age group. Some analysts have suggested that Turkey could enter a 
'golden age' around 2010 if it manages to utilise this demographic potential by creating an active 
young population integrated in the workforce (active population as a ratio of total popula-
tion).366Given Turkey’s geographic location close to the markets in the Middle East and the 
Caucasus, as well as its large domestic market, the country certainly has great potential to do 
it.367 
The Persistent Challenges of the Turkish Economy 
As stated already, in the past such sustainable growth has been held back macroeconomic and 
financial instability including high inflation, large public deficits, current account crises and high 
public debt. If Turkey wishes to utilise its potential to achieve sustainable high growth it has to 
break this 'boom and bust' cycle of its economy. Currently macroeconomic stability and sustain-
able economic growth is still a target rather than a reality due to the number of structural weak-
nesses in the Turkish economy. 
First of all, there is a duality in force in the Turkish economy with sharp divisions existing 
between modern and traditional sectors in the economy and various regions of the country. The 
modern sector is a high-performance economy with high levels of productivity in services, 
construction and industry, on par with the CEEC-10 countries. However, approximately half of 
the working population is in effect untouched by the modern sector with approximately 33% of 
the total workforce being employed in the agricultural sector, which accounts for 14% of GDP, 
and a large additional portion of the population either engaged in the informal 'black economy' or 
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being unemployed. The service sector currently accounts for 48 % of total employment and 57 % 
of the GDP.368 The income disparity between the rich and the poor regions also represents a 
problem. Whilst Turkey as a whole is at about 29% of the EU-25 average in terms of income per 
capita, the poor regions are well below the national average, with the poorest regions producing 
less than one-fourth of the GDP per capita than the richer ones.369 For instance, East Anatolia has 
an income level of only 28% of the national average. In the extremely rich regions, such as 
Marmara (Istanbul) and Aegean income levels of 153% and 130% compared to the national 
average are to be found.370 Taking into consideration Turkey’s low level of economic develop-
ment and the wide income gap between rich and poor regions, its accession would increase the 
income disparity in the EU. In comparison, the CEEC-10 had 44 % of the average EU income in 
1997 but due to rapid sustained economic growth progressed to having 50% levels in 2005.371 
Secondly, the active working population is still much too small with active population being only 
about 44% of the total working age population (compared to about 55% in the CEEC-10 coun-
tries and 64.4% in EU-15), leaving a large proportion of the population outside the formal 
economy, mainly women and an estimated 20-50% working primarily in the informal 'black' 
economy.372 
Thirdly, public debt and the government budget deficit are also high and well above the targets 
of Maastricht Criteria at 8.4% and 8.8% of GDP respectively.373 Moreover, the large external 
current account deficit also represents a threat to macroeconomic stability and growth.374 
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Fourthly, whilst unemployment in Turkey is not at a particularly excessive level (10.8% in 
2004), the low levels of human capital is keeping unemployment up and is hindering the produc-
tivity of the economy. The low overall level of productivity again is consequently hindering the 
GDP per capita growth.375 Currently the average level of schooling for adults in Turkey is only 
4-5 years, whilst the mandatory minimum length has been now raised to eight years from five 
years previously.376 In general, Turkey has been faring poorly in international comparisons of 
education, in particular in terms of the quality and accessibility of primary and secondary educa-
tion. The quality of private schools and higher education institutions, however, is in general 
relatively good, making the human capital shortage most serious in the low- and middle-levels of 
the labour market, whilst as a sign of the educational duality the public administration and formal 
sector high-end benefit from a large pool of well educated recruits. 377 Moreover, the contribu-
tion of women in particular, but also the younger generations and workers from the poorer 
regions is relatively low in the economy, reflecting weak job creation in the economy’s formal 
sector.378 Integrating women, workers from the poor regions and the youth to the workforce in 
high-productivity sectors in the industry and services could gear the Turkish economy towards 
reaching the levels of the CEEC-10 countries, and eventually the EU average. 
Closing the income gap with the EU 
Whilst Turkey’s GDP per capita level is roughly similar to that of Bulgaria and Romania,379it has 
been catching up with the EU average considerably slower than the CEEC-10 countries did in 
the decade (1993-2003) prior to their accession.380In order to secure successful accession, Turkey 
needs to catch up with the EU-25 average much faster than it is doing currently. Currently the 
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GDP per capita in Turkey is only 29.1% of the EU-25 average.381 This is considerably lower than 
the level that the CEEC-10 countries had prior to accession, but not so in comparison to Bulgaria 
and Romania. 
The World Bank presents three growth scenarios for Turkey in its 2005 economic report on 
Turkey; a base-case scenario, high-case scenario and a low case scenario. According to the base-
case scenario the per capita income would increase to 34.2 % of the EU-25 by 2015, in high-case 
scenario to 40 % and in low-case only to 30.1 %. Assuming macroeconomic stability and the 
continuation of the reforms the high-case scenario should be well within Turkey's reach, even 
though fast population growth tends to slow down convergence of per capita GDP. The speed of 
convergence in high-case scenario would be 1.5, whereas only two Central and European coun-
tries had lower than that (Czech Republic 1.1 and Poland 1.4), whilst others had well above 2 
and two well over 3 (Estonia and Slovenia had 3.8).382 Given Turkey’s potential for growth, the 
high-case scenario should thus be at least plausible to reach. However, as already pointed out, 
such sustainable growth requires a well-functioning legal, administrative and physical infrastruc-
ture coupled with a stable political and macroeconomic environment.383 A stable political and 
macroeconomic environment can only be built with continuous reforms and sound policies that 
will address the structural problems in the Turkish economy, government and civil society. 
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Table 5. Per Capita Income Convergence New EU Member Countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2006), p. 37 
Trade with the European Union 
In General, Turkey has the benefit of both a large potential for trade, due to its large domestic 
market (in terms of the number of consumers and size of the workforce, less so in terms of 
buying potential), and a strategic location of close proximity to the markets in Middle Eastern 
and the Caucasus. Moreover, Turkey has a very advanced level of trade integration with the EU, 
owing to the Customs Union agreement with the EU, which has been in effect officially since 31 
December 1995. In terms of actual trade, the EU is by far the most important trade partner for 
Turkey. In 2005 47.9 percent of Turkey’s total external trade was with the EU (53.6 % of ex-
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ports, 50.1 % of imports), reaching a total value of € 75 billion. 384 In comparison, Turkey’s other 
important trade partners are far behind in volume; in second place is Russia (7.5%) followed by 
the United States (5.2%), China (3.1%) and Iran (2.1%).385 
The two-way trade has been growing rapidly reaching a total growth of 100 % during the 1995-
2002 period.386 Turkey’s external trade in general has also been growing, 24 percent per year but 
it is notable that 70 % of this growth came from the growth in trade with the EU.387 
The Customs Union is probably the most important single factor in trade creation between 
Turkey and the European Union, and a clear real strategic advantage in comparison to most 
candidate countries in the past (with the exception of Austria, Finland and Sweden, who were 
European Free Trade Association members and enjoyed the benefits of EC-EFTA framework). It 
has been estimated that 70 % of Turkish imports enter the EU free of duty and import barriers 
due to the Customs Union treaty. The exceptions are products that fall under protective measures 
as core products in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), namely products that are considered 
vital for farmers in the old member countries; cereals, processed cereals, sugar and sugar prod-
ucts, as well as dairy, meat and olive oil products. Moreover, Turkish vegetable and fruit prod-
ucts receive export subsidies under the current arrangement.388 The Customs Union treaty, 
however, excludes the free movement of people and services. 
Nonetheless, the Customs Union treaty is an important tool for Turkey to align itself with the EU 
towards accession as it is not limited to bilateral and third-party liberation of industrial tariffs. 
Turkey also has been expected to adopt a bulk of Community legislation, to participate in the 
elimination of technical non-tariff barriers to trade, protection of competition and harmonisation 
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of border procedures. In general, the Customs Union has had favourable impact on Turkey’s 
trade with the EU, although it has been running a constant deficit in the trade balance. Nonethe-
less, it has produced considerable trade creation and little trade diversion, and it has been esti-
mated that liberalisation of industrial tariffs alone has benefited Turkey at around 1% of GDP.389 
The Customs Union, however, is not a popular project in Turkey. It has gained a negative public 
perception as being unfair towards Turkey due to the constant deficit in bilateral trade. As such it 
has become a popular rallying point for the anti-EU camp, as well as the interconnected anti-
globalisation campaign.390 
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Table 6. Turkey’s Trade Growth 
 
Source: WEF/PWC 
Turkey is also an important trading partner for the EU, albeit to a somewhat lesser degree. 
Turkey is currently the 7th most important trading partner for the EU, ranking 6th in exports 
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(3.9%) and 7th in imports (2.8%).391 However, on the down side, Turkey is not a particularly 
important trading partner to individual EU countries, with the exception of Greece, Bulgaria and 
Romania, and Turkey's exports are not as concentrated on the EU as those of the CEEC-10.392 
Turkey is also less export oriented than the CEEC-10 countries, with exports accounting for 15-
16% of Turkey’s GDP, compared to 20% for Poland (which was the least open of the CEEC-10 
states).393 Turkey’s trade openness (share of exports and imports of GDP), however, increased 
considerably during the decade 1993-2003 from 33 % to 59 % to the benefit of Turkey's modern 
sector. Turkey also ranks relatively high in terms of trade in goods, whilst much unrealised 
potential remains in the services trade (excluding travel, where Turkey is already very competi-
tive).394 Turkey’s exports are particularly strong in transportation equipment and automobile 
parts.395 In terms of the ability to cope with competition in the common market, Turkey could 
find it hard to cope in this regard in certain service sectors, particularly in banking and insurance. 
On the other hand, Turkey still has considerable amount of time to reform and improve its 
competitiveness in these sectors prior to accession. Finally, Turkey would be a prominent com-
petitor in sectors such as textiles, apparel, cement and tourism.396 
Economic Impact of Turkey’s Membership 
Assessing the exact impact of adding Turkey’s economy to the EU in the long-term is problem-
atic and subject to a certain degree of speculation. However, one could assert with considerable 
certainty that in short- and medium-term the economic gains would be mainly for Turkey rather 
than for the EU. Turkey would benefit in particular from increased trade resulting from unlimited 
access to the internal market, including sectors not covered in the Customs Union, specifically 
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the agricultural products covered by CAP. This increased access to markets could potentially 
increase Turkey-EU trade by an additional 40 %.397 It is also very likely that the Turkish econ-
omy would grow substantially prior to accession as a result of intensifying reforms and increased 
investment closer to accession, and in particular immediately following accession. 
In terms of the level of economic development it is worth noting that Turkey is not substantially 
worse off than Bulgaria and Romania, and as such should by no means be unmanageable eco-
nomically for the EU to absorb. Moreover, where as Turkey’s economy corresponded to slightly 
less than 2% of EU-25 in 2004, it can reach approximately 4% of EU GDP by 2015, assuming 
that the average annual growth stabilises at about 5 % or more.398 
Considering the small size of the Turkish economy, the economic impact for the EU would be 
relatively small and would probably have a modest positive impact on EU GDP ranging between 
0.1 % and 0.3 %.399 In comparison, a European Commission study in 2001 predicted 1.3% 
additional growth for the CEEC-10 countries following accession and 0.5-0.7% for the EU-15.400 
These expectations were largely fulfilled, albeit with some disparity within the CEEC-10 group 
in particular. Moreover, the study predicted a loss of 0.1 % for the CEEC-10 if accession for 
some reason did not take place.401 
4.4 Impact on EU Budget – Financial cost of accession 
The opponents of Turkey’s membership in the EU frequently suggest that accession would be 
too costly in the form of transfers from the EU budget to Turkey. This line of argument follows 
closely Mattli’s logic of integration by attempting to calculate the material costs/benefits of 
Turkey’s accession to the EU, generally arguing that the cost would be too high. This is a con-
cern driven mainly by the current net contributors to the EU budget, who are concerned that they 
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may again be forced to increase their contributions. However, most calculations made by ana-
lysts do not predict a particularly high cost from Turkey’s accession, in particular in comparison 
to the ‘big bang’ enlargement of the CEEC-10 countries in 2004. 
This section provides an overview EU financial framework and budget allocation and the types 
of calculations used to estimate the cost/benefits of Turkey’s accession. It is worth noting that 
there are no absolutely reliable means of providing accurate calculations on the cost/benefits of 
Turkey’s accession, simply because the accession is still at least eight years away and both the 
conditions in Turkey and the EU are likely change, as are the rules and policies related to the EU 
financial framework and budget. All estimates are thus based on factors subject to change and 
attempting to predict the future state of affairs is essentially speculative. Moreover, assuming 
that Turkey gets the green light to join in 2015 its first years of membership would be covered by 
a financial framework already in force and it would probably become fully integrated into the 
EU financial framework in the 2018-2024 period.402 The rules of accession assistance and 
funding for new member countries are also likely to change should there be any grave concerns 
over the potential costs of accession. Reflecting such concerns the European Council in Brussels 
in December 2004 stated that: “accession negotiations yet to be opened with candidates whose 
accession could have substantial financial consequences can only be concluded after the estab-
lishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014 together with possible consequen-
tial financial reforms”. 403The European Parliament has also expressed considerable concern over 
the cost of enlargement, in particular Turkey’s accession, and has stated that is “considers it of 
paramount importance that the European Union puts in place the institutional and financial 
preconditions in due time for Turkey’s accession”. 
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The EU Financial Framework and Budget 
The financing and spending of EU activities is based on seven- year financial frameworks that 
provide the limits and priorities for the total spending for the period. The current financial 
framework covers the period of 2007-2013. The annual budgets detail the Union’s spending for 
the fiscal year and are confirmed separately for each year. The contributions to the EU budget 
are decided based on proportional system decided primarily based on Gross National Income 
(GNI) to enforce a principal that rich member countries pay proportionally more to finance the 
development in more disadvantaged countries and regions. The system is not entirely straight-
forward however, and is further complicated by political negotiations that may alter the balance 
from time to time. The funding for the EU budget is drawn from three primary sources: VAT 
revenues, customs duties collected and tax related to GNP in member countries.404 However, in 
order of fairness the total contributions of member states are capped to 1.24 % of GNP.405 The 
outflows of funds from the EU budgets have two major destinations: the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and Structural Actions aimed at supporting disadvantaged regions (at 75 % or less 
of EU GDP). For instance in the 2005 budget 46.23 % of the funds were contributed to CAP 
whilst structural actions got 31.24 %, e.g. the two items together took a total of 77.47 % of the 
total budget.406In order to safeguard a fair distribution of EU funds the Berlin European Council 
adopted a 4% cap of the recipient country’s GDP.407 
Cost/Benefit Calculations related to Turkey’s accession 
The cost/benefit calculations attempting to estimate the net effect of Turkey’s membership to the 
EU’s financial framework utilise mainly one (or more in some cases) of three primary ap-
proaches: 1) how much Turkey would receive if it was a member today?, 2) what the cost would 
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be in the like year of accession -2015 – assuming the current rules apply?, and 3) what kind of 
package Turkey would receive if it would be granted a similar arrangement to that of Bulgaria 
and Romania? 
The first variety, carried out by Kemal et al is attempting to estimate how much Turkey would 
receive if it were a full member today (in this case 2004). The logic of this estimate is that any 
long-term predictions are highly speculative and thus one approach is to utilise the current rules 
and assume Turkey is a fully integrated member of the EU. The analysis points out, as estab-
lished also in the previous section here, that the EU budget and financial framework are domi-
nated by two items: CAP and Structural Funds (a.k.a. Structural Actions). Thus, taking into 
consideration that Turkey’s average annual GDP is around € 200 billion and that receipts are 
capped to 4 % of GDP, Turkey would receive € 8 billion annually from Structural Funds. The 
CAP payments are based on per hectare yields and would mount up to € 9 billion per annum. 
Taking into account the additional funding that Turkey would receive under other programmes it 
brings the total receipts to slightly under € 20 billion. Furthermore, considering that the EU 
member states’ contributions in 2004 were approximately 1 % of the GDP (ceiling was 1.25% at 
the time), Turkey’s contributions would be around €2 billion per annum. Hence, the net benefit 
for Turkey at current level would be approximately €16 billion per annum.408 
The second variant estimates Turkey’s contributions in the likely year of accession – 2015 – 
using the current rules as the base for assumptions. Hence, the 4 % ceiling for Structural Funds 
would still apply and the variation in comparison to “Turkey in the EU today” scenario would 
principally result from growth in the Turkish GDP. Kemal et al again use the base assumption 
that the Turkish GDP would grow an average of 5 % per year and the Turkish GDP would by 
2015 correspond to 4 % of EU-28 GDP. Hence, Turkey’s potential receipts from Structural 
Funds would amount to 0.16 % of EU-28 GDP (0.4*0.4).409 The CAP transfers, however, have 
to be based on a guesstimate of what the output of Turkish agriculture would be in 2015. Also, it 
is reasonable to assume that the current 20 % of total value maximum in CAP receipts would 
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continue to apply and that the share of agriculture in Turkey’s economy would probably continue 
declining. Kemal et al predict that the share of agriculture would be at the maximum 10 % of 
Turkey’s GDP by 2015. Again assuming that Turkey’s share of EU-28 GDP would be around 4 
percent and that the share of agriculture would be around 10 % of this, the likely receipt from 
CAP would settle somewhere between 0.045 to 0.08 p%. Since it is likely that CAP substitutions 
are likely to fall due to the EU’s WTO commitments to cut substitution, so would Turkey’s 
receipts. 
Thus, the total receipts Turkey would receive under Structural Funds and CAP in this scenario is 
estimated at 0.26 % of EU-28 GDP. Taking into consideration, again, that the EU budget has a 
ceiling of around 1-1.2 % of member country GDP, Turkey’s maximum contribution would 
be1.2 % of its GDP. When adjusted to the proportion of Turkey’s GDP to that of the EU-28 the 
contribution would be probably around 0.048 % of EU GDP. The maximum net cost of Turkey’s 
membership for the EU would thus mount up to 0.20 % of EU GDP, e.g. approximately € 20 
billion. 
Table 7. Maximum Budgetary Cost of Full Membership: Today and 2015 
 
Source: Derviş et al. (2004), p. 4 
However, other analysts have derived at a smaller result by using equivalent assumptions. Kirsty 
Hughes, for instance, also assumes 5 % growth, but using 1999 prices, arrives at a result indicat-
ing that Turkey’s maximum receipts would be around 10.8 % of EU-27 budget, which she 
estimates at € 140 billion by 2013.410 
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The third option is based on the assumption that Turkey is likely to get a similar package to 
Bulgaria and Romania. This scenario is based on the argument that the countries share similar in 
the level of economic development and that like Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey is likely to join 
in the middle of a financial framework, and thus its first few years of membership will be cov-
ered by a framework in which it did not participate. Hence, Turkey is likely to focus on Roma-
nia, Bulgaria and Croatia as benchmarks for its own accession package. Given that the proposed 
allocation for Bulgaria and Romania is about € 15 billion, and adjusting that figure to the popula-
tion size, Turkey should receive 2.3 times as much (15*2.3=35), e.g. € 35 billion over the first 
three years, amounting to € 9-12 billion net transfers per annum. This is likely to increase to € 15 
to 20 billion in the 2020s after Turkey becomes fully integrated into the financial framework. 
Kirsty Hughes arrives to a similar result for the same scenario, predicting the net receipts as € 
36.7 billion over three years.411 
Table 8. Same as Bulgaria and Romania, CEEC-10 or a Combination 
 
Source: Hughes (2004), p. 21 
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Is the cost for Turkey’s accession too high? 
The estimated net budgetary cost of Turkey’s accession thus ranges somewhere from €15 to €35 
billion over the first three years of membership, or around 0.20 % of EU GDP, depending on the 
scenario used. However, as already pointed out these estimates are all highly speculative and are 
thus unlikely to provide anything more than rough “ballpark” figures on what the possible costs 
could be. Realistically nobody can accurately predict the changing conditions in Turkey and the 
EU, whether the rules would change and how by 2015 It is, however, highly likely that if it 
should appear that Turkey would benefit “too much” from EU funding the current member 
countries (in particular net contributors and the opponents of Turkey’s membership) would force 
a change of rules to accommodate for the impact. Moreover, the EU would also benefit from a 
successful accession by Turkey economically, again possibly worth of somewhere between 0.1 
% and 0.3 % of EU GDP. This would actually indicate that the EU money would be well spent. 
Furthermore, even if the maximum would match that of the “Eastern Enlargement” of the CEEC-
10 countries, the financial cost of Turkey’s accession should by no means be unmanageable for 
the EU. The CEEC-10 experience in fact should be an encouraging experience to the EU. The 
transfers to the CEEC-10 countries totalled € 28 billion in a 15-year period up to 2004, reaching 
2% of CEEC-10 GDP, 6.9% of EU budget in 2004 and 0.1% of EU-15 GDP the same year.412 
The Financial Framework for the period 2007-2013 includes transfers to the CEEC-10 varying 
between1.6 to 3.3. % of their GDP.413 As the commission paper points out, this is a miniscule 
commitment in comparison to the Marshal Plan, which costed 1.1% of the US GDP.414 The 2007 
budget includes approximately 1% of EU total GNI to CAP and Structural Funds, with a ceiling 
of 1.24%.415 
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4.5 Regional Politics and Institutions: Deepening versus 
widening 
Turkish membership in the European Union has a variety of political implications on regional 
institutions, policies and political dynamics that have been raised as areas of concern in Rational-
ist analysis. One of the most common concerns the opponents of the Turkish membership put 
forward is that Turkey with its large population will gain unjustified political power in EU 
institutions. With a population currently over 72 million, and likely to reach 82 million by the 
time of the likely accession date of 2015, the country would command too much political clout in 
the EU, according to opponents of Turkey’s accession. Part of this resistance is connected to the 
wider debate on “widening versus deepening”, a common view that enlargement holds back 
deeper integration, and the interconnected “enlargement fatigue”, which produced the concept of 
”absorption/integration capacity”. However, it is also partly resulting from internal Turkish 
resistance, which stems from the notion that Turkey is not European and does not share Euro-
pean values. For this reason it seems ludicrous to hand over considerable decision-making power 
to the EU. To put it simply, European decision-making is a grave concern.416 
Also, taking into consideration the opposing demographic trends in Turkey compared to the EU, 
this situation is likely to deepen over time. Whilst the population in the ‘old’ member countries is 
steadily decreasing, the Turkish population will probably be around 95 million by 2050, making 
it by far the largest member country in terms of population size.417 Moreover, traditionally 
economic and political powers have been lumped together as the ‘big four’ of today’s EU – 
Germany, France, Italy and the UK – are also the largest economies.418 Should Turkey, however, 
become a member in the EU it would immediately have the second largest population after 
Germany, and probably pass it around 2020. This will mean that if there is a proportional down-
scaling (as opposed to increasing the amount of MEPs) it will have the same amount of MEPs in 
the European Parliament and voting power in the Council as Germany, i.e. 88 MEPs (11.2 % of 
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the vote) and 14 % of the vote in the Council.419 Thus, whilst it would not be able to dominate in 
any institution, it could theoretically block Council decisions together with three other large 
states by a 35 % share of the votes.420Furthermore, some hold fears that Turkey could become a 
“Trojan Horse” within the EU and block decisions that do not favour its interests, thus slowing 
down the deepening integration.421 
Whilst it is true that as long as institutional arrangements are based on population Turkey would 
have considerable power in regional institutions, perhaps even on par with the ‘big four’, in 
particular in the European Parliament, its impact is exaggerated. First of all, in the European 
Parliament, where Turkey’s membership would have the biggest impact, representation and 
voting are largely arranged along party lines, rather than along national lines. Secondly, changes 
in voting decided by the European Council in Nice and in effect since 2005 require a qualified 
majority of 74 %.422 Had the constitutional treaty, rejected by the French and Dutch referendums, 
been ratified, the impact would have been moderated even further with the introduction of a 
double majority system that would have required 55% of membership and 65% of total EU 
population to pass a decision. The impact in the European Commission would be considerably 
lower, with Turkey under the current rules getting its own commissioner. Alternatively, the 
Commission is possibly facing a reform in any case as the membership increases and the possi-
bility of establishing a smaller “mini-commission with rotating membership is still a distinctive 
possibility. In this case Turkey would be in the same terrain as other members, i.e. at times it 
would have Commissioner, at other times it would not.423 Hence, Turkey would not be able to 
dominate in any central EU institution, i.e. in the European Council, the European Parliament or 
the European Commission. 
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However, this is not to say that Turkey’s membership would not have any major effects on EU 
institutions and policy making. It would probably underline and act as a motor for institutional 
reform, just as it has contributed to the motivation for the current ”period of reflection for the 
future of Europe”. Much of the EU institutions are designed for the “original six” and to a point 
still reflect that, although the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties were designed and 
adopted with future enlargements in mind. However, the Treaty of Nice, which was supposed to 
prepare the Union for EU-25 and EU-27 has not saved the EU from the brink of paralysis and is 
clearly not enough to ensure the functioning of institutions and consensus decision-making in an 
enlarged Union, certainly not for an EU-30. As already pointed out, it is very possible that 
further reform will be made a precondition before the EU absorbs another large enlargement, 
such as Turkey. In the policy making area, Turkey would strengthen the group of big countries, 
would certainly have a lot of common interests with the other poorer net recipients, and as such 
could be seen working against the rich EU-15 or even ruining the chances of domination by for 
instance France (which has always been aspiring to lead the European project) and Germany 
(somewhat more hesitant to lead). However, assuming that some sort of institutional reform 
takes place to gear EU decision making towards further enlargement, Turkey’s entry would not 
drastically alter the balance between large and smaller member states. The largest five countries 
in EU-28 will have 60.3% of the vote, only 3.4 percentage points more than the “big four” in 
EU-25 (56.9%).424 
As for the policy making, and keeping the widening versus deepening concern in mind, Turkey 
would probably favour an Intergovernmentalism approach over a federalist one and work to-
wards a balance between national sovereignty and supranationalism,425 instead of pushing the 
EU towards further integration. On the other hand, it might become active in foreign and defence 
policy and seek to play a major role, where it would contribute and conform with, but probably 
not push for a common foreign policy. It would perhaps be less active in economic policy, where 
it would likely be seeking middle ground, rather than position itself in the liberal end of the 
spectrum. Whilst in general it would probably seek to align itself with other larger member 
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states, it would more likely cooperate with the Mediterranean members in agricultural policy and 
in efforts to refocus EU’s attention in the south. 
4.6 Impact on Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
Geopolitics 
“Turkey is situated at a regional crossroads of strategic importance for Europe: 
the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean; its 
territory is a transit route for land and air transport with Asia, and for sea trans-
port with Russia and the Ukraine. Its neighbours provide key energy supplies for 
Europe, and it has substantial water resources.”426 
Turkey’s membership would have a substantial impact on EU’s foreign and security policies 
simply due to its size, considerable military capabilities and geographical location. Like many 
changes, if not all, its membership presents both risks and opportunities, including in foreign and 
security policy making. First of all, its membership would extend the EU’s borders to a volatile 
neighbourhood in the Middle East and Caucasus and further increase the EU’s interests in the 
Black Sea region. This would mean that the EU’s new next door neighbours would include 
countries such as Syria, Iran and Iraq. Although these regions present security concerns to the 
EU even without Turkey as a member, in terms of terrorism and illegal trafficking of people, 
drugs and weapons (including WMD), they certainly would demand added focus from the EU. 
Moreover, even though Turkey is likely to stay out of the Schengen Treaty possibly for a lengthy 
transition period, some fear it could just as well become a bridge to illegal immigration, terror-
ism and other forms of transnational crime and/or drag the EU into regional conflicts. Also, 
Turkey might not become a bridge between civilisations as some of the more optimistic observ-
ers have argued since it has not shown any significant interest to export its secular democracy.427 
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In terms of opportunities, Turkish membership could bring substantial benefits to the EU’s 
foreign and security policy in the form of added capacity and in its ability to present itself as a 
truly global actor. First of all, Turkey has already been aligning its foreign policy with that of the 
EU and is likely to become a constructive player once a full member.428 Turkey is a member of 
the same international organisations as most of the incumbent EU member states, such as the 
United Nations, OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD Stability Pact for South-East 
Europe, as well as in organisations where the EU currently has no access. In particular Turkey's 
leadership role in the Islamic Conference Organisation and observer status in the Arab League 
would enhance the EU's engagement with the Islamic world. Hence, Turkey's membership in the 
EU would bear no foreseeable negative or limiting impact in terms of the Union's participation 
within international organisations. On the contrary it would probably provide added value in 
terms of access to new organisations. 
However, it also needs to be acknowledged that Turkey has not always maintained a policy 
alignment with the EU on all issues, in particular in relation to the Middle East and Human 
Rights in Turkey. Moreover, whilst Turkey's foreign policy convergence with the EU has been 
considered high in general, it has nonetheless ratified fewer EU declarations than acceding 
countries in the past,429 indicating that Turkey does not automatically follow the EU in its foreign 
policy. This, however, is not entirely uncommon in the conduct of the incumbent member states 
and thus, does not necessarily imply that Turkey would in some significant manner contribute to 
any further fragmentation of a common foreign policy. It is also very likely that Turkey will 
increase the level of convergence in this regard as well in the years leading to accession. 
Turkey also does not have intentions to become a global player, but chooses to act within the 
context of its alliance partnerships and multilateral institutions and increasingly within the EU 
context.430 Hence, whilst Turkey would favour the intergovernmental approach431, and as such 
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would probably not strongly promote a common foreign policy, there is little reason for concerns 
that Turkey would divert from the EU common policies or drag it into conflicts that it would not 
otherwise want to get into. On the contrary, Turkey could potentially contribute to the strength-
ening of the EU’s foreign policy as well as to its security capabilities and international credibil-
ity. 
First of all, Turkey is an important regional player and an active foreign policy actor in the 
Mediterranean, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans, all areas where the EU has 
serious security concerns but has been either hesitant to engage or has had trouble doing so.432 
Most of these areas are also in the focus of the European Neighbourhood policy, which aims at 
establishing close relationships with neighbouring countries in Europe’s immediate neighbour-
hood that have no prospects of membership but that the EU wants to keep close. Given Turkey’s 
position between these regions and the EU it could be instrumental in promoting the European 
Neighbourhood strategy.433 Turkey would also probably inherit a central role in the European 
security strategy combating key security threats such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism 
and illegal trafficking of drugs and people.434 Turkey’s better understanding of and acceptability 
for these regions due to cultural, religious and ethnic communalities as well as closer historical 
and current linkages with them (with Muslim countries in particular), would most likely signifi-
cantly enhance EU’s capabilities to engage constructively with these regions. Secondly, Turkey 
has by far the largest NATO standing armed forces in Europe with its 793,000 military personnel 
that constitute approximately 27% of the forces of NATO’s European forces.435Moreover, 
Turkey has cooperated with EU countries in a number of military and security operations, mainly 
in the NATO operations but also through Partnership for Peace, UN and even EU missions. 
Turkey’s participation in missions includes for instance several in the Balkans, Lebanon and it 
led the ISAF mission in Afghanistan until the end of 2002. Finally, Turkey is in general sympa-
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thetic towards European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and would most likely contribute 
considerably in its development and capabilities.436 
Turkey’s Contribution to Building a European Neighbourhood 
Turkey’s contribution to the European Neighbourhood strategy could be potentially significant 
due to Turkey’s active role in the regions central to the concept, in particular in regions such as 
the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. The following section 
provides a brief summary of Turkey’s involvement and potential contributions in each region. 
Turkey has historically been an active player in the Balkans and has close linkages with signifi-
cant Muslim communities in the region. Turkish EU membership would not only be welcomed 
in the region437, but it would also be likely to advance EU’s interests in the region. Turkey’s 
involvement in the region has been extensive. It participated in the UNPROFOR operation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the NATO operations IFOR and SFOR. During the Kosovo 
war Turkey participated in both, the initial combat operations and later in the KFOR mission. 
Even more importantly, Turkey participated in the first ever EU military operation in the Repub-
lic of Macedonia in 2003 and EU police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Republic 
of Macedonia.438 Turkey‘s leadership in the South-East European Brigade (SEEBRIG) also 
indicates its commitment and willingness to lead regional security initiatives in the region.439 
In the Black Sea, Turkish initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 
organisation and the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (Blackseafor) - are central 
instruments in regional cooperation440 and would as such provide the necessary instruments for 
the EU to build its engagement upon. 
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The Caucasus presents another opportunity that Turkish membership could further. The EU does 
not currently have a substantial presence in the Caucasus, but key countries in the region - 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia- are planned to be included in the framework provided by the 
Wider European and European Neighbourhood policy.441 Turkey has strong economic, political 
and military links with Azerbaijan and good relations with Georgia. It also takes an active part in 
the regional energy projects and participates for instance in the Caspian Sea energy project, the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and in the project to bring a gas pipeline to Erzurum.442 Taking 
into consideration that the security of its energy supply is one of the EU’s most paramount 
concerns these are significant initiatives. Turkey- Armenia relations, however, have been cool 
since Turkey closed the border in 1992 in support to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.443 This is obviously a problem Turkey would have to work hard to rectify as the EU 
demands good neighbourly relations from acceding countries and in general444requires them to 
settle any conflicts with their neighbours prior to accession. 
In Central Asia, Turkey has strong cultural, linguistic, religious and historical linkages with the 
post-Soviet states and has since the breakup of the Soviet Union charged in to re-establish close 
links with them,445 to the great annoyance to Russia. Turkish-Russian relations have historically 
been cool and Russia is not particularly happy with the competition over regional influ-
ence.446Turkey would become an even more serious competitor in Central Asia, the Caucasus 
and the Black Sea regions, and if it were to become an EU member this could also affect EU-
Russia relations.447 On the other hand, the relationship has also shown positive signs and both 
                                                 
441 European Commission (2004), ”European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper”, Brussels,  p. 7 Available 
online at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf, date accessed: 23.3.2007 
442 Emerson and Tocci (2004), p. 13 
443 Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p. 12 
444 This does, however, not always apply. For instance Estonia has had a potentially serious border dispute with 
Russia since independence, which still remains unsolved 
445 Emerson and Tocci (2004), pp. 16-17 
446 Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p. 13 
447 Emerson and Tocci (2004), p. 19 
R A T I O N A L I S T  A N A L Y S I S  O F  T U R K E Y ’ S  E U  A C C E S S I O N  P R O S P E C T S  
147 
countries are members in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) working towards largely 
the same goals.448 Even more importantly, Russia and Turkey cooperate in a number of energy 
initiatives, including the ”Blue Stream” natural gas pipeline and the Trans-Thracian oil pipeline, 
both potentially important for the EU’s energy and security interests.449 
In the Middle East Turkey supports the Middle-East peace processes as a non-partial party in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, being the only country in the region with an ambassador in Israel and a 
close relationship with it. Turkish –Israeli relations are still strong, but have cooled somewhat 
following the rapprochement with Syria. Nonetheless, Turkey has more credibility as a non-
partial player in the conflict than the EU, and as such could equip the EU to come out of the 
shadow behind the US and take a more active and independent role in the peace process. As for 
Iraq, Turkey maintains a convergent policy with the EU, and the Turkish public has a similarly 
negative image of the war much like in many EU member states, albeit due to the Northern Iraq 
Kurdish problem this may change if the situation suddenly worsens and Turkey feels the need to 
intervene.450 Turkey’s role in the wider Middle East is in many ways linked to its membership in 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In this sense Turkey could play a role of a 
bridge to the Middle East by acting as intermediary between OIC and the EU.451 Turkey’s 
relations with Iran have been cool after the 1979 Iranian revolution due to fears of Iran exporting 
Islamic revolution to Turkey and its support for the PKK.452 Although the relations have in 
recent years somewhat improved Turkey is suspicious of Iran’s nuclear intentions and supports 
the EU in its efforts to bring a diplomatic solution in the issue. Turkey and Iran also cooperate in 
the energy sector in the context of the Tabriz-Erzurum gas pipeline.453 Should the nuclear issue 
be resolved peacefully this would be a significant addition to the EU’s energy security efforts, as 
Iran is one of the world’s primary oil and natural gas suppliers. 
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Finally, Turkey has the potential to play a positive and significant role in t transatlantic relations 
having been a close ally of the US for over 50 years. This is still a strong alliance despite the 
cooling of relations after the March 2003 decision by Turkey not to allow US forces to use 
Turkish territory as a staging area.454Whilst the relations did experience a temporary dip, it seems 
that the issue has mainly passed and could be even be interpreted as a positive signal of a more 
balanced relationship where Turkey does not automatically follow all US foreign policy deci-
sions.455 This would fit quite well in the general EU line that emphasises good relations, but 
interprets the ability to disagree at times as part of a definition for genuinely good relations. 
4.7 Migration from Turkey to the EU 
“The spectre of a massive influx of poor Anatolian migrant peasants is one of the 
most powerful obstacles inhibiting a rational discussion of the Turkey issue.”456 
Whilst the concerns over migration are not entirely rational in terms of motives, and are moti-
vated by cultural fears rather than rational cost concerns, the issue of free movement of labour 
within the EU is one of the most politically sensitive topics. As a result the debate of potential 
migration from Turkey in the event of accession has played an important part in the Rationalist 
analysis and a number of cost/benefit calculations attempting to forecast the future levels of 
migratory flows from Turkey to the EU, in particular to the EU-15 where the fear of the effects 
of unchecked immigration is most marked. This topic is particularly contentious in the countries 
with existing large Turkish immigrant communities, as well as Muslim communities in general. 
The number of Turkish immigrants in the EU was estimated at approximately 3.8 million in 2004 
(5 million if Bulgaria and Romania are included457, of which 77.8 % live in Germany, 7.9% in 
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France, 4.7% in Austria and 4.4% in the Netherlands.458 The UK has about 80 000 Turkish 
immigrants (and a very large Muslim community), of which 60 000 live in London, but the issue 
has not caused significant alarm there.459 However, the negative popular opinion towards, Turk-
ish migration in particular in Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands is strongly influ-
enced by fears that these countries would receive a disproportionate share of immigrants. 
Most Turkish immigrants in the EU-15 countries had arrived as guest workers after the Second 
Wold War, and were invited to do so by the host governments in an attempt to cover for the 
labour shortage caused by the wars, deepening throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Migration from 
Turkey has since been mainly limited to family reunification and marriage, and has been relative 
modest overall. One potential source of the anti-immigrant sentiments in these countries was that 
most of the guest workers were poor unskilled workers from regions in Anatolia who found it 
hard to integrate to their host societies due to a radical change in their living environment.460 As 
a consequence of this double shock Turkish immigrants largely clung to tight communities for 
support. Concentrated in these ethnic enclaves, Turkish immigrants preserved their language, 
religious practices and culture, and consequently had limited exposure and integration into the 
host society. In practical terms this tended to create a vicious cycle where exclusion increases 
with isolation, and in consequence social networks in ethnic enclaves increasingly become safety 
networks against social and economic exclusion.461 
Whether these fears can be categorised as rational or not, they have inspired forecasts and esti-
mates of potential migration flows from Turkey that follow Rationalist logic. In fact, many of 
these studies appear to be aimed at calming the fears with rational arguments pointing out the 
findings supporting the limited impact and positive aspects of migration flows. As is the case 
with other similar projections, for instance the budgetary cost of Turkish accession, the analysis 
is subject to a number of changing factors in Turkey and the EU. Some of the most important of 
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such factors are the demographic and economic developments in Turkey and the EU, the changes 
in the relative income levels between Turkey and the EU, as well as within Turkey. 
Assuming that sustained economic growth in Turkey leads to increased employment opportuni-
ties within the country, migration to the EU could be partly replaced by internal migration within 
Turkey to high-growth areas.462 Potentially high levels of economic growth and the resulting 
increased employment opportunities in Turkey could potentially also lead to substantially in-
creased return migration of Turkish migrants from the EU.463 Moreover, EU policies are also 
subject to change and a variety of restrictions may be placed on migration from Turkey, although 
it should be emphasised that under no conditions can the EU exercise a zero immigration pol-
icy464 
Indeed restrictions have been utilised in connection with past enlargements with a 7 years transi-
tory phase applied to Spain, Portugal and Greece and later to the CEEC-10 countries. In the latter 
case, only the UK, Sweden and Ireland decided not to apply restrictions, whilst Finland, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal lifted restrictions in 2006.465 Furthermore, as the experiences of Spain, 
Portugal and Greece point out, reforms and the resulting economic growth tends to mitigate 
migration pressures, and whilst this is arguably a result of a long-term process, there is no reason 
why the same would not apply to Turkey.466 Finally, it is also entirely possible that by the time 
the restrictions on labour movement would be lifted, probably well into the 2020s, the prospect 
of Turkish migrants could be viewed as a blessing, or at least as a considerably more attractive 
option than today, rather than a threat. Whilst not a particularly popular argument in the light of 
today’s situation, due to the demographic trends in the incumbent EU members it is possible that 
the labour shortage situation would have deteriorated to a level that would require increased 
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immigration to the EU in any case. In such situation the prospect of increased, in particular 
skilled migration, from Turkey could be welcomed in comparison to migrants from more distant 
lands.467 
As for the estimates, a wide variety of methodologies have been utilised, including statistical 
inference, opinion polls, econometrics and forecasts based on past enlargements, resulting in a 
relatively high variance between the results reached. Some analysts have concluded that such 
attempts are not entirely productive and helpful due to low level of accuracy they offer.468 Daniel 
Gross points out that in particular the use of today’s labour market data to produce forecasts for 
Turkey’s case are highly speculative as free labour mobility from Turkey could be 20 years 
away.469 The European Commission issue paper in 2004 concluded that the forecasts of Turkish 
migration to the EU vary between 0.5 and 4.4 million migrants.470 In the middle-range of these 
estimates, one of the most referred to is by Lejour, de Mooij and Capel, which concludes that 
Turkish EU accession would be likely to result in 2.7 million migrants in the long-term, which 
would represent 4% of the total Turkish population and a meagre 0.7% of EU-15 population, in 
comparison to 2.9 million migrants that were estimated to result from the CEEC-10 acces-
sion.471The study also provided an estimate of the economic impact of immigration from Turkey 
concluding that it would reduce GDP in Turkey by 2.2%, whilst simultaneously increasing GDP 
in Germany by 2.2% and in Netherlands by 0.6%. However, as the decline in Turkish GDP is 
lower than the outflow of people, the GDP per capita would have to increase. The opposite 
applies to Germany and other destination countries, albeit at a very modest level.472 
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At the higher end of the estimates Henry Flam (2004) has suggested that 3.5 million Turkish 
migrants would reach the EU by 2030, assuming no restrictions are placed on migration.473 This, 
however, as Henry Flam asserts himself, is not a particularly helpful assessment as it is highly 
unlikely that such an assumption would apply in the Turkish case, in particular taking into 
consideration that restrictions have been applied in the past cases. In the lower end of the spec-
trum, Refik Erzan, Umut Kuzubas and Nilufer Yildiz (2004) have concluded that migration to 
the EU-15 between the years 2004-2030 would reach only 1-2.1 million, assuming sustained 
strong economic growth and freedom in labour mobility 2015 onwards. 
Alternatively, assuming accession appears unlikely to take place and the absence of freedom of 
mobility, migration from Turkey could reach 2.7 million, i.e. the EU might face a higher level of 
migration if the accession prospect is lost than if accession is successful and free mobility pre-
vails.474 Another option, the team argues, is to assess the future level of migration by comparing 
Turkey’s situation to the Southern “Cohesion” countries -Greece, Portugal and Spain, which had 
a similar situation to Turkey at the time of accession. The team concludes that migration phases 
out with economic growth and increased employment opportunities, a scenario ran with the same 
base assumption would result to less than 1 million migrants.475 The same scenario but adding 
the guest worker dummy raised the total to 2 million, albeit the authors believe this would be an 
inflated assessment of the true potential.476 
4.8 Conclusion: Strengths and Weakness of the Rationalist 
Approach 
The Rationalist analysis of Turkey’s EU accession prospects reveals few reasons why the project 
could not be successful If Turkey continues to engage in the necessary reforms there is no 
evidence to suggest that it cannot meet the “Copenhagen Criteria”. Moreover, assuming macro-
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economic stability will be maintained Turkey should have no problems meeting the economic 
criteria. Whilst the exact economic impact of Turkey’s membership is impossible to assess due 
to the fact that even the best projections are essentially speculative and subject to a number of 
changing conditions in Turkey and the EU, it is quite clear that Turkey would be net beneficiary 
in short- to medium-term at least. Turkey would directly benefit in particular from increased 
trade and in receipts from EU budget funds, specifically from CAP and Structural Funds. The 
economic impact on the EU would likely be relatively minor, due to the relatively small size of 
the Turkish economy. Thus economic motives from the EU’s part have little backing in terms of 
factual evidence. From Turkey’s point of view, however, the economic motives are quite clearly 
substantiative and thus, may constitute a genuine source of motivation to join the EU as a full 
member. 
The budgetary impact of Turkey’s accession would be significant at approximately € 15 to €35 
billion, but manageable in scale (maximum of 0.20% of EU-28 GDP), roughly matching the 
commitment made towards the ”Eastern enlargement”. Taking into consideration the EU’s 
decision to commence membership negotiations with Turkey, it is only fair to insist that in 
principle at least the Union has already committed itself towards Turkey’s membership and 
hence, the costs it will entail. Moreover, taking into consideration the high level of cost incurred 
by the “Eastern enlargement” it would be justifiable to argue that cost is of secondary importance 
at this stage and the real issue is whether the EU has intentions to assign a similar level of com-
mitment towards Turkey’s membership as towards that of the CEEC-10. This is one of the 
weaknesses of the Rationalist analysis; it does not sufficiently account for the “hidden agendas” 
behind the ”Eastern enlargement”, which were presented as an exercise in the reunification of 
Europe, and Turkish accession, which is presented as a ”cross-civilizational” project creating a 
”bridge across civilizations.”477 
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A similar weakness extends to assessments on the impact on EU institutions, which arguably is 
much more modest than feared in worst case scenarios. In fact, the EU has discovered from its 
past enlargement experiences that institutional reform can moderate the adverse impact of 
enlargement on deeper integration. Whilst the arguments based on the population size of Turkey 
and its proportional share of votes are arguably better analysed using a Rationalist framework, 
without carrying out an Ideational analysis we cannot reasonably conclude that the main concern 
here is a neo-functional concern over the technical functioning of institutions, rather than a 
concern motivated by a hidden agenda, i.e. that due its cultural (or even “civilizational”) differ-
ences Turkey would utilize its power in EU institutions in a manner not corresponding with 
“European values”. Moreover, whilst this “absorption” or “integration capacity” essentially is a 
neo-functional concept in essence, we should nonetheless concern ourselves with the motives 
behind using it specifically against the Turkish membership 
The Cyprus issue, whilst not part of the accession criteria, would by default need to be solved 
prior to accession. The fact is that a country that does not recognise all member states cannot 
become a member itself. This, however, indirectly leads us to an Ideational question: why 
Cyprus (the southern part of the island in effect) was judged as “European”, whilst Turkey’s 
“Europeanness” is contested? 
Finally, in relation to EU’s foreign and security policy, Turkey’s accession would most likely 
have principally a positive impact, whilst there is little reason to believe it would cause any 
significant negative change to policy coherence on these issues. The emphasis on Turkey’s 
military power as an asset for the EU’s ambitions to become a more “credible force” clearly stem 
from a Rationalist agenda, whilst the EU’s own emphasis on its "soft power” is essentially an 
Ideational concept. How Turkey would contribute to the EU’s “soft power” would is a question 
that would place the onus upon the Ideational rather than the Rationalist framework. 
In general, the analysis thus far reveals the strengths and weaknesses of Rationalist analysis. The 
strength of the Rationalist approach clearly lies in its ability to explain the “Regionalism proc-
ess”, or in this case the accession process. However, I would argue that if Rationalist analysis is 
strictly applied, it becomes weak in regards to motives and drivers behind EU enlargement. In 
the strictest possible senses of Rationalist analysis, after all, the EU-15 should have been the 
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maximum as the EU has been a net payer since. The 1995 enlargement of Finland, Sweden and 
Austria, was in fact an easy decision in both senses; nobody questioned their “Europeanness”, 
their level of economic development was above the EU average and their utilitarian value high as 
they quickly became net contributors in EU budgets. Hence, the EU-12 to EU-15 enlargement 
was characterised by utilitarian choice with no Ideational hang-ups to consider. The “big bang” 
enlargement, on the other hand, was an entirely different story. The Eastern and Central Euro-
pean countries were much poorer, just emerging from Soviet control and not particularly strong 
in their democratic credentials. Moreover, the costs were significant over a decade or so. Hence, 
there was speculation regarding economically beneficial in the long run, the Eastern enlargement 
hardly made rational sense at the time. Consequently, one could argue that it is possible that the 
main driver was “reunification” of the continent and costs did not play a central role in the 
decision. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania arguably constitutes a logical continuation of 
Eastern and Central European enlargement and hence, was relatively uncomplicated regardless 
of problems of corruption, economic development and rule of law. Turkey, however, is a much 
trickier case as utilitarian considerations have been given more attention because the “European-
ness” of Turkey is contested. Consequently, following Mattli´s framework Turkey should not 
join, unless its rejection would create ”negative externalities.”What these externalities might be, 
except those concerned with the “losing Turkey” thesis, which is essentially an Ideational con-
cept, is hard to imagine. Thus the Rationalist framework applied to the Turkish case clearly 
leaves the door open for applications of the Ideational approach. 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that Turkey has well-established material interdependency 
with the EU in all the aspects analysed; economic, political and security interests. Moreover, 
officially Turkey will accede to full membership as long as it fulfils the Copenhagen Criteria. 
Thus far each and every country that has been granted an official candidate status has acceded to 
full membership and in that sense there is no rational reason to doubt that Turkey will become a 
member of the EU. However, the hidden unofficial agenda that is threatening to stop Turkey’s 
accession regardless of whether it meets the criteria or not reveals the constraints of the Rational-
ist approaches. Turkey’s ”Europeanness” and the “European identity” and “idea” it is judged 
against constitutes a research agenda that can only be analysed by applying the tools of the 
Ideational approaches. The next chapter will focus on this approach. 
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Chapter 5: Ideational Analysis of Turkey’s EU 
Membership Prospects 
5.1 Introduction 
“Admission of Turkey to the European Union would provide undeniable proof 
that Europe is not a closed ‘Christian Club’. It would confirm the Union’s nature 
as an inclusive and tolerant society, drawing strength from its diversity and 
bound together by common values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and re-
spect for human rights.478…“…a multiethnic, multicultural and multifaith Europe 
could send a powerful message to the rest of the world that the ‘Clash of Civilisa-
tions” is not the ineluctable destiny of mankind”479 
The “Rationalist” analysis on Turkey’s EU accession prospects, as the previous chapter demon-
strated, tends to prioritise the analysis of material costs versus the benefits of accession, often 
(but not always) to the point of completely excluding the impact of “Ideational” factors. The 
“Rationalist” analysis of Regionalism has been criticised for this weakness. Frank Schimmelfen-
nig, for instance, has argued that the Rationalist framework was able to explain EU enlargement 
up to the point of the CEEC-10 association agreements, but not able to explain the actual acces-
sion.480According to Schimmelfennig the Association Agreements offered optimal benefits to the 
EU, but full membership with its budgetary, structural and CAP funds cost was too expensive for 
this option to make rational sense. Social Constructivism, on the other hand, has been credited 
for providing a more credible explanation, according to which the driver for Eastern enlargement 
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was in fact Ideational, i.e. a kinship based duty to “reunify” the continent after over four decades 
of Cold War separation.481 
As chapter 4 has demonstrated rational (material) issues are important in terms of Turkey’s EU 
accession prospects. The membership criteria as dictated by the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria and in 
the accession itself set the framework for issues that Turkey has to fulfil in a satisfactory manner 
before accession is possible. The potential material costs and benefits of Turkey’s membership 
are either motives or barriers for Turkey’s membership, depending on whether one favours or 
opposes the accession. However, as chapter 4 demonstrated as long as Turkey meets the Copen-
hagen Criteria and settles the Cyprus question, there is little reason why the accession could not 
be successful. The analyses of economic cost/benefits are highly speculative. However, the most 
credible accounts tell us that integrating Turkey’s economy into the EU would probably be 
modestly beneficial to the EU, and highly beneficial to Turkey. Moreover, the budget costs of 
Turkey’s accession would be high, but on a similar level with what the EU had to commit into in 
the CEEC-10 enlargement process. Hence, if Turkey is treated as an equal with other candidates 
this does not constitute a valid reason to exclude Turkey (from the Rationalist point of view). 
In terms of the infamous “absorption capacity” (a.k.a. “integration capacity”) the institutional 
impact of Turkey’s membership has been somewhat exaggerated. Turkey would strengthen the 
group of big countries, but would not be allowed to dominate. Since the completion of chapter 4 
a double majority voting system has already been agreed upon in the June 2007 European Coun-
cil and will be implemented by time of Turkey’s accession. Finally, the popular fear of mass 
migration from Turkey, in particular poorer regions such as Anatolia, has also been over-
exaggerated. Studies show that the probable level of immigration would constitute approximately 
0.7% of EU’s total population and compares well to the estimated 2.9 million migrants expected 
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T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
158 
from the CEEC-10 countries in the long-term. Temporary restrictions easily allow up to 7 years 
on freedom of movement from Turkey and would be most likely implemented, as has been done 
with past enlargements. Moreover, the level of migration may be equal or higher if the member-
ship prospect is lost and could be a welcomed prospect by the time restrictions on free movement 
of labour would be lifted. 
In conclusion “Rationalist” analysis does not entirely explain the opposition or the motive for, 
Turkey’s membership due to the fact that it does not take the “hidden agenda” into account. It 
has been argued that in the case of CEEC-10 enlargement material concerns were overcome by a 
“kinship based duty” to “reunify” these countries with Europe following a four decade long 
separation imposed by the Cold War. Much like in the CEEC-10 case Turkey’s membership is 
being justified by perceived Ideational benefits. It has been argued that Turkey’s membership 
would constitute "a Bridge between Civilisations”, i.e. Europe/the West and the Middle 
East/Islamic world and prove that democracy and Islam are compatible and thus, prevent a 
looming “Clash of Civilisations”. On the other hand, it has been argued that the EU must honour 
its word and allow Turkey’s accession or else it risks “losing” Turkey to nationalism and Islamic 
fundamentalism. Significantly, unlike in the CEEC-10 enlargement, Turkey’s “Europeanness” is 
contested, and consequently much of the opposition is Ideationally motivated. According to 
recent Eurobarometer surveys 48% of Europeans would not permit Turkey’s entry even if it 
meets the Copenhagen Criteria and 55% feel that the cultural differences are too great to permit 
accession. This chapter argues that this is largely due to a process of “othering”, in which Turkey 
has become “Europe’s” significant “other”. Moreover, Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” has 
gained a central role in the accession discourse and has, explicitly served as an inspiration for 
arguments for and against Turkey’s membership, in particular for widely used catchphrases 
”Bridge between Civilisations” and “losing Turkey”. The fact that Turkey’s culture, identity, 
values and religion are seen as divergent is a serious hurdle for Turkey’s membership aspira-
tions. The negative public opinion, as well as partially elite opinion, may stop Turkey’s entry as 
each enlargement treaty has to be ratified by each incumbent member state, which will be sub-
jected to national referendums in countries like France and possibly others. Just one negative 
vote can thus stop Turkey’s accession. Finally it is argued that the ”othering” is part of EU’s soul 
seeking process which, motivated by the prospect of Turkey’s membership, has produced a 
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debate regarding the EU’s ultimate borders and its regional identity. This chapter seeks to ana-
lyse Turkey’s “Europeanness” and the discourse around it in the context of this debate. 
5.2 Defining Europe’s Borders: History and Geography or 
Identity and Values? 
When the CEEC-10 countries joined the EU in 2004 it marked the end of a project to “reunite” 
those countries with Europe after four decades of separation imposed by the Cold War. Turkey, 
however, is a different case altogether. None of the duty of “reuniting with Europe” applies to 
Turkey. On the contrary, Turkey’s potential entry into the EU has raised the issue of the ultimate 
limits, or borders, of the European Union to the forefront of discourse on EU enlargement. This 
represents a grave challenge to Turkey’s membership aspirations, in particular since there is a 
level of vagueness about these borders. Turkey is generally considered as partially European, but 
is that enough? The EU has no official position as to what its final limits will be geographically, 
but instead states that the Union is open to all “European” states that respect its values. The 
“European values” criterion is fairly well defined in the Copenhagen Criteria, but what consti-
tutes “European” is left vague. Such vagueness arguably reflects the lack of consensus on what 
constitutes “Europeanness”. For some the determining factors are history and geography, where 
as for others the experience of Renaissance and the Enlightenment defines Europe in cultural 
terms. Yet for some others, the Christian heritage is what defines Europe.482 Finally, the EU can 
be seen as primarily a political project, developing common political identity and values, as well 
participation in regional institutions ultimately defining the region. 483 
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The EU’s borders can, thus, be seen at least as; geographic, institutional, civilizational, cultural, 
or a combination thereof. This, however, is not satisfactory, nor particularly helpful, since the 
EU cannot expand endlessly and some sort of geographic limits are ultimately required. Institu-
tional limits, on the other hand, are not truly limits at all: it is ultimately a political decision how 
many states belong into European institutions. In principle the number participants could be 
endless such as in the UN, or at the least in the OSCE - which has 56 members. The Council of 
Europe, a pan-European organisation which has a mission to unify all European democracies 
which accept the principle of the rule of law and are able and willing to guarantee fundamental 
human rights and freedoms, has 47 member states, all considered as “European”. Finally, civili-
zational and cultural criteria are fine as such; the EU probably does function better if member 
states are unified under the broad umbrella of a “European” common identity, culture, values and 
political culture. However, it must be recognised that the EU in its current format of EU-27 
already is a diverse multicultural, -ethnic and -religious construct with a fairly vague universal 
regional identity. The question therefore is, how do we settle the problem of ”borderline” cases 
like Turkey that are ”partially European”, have the same political system (if not the political 
culture), subscribe to the common European values as prescribed in the founding treaties, par-
ticipate in regional institutions and have intimate economic, political and security ties with the 
EU? “Borderline” states such as Turkey suffer from a dilemma of being perceived as part of the 
region, but not “genuinely of region”. Unfortunately for Turkey it is destined to serve as a test 
case towards defining those borders. This section of the chapter explores the question of Tur-
key’s “Europeanness” with the above mentioned criteria and the debate on Europe’s ultimate 
borders in mind. 
Turkey as a European power: The legacy of history 
Turkey has a long shared history with Europe, and even more importantly has been a key part of 
European history. Moreover, it has a rich Greco-Latin and Judeo-Christian heritage in Anatolia 
where the Roman Eastern Empire was based in Pergamum. The foundation of Constantinople 
(modern Istanbul) in 330 subsequently solidified the Eastern Empire’s dominance over Rome,484 
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shifting the centre of power towards east roughly into the area that now comprises Turkey. 
Consequently, as well as being an important historic site and player in Islamic history, Turkey 
has also played an important role in the history and development of Christianity with central 
Christian figures such as Saint Peter and Saint Paul preaching there and spreading the faith 
beyond the lands of Judaism, as well as hosting legendary Christian sites such as Mount Arat - 
the site of Noah’s Ark and the capital of Eastern (Orthodox) Christianity in Constantinople.485 
The interaction between the Turks and Christianity, however, has not been entirely peaceful by 
any means. The first Crusade carried out by the Europeans in 1097 was a response to the arrival 
of Islam in Anatolia with the Turkic nomadic tribes and resulted in the occupation of parts of the 
province. The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, became a European power through conquest 
and alliances, establishing the “terrible Turks” legacy in many parts of Europe. This legacy of 
conflict and conquest still lives in the minds of many Europeans and contributes towards Tur-
key’s "otherness” in the discourse of its EU membership. 
The Ottoman Empire established a permanent presence in the European continent with the 
conquest of Gallipoli in 1354 and expanded its presence in the continent subsequently taking 
control over Balkans following the battle of Kosovo (“Blackbird field”) in 1389 where it de-
feated the Serbian forces. The defeat of the Bulgarians in 1394 further consolidated the Ottoman 
rule in the region.486 Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire established itself as a major power in 
Europe with the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, which was subsequently renamed Istanbul 
and made the new capital of the Empire. The Ottomans continued to expand their presence in 
Europe through conquest and alliances, culminating in the siege of Vienna in 1529 that spear-
headed Ottoman expansion in Central Europe. At the height of its glory under Süleyman the 
Magnificent (1520-66) the Ottoman Empire ruled over the Arab lands, the Balkans, most of 
Hungary, the Black Sea littoral and North Africa487 
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In the 17th century the Ottomans’ final push into Europe ended with the Battle of Vienna in 1683 
where the multinational European force drove the Ottomans back forcing the empire to accept 
the Treaty of Karloqicz in 1699, resulting in the loss of territory for the Ottomans. The Otto-
mans’ wars with Russia also ended in humiliation and the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynarja 
forced the empire to allow Russian ships access to Ottoman waters.488 The decline continued and 
deepened throughout the 19th century and the Ottoman Empire consequently became known as 
the “sick man of Europe”.489 The first serious blow to the empire’s prestige came in 1832 when 
European powers forced the Ottomans to recognise Greek independence. A temporary victory, 
however, emerged during the 1854-56 Crimean War, in which the Ottoman Empire allied itself 
with France and Britain against Russia. As a member of the victorious alliance the empire 
became a member in the Concert of Europe in 1856 and gained its place in the European society 
of states.490 The decline resumed, however, after the brief period of regained glory when the 
1878 Treaty of Berlin made Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia independent. Soon after the comple-
tion of the treaty Britain took Cyprus, Egypt, France, Algeria and Tunisia, thus starting the 
carving up of the Empire from its previous might. During the turbulent period of 1909-1912 
more territory was lost in the Balkan wars. Just a couple years later WWI started and the Otto-
mans allied themselves with the Germans, thus picking the losing side and losing even more 
territory.491 Moreover, the 1915 genocide of Armenians in Anatolia took place during this 
turbulent period, an event that still is a hindrance in the relations between Turkey and the EU. 
The 1920 Treaty of Sèrres carved the empire up into separate spheres of influence as instigated 
by the victorious allies and the Ottoman Empire began its final collapse. Finally, the July 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne ended WWI for the Ottomans and lead to the declaration of the Republic of 
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Turkey in October the same year by the Gallipoli and independence struggle hero Mustafa 
Kemal (later known as Atatürk, the father of Turks).492 
Reforms and Modernisation 
Turkey’s quest to modernise, and in effect to Westernise itself along European lines, started early 
with the realisation of the decline of the Empire in the 19th century. Sultan Mahmud II assisted 
by the so-called Young Ottomans, initiated reforms during the 1838-1876 period that aimed at 
establishing a modern bureaucracy along the European lines. These Tanzimat (regulations) 
reforms were essentially an elite driven system enforcing a modern bureaucracy by copying 
Western institutions aimed at secularisation of the educational and legal systems, as well as 
weakening the influence of the Ulemma.493 The Tanzimat reforms lead to a new constitution in 
1876, which limited the Sultan’s powers. The constitution was abolished a year later but the 
reforms continued relatively uninterrupted.494 In 1908, the “Young Turks” following the foot-
steps of the “young Ottomans” revitalised the constitution and launched a revolution against the 
Sultanate.495 The movement, however, met its demise soon after with its mistake to engage in 
WWI adventurism.496 
The establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 under Kemalism and the watchful eye of 
the father of the republic - Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – initiated a strong impetus for further re-
forms to modernise Turkey. Atatürk’s reforms were inspired by the French Revolution and 
besides the copying of French institutions, they made secularism the guiding principle for the 
new state, permanently abolished the sultanate, the caliphate and the Ulemma. Other major 
measures included replacing Sharia law with a Civil Code and the Arabic alphabet with the 
Roman one, as well as formally giving political rights to women for the first time. Thus the state 
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took over control of religion, reformed legal and educational systems and the ideology of Kemal-
ism unified the country under one universal identity (Turkish). The ultimate goal of Atatürk was 
always clear: becoming a modern, if not a Western, state comparable with those in Western 
Europe, stating that; “the West has always been prejudiced against the Turks…but we the Turks 
have always consistently moved towards the west…in order to become a civilised nation, there is 
no alternative”.497 
Engagement with European Institutions 
Turkey’s involvement and role in European institutions has been extensive, long-term, commit-
ted, and to an extent even pioneering. Turkey was for instance a founding member in the Organi-
sation for European Economic Cooperation in 1948 (OECD since 1961) and among the first to 
join the Council of Europe a year later. The Council of Europe membership is particularly 
important, as it is a pan-European institution representing what are commonly perceived as core 
European values. The Secretary- General of the Council of Europe - Terry Davis- has pledged 
the Council’s continuous support for Turkey in its accession quest, stating that ''Turkey fully 
deserves these negotiations'', as well as praising Turkey’s commitment to European values; 
''Turkey, which has been a member state of the Council of Europe since 1949, has achieved 
substantial progress in the fields of human rights and democracy, and has clearly demonstrated 
its commitment to fundamental European values''.498 Turkey’s welcomed participation in these 
early European institutions signalled a universal acceptance of Turkey as a European nation at 
the time, a state of affairs that appears to have been either forgotten or challenged recently. 
In addition to the Council of Europe membership, the early Cold War years witnessed an intensi-
fied push towards the Western alliance with Turkey becoming a NATO member in 1952. Turkey 
also enthusiastically welcomed the early developments of European integration and consequently 
applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, barely 
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two years after its establishment. More importantly, Turkey was equally welcomed by the EEC 
and made an associate member in 1963. The President of the Commission at the time Walter 
Hallstein declared after the signing of Association Agreement (a.k.a. the “Ankara Agreement”) 
in 1963 that :”Turkey is part of Europe today”.499 500 Turkey and the EEC also signed an Addi-
tional Protocol (AP) in November 1970 describing the details for the establishment of a Customs 
Union and a gradual removal of tariffs. The AP was, however, never fully implemented.501 
Moreover, the positive perception and spirit had already changed by the time Turkey applied for 
full membership in the EEC in 1987. The occupation with Northern Cyprus in 1974, military 
coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980, numerous economic crises and the surge of Kurdish terrorism had 
contributed towards the building up of a generally negative perception of Turkey in Europe.502 
Turkish decision to apply for full membership in 1987 was largely motivated by domestic politi-
cal considerations and with full knowledge of poor prospects for success.503 The 1987 applica-
tion was submitted under the normal provisions of the Treaty of Rome, i.e. sent to European 
Council which subsequently requested the European Commission for an Opinion. The Commis-
sion’s Opinion reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility in December 1989, significantly differentiating it 
from Morocco as a precedent, whereby that country was considered not European. The Council 
subsequently gave its approval in February 1990 acknowledging that Turkey is eligible, but 
politely declined to start the accession process referring to EC’s own internal situation, i.e. the 
preparations to launch the Single Market, as well as Turkey’s economic and political situation. 
Nonetheless, the EC agreed to the establishment of a Customs Union until circumstances would 
permit Turkey’s entry and promised financial assistance to aid Turkey’s transformation. How-
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ever, the "Manutes Package” financial aid scheme never materialized due to objections by 
Greece.504 
The early1990s witnessed a continuation of a downslide in Turkey-EU relations and the rein-
forcement of the negative image of Turkey already prevalent in the EU due to the economic 
crises and a “post-modern” military coup. Also, the European Parliament in particular became 
more critical towards Turkey’s track record on human rights and treatment of minorities and 
demands were made towards improvement of conditions for the Kurds and recognition of the 
Armenian massacre.505Whereas the late-1980s and early 1990s were a problematic period for 
Turkey, a more positive turn emerged eventually in the mid-1990s and a Customs Union agree-
ment was signed in 1995 (in effect since 1996). Encouraged by the fresh wave of positive devel-
opments Turkey applied for EU membership again in 1997. The Luxembourg European Council 
of 1997, however, decided that negotiations were to be started with the CEEC states and Cyprus, 
but not with Turkey. As an added snub the EU offered Turkey a “European Strategy” instead of 
an Accession Partnership, despite pledges to treat all candidates equally. Moreover, Turkey was 
excluded from the EU enlargement strategy at the same time in its Agenda 2000 (published in 
1997), which made no reference to Turkey’s full membership prospects.506 The move seriously 
angered Turkey and its government quickly condemned the EU’s decision as "unjust and dis-
criminatory”. Perhaps even worse than an outright rejection, the EU thus sent mixed signals to 
Turkey: on the one hand it was deemed eligible, but on the other hand not wanted.507 
Becoming an “ordinary” candidate? 
The late-1990s, however, produced perhaps the most important breakthrough in Turkey’s mem-
bership quest when the 1999 Helsinki European Council recognised Turkey officially as a 
candidate country following a positive assessment by the European Commission. Besides finally 
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promising Turkey real prospects of full membership, the EU now offered Turkey an Accession 
Partnership and equal treatment: 
“The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as 
noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its 
reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate 
State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the 
other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like 
other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and 
support its reforms….. Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in 
Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate States 
and the Union in the context of the accession process. An accession partnership 
will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions while 
containing priorities on which accession preparations must concentrate in the 
light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, 
combined with a national programme for the adoption of the acquis. Appropriate 
monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying the har-
monisation of Turkey's legislation and practice with the acquis, the Commission is 
invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the acquis. The Euro-
pean Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for coordinat-
ing all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-accession.”508 
Perhaps even more importantly, this time the EU made good of its promises and the Accession 
Partnership was established in November 2000, giving Turkey a clearly defined path towards full 
membership for the first time. The December 2001 Laeken European Council continued the 
positive turn in relations and Turkey gained access to participation in the European Security and 
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Defence Policy and the work on the Convention on the future of Europe on equal footing with 
other candidates.509 
The 2002 Brussels European Council, however, declared that the EU had intentions to open 
negotiations with Turkey once the conditions in Turkey and the EU would so permit. Turkey did 
not need to wait for long. In 2004 the Copenhagen European Council, following a positive 
assessment by the European Commission, declared that it would begin negotiations with Turkey 
without delay and in October 2005 the negotiations were officially opened. Taking into consid-
eration that in December 2006 8 chapters were frozen due to the disagreements over the Cyprus 
issue, one can legitimately conclude that Turkey’s accession process since its first application in 
July 1959 has been an extraordinarily rollercoaster-like process with plenty of ups and downs 
along the way. Nevertheless, the fact that Turkey’s accession process is an open ended one (i.e. 
no definite timeline or accession date is given), makes it relatively safe to assume that more 
thrills and frills are to be expected. 
Table 9. Turkey’s Road to Europe 
1948 Turkey becomes a founding member of OEEC (OECD since 1961) 
1949 Turkey becomes a member of the European Council 
1952 Turkey becomes a member in NATO 
1959 Turkey applies to join the EEC (founded 1958) 
1963 The “Ankara Agreement” is signed (enters into force in 1964) 
1970 The Additional Protocol is signed 
1982 The European Community freezes its relations with Turkey 
1987 Turkey applies for full membership in the EEC (rejected 1989) 
1995 Turkey and the EU form a Customs Union (enters force in 1996) 
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1997 Turkey applies for full membership in the EU 
1999 Turkey becomes an official candidate by the Helsinki European Council decision 
2004 The Copenhagen European Council decides to open membership negotiations with Turkey 
2005 Membership negotiations officially opened 
2006 8 Chapters frozen over dispute on Cyprus 
2007 Negotiations resume once again 
 
Geography of the EU: Constructing Turkey into versus out of Europe 
One of the most conceptually difficult questions in the EU enlargement debate is defining the 
geographic borders of Europe. Geography defines Europe as the westernmost peninsula of 
Eurasia west of Asia. Its western, northern and southern borders are well defined by clear 
boundaries; the Atlantic Ocean in the west, Barents Sea to the north and the Mediterranean to the 
south. The eastern boundaries of Europe, however, are contested. In terms of physical “natural” 
geographic boundaries the European continent is often said to be limited in the east by the Ural 
Mountains, and further down by the Caspian Sea, Caucasus Mountains, Black Sea, the Bosporus 
Straits, Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles510. However, this definition is contested and geog-
raphers have never reached a full consensus as to Europe’s borders in the east. The European 
Union’s current borders on the other hand, as the Commissioner for Enlargement, Dr. Olli Rehn 
points out, are defined by the Treaty of Nice, the various accession treaties since then and the 
Withdrawal Treaty of Greenland in 1985. The borders of the EU are thus a legal concept also.511 
The EU is thus geographically limited to Lapland in the North, the Reunion in the South, Guade-
loupe in the West, Cyprus in the East.512 The EU’s borders to the west or north have never been 
an issue and there was a precedent made in regards to the southern limits when Morocco’s 
                                                 
510 Wikipedia, “Europe”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europe, date accessed 
28 May 2007 
511 Rehn (2006), p.56 
512 Rehn (2006), p. 56 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
170 
application was turned down in 1993.513 This again leaves the eastern limits of the Union as an 
open question, strengthening the argument that Europe is an intellectual construct in essence. 
Also, the fact that the French overseas territories are within EU’s borders defends the view that 
its borders are not exclusively geographic. 
Turkey’s geographical position is, open to interpretation. The territory of modern Turkey is 
divided between Anatolia situated geographically in south-west Asia and Thrace situated in 
south-east Europe. This division between the European and Asian parts of Turkey, divided by the 
Bosporus straits, has often been raised as a point in the discourse on Turkey’s EU accession 
prospects; mainly by the opponents to Turkey’s membership who point out that only 3% of its 
territory belongs to Europe geographically. Those more sympathetic to Turkey’s membership 
point out that nonetheless the country is at least partially European geographically, historically 
and culturally. Hence, whilst only 3% of the territory is within continental Europe, this area 
contains 11% of its total population and the historic, as well as economic and cultural capital 
Istanbul,514 the largest city in Turkey and one of the most populous cities in Europe. Moreover, 
the proponents argue that geography is not the only criteria and that Turkey’s historical, political, 
economic and security linkages make it European. Indeed whilst a candidate country must be a 
European state, Turkey was accepted as a candidate country in 2005 and participates in a number 
of European institutions which indicates a de facto, if not de jure, recognition of Turkey meeting 
that criterion. Moreover, Thierry de Montbrial points out that the opponents arguing against 
Turkey’s membership on the basis that the country is only partially in Europe geographically 
relies on a concept of Europe that intellectually derives from the Middle Age concept of the 
Christian world.515 
Sanem Baykal argues that rather than being a question of economic, political, social and other 
problems in Turkey, the real issue is its perceived or factual divergent identity that influences 
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Turkey-EU relations. This is because Turkey has traditionally been EU’s historical “significant 
other”516 Ernst Hirsch Ballin, a Dutch veteran politician, takes the argument even further by 
stating that questioning Turkey’s European vocation is in fact a symptom of EU’s own identity 
crisis.517 Hence, the real defining question will be what kind of EU will emerge during Turkey’s 
accession process and what kind of concept of borders it will endorse. 
What Borders for Europe? 
European institutions say nothing conclusive about the future limits of the EU, perhaps because 
the issue is largely considered a taboo. Nonetheless, a common position, especially in the Euro-
pean Commission, is that the limits of the EU are not geographic but it is rather the common 
values that form the ties that bind the community together.518 However, the criterion of values is 
not very conclusive either, other European institutions that are also based on values have a much 
broader membership. For instance the Council of Europe had 47 members in 2007 and the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 56 members. Since some of the 
member countries are either not European, or have no interest in joining the EU, one could 
speculate about the potential maximum membership stock for the EU by engaging in a process of 
exclusion too seed out the unsuitable and unwilling candidates. First step in such a process would 
be to exclude the US and Canada, the Central Asian states and European micro-states that have 
no interest in joining. This would leave us with 17 states that are officially recognised as Euro-
pean but are not EU members: Balkan states, Turkey, countries covered by the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia. This would imply that the outer limits of the EU could 
be considered EU-44.519 Of these the Balkan states and Turkey are currently considered as 
potential members. Russia is not currently interested in EU membership and possibly would 
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react unfavourably if the EU sought to include the ENP countries that it considers as being in its 
sphere of influence. In any case can the EU become EU-44? In the short term most likely not 
since many of these countries would not be able to meet the Copenhagen Criteria any time soon. 
However, even if they did, would they still be considered European by the incumbent member 
states? Graham Avery, a former European Commission official and a European Policy Centre 
advisor has suggested that candidate countries cannot be excluded on the basis of not being of 
“European” if they at the same time are members in other European institutions. However, they 
can be rejected based on other legitimate grounds, i.e. the Copenhagen Criteria or “absorption 
capacity”.520 In other words, membership criteria should be based on “Rationalist” factors, not 
Ideational. 
EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, argues in his recent book “Europe’s Next 
Borders” that it is the shared values that make the European borders, not geography alone: "The 
map of Europe is first and foremost defined in the minds of Europeans. Geography sets the 
frame, but essentially it is our common values that make the borders of Europe”521 He also 
asserts that enlargement is essentially about extending the zone of these values to the candidate 
states, and consequently enlargement is the most effective EU soft power policy tool.522 He also 
argues that European discourse is dominated by the limits and borders of Europe, constituting an 
ostrich attitude rather than one of openness that the EU tends to pride itself on. Consequently 
Rehn instigates that the issue should be of next frontiers instead. Unlike borders, that are exclu-
sive and restrictive, frontiers are a positive, constructive concept, according to Rehn.523 Rehn 
blames the opponents of enlargement as having an “ostrich attitude” and asks rhetorically what if 
the American founding fathers had declared in the 1787 constitution that the thirteen founding 
colonies will define the borders of the United States?524 Instead of this “ostrich attitude”, as Rehn 
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calls it, he instigates that "an intellectual interpretation that takes into consideration the political, 
cultural and historical relationship between Turkey and Europe” is needed.525 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, former French finance minister, speaks of two alternate visions for the 
EU. One that relies on the past and thus, a geographical and historical identity for Europe, giving 
the EU a sacred duty to unify all countries that share this identity. Turkey does not conform to 
this concept, according to Strauss-Kahn. The second vision looks towards the future instead of 
the past. In this vision the EU’s borders cannot be based on geography and history, but rather it is 
a political project with a political identity unifying under the umbrella of common universal 
values; human rights, rule of law and democracy. Strauss-Kahn states that geography and history 
do not provide a satisfactory resolution to the problem of defining Europe’s borders: “these 
borders have been in such a state of flux in the past and are so vague in geographic terms that it 
appears to be impossible to make it relevant criteria to define the limits of Europe’s territory.”526 
Therefore, the determining membership criteria are the Copenhagen Criteria alone and any state 
that fulfils these criteria can join.527 This interpretation, however, still presents a problem: if 
geography is excluded why couldn’t Australia, New Zealand and Canada join? All these states 
could be considered “European” in all but geography. Yet, the EU is supposedly a regional 
organisation. How can the EU balance between openness and the reality that the EU must have 
some sort of outer limits? Widening versus deepening can perhaps be seen as complimentary 
activities (although many disagree), but how would this work in practice if there is no cap? The 
EU has thus far failed to agree on constitution and voting rules and is arguably facing a looming 
decision-making paralysis if something is not done, how would it handle 30 or more members 
and still be able to function? Referring to the failure of the Nice summit Strauss-Kahn has 
suggested that one potential end result could be a combination of two poles of a European Union 
and a Mediterranean Union. This would establish a zone of peace and economic integration 
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where a core group of countries in both unions that are willing and able to may form a deeper 
political union.528 
In a similar way, but with a more negative connotation, Nicolas Sarkozy, the newly elected 
French president at the time of the writing, has on several occasions stated that he wants the 
European project to have some sorts of ultimate borders. As a presidential candidate he stated in 
his UMP party’s candidate nomination speech that: "I want to say that Europe must give itself 
borders, that not all countries have a vocation to become members of Europe, beginning with 
Turkey which has no place inside the European Union." 529 The given reason for this statement 
was the deepening versus widening logic, the fear that the EU would risk turning into a mere 
enlarged free trade area: "Enlarging Europe with no limit risks destroying European political 
union, and that I do not accept".530 More recently, since becoming the president, Sarkozy has 
indicated that he wants the European Council to discuss the borders of Europe in December 2007 
at the end of Portuguese presidency. Moreover, he wants a clear conclusion that Turkey is not 
and will not be considered as European. Instead of EU membership for Turkey, Sarkozy says 
that a Mediterranean Union is going to be proposed during the French EU presidency in the 
second half of 2008. According to Sarkozy’s vision the Mediterranean Union would eventually 
become a fully fledged union like the EU with its own institutions. A close cooperative relation-
ship between the two would provide a better working solution than an EU that would comprise 
all the states in the two regions.531 
In conclusion, what kind of union the EU evolves into in the next 10 to 15 years determines what 
kind of borders it will have and how candidates are selected and treated is a question of primary 
interest to Turkey. Should the EU turn out to evolve into an exclusive “club” based on history 
and geography, Turkey should expect trouble. On the other hand, should the EU evolve into an 
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open ended community based on a political and economic project which has room for potential 
candidates with “divergent identities”, Turkey has a relatively good chance of getting accepted. 
5.3 Identity and Culture: Turkey’s “Europeanness” and the 
European Values 
“The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are re-
solved to share a peaceful future based on common values.”532 
Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
“The term 'European' combines geographical, historical and cultural elements 
which all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of ideas, 
values, and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple timeless for-
mula and is subject to review by each succeeding generation”533 
The European Commission 
Samuel P. Huntington has suggested that Turkey’s chances becoming a member in the EU are 
slim at best because what it is trying to achieve means “defecting” from one civilization to 
another, a task that rarely succeeds. Moreover, having rejected Mecca and been rejected by 
Brussels Turkey has become a torn country between two civilizations, Huntington asserts. Whilst 
Huntington’s cultural realism has been vehemently criticised for being too deterministic and 
relying too much on rather vague concept of “civilizations”, the fears of an emerging “Clash of 
Civilizations” nonetheless are prominent in Turkey-EU discourse, primarily used for describing 
the potential consequences of ”losing Turkey”. At the other end spectrum the supporters of 
Turkey’s membership are also claiming that Turkey’s integration into the EU would constitute, 
or build, a "Bridge between Civilizations”, i.e. Europe and the Islamic world. In any case, it 
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would be a rather futile task to attempt to deny that cultural factors are not prominent in the 
discourse. Turkey’s “Europeanness” is being contested by the politicians and the public in the 
European Union’s incumbent member states, in particular on the basis that its identity, culture 
and values do not correspond to the prevailing perception of what constitutes “Europeanness”. 
As an indication of the cultural resistance, 55% of respondents in the Eurobarometer study stated 
that cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are too significant for the accession to be 
allowed.534 However, there is a significant level of vagueness as to what exactly constitutes 
“Europeanness”, i.e. how the “European” identity, culture and values are defined, and crucially 
for future enlargement projects how the final borders of Europe are defined. Slovenia was 
constructed as “European”, in a similar manner to the CEEC-10 countries that joined in 2004, 
justifying its rightful return to “Europe”, but at the same time it was considered sufficiently 
“Balkan” to for a “bridge” between the two”.535 To Turkey’s detriment the foundations of that 
particular “bridge” are not seen as equally solid, namely in the “European” end of the imaginary 
bridge. 
What then is this concept of "Europeanness” and the universal European culture that Turkey is 
being judged against? First of all, it needs to be recognised that Europe is not a homogenous 
entity but rather extremely diverse in terms of ethnicity, religion and languages (as well as in 
many aspects, such as legal and political systems, living standards and level of economic devel-
opment). In fact the approximately 490 million citizens of the current 27 member countries 
include countless national minorities, speak 23 official languages and over 60 regional or minor-
ity languages.536In a gesture of acknowledgement of this fact the EU has launched an official 
motto for European integration: "Unified in Diversity”. Many observers claim that Turkey is the 
ultimate test case for “unity in diversity” in that its success or failure in the quest for full mem-
berships will determine what kind of EU will emerge in the future: an inclusive versus an exclu-
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sive union. The prevailing conventional wisdom dictates that a deepening political union requires 
more "unity” than “diversity”, referring to the widely proclaimed “widening versus deepening” 
argument. As already established, Rehn calls this a false dichotomy and states that the two are 
compatible. Hence, following the official Commission line he proclaims that the EU is really a 
value community with a diverse polity unified under the banner of common universal values,537 
and that consequently EU membership is open to all countries that respect and are committed to 
its values. Consequently, only not subscribing to these values stops Turkey from joining the 
EU.538 This would follow the general principle that if a candidate meets the criteria, the EU must 
honour its part (the pacta sunt servanda principle) by approving and facilitating accession.539 If 
this was the case in practice too, Turkey’s accession should not be a problem: if Turkey fulfils 
the Copenhagen Criteria it will be admitted.540 However, the opponents of Turkey’s accession 
refer to its divergent identity and values as impassable obstacles, a view that appears to be 
enforced by the European public opinion. 
European Values 
As for the universal European values, the issue should be relatively straightforward. The official 
values of the European Union are democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights as stipu-
lated in the Article 49 of Treaty of the European Union, enforced by the Copenhagen Criteria. 
Had the Constitutional Treaty entered force, it would have further solidified and specified these 
universal values towards creating a political identity for the EU, but the emergence of the treaty 
in any significant form appears increasingly doubtful at the time of the writing. Whilst the values 
of the EU as a regional institution are fairly clear, nonetheless a wedge between how the EU 
wants to be perceived by its populations and how they perceive it still exist:  
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Table 10. Personal versus European Values 
Top-5 Personal Values Score Top-5 European Values Score 
Peace 52% Human Rights 38% 
Respect for human life 43% Democracy 38% 
Human Rights 41% Peace 36% 
Democracy 24% Rule of law 24% 
Individual freedom 22% Respect for other cultures 19% 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 66 
The biggest gaps between those perceived European and personal values were in: respect for 
human life (personal 43%, 2nd, EU 13%, 8th); individual freedom (personal 22% 5th, EU 10% 
10th); and, respect for other cultures (personal 11% 10th, EU 19% 5th). Whilst this does not mean 
European values are not backed by the citizens, or that there are not universal values to be found 
in the EU, it also indicates that the universality is not at the level where minor divergence should 
constitute a problem. On the contrary in a pluralistic and tolerant Europe there should be consid-
erable leeway for personal values. Hence, the issue of values in terms of the accession process 
should refer only to the level of universal values in the society and the state, i.e. adherence to the 
Copenhagen Criteria and the founding treaties. José Torreblanca has also pointedly stated: 
"identities are acquired whereas values are chosen”.541 In terms of the Turkish state, it would 
seem it has already made this choice. 
Secondly, a "European identity” does not really exist independently, but rather merely as a 
supplementary on the side of national identities.542 A study commissioned by the European 
Commission to examine the emergence of a European identity from a wide variety of theoretical 
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perspectives found that whilst such an identity may be forming, it still is a long way off.543 The 
Eurobarometer studies have also constantly found that EU citizens prioritise their nationality first 
over European identity (see: chart 5.2.), supporting the supplementarity of the European identity. 
Of the respondents 41% identify with their respective nationality only and 48% nationality first 
and European second.544 In comparison, national identity is the prevailing one in Turkey with 
74% of Turks associating themselves with nationality only.545 However, how would one expect 
the Turks to feel more European whilst their country is not a member and arguably has faced 
fierce resistance to join? Should Turkey join the EU first, it is rather likely that this figure would 
improve somewhat. It is, on the other hand, rather unlikely that a feeling of “Euro-nationalism” 
would be behind the resistance to Turkey’s membership when such a phenomena arguably does 
not even exit. Hence, it would be justified to ask whether religion is really the bigger issue, and 
in fact equals culture in Turkey’s case? 
Table 11. European Identity 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 64, June 2006, p. 46 
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5.4 The Role of Religion 
“As a secular republic with a predominantly Muslim population, a staunchly de-
mocratic Turkey integrated into the EU would be a powerful example against 
fundamentalist claims of an essential incompatibility between democracy and Is-
lam”546 
Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement 
“Throughout history, especially throughout the Ottoman history, there has always 
been a conflict between Christianity and Islam…There is an inherent fear of Islam 
deep in the hearts of many European countries.” (Male, Austria)547 
The role of religion is a politically sensitive topic, but nonetheless a critical factor in Turkey’s 
EU accession process. Whereas the question of religion is not featured in the official dis-
course548, in particular by the EU institutions, it nonetheless is quite prominently featured in the 
popular discourse. Besides being politically sensitive, the question of religion is also increasingly 
a complex one. On the one hand, many EU citizens are worried that Turkey’s accession would 
result in too many Muslim immigrants to the EU, and thus to a growing Islamic influence in the 
EU. On the other hand, the EU is worried that fundamentalism might gain ground in Turkey, in 
particular unless the EU avoids “losing Turkey” by integrating it into the European “zone of 
peace and stability”. Securing Turkey’s integration into the EU would, allegedly, prove that 
democracy and Islam are compatible, and thus provide an example for other Muslim states for 
their path to democratic reforms. This claim obviously ignores the fact that Turkey already is 
both democratic and Muslim, and has demonstrated little interest in exporting its secular model 
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to the Islamic world. Moreover, the EU, again allegedly, must avoid creating an image that it is 
discriminating against a Muslim country, thus angering the Islamic world and losing its trust, 
should Turkey’s accession fail. Finally, Turkey worries that the EU is, in reality, an exclusive 
Christian club and that it would be consequently turned down due to its Islamic identity. 
Since both, Turkey and the EU, are officially secular the question of religion should not matter. 
Moreover, refusing accession for Turkey on the grounds that is a Muslim country is not accept-
able if the EU intends to withhold its core values of tolerance and plurality.549 
Yet, as this section will demonstrate, crucial differences persist in terms perceptions on religion’s 
role in society. Moreover, it would seem that Turkey still has to discover how to reconcile 
Ataturk’s secularism and the growing political role of Islam whilst maintaining a functioning 
democracy, as 2007 presidential elections so drastically demonstrated. In a similar vein, the EU 
has to discover how to deal with an increasing Muslim population and prospects of growing 
Islamic identity and influence. Exclusion of Turkey on basis of its religious identity would 
arguably send a negative message not only to the Islamic world but also to Muslims in Europe. 
Furthermore, exclusion of Turkey based on such reasons would hurt the EU’s external image and 
would be seen as a direct violation of the core values the EU pledges to promote; religious 
tolerance, secularism, pluralism and human rights.550 
The Role of Religion in the European Union 
The European Union is officially secular and religion is not mentioned in the founding treaties. 
The Berlin Declaration issued in 2007 to commemorate 50 years551 of European integration 
followed the same policy line, angering the Catholic Church and prompting the Pope to issue 
statements expressing his disappointment that Europe’s Christian heritage was not even men-
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tioned. In a similar vein one million Europeans signed a petition in 2004 in favour of including 
Christianity in the Constitution.552A compromise, however, was reached that refers to Europe’s 
spiritual heritage but does not define what that heritage includes. Consequently, the preamble of 
the Declaration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union reads: 
“Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indi-
visible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is 
based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law”553 
In general, the question of religion is no small issue; a majority of Europeans - 66.7% -
considered themselves religious according to the European Values Study in 1999554, although 
religiousness appears to be in decline in Europe with only 52% of EU-25 citizens now declaring 
they believe in God.555 The role of religion divides Europeans somewhat, but in general it is 
considered important. When asked whether they agree with the statement “the place of religion 
in our society is too important”, 48% responded they totally disagreed whilst 46% responded 
they totally agree.556 
However, according to the same survey secularism is equally strong in Europe, thus justifying 
the separation of religion and the state; 72.2% of the respondents strongly agreed that religious 
leaders should not influence government policy making. In Turkey the corresponding figure was 
72.3%. Consequently, Rehn has stated that secularism is a value that unites Turkey and the 
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EU.557 However, whilst the EU is officially secular and most member countries are secular, 
secularism is not completely universal in Europe. Some of the member states have official state 
religions (churches); the UK (the Anglican Church), Finland (Evangelic Lutheran Church), 
Denmark (Lutheran) and Greece (Greek Orthodox Church), whilst Christianity is referred to in 
constitutions of some of the officially secular states (e.g. the Irish Republic). 558 Moreover, there 
is a rapid process of secularism that appears to be creating a post-Christian Europe with less 
people belonging to religious congregations. This, however, is not necessarily indicative of 
religion’s permanent decline in Europe as a majority of Europeans still believe in God. José 
Casanova calls this emerging state of affairs as ”believing without belonging”.559 Furthermore, 
there have been serious attempts of a Christian revival in Europe, in particular since the reunifi-
cation of Catholic Poland with Europe, a project that has reunited the territories of Medieval 
Christendom within the enlarged EU.560 
As for the spiritual heritage, whilst Islam has been a long-standing and an important element in 
European history, it is Christianity that has had the dominant impact on Europe’s cultural evolu-
tion.561 Moreover, whilst there is a significant and growing Muslim minority in Europe, a clear 
majority of Europeans are Christians (Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox) and identify with 
Christian identity.562 Also, despite the long interaction between Islam and Europe, as well as 
Turkey’s well-established tradition of secularism, Islam is still seen as the “other” for Western 
civilization and Western secularism from the perspective of Europe’s Judeo-Christian heri-
tage.563The perceptions of Islam as an un-European religion and the link between it and funda-
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mentalism and extremism are deeply rooted.564Also, attitudes towards Islam in Europe have in 
general been hardening following the 9/11, “11M” Madrid bombings and 7/7 London bombings 
with a growing number of Europeans becoming concerned about Islamic extremism.565 The 
French ban on Muslim veils and other ostensibly religious symbols and the murder of anti-
immigration politician Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands have only reinforced the polarisation 
between Islam and the West in Europe. The feeling of concern is worst in countries with the 
largest Muslim populations; 78% of Germans, 77% of Spaniards, 76% of Dutch, 73% French 
and 70% of British worried about Islamic extremism.566 The concerns over Islamic extremism 
were also found to be linked to the opposition to Turkey’s membership, although concerns over 
eroding national identity and negative views on immigration were linked even more intimately to 
the opposition.567 Nonetheless, a worrying trend seems to be emerging: 
Country Generally good Generally bad 
Germany 23% 70% 
France 33% 66% 
UK 28% 61% 
Turkey 14% 64% 
 
Source: PEW Divided World p. 29 
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The prospects of growing Islamic identity also worries Europeans with 66% of respondents in 
Germany, 63% in the UK, 70% in France and 60 % in the Netherlands seeing a growing Islamic 
identity in their country.568 The integration of European Muslims is another problem often raised 
in connection with Turkey’s EU accession. A majority of Muslims in Europe tend to see them-
selves as Muslims first and citizens of their respective countries of residence second: 
Country Muslims first Citizens first 
UK 81% 7% 
Spain 69% 3% 
Germany 66% 13% 
France 46% 42% 
 
Source: PEW, Muslims in Europe, p. 9 
European Christians on the other hand generally see themselves as Citizens first, whilst Christian 
identity is seen as secondary: 
Country Christians first Citizens first 
UK 24% 59% 
Spain 14% 60% 
Germany 33% 59% 
France 14% 83% 
 
Source: Pew, Muslims in Europe, p. 3 
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Attitudes towards Muslim Immigrants in Europe 
The integration of the approximately 23 million European Muslims is a serious potential prob-
lem, as it only tends to take place in the 2nd or 3rd generation, and even then it does not always 
happen. In Germany for instance Muslims with German citizenship are often still considered 
immigrants. Moreover, only 600 000 out 3 million German Muslims have acquired citizen-
ship.569 The same applies to many other EU countries. In Denmark acquiring citizenship was 
recently made harder for immigrants, making many of them to feel not wanted.570 Even more 
seriously, Muslims in Europe see assimilation instead of integration being the reality.571 A 
majority of respondents in European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia study do not 
see their values as incompatible with the host society values572, yet perceptions of Islam being a 
threat to European values are seen as common amongst the majority populations.573 The sources 
of Islamophobia are linked to fears of the Muslim “demographic time bomb” and perceptions of 
Muslims being threat to law and order and terrorist sympathisers.574 Muslims in Europe, how-
ever, are more worried about economics and unemployment than religion or culture and in 
general do not see Europeans as hostile towards Islam.575 
Muslims in Europe continue to suffer from discrimination and marginalisation in employment, 
education and housing services due to stereotyping by the majority population.576 Some of the 
interviewees in the study reported stereotyping of Islamic society and culture as exotic and 
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under-developed by the majority population and media. 577 The European Values Survey reports 
that respondents in Denmark preferred emotionally unstable people as neighbours over Muslims 
(14.1% did not want emotionally unstable people as neighbours, whilst 16.3% did not want 
Muslims as neighbours).578 In general, Muslims appear more vulnerable to discrimination than 
non-Muslims, but at the same time religion alone does not explain their problems. Much of the 
problems are rather linked to a general anti-immigration sentiment rather than direct hostility 
towards Muslims in particular.579 In general Muslims do not see their host populations in Europe 
as hostile, with the exception of Germany where 51% of Muslims see their hosts as hostile (22% 
of respondents reported that most and 29% that many are hostile).580Europeans are not necessar-
ily against Muslim immigrants in particular with immigration from the Middle East and North 
Africa mostly still seen as positive, except in Germany, where only 34% see it as a good thing in 
comparison to 59% who see it as a bad thing.581 Finally, a five nation survey carried out in the 
UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain by the Financial Times found that religion was not a 
criterion for EU membership for respondents. However, the survey found that 35% of French 
and Germans thought that the EU is predominantly a Christian club.582 Nonetheless, as Rehn 
states the critical task in integrating Muslims into European societies is creating European Islam, 
instead of Islam in Europe.583 
The Role of Religion in Turkey 
Secularism is a long established tradition in Turkey and plays a central role in the official na-
tional ideology - Kemalism. The Ottoman Empire already exercised considerable tolerance 
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towards religious minorities, in particular the “peoples of the book” - Christians, Jews and 
Zoroastrians.584 The principle of secularism is also one of the basic principles established in the 
constitution for the Turkish Republic and enjoys broad popular support in Turkey. In the 1999 
European Values Survey 72.3% Turks responded that they strongly agree that religious leaders 
should not influence the government.585 
However, a certain level of growth in fundamentalism appears to be emerging in the Turkish 
society. In particular the gap between the different views regarding the role and importance of 
religion in society can lead into dangerous polarisation in Turkish society. The trend currently 
seems to be a growing role for Islam in politics in Turkey. According to the PEW Global Atti-
tudes project study, 47% see a growing role for Islam in Turkish politics, whilst 32% see less. Of 
those seeing a growing role for Islam, 50% see it as a good thing and 39% as a bad thing.586 
When asked if democracy can work in Turkey only 44% of Turks answered positively. In com-
parison 62% conceded that “Islam plays a large role in political life”. Of the countries surveyed, 
only Pakistanis were more sceptical about democracy – 43% versus 62% respectively. The others 
were more positive about democracy as a workable system, whilst Islam still plays a relatively 
large role in political life: Lebanon 83%-54%, Jordan 80%-30%, Morocco 83%-75% and Indo-
nesia 77%-85%.587 As for the importance of Islam having an influential world role, 43% of 
respondents in Turkey consider it very important, 32 % somewhat important and 18% not too/not 
at all important.588 
In general Turks are very religious, more so than Europeans: 80.6% of Turks as opposed to 
66.7% of Europeans consider themselves religious.589 Consequently, there is a very strong 
Islamic identity in Turkey with 29% of Turks see themselves as Turks first, whilst 43% see 
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themselves as Muslims first.590 Turks also hold very negative views of Christians, even in com-
parison to other Muslim countries. 
Turkish views of Christians, Jews and Muslims 
Christians Jews Muslims 
Favourable / Unfavourable Favourable / Unfavourable Favourable / Unfavourable 
21% 63% 18% 60% 83% 11% 
 
Source: Pew, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics”, p.4 
Moreover, whilst only 26% of Turks think that some religions are more violent than others, a 
very high number of them named Christianity as the most violent religion: 
 
Country Islam Judaism Christianity 
Turkey  15% 20% 46% 
Morocco 3% 83% 5% 
Lebanon 18% 66% 15% 
Pakistan 6% 51% 4% 
 
Source: Pew, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics”, p. 12 
Anti-Western sentiments in Turkey are also relatively high; 79% of Turks believed that relations 
between the Islamic world and the West are bad and that the Westerners are mostly to be blamed 
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for this. In comparison the numbers in other major Muslim countries are somewhat lower: 
Indonesia 64%, Jordan 61%, Pakistan 60% and Egypt 56%.591 
The May- June 2007 riots and the annulment of the first round of parliamentary presidential 
elections were an indication of growing anxiety over Islam’s role in Turkish politics, secularism, 
the role of the military and the state of the Turkish democracy. Many Turks are worried about the 
Islamic AK party and its true agenda. The AK has roots in the Islamist Welfare Party (which 
won the elections in 1995 and 1996 and introduced political Islam in modern Turkey)592 and its 
leader Prime Minister Erdoĝan has had a past as an Islamic radical. Erdoĝan, as the mayor of 
Istanbul sought to establish a partial ban on alcohol in the city and he openly supported establish-
ing Sharia law. Moreover, Erdoĝan was sentenced to ten months in jail in 1999 for his radical 
Islamism.593 Many Turks are now sceptical of his milder tone and policies and speculate whether 
he has changed or whether the goal of reforms is just to get rid of the military and take over 
secularist institutions.594 In any case, it seems that an AK prime minister, parliamentary speaker 
and president at the same time is too much for the Turkish public to stomach. The appointment 
of foreign minister Abdullah Gül from the AK government clearly was not acceptable to the 
Turkish public, as Mr. Erdoĝan too had to concede. The office of the president is supposed to be 
an institution guarding secularism and Mr. Gül and Mr. Erdoĝan do not fit the public’s image of 
men who would do this, especially since their wives wear headscarves. What direction this 
looming political crisis in Turkey takes, and whether the military has the patience to stay out 
despite its role as the traditional guardian of secularism, is going to be of paramount importance 
to Turkey’s image and the future of the EU membership negotiations. The AK party has thus far 
been very supportive of EU membership and has carried out many important reforms towards 
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that end. However, it still has to find a way to reconcile its Islamic identity and values with those 
of secularism and democracy, as well as find a way to keep the military at bay. 
5.5 Public and Elite Opinion in the EU and Turkey and Official 
Discourse: Turkish-European Discourse 
  
This section focuses on three separate but intercon-
nected aspects of Turkish membership discourse; 
public opinion, elite opinion and official discourse. In 
theory at least the relationships between these dis-
courses should be mainly linear in a sense that public 
opinion influences elite opinion, which in turn influ-
ences policy making and thus, shapes official dis-
course. However, the relationship between public and 
elite opinion can also be seen as dialectic, since elite 
opinion also shapes public opinion through “thought 
leadership”. The importance of the analysis of the public opinion in the EU and Turkey, in 
particular in terms of the levels of support towards Turkey’s membership, as well as the per-
ceived reasons for support and opposition, is to provide clues as to what matters most; Rational-
ist factors, such as the costs and benefits (economic in particular); or Ideational factors, such as 
Turkey’s contested “Europeanness”, in particular in regards to European and Turkish identity, 
history, ethnicity, language and religion. From a practical point of view the importance of public 
opinion is also paramount as lack of adequate public support towards Turkey’s membership in 
Europe would most likely result in the rejection of Turkey’s accession treaty in the national 
referendums, thus stopping Turkey’s accession regardless of the fact that in order to have 
reached this stage in the accession process it would have had to meet all the requirements stated 
in the negotiating framework. Elite opinion, on the other hand, is important because it shapes 
both public and official discourses by providing ”signposts” that set the tone, direction and 
parameters for them. Finally, official discourse revolves around the formal requirements and 
Public 
Discourse 
Official 
Discourse Public 
Opinion 
Elite 
Opinion 
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tends to be formally structured with a contractual tone whereby one party transmits requirements 
to another. The ultimate question, however, is whether discourses transform into “action” and 
how much they reflect the reality of political decision-making, or whether they are mainly 
“rhetorical action” as Schimmelpfennig has suggested?595 
The method and sources for this section include the analysis of Eurobarometer public opinion 
surveys, other public opinion surveys, such as PEW Global Attitudes surveys and European 
Values Study 1999. FPDA was also utilised for analysing elite opinion, following an assumption 
that speech acts by influential individuals hold the power to formulate or influence policy mak-
ing and provide signposts for the discourses. The sources for elite opinion and discourse thus 
included speeches and statements by European and Turkish senior officials and other senior 
figures. The analysis of the official discourse focuses on official documents; foundational docu-
ments, such as Turkey’s Accession Partnership and progress reports by the European Commis-
sion and the European Parliament between 2000 and 2006, as well as the Turkish government’s 
accession strategy paper. The research process is described in more detail in chapter 3 and more 
information on analytical coding of nodes in available in Appendix D. 
Public Opinion and the Popular Discourse 
Turkey’s real and perceived inability to conform to the European ideal and practices, combined 
with perceptions of cultural divergence, have been reflected in a generally negative public 
opinion towards Turkey’s accession. Turkey is said to have become Europe’s significant “other” 
replacing the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block, thus acting as the “other” in European identity 
construction. Consequently, Turkey’s “Europeanness” remains contested.596 Theoretically at 
least Turkey can fix the first problem in a relative short period of time if it chooses to do so. 
However, the second issue is more problematic and a long-term challenge to change. The first 
problem is one that Turkey can address in the short- to medium-term and that can be fixed by 
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adhering to the Copenhagen criteria, i.e. carrying out the political and economic reforms that are 
required within the context of the Accession Partnership framework. However, in practice this 
alone will not provide a complete solution to Turkey’s problem since the negative popular 
opinion it suffers from is a real hurdle on its path to the full membership, as each enlargement 
requires unanimous acceptance by incumbent member states before ratification of an accession 
treaty is possible. Moreover, referendums to consult the populations on Turkey’s accession are 
almost a certainty in some of the EU member states. So far France, the Netherlands and Austria 
have indicated that they would arrange a referendum on Turkey’s membership and in Ireland 
referendums on EU treaties are required by constitution. Should the result be negative in only 
one of these countries, Turkey’s accession becomes impossible. Hence, in some manner or other 
Turkey, and the European Commission as the other partner in the process, need to find ways to 
break the perception of “otherness” in order to facilitate Turkey’s accession to full membership. 
Currently 48% of Europeans would not support Turkey’s accession even if it fulfils the Copen-
hagen Criteria and 55 % feel Turkey is culturally too different for accession to be allowed.597 
Table 12. Beyond the Copenhagen Criteria 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer EBS 255, p. 70 
Support for enlargement in the incumbent member states 
A special Eurobarometer on enlargement, published in July 2006, found that a relative majority 
of Europeans are generally in favour of enlargement, but also that the population is nonetheless 
rather divided on the issue with 45% of respondents being generally in favour of EU enlargement 
and 42% opposing it.598 The study also found that the respondents in the new member states 
were in general considerably more supportive towards enlargement than those in the EU-15 
countries. The highest levels of support in the new member states were found in Poland (72%) 
and Slovenia (73%), but support was also strong in Bulgaria (62%) and Romania (69%). In the 
candidate countries support was strong in Croatia (64%), but much less so in Turkey (45%). In 
the EU-15 states the support was even more divided between those in favour and those against. 
The EU-15 member states in favour of enlargement were: Greece (56%), Spain (55%) and 
Denmark (51%), whilst a relative majority in favour was found in Sweden (49%), Italy (48%), 
Portugal (47%), Ireland (45%) and the UK (44%). Opposition to EU enlargement on the other 
hand was strong in Germany (66%), Luxembourg (65%), France (62%), Austria (61%) and 
Finland (60%). The latest Eurobarometer at the time of writing, Standard Eurobarometer 65, 
found the same general level of support for enlargement, with support being 41% in the EU-15 in 
comparison to 66% in the new member states.599 In general the Eurobarometer studies since 
2000 show a general downward trend with support for enlargement having fallen from 51% in 
April 2002600 and 50% in March 2003601 to 45% (42% against) in 2006.602 
Socio-demographic factors would seem to have an impact on the levels of support for enlarge-
ment with men being more likely to favour it than women, as well as younger respondents (15-
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24 years old) being more supportive than older (55 or more). The level of education also matters; 
those with better educational level are more in favour than those with a lower level of education. 
The political ideology of respondents also had an impact on the level of support with respondents 
with left wing rather than right-wing views being more likely to support enlargement. Finally, 
awareness and knowledge of issues relating to enlargement was found to have an impact on the 
respondents’ views. Although EU citizens in general do not feel well informed about matters 
relating to enlargement, those who feel more informed are in general also more supportive of 
enlargement. However, general knowledge of the EU was found having little impact on how 
enlargement was viewed.603 
The perceived problems and benefits of enlargement 
In general, the respondents in the Eurobarometer study were slightly more aware of the per-
ceived problems connected to enlargement rather than the benefits.604 The major problems with 
enlargement were identified as; increased job transfers to countries where labour is cheap (75%), 
increased migration of workers from new member countries (73%), increased crime (62%), 
illegal immigration (60%), strain of EU budget funds (57%), increased political instability (46%) 
and the eroding of democracy (43%).605 The most popular perceived benefits were: increased 
mobility of people (82%), enhanced cultural diversity in the EU (71%), enhanced peace and 
stability in the region (67%), enhancement for the EU as a global actor (67%), increased democ-
racy (67%), development in candidate countries (66%), benefits in the war on terrorism and 
crime (66%), improvements in human rights and protection of minorities (65%), enhancement of 
the development of a political union (62%), improvements in life standards and norms in the 
region(61%), enhanced regional integration (57%) and benefits in trade (47%).606 
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Support for Turkey’s membership (..lack thereof) in Europe 
The opposition to Turkey’s membership has been consistent in Eurobarometer studies since 
1999. Turkey has been the least favoured candidate since 1999, whilst Croatia is the most fa-
voured. The countries where the popular opinion is most against Turkey’s membership are: 
Austria (81%), Germany (69%), Luxembourg (69%), Cyprus (68%) and Greece (67%). In the 
EU-25 31% of the respondents were in favour of Turkey’s membership, whilst 55% were 
against. 607Moreover, there is a differing perception of the benefits for the parties: 52% of EU 
citizens see accession as primarily in Turkey’s interest, whilst only 20% see as mutual benefit for 
both and 7% primarily in the EU’s interest. Turks, however, have an opposing view: 34% per-
ceive accession to be primarily in the EU’s interest, 30% mutual and only 13% see it as primarily 
in Turkey’s interests. In the EU member states where enlargement in general is least supported, 
respondents tend to emphasise the view that accession is primarily in Turkey’s interest, whilst 
the opposite applies to where Turkey’s membership is most supported.608 Also, those who are 
against enlargement in general tend to oppose Turkey’s membership, whilst those generally 
supporting enlargement also support Turkey’s accession.609 
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Table 13. Support for Candidates 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer EB 64, June 2006, p. 137 
The reasons for opposition to Turkey’s membership 
What are the reasons behind the European public’s opposition to Turkey’s membership? Some 
have suggested the “no” in the French and Dutch referendums on Constitutional Treaty were 
influenced by the fear of enlargement, and Turkey’s accession in particular. Ruiz-Jimenez and 
Torreblanca (2007) disagree: in France only 6% of those who voted “no” cited Turkey as the 
motive, whilst in the Netherlands 6% of “no” voters declared opposition to enlargement in 
general and 3% against Turkey in particular.610 The opinions that are held by the public in 
relation to Turkish accession are based on people’s various beliefs on Turkey and the EU, as well 
as life in general. The selections of alternative approaches to the question vary from utilitarian, 
identitarian and post-national. Depending on the chosen ontology the nature of the EU can be 
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perceived as a utilitarian cost/benefit enterprise, a value based community or a post-national -
rights based union united by the pursuit of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.611 
The Eurobarometer studies indicate that people generally in opposition to enlargement also 
oppose Turkey’s membership. Also, immigration from Middle East and North Africa is still 
generally welcomed in Europe in similar levels to immigration from CEEC-10 countries.612 
Moreover, 9/11, the 11M Madrid bombings and the 7/7 London bombings have contributed 
towards a general sentiment of concern over Islamic extremism and terrorism. The PEW study 
on Muslims in Europe found links between concerns over Islamic extremism and terrorism and 
opposition of Turkey’s accession. However, concerns over national identity in Europe were even 
further linked to the opposition and negative views on immigration in general correlated with the 
opposition as well.613 
However, Turkey also seems to be a special case. It is the least favoured candidate and majority 
think that accession should not be allowed even if Turkey meets all the criteria. According to 
Eurobarometer studies only Albania is similar in the level of support to its membership. Much of 
the opposition is materially motivated. The top statements of people’s concerns over Turkey’s 
membership were: human rights, economic development in Turkey, increased immigration, 
cultural differences and geography (see: table 5.6.) Public opinion towards Turkey’s accession 
may have been influenced by ”othering”, which is part of the process of building a European 
identity. The theory of identity building dictates that collective identities are a result of an ongo-
ing process of identity constructions and reproduction of shared understandings of a collective 
“Self”. The construction of the “Self” requires a sense of “we-ness” developed through shared 
experiences, memories and myths.614 Unfortunately for Turkey such identity building requires 
distinguishing the “Self” somehow from the “others”, i.e. “Europeans” from “Americans”, 
                                                 
611 Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca (2007), pp. 2-4 
612 PEW, “Divided World”, p. 6 
613 PEW, “Muslims in Europe”, p. 3 
614 Hülsse, Rainer (1999), “The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference – Turkey as Europe’s Ot-
her?”, Discussion paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop, Mannheim, 26-31 March, 1999, p. 2 
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“Asians”, etc.615 Much of the “othering” by “Europe” has been against Russia, the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War, but also against Asia (or collectively “East”) and Islam.616 The “othering” 
against Islam has traditionally been against the Ottoman Empire, which has served as the Muslim 
“other” for Europe.617 It would appear that Turkey still equals “Islam” to Europeans. Hence, 
Turkey has become Europe’s “significant other”, in particular since the Cold War. Consequently, 
Turkey’s “Europeanness” remains contested.618 
How could Turkey change this then? The answer is that it probably cannot, at least in the short to 
medium term. However, Turkey could influence its image in Europe, and consequently possibly 
improve its popularity amongst EU citizens. Rainer Hülsse has argued that Turkey reacts too 
harshly to the EU’s snubs, conveying an image of emotional and irrational peoples, whereas the 
European political culture is more discursive and less aggressive in its rhetoric. Consequently, 
Hülsse argues that Turkey should aim at becoming “Cool Turkey” and improve its image by 
acting in a more “cool”, i.e. “ rational” and unemotional manner, to weather the setbacks in the 
accession process. 
                                                 
615 Diez, Thomas (2004), “Europe’s Others and the Return to Geopolitics”, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004, pp. 321, 324 
616 Diez (2204), p. 324 
617 Diez (2004), p. 328 
618 Diez (2004), p. 329 
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Table 14. Importance of Enlargement Topics 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer EB64, June 2006, p. 139 
Public Opinion and Discourse in Turkey 
The popular support for EU membership has fallen in Turkey in recent years relatively drasti-
cally: after the 2002 elections 74% of Turks were in favour of membership, in spring 2006 only 
57%.619 The probable reason for this downslide in popularity is frustrations over the perception 
that the EU always seems to come up with a way to say no, or postpone the accession. One 
should remember that Turkey started its path towards membership almost 50 years ago and yet 
there is no definite date for accession. As an indication of this sentiment, an opinion poll carried 
out in July 2005 found out that 66% of Turks agreed with the statement that “Western countries 
want to disintegrate Turkey like they disintegrated the Ottoman Empire in the past.” Moreover, 
                                                 
619 Rehn (2006), p. 88 
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51% agreed with the statement that “the reforms required by the EU are similar to those required 
by the treaty of Sevres which dismembered [the] Ottoman Empire in 1919”.620 
Keeping that in mind, who could blame the AKP turning towards the popular opinion and slow-
ing down the reforms until the EU appears more accommodating towards Turkey’s accession? It 
is quite natural to assume that every time there is a setback in the negotiations, the popularity of 
membership goes down in Turkey and gaining back the popularity takes longer the further down 
it goes. One could argue that creating an image of “cool Europe” in Turkey is rapidly becoming 
as necessary as the creating the image of “cool Turkey” in Europe. 
Elite Opinion and Discourse in the EU regarding Turkey’s membership 
Much of the elite opinion regarding Turkey’s membership features civilizational overtones, one 
way or the other. The prominent elite opinion discourse can be divided into three main ap-
proaches: 1) “Othering”, i.e. criticism over Turkey’s identity, culture or religion not being 
European; 2) “Bridge between civilisations”, i.e. claims that Turkey’s membership would essen-
tially form a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world in particular, but also the developing 
world in general. In addition Turkey’s EU membership would allegedly provide an example to 
other Muslim countries that Islam and democracy are compatible. It is also sometimes argued 
that it would thus contribute towards avoiding a “clash of civilisations”, and 3)”losing Turkey”, 
i.e. arguments that rejecting Turkey will ruin Europe’s international reputation and enforce the 
image that it is an exclusive “Christian club”. Moreover, it would cause a rift between Europe 
and the Muslim world and thus contribute towards a clash of civilisations. Finally, it would act as 
a catalyst for the growth of nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, thus making the 
European neighbourhood increasingly more unstable and dangerous. 
The first argument is mainly utilised by popularistic politicians to appease a domestic audience, 
in particular before elections, especially in countries where Turkey’s membership is most vehe-
mently opposed. Whilst arguably opportunistic, this type of political strategising simply makes 
                                                 
620 The “Sevres trauma” continues to shape the Turkish public’s perceptions of unfair treatment by the EU See for 
instance: Gordon and Taspinar (2006), p. 65 
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sense in a system of participatory democracy. What other options are there if popular opinion is 
against Turkey’s membership? A savvy politician may not want to argue against popular will, as 
indicated by polls and opinion surveys, in particular before elections. These are, unfortunately, 
also essentially exercises of ”othering” as the comments tend to refer to Turkey’s divergent 
culture and identity. Two prominent examples are leading politicians in Germany and France. 
German Chancellor, a Christian Democrat, Angela Merkel called for a “privileged partnership” 
between the EU and Turkey short of full membership,621 and even a petition in Germany to back 
such a policy. 622Merkel, however, executed a near-full policy reversal in December 2006, just 
prior to Germany took over the rotating EU presidency, by suddenly declaring she now sup-
ported Turkey’s “eventual” membership.623 The newly elected French president -Nicolas 
Sarkozy- may well be pulling the same stunt. Prior to his election it seemed his presidency would 
spell bad news for Turkey. Prior to the elections in May 2007 Sarkozy was categorically opposed 
to Turkish membership saying that Turkey is not a European country and has no place in the 
EU.624 However, in the end of May he already signalled that France would not block the mem-
bership talks, but on the premises that the EU should be honest towards Turkey and make it clear 
that full membership will never be a realistic option. Instead of a full EU membership Sarkozy 
said he will propose the establishment of a Mediterranean Union doing the French EU presi-
dency in the second half of 2008. 625Moreover, other French senior politicians have also spoken 
against Turkey’s membership, perhaps most prominently Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former 
French president and the Chairman of the European Convention that produced the draft for 
European constitution, who stated that Turkey could and should never be admitted as it simply 
                                                 
621 Financial Times, “Paris and Berlin dent Turkey's EU hopes”, August 26, 2005, 
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was not European, but rather an Asian country: “Its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its popula-
tion live outside Europe, it is not a European country “.626 The previous president before Mr. 
Sarkozy, Mr. Chirac, was somewhat more conciliatory in his comments, whilst warning against a 
clash of civilizations: 
“It’s in our political interest to have a stable, modern democratic Turkey who 
opted to become a secular State in 1924. A Turkey agreeing to share our goals 
and our values. And who, in this respect, could serve as a model for the whole re-
gion surrounding her. This prospect is without any doubt preferable to that of a 
Turkey who. Out of conviction, had made considerable efforts to adapt and then 
saw herself rejected or left out for ethnic or religious reasons. That couldn’t fail 
to play into the hands of all those who, today, advocate the clash of civilizations 
or seek to pit the West against Islam.”627 
Religious figures have also contributed to the discourse. For instance Pope Benedict XVI, when 
still a Cardinal, spoke against granting Turkey membership in the EU arguing it “would be a 
mistake”, because “Europe is a cultural and not a geographic continent”.628 Moreover, his more 
recent remarks in 2006 about Islam sparked violent riots and openly hostile comments by Turk-
ish leaders referring his comments being a sign of revival of the Crusades. Since then the Pope 
has spoken of a rather German concept of privileged partnership, this time between the Chris-
tians and Muslims629 rather than Turkey and the EU per se, but nonetheless the message was 
received loud and clear.630 
                                                 
626 BBC, “Turkey entry ‘would destroy EU’”, 8 November, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm 
627 Press conference given by President Jacques Chirac, Paris, 29.04.2004, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Press-
conference-given-by-M,4528.html, Date accessed: 28.5.2009 
628 Schilling, Timothy P. (2005), “Turkey & the EU: how inclusive can Europe afford to be?, Commonweal, 
132/16 September 23, 2005, p. 8 
629 Rehn (2006), p. 87 
630 This despite the fact that the Pope later on softened his position on Turkey and attempted to distance the 
Catholic Church from such a political decision 
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Secondly, the “bridge between civilisations” argument has been mainly promoted by European 
Commission officials and European think tanks, primarily the pro-EU and Brussels based ones, 
as well as ad hoc independent bodies such as the Independent Commission for Turkey (ICT). 
The latter included senior European political veterans, chaired by the former Finnish President 
Martti Ahtisaari (who also was the chief negotiator in the Aceh peace process and the UN Spe-
cial Envoy for Kosovo) and included senior politicians such as Michel Rocard – a former French 
prime minister, as well as Anthony Giddens – a well known sociologist. The ICT report stated 
for instance that: 
“Europe could send a powerful message to the rest of the world that the “Clash 
of Civilisations” is not the ineluctable destiny of mankind. Presenting an alterna-
tive model to the exclusive, sectarian and closed society propagated by radical 
Islamists, Europe could play an inestimable role in future relations between the 
“West” and the Islamic world.”631 
The European Commission officials have tended to echo the same sentiment. The EU’s Commis-
sioner for Enlargement, Dr. Olli Rehn, for instance has implied on numerous occasions that 
Turkey’s accession could set an example to the other Muslim states that Islam and democracy 
are compatible, as well as that Turkey would provide a bridge between Europe and the Muslim 
world. The following are extracts from statements and speeches made by Rehn: 
Europe needs Turkey: 
“… we need Turkey with us, as an anchor of stability in the most unstable and 
dangerous region, and as a benchmark of democracy for the wider Middle East. 
                                                 
631 Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), “Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?”, supported by the 
British Council and the Open Society Institute, September 2004 p. 16. Available online at: 
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The high stakes of the Cold War have been replaced by other, more complex chal-
lenges, in which Turkey remains a vital strategic partner in Europe.”632 
Turkey as a model for the Islamic world: 
“As a secular republic with a predominant Muslim population, a staunchly de-
mocratic Turkey Integrated into the EU would be a powerful example against 
fundamentalist claims of an essential incompatibility between democracy and Is-
lam. “633 
Turkey needs Europe, would build a bridge: 
“We also have an unparalleled opportunity to influence Turkey’s development, 
ensuring an open society with fundamental freedoms there and building a sturdy 
bridge to the Muslim world.”634 
Speaking about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, Europe’s relations with Islam and Tur-
key’s importance as an “anchor of stability” Rehn warns about a clash of civilisations and argues 
that Turkey’s membership would facilitate building bridges with moderate Islam: 
“Our best response to this challenge is a combination of containment and coop-
eration – that is, to firmly contain Islamic fundamentalism, while cooperating and 
building bridges with moderate strands of Islam. The 21st century is not doomed 
to a clash of civilisations, as some fear and others hope: rather, the course of this 
century can just as well be built on dialogue and deepening interaction between 
them”635 
                                                 
632 Speech by Mr. Olli Rehn, Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement, “Turkey’s 
Accession Process to the EU”, the University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 27 November 2006, Speech-06-747-EN(1) 
633 Ibid  
634 Speech by Mr Olli Rehn, Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement, “Europe’s Next 
Borders”,  the European Policy Centre, Brussels, 10 October 2006, Speech-06-586-EN(1) 
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Other European senior politicians have at times echoed this sentiment. For instance the Portu-
guese Foreign Minister Diogo Freitas do Amaral stated in October 2005 that: “ The agreement to 
start talks with Turkey will probably displease Mr Osama bin Laden, who has done everything to 
prevent this moment arriving".636 
Turkish senior officials have rather predictably promoted such sentiments. Ali Babacan, the State 
Minister for Economy and the Turkish government’s chief negotiator with the EU has stated that: 
“Turkey’s accession to the EU will give to the Islamic world the message that 
democracy and Islam are not incompatible and the EU is not closed to countries 
of others faiths as long as they comply with the required standards.”637 
Some observers have, however, been sceptical about the claim that Turkey would set a model for 
the Middle East and Muslim countries around the world. They argue that Turkey is an exception 
set apart from the rest by its long history of secular traditions.638 As Commissioner Rehn ac-
knowledges too, this assumes that both civilisations agree to have Turkey as a “bridge”: "Turkey 
can be a bridge only if both Turkey and the EU want it to be”.639 What is particularly striking 
about Rehn’s comment is the reference to two civilisations. Is Rehn inadvertently acknowledging 
that Turkey and Europe constitute separate civilisations? This would support the view that the 
Commission is in fact promoting the “othering” of Turkey through promoting a debate about 
whether and why Turkey must join (to avoid the “clash” and to build the “bridge”) instead of 
only concerning itself with the conditions in which Turkey will join the EU.640Moreover, as 
Rainer Hülsse has pointed out, the Eurobarometer studies poll the European citizens on Turkey’s 
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cultural difference, whereas this process has not been replicated with any other candidate coun-
try.641 If this is not an exercise of “othering”, then what is? 
The “losing Turkey” argument, again rather predictably, has been mainly put forward by Turkish 
officials, but also backed by EU officials and pro-EU think tanks. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoĝan, for instance, has warned that the negotiations are beginning to display a “mutual lack 
of respect between cultures and religions”, which "would create a “Clash of Civilisations” that 
would “throw world peace into doubt”. He said that whilst criticism was acceptable, insults were 
not and the two parties should respect each other’s sensitivities in order to avoid such a “clash”. 
With an indirect reference to the cultural opposition in Europe towards Turkey’s membership he 
stated to Euro-Parliamentarians that “We see Islamophobia - like Anti-Semitism - as a crime 
against humanity".642 Ali Babacan has also emphasised the benefits of Turkey’s eventual mem-
bership to the region, the Muslim world, the EU and the world as a whole, as well as pointing out 
that failure of the accession would be catastrophic for the world: 
“Turkish future membership to the EU or even the accession process, the negotia-
tion process itself will be very crucial to the Middle East, Central Asia, North Af-
rica, even Russia. Because when we prove that a country like Turkey which has a 
Muslim population but also a country which has a fully functioning democratic 
system and if this country fulfils all the criteria and proves that it shares common 
values and ideals of The EU. Then it is going to mean a lot to the rest of the coun-
tries and the region. “643 
Babacan also delivered a staunch warning to avoid a “Clash of Civilisations”: 
“Furthermore, Turkey’s membership in the European Union will surely be a sym-
bol of harmonious co-existence of cultures, and enriching the spiritual fabric of 
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the European Union. If the EU gives the impression that it is a Christian Club, 
this will give a pretext to the fundamentalist organizations to claim that the EU 
excludes non-Christians and that the world is divided on the basis of the religious 
fault lines. Such a scenario will look like a reconfirmation of the theory of the 
Clash of the Civilizations developed by Huntington. I believe that this theory is 
detrimental to peace and stability in the world. Experience of 9/11, Afghanistan 
and Iraq suggests that the Clash of the Civilizations does not make the world 
more secure.”
644
 
The Independent Commission on Turkey also argued that Turkey needs Europe for its moderni-
sation and peaceful development as the accession process is the main motive for reforms. More-
over, the threat would be growing instability in Turkey: 
“If Turkish hopes are disappointed, an advance of ultranationalist as well as 
Islamist currents should be expected and a revival of violence in the Kurdish 
populated regions would be likely leading to increased instability and the return 
of the military establishment to a more assertive role”645 
“For Turkey, EU accession would be the ultimate confirmation that its century-
old orientation towards the West was the right choice, and that it is finally ac-
cepted by Europe. EU membership would also ensure that the country’s transfor-
mation into a modern democratic society has become irreversible, enabling 
Turkey to fully exploit its rich human and economic resources. A failure of the 
Turkish accession process would not only mean the loss of important opportuni-
ties for both sides. It could result in a serious crisis of identity in Turkey, leading 
to political upheaval and instability at the Union’s doorstep646”. 
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The logic has been replicated by European officials, as well as academics. The general argument 
is that the EU is the main motive for reforms647and that the civilisational dimension has become 
more important following the rise of Islamic terrorism and fundamentalism, making integrating 
the majority Muslim Turkey into Europe even more important than before.648 Thus, although 
Turkey is indeed a special case in the Islamic world, it could still provide an inspiration to others 
and prove the Clash of Civilizations thesis wrong.649 Hence, the EU should support the AKP 
against rising nationalism and political Islam in order not to “lose Turkey”.650 In a similar vein, 
Commissioner Rehn has warned that the promotion and debate on the “privileged partnership” 
plays into the hands of the nationalists in Turkey that wish to call off the membership talks, 
nullify the Customs Union, and wants to re-examine Turkey’s NATO membership and relations 
with the US. For the Turks, he argues, “privileged” spells out “prejudiced”.651 
Official Discourse: The Language of Accession 
This section focuses on reporting the results of a discourse analysis on official documents related 
to Turkey’s accession. The analysis was carried out utilising analytical coding of the texts based 
on predetermined nodes that were designed to represent the central Rationalist and Ideational 
topics. The sources can be roughly divided into two primary categories; 1) foundational docu-
ments detailing the criteria and terms, as well as the process for Turkey’s membership, such as 
the Accession Partnership, the negotiation framework and European Commission’s enlargement 
strategy documents, and 2) progress reports by the European Commission (from 2000 to 2006) 
and the European Parliament (2006), detailing the process of assessing Turkey’s ability to meet 
the membership criteria. 
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As expected the dominant official discourse is prominently Rationalist in spirit and the language 
contractual in nature. Moreover, the power relations in the discourse are clear: the EU is present-
ing the terms and measuring Turkey’s progress towards meeting these terms. Turkey’s role is 
simply to provide evidence of meeting such terms. 
The foundational texts nonetheless also featured Ideational components in terms of referring to 
the components of the ”European idea” and European values, i.e. democracy, human rights and 
rule of law as values that unite EU member states. 
Significantly, enlargement is primarily seen as an important tool in spreading these values and 
expanding the European zone of peace and as such an important part of the “European project” 
from the very beginning. The European Commission’s Enlargement Strategy, however, recog-
nises the challenge of diminishing popular support for enlargement and consequently stresses a 
rigorous but fair accession process to ensure not only successful accession but also the mainte-
nance of the EU’s absorption capacity. Finally, the foundational texts stress the importance of the 
formal membership criteria – “the Copenhagen Criteria”652, defining the ”European standards”, 
which Turkey and other candidates must meet in order to gain membership. As the Commis-
sion’s enlargement strategy document states these two aspects set the foundation for further 
enlargement: 
“Enlargement policy is defined by Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, 
which states that any European State which respects the EU’s fundamental de-
mocratic principles may apply to become a member of the Union. The EU has set 
political and economic criteria for membership, as well as criteria related to the 
obligations of membership and the administrative capacity to implement and en-
force the EU’s laws and policies”653 
Whilst the references to “European standards” and “European vocation” are also present in the 
Accession Partnership and the European Commission’s progress reports, the emphasis is on the 
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653 European Commission (2005), “Enlargement Strategy P
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Copenhagen Criteria and the ability to meet the requirements of membership by implementing 
the acquis communitaire. In this context the language is almost equivalent to a typical service 
level agreement between two companies in a contractual relationship, detailing in a technical 
manner the milestones that must be met in order to the contract to be fulfilled in a satisfactory 
manner. Consequently the majority of the progress reports are dedicated to the accession process 
and in particular the 35 chapters required for accession, as well as the prioritization for the 
implementation of these. 
Other topics that occupy the majority of the remaining text are mostly linked to political criteria 
EU’s values (in this regard; democracy, human rights and rule of law), protection of minorities, 
civilian control of military, torture and corruption. The tone of the assessments, however, is 
balanced between praise for progress and providing guidance for closing the perceived gaps in 
implementation. Moreover, the Turkish government is praised, encouraged and guided in regards 
to its reforms, rather than overtly criticised for its shortcomings. 
Other topics of relevance include the relatively frequent emphases on absorption capacity and the 
open-ended nature of Turkey’s accession process, both in terms of time and end results. Idea-
tional concepts, such as ”Europeanness”, ”European values and standards”, as well as Turkey 
forming a ”bridge between civilizations” are also featured in the texts but not prominently, 
suggesting that Turkey’s “European vocation” is not automatically acknowledged. 
The Cyprus issue also features relatively prominently and is referred to in all of the progress 
reports. The Cyprus issue is, however, mainly linked to the accession process as an issue that 
must be solved prior to Turkey’s accession to full membership, but the tone is overwhelmingly 
positive, reporting progress rather than advocating the halting of negotiations. 
There is also a notable trend in the European Commission progress reports in terms of a change 
in emphasis over time from economic to political criteria and hence, towards European values. In 
the 2000 report the emphasis changes from Copenhagen Criteria towards the acquis communi-
taire, reflecting Turkey’s newly earned status as an official candidate. The focus then turns to 
issues in connection to political criteria, until the 2004 report concludes that Turkey sufficiently 
fulfils the political criteria and recommends that membership negotiations with Turkey can 
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begin. Once the membership negotiations begin in 2005, the emphasis on the acquis increases 
sharply to the point that the 2006 report is to a significant extent dedicated to accessing Turkey’s 
progress towards them. Theoretically, as long as the accession is a rational process, the further 
Turkey progresses towards meeting the Copenhagen Criteria the more the reports should empha-
sise on reporting progress towards the acquis, and once Turkey meets the political criteria in full 
the report should be clearly dominated by these. The shift in emphasis between 1999 and 2006 at 
least appears to be supporting exactly that. 
Table 15. Top 10 Coded Nodes – EC Turkey Progress Report 2000 
 
Table 16. Top 10 Coded Nodes – EC Turkey Progress Report 2006 
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In general the tone and style of the European Commission’s reports is technical and non-
emotional focusing on providing ”matter of fact” evaluations of Turkey’s implementation of the 
requirements stemming primarily from the Copenhagen Criteria. Moreover, the texts appear to 
construct a partnership between Turkey and the EU rather than a relationship driven by unilateral 
compliance by Turkey towards the EU. 
However, in contrast to the European Commission’s generally respectful and non-emotional 
assessments, the European Parliament 2006 report on Turkey’s progress, in addition to being 
more critical in general features, features entirely different tones of address. Whereas the Euro-
pean Commission’s language is mostly that of an objective audit, the European Parliament uses 
language that resembles more a school master-student disciplinary session with heavy usage of 
phrases such as; ”deplores the lack of progress”, ”regrets that”, ”condemns”, ”strongly con-
demns”, ”reiterates”, ”reminds Turkey”, ”insists that”, ”urges Turkey”, ”is deeply concerned 
about” and ”expresses its disappointment”. Two particular focus areas of the European Parlia-
ment report are human rights and protection of minorities: 
“Deplores the fact that only limited progress has been reported over the last year 
as regards fundamental rights and freedoms; condemns violations of human 
rights and freedoms and constraints on the exercise of those rights and free-
doms”.654 
The topic of civilizations also features somewhat more than in the European Commission’s 
reports, albeit mostly in the context of suggesting Turkey’s accession would create a “bridge 
between civilizations”: 
“Whereas Turkey’s cultural and historical background puts the country in a posi-
tion to act as a bridge-builder between Europe and the Islamic world” 655 
                                                 
654 European Parliament (2006), p.10 
655 European Parliament (2006), p. 6 
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“Reaffirms its belief that a modern, democratic and secular Turkey, whilst pro-
gressively aligning itself with the policies of the EU Member States, could play a 
constructive and stabilising role in promoting understanding between civilisations 
and between the European Union and countries in the region surrounding Turkey, 
particularly in the Middle East...”656 
The Nature and Significance of Dominant Discourses for Turkey’s 
Accession 
In conclusion, whilst popular discourses, both in terms of public and elite opinion, feature 
cultural and civilizational overtones relatively prominently, the official discourse is mainly 
Rationalist in nature, utilising the language of a contractual partnership and mostly focusing on 
the process of Turkey’s accession to membership through the implementation of the negotiation 
framework. References to different civilizations, whether in the context of a ‘clash’ or ‘bridge’, 
are present but not prominent in the official discourse. In this sense Ideational analysis can offer 
little value, except in revealing those limited but yet potentially revealing nuances that may 
reflect the power of Ideational factors in the overall positions of the negotiating parties. The 
significance of popular discourses, on the other hand, is paramount as public and elite opinion 
may well over-ride the process of accession, regardless of how well Turkey fairs in terms of 
meeting the formal membership criteria. Moreover, public discourses, both in terms of public 
and elite opinion feature prominently as themes related to the ”Clash of Civilizations” thesis, 
both directly and in a reverse manner through the concept of ”Bridge between Civilizations”. 
The European Commission, though mostly emphasising the process of enlargement, also con-
tributes to the ‘clash’ discourse through testing the perceptions of Turkey’s cultural divergence 
in the Eurobarometer studies, and in particular through the frequent emphasis on a “dialogue 
between civilizations” and suggestions that Turkey’s membership in the EU would create a 
bridge between Europe and the Islamic world. Whilst the intentions may be benign in this regard, 
                                                 
656 European Parliament (2006), pp. 13-14 
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they nonetheless could easily be argued to be counterproductive, if the genuine intention is to 
promote Turkey’s membership to the public. 
Finally, one important question is whether discourses- popular (public & elite) discourses and 
official discourse, turn into action within the context of political decision-making. The most 
straightforward one of these is the official discourse, which is directly tied into to the accession 
process and based on the official policy position that Turkey is officially a candidate country and 
on a path to EU membership, regardless of its perceived cultural divergence. If we accept this, 
we can argue that popular discourses revolving around Turkey’s cultural divergence are merely 
political rhetoric that will not determine the end result of the negotiation process, as this is in 
effect a political decision made at a higher level. The immediate weakness with this line of 
argument is that the end result of the negotiations has been purposefully left open and that thus, 
the official discourse has little importance with regard to the end result, whilst if the results of 
referendums are to be carried out in the incumbent member states that are negative because the 
general populations in the EU feel that Turkey is not a European country and consequently has 
no place in the EU. As it has been pointed out earlier, this would simply stop Turkey’s accession. 
Thus the public discourse revolving around Turkey’s cultural divergence may well have a major 
impact on Turkey’s EU membership aspirations. 
Besides the potential long-term political impacts, the public discourses have also had a more 
immediate effect. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy for instance has proposed the formation 
of a Mediterranean Union, which would form a separate union of the Mediterranean countries 
that are not considered “European” but have close ties to the EU. It is hardly a big secret that the 
main motivation for this proposal is to find an alternative for Turkey’s membership in the EU 
and that the main motivation for opposition to Turkey’s membership is indeed cultural diver-
gence. On the other hand, the Mediterranean Union proposal has attracted relatively little back-
ing in the EU and has been left in the shadow of other European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
initiatives, in particular the efforts to extend ENP to the former Soviet states in Eastern Europe 
and Caucasus; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Moreover, 
Sarkozy has not blocked the Turkish accession process, despite his threats to do so during his 
election campaign. More or less the same applies to Turkey where there has been a significant 
drop in the popular backing for EU membership and an increase in anti-EU rhetoric. Whilst 
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Turkey has under the AKP government increasingly focused towards its traditional areas of 
influence in the Caucasus and aligning Turkey increasingly with the Islamic world, no radical 
turn away from Europe is apparent and the government still appears to be committed to EU 
membership. Turkish officials have also on their behalf contributed to the "bridge between 
civilizations” discourse and utilised it as an argument for Turkey’s membership. 
Constructing Rational Choice: Where Rationalist meet Ideational 
As stated earlier, the purpose of carrying out FPDA here was to provide an additional method of 
testing the relevance of Rationalist and Ideational assumptions to the process of enlargement and 
specifically in the context of Turkey’s ‘accession’ to EU membership. As has been established 
the process of accession mainly follows the logic of rational choice, at least in a sense that it is 
build on a pre-determined criteria (mostly material) and focused towards objectively measuring 
Turkey’s progress against this criteria. Thus, it appears that the rational approaches have a 
particular strength in terms of analysing the process of enlargement. The Ideational approaches, 
however, can contribute in the analysis of the process, and whilst the official discourse is mainly 
Rationalist in nature, it nonetheless has Ideational overtones, in particular where the analysis 
extends to evaluating whether Turkey adheres to ”European values” or has a ”European voca-
tion”. Moreover, as it has been already pointed out the public discourse in the Turkey-EU case 
carries a paramount importance, not only in terms of public opinion having the potential to stop 
the accession process from being completed, but also because the examination of the motives for 
support and opposition towards Turkey’s accession reveals important clues as to what the pri-
mary motives for enlargement may be. This is particularly important given the Rationalists’ 
failure to explain the CEEC-10 enlargement, where is could be argued that the value of the 
European idea surpassed the considerations of material cost and institutional challenges 
enlargement created. In Turkey’s case it is equally plausible that the European idea would 
override the strategic interests of the EU that Turkey’s accession could bring it. However, even 
more importantly, the possibility that a strategic decision to enlarge or include a certain new 
member is constructed in a manner that the idea determines how decision-making elites see the 
material/strategic interests. An example of this is the long-term material benefits that Eastern 
Enlargement was seen as producing. Regardless of whether there are argued as having material-
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ised, or that they will, there was no means of measurability at the time the decision was made to 
prove they would. In this context it would be possible to argue that these future benefits were 
constructed to support the European idea that was the primary motive behind Eastern Enlarge-
ment, whereas in Turkey’s case equally speculative costs may be constructed to protect that 
European idea against a candidate that is not seem to fit in terms of its identity and culture, 
despite the possibility of producing strategic benefits. Thus, these two cases could be seen as 
Ideational motives presented in a rational choice arguments. In conclusion, providing tools for 
the analysis of motives of enlargement not only is the key strength of Ideational approaches, but 
it absolutely requires their application. 
However, in addition to this potential division of labour it would appear that the Rationalist and 
Ideational approaches intersect and can be converged. One of these areas of convergence is the 
undefined future benefits or costs that cannot be quantified in any entirely reliable manner, but 
are nonetheless utilised in both approaches as arguments for and against Turkey’s membership. 
Typically these essentially speculative projections of future levels, as well as costs and benefits 
that Turkey’s membership would create in integration topics such as immigration, financial 
budgets and political decision-making. Arguably the analysis of these topics, since reliable 
projections are not possible, and the determination as to whether the results are positive or 
negative may very well be significantly influenced by the analyst’s Ideational motivation, i.e. 
his/her ideological position in regards to as what the idea of the region is, as well as the analyst’s 
position in regards to whether Turkey fits that idea. Hence, the analysts applying such cost-
benefit analyses are not necessarily exclusively utilitarian but may either subscribe to or be 
influence to/by identitarian or post-national ontology. The second point of convergence, and a 
closely related one, is Mattli’s concept of ’negative externalities’, which is apparent in for 
instance the "losing Turkey” argument. This is arguably an exercise of supporting rational choice 
with an Ideational argument where Rationalism wears thin. It is thus also an example that ra-
tional choice can involve both Rationalist and Ideational elements, and that the two intersect. 
Moreover, since Turkey now is an official candidate, the question of stability of enlargement 
could present another point of convergence between the Rationalist and Ideational approaches by 
incorporating the challenge of integrating candidates that are not perceived as cognitively com-
patible (thus increasing the heterogeneity of the organisation, potentially weakening its cohe-
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sion), in addition to the material and institutional concern of integration capacity in the research 
agenda of European integration. 
Finally, the Ideational camp also uses arguments based on material benefits, as well as promotes 
them, with arguments about a common future and benefits from bridge between civilizations and 
spreading democracy and European values to the neighbourhood thus creating a zone of peace, 
stability and prosperity in and around the region. Consequently the possibility of a dialectic 
relationship between Rationalist and Ideational forces should be investigated further. 
5.6 Conclusion: Strengths and Weakness of the Ideational 
Approaches 
Whilst main strength of the Rationalist approaches lies in explaining the ”process” of enlarge-
ment, including Turkey’s accession process, the main strength of the Ideational approaches hits 
at the area where Rationalist approaches are at their very weakest: explaining the underlining 
motives for enlargement, and thus also Regionalism in general. In this specific case explaining 
the opposition to Turkey’s membership in Europe that may well override the process of enlarge-
ment and stop Turkey’s accession, regardless of how well it meets the formal membership 
criteria and implements the requirements of the accession process. Explaining the prospects of 
Turkey’s membership in the EU is not possible without analysis of the impact of factors such as 
history, culture, geography, religion, values and identity. Moreover, the prospect of Turkey’s 
potential membership has clearly prompted a process of self-examination of the European 
project, in particular in terms of what an “European identity” entails and what the ”final” borders 
or boundaries of the European Union will be. Significantly Turkey’s membership has become if 
not a focal point, then at least a vehicle for the process of defining these borders/boundaries, both 
geographically and mentally. Geographically the outcome of Turkey’s membership negotiations 
will significantly contribute towards determining the EU’s eastern boundaries, and mentally the 
boundaries of the idea of the “European project”, where aspects of culture, values and identity 
are considered the glue that tie the “European” nations together. As such providing credible 
explanations for Turkey-EU relations is simply not possible without Ideational analysis. The 
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Rationalist approach, on the other hand, is more appropriate for analysing the “process of 
enlargement”, or specifically in this context the accession process. 
The Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis (FPDA) would appear to support the previous findings 
regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Rationalist and Ideational approaches, i.e. that the 
Rationalist approaches are more appropriate for explaining the process of enlargement (and the 
accession process in this particular case) and Ideational approaches in terms of explaining the 
underlying motives of enlargement. 
The analysis of the official discourse is mainly Rationalist in spirit and emphasises the accession 
process and the acquis communitaire, as well as Turkey’s progress in terms of implementing the 
formal criteria. The official discourse would thus suggest that as long as Turkey meets these 
“contractual” terms of this rational process it would accede to full membership in the European 
Union. 
The dominant popular discourse, however, embedded in public and elite opinion, reveals an 
entirely different dimension, in particular in reference to the underlying motives behind the 
opposition to Turkey’s membership, but also behind the support as well. Within the context of 
the opposition the perceived cultural divergence of Turkey is a strong and visible source of 
motivation and has direct and indirect links to the ”Clash of Civilizations” thesis. The support for 
Turkey’s accession, on the other hand, is like mirror image of the clash thesis with ”Bridge 
between Civilizations” and ”losing Turkey” utilised by the European Commission and European 
thought-leaders as an argument for justifying Turkey’s membership. Interestingly this is based 
on Turkey’s perceived cultural divergence just as much as the ‘clash’ thesis that is utilised by 
opponents. In the context of popular discourse Turkey’s memberships is thus seen as a cross-
civilizations project regardless of whether the agents in the discourse are opponents or supporters 
of Turkey’s membership. Moreover, it could be argued that the ”Bridge between Civilizations” 
concept provides fuel for the “Clash of Civilizations” discourse and has a negative impact on 
Turkey’s membership prospects. Suggestions by the political elite that Turkey’s membership in 
the EU would create a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world, as EU public opinion 
suggests is a bridge too far for many Europeans. In this sense the nature of the discourse may 
well be a sign of what is coming, not only in the context of Turkey’s membership prospects, but 
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also within the context of the internal battle of values within the EU that is being fought over. 
The question concerns what will be the core of European identity: a Judeo- Christian value 
community or an interest community based on liberalism and an ideological drive to extend the 
European zone of peace, democracy and prosperity to the whole region. 
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Chapter 6: Rationalist Analysis of Australia – East 
Asia Relations 
6.1 Introduction 
“Globalisation and the economic rise of East Asia will be the two most profound 
influences on Australia’s external environment over the next fifteen years.” 
“In the National Interest”, Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper - 1997 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a Rationalist analysis of Australia’s relations with East 
Asia and its position in East Asian Regionalism in a similar manner as in Chapter 4 Turkey – EU 
case; by providing an empirical analysis of Australia’s and East Asia’s economic, political and 
security relations.657 According to the chosen theoretical frameworks - Mattli’s “logic of integra-
tion” and the “club theory” if levels of material interdependency are high and material benefits 
from inclusion in regional integration override the costs associated with them , Australia should 
seek deeper integration in regional institutions and further cooperation. Whereas Mattli’s theory 
operates on the level of a pure cost-benefit calculation for justifying enlargement and deepening 
integration from the regional organisation’s point of view, the ”club theory” seeks an optimal 
level of cooperation for an individual member: ”…from the point of view of an individual 
country, the optimum amount of cooperation in reached where the ratio of the share of its bene-
fits in the club to the share of the cost time the marginal benefits for the group as a whole equals 
                                                 
657 The definition of East Asia adopted here is the one used by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) that East Asia consists of North Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan) and Southeast Asia, comprising the ASEAN-
10 (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) 
and East Timor.  
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the club’s marginal costs”658. Thus, each member seeks to maximise its own expected net gain, 
which is the difference between individual benefits and individual costs from membership. 
As this chapter will demonstrate Australia has a long-established and deep material interdepen-
dency in East Asia. This applies in particular to economic interdependency; since the early 1990s 
Australia has been more dependent on Asian trade than any other OECD country659 and in 2007 
two-thirds of Australia’s total external trade was with East Asia. Moreover, two-way trade with 
East Asia has been constantly increasing and the economically vibrant East Asian states have 
increasingly high demand for natural resources in order to sustain their continuous economic 
growth, in particular for the minerals and agricultural resources that Australia offers. 
Australia’s security has historically depended on regional stability and when it has faltered 
Australia has felt obliged to intervene through military means in order to protect its security 
interests. In fact Australia has taken part in most major regional conflicts, from the Korean War 
to Vietnam War in the Cold War era to the East Timor crisis in the post-Cold War era. Since the 
end of the Cold War, Australian security and defence analysts have argued that an "arc of insta-
bility” has formed around the country. In addition to actively deploying military and security 
forces to trouble spots in the region, Australia has also maintained a particularly active role in the 
establishment of multilateral regional institutions, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion organisation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).Australia has also engaged in 
active bilateral diplomacy with East Asian states, establishing a web of bilateral memorandums 
of understanding and treaties for economic, political, security and cultural cooperation with a 
significant number of regional states. 
This chapter will argue that Australia not only has strong economic, political and security links 
with the region but also that it has significant levels of material interdependency with the East 
Asian region. Research shows that despite these high levels of material interdependency, Austra-
                                                 
658 Frantianni, Michele and John Pattison (2001), International Organisations in a World of Regional Trade 
Agreements: Lessons from Club Theory”, The World Economy, Vol. 23, Issue 3,  p. 334 (pp. 333-358) 
659 Ravenhill, John (1997), “From Paternalism to Partnership: Australia’s Relations with ASEAN”, Working 
Papers, 1997/8, Australian National University – Department of International Relations p.2 
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lia is the ‘odd man out’ and that its exclusion from the regional institutions has been largely 
culturally and ethnically motivated, rather than being on the basis of Rationalist reasoning. 
6.2 Economy, Trade and Investment 
Early History of Trade Relations with Asia 
Australia’s trade relations with Asia have a long history and can be traced back to the establish-
ment of European settlements.660 The early contacts, however, were limited to incidental encoun-
ters between the settlers and their Asian neighbours, rather than signifying any coordinated 
efforts towards establishing formal foreign or trade relations with them. The British authorities in 
early 19th century consequently established trade settlements in Fort Dundas and Port Essington, 
attempting to capture some of the Southeast Asian trade from its Dutch and French rivals. Mat-
thew Flinders, whilst circumnavigating Australia on his famous journey, met a Macassan trading 
fleet near Darwin, an encounter that led to the establishment of the Melville Island and Coburg 
Peninsula settlements. However, whilst the British intended Port Essington to develop into a 
major trading post on par with Singapore, the trading settlements became short-lived experi-
ments due to the shortage of skilled labour and supplies. Australian commercial vessels also 
occasionally ventured to Asian ports. The first significant contact with Japan, for instance, took 
place when an Australian whaling ship sailed into the Hamanaka port in Hokkaido in 1831. This 
fairly low key event, and largely an accidental one, resulted in the formation of trade relations 
between Australia and Japan.661 Trade relations with Japan following these early contacts, 
however, were nonetheless conducted within the framework of the Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty 
                                                 
660 Evidence of long-lasting encounters between Aboriginals and Torres Straits Islanders in Northern Queensland 
and West Australia that predates European settlements has been emerging lately. For details on Macassan-
Aboriginal encounters see for instance: Russell, Denise (2004), “ Aboriginal-Macassan interactions in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries in Northern Australia and Contemporary  Sea Rights Claims”, Australian 
Aboriginal Studies, Vol. 2004, Issue 1, pp. 1-4. More analysis on the Macassan traders is provided by Antho-
ny Reid in Reid, Anthony (1999), Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia, Silkworm Books, 
Chiang Mai. 
661 Byrnes, Michael (2006), Australia and the Asia Game: The Politics of Business and Economics in Asia, Allen 
& Unwin, Sydney,  p. 14 
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of 1894.662 Despite these incidental events of early economic contacts with Asia, Australia’s 
trade relations with Asia, however, remained limited and largely confined within the context of 
the British Far Eastern policy663 until the earlier part of the 20th century, despite the formation of 
the Federation in 1901. However, whilst the 1931 Statute of Westminster granted Australia 
formal sovereignty along with other British overseas dominions, nonetheless trade relations 
continued to be conducted by and on behalf of the British Empire until WWII. Again, the issue 
was not necessarily a lack of interest towards Asia, on the contrary the potential for a growing 
significance of Asia for Australia was already widely debated within Australian policy-making 
circles664, but the primary motivation of such an arrangement was the strong belief in the Com-
monwealth as the best guardian of Australia’s interests through imperial preferences, great power 
diplomacy and military might. The first sign of an independent trade policy with Asia emerged 
when Canberra sent trade commissioners to Tokyo, Shanghai and Batavia (Jakarta) in 1935.665 
Post WWII Era Trade Relations 
The immediate post-WWII era witnessed a rapid expansion of Australia’s economic interests in 
Asia led by the post-war economic recovery of a resource hungry Japan. Japan rapidly became 
Australia’s most important export destination. At the same time Australia was losing commit-
                                                 
662 Tweedie, Sandra (1994), Trading Partners: Australia & Asia 1790-1993, University of New South Wales 
Press, Sydney p. 27 
663 Goldsworthy, David (2003), “Introduction” in Edwards, Peter and David Goldsworthy (Eds.) (2003), Facing 
North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia – Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, Melbourne University 
Press, Melbourne, p.1 
664 Goldsworthy has observed an "embryonic sense of Asia’s potential significance for Australia” in the Australi-
an discourse on the importance of the region for the country’s future. Goldsworthy, David (2003),  “Introduc-
tion”, in Edwards, Peter and David Goldsworthy (Eds.) (2003), Facing North: A Century of Australian 
Engagement with Asia – Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p.1  
665 Wesley, Michael (2007a), The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia 1996-2006, ABC Books, 
Sydney, p. 5 
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ment to imperial preferences, a system that regulated preferential trade within the Common-
wealth.666 
The depth and extent of Australia’s trade relations with East Asia were steadily increasing as 
Australia entered a long period of economic boom from the mid-1960s onwards. In general terms 
the post WWII resource boom had been particularly kind to Australia’s resource-oriented econ-
omy, a state of affairs that earned Australia ‘the lucky country’ title.667In particular the growing 
hunger for minerals and other raw materials by Japan fuelled the expanding and diversifying 
trade within Asia. Other factors were also important. First of all, the boom took place at the same 
time as ASEAN countries and Japan had entered a period of rapid industrial growth. On the other 
hand Australia’s traditional markets were threatening to spiral into decline with prospects of the 
UK joining the EEC. Inspired by the threat of losing a major market and abandonment of the 
imperial preferences, Australia established a generalised system of preferences in 1966. Al-
though the system was highly selective and excluded the major ‘competitive’ products, ASEAN 
countries benefited significantly nonetheless and trade with Australia boomed.668 
The second major shift in Australia’s trade policy completed the gradual move towards an 
independent foreign and trade policy under the Whitlam and Fraser governments; First, In 1972 
Australia recognised the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and then in 1973 Australia imple-
mented a 25% tariff cut towards ASEAN products. The positive impact of these measures, 
however, was reduced by the 1974 currency devaluation of the Australian dollar and the decision 
to implement quotas on textiles, clothing and footwear, all important ASEAN exports. Conse-
quently trade growth slowed down again and much of the expected gains did not materialise.669 
Trade with China, however, picked up again following the economic reforms there from 1978 
                                                 
666 Ravenhill, John (2007), “Australia and the Global Economy”, in Cotton, James and John Ravenhill (Eds.) 
(2007), Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001 – 2005), Oxford University Press, Mel-
bourne, p. 198 
667 Ravenhill (1997), p.3 
668 Ravenhill (1997), pp. 11-12 
669 Tweedie (1994), p. 195 
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onwards, in particular in regards to minerals, for which Australia soon became a preferred 
supplier. 
The Rise of the “Tigers”: From 1980s to 1990s 
In the early 1980s a global economic recession caused commodity prices to collapse, a develop-
ment that motivated a program of rapid economic liberalisation in Australia.670 One of the first 
major consequences was an influx of Japanese investment in Australia, despite the still prevail-
ing negative public opinion towards increasing Japanese influence in Australia.671 More impor-
tantly, Australia’s positioning in the region was influenced by three major developments taking 
place almost simultaneously; First of all, the fear of traditional markets disappearing gathered 
support as the impact of the UK’s EEC membership on bilateral trade was threatened to be 
complicated by the Single European Act, which was signed in 1986 and aimed at creating a 
single market by 1992; secondly, the threat of losing the traditional UK market was combined 
with a recession in the United States in 1987 that hit the world economy hard, but in particular 
economies that had a close economic relationship with it, such as Australia; thirdly, the East 
Asian “Tiger” economies were booming in the 1980s and 1990s, offering enormous potential for 
growth and promoting the idea that the region was the key to Australia’s future economic suc-
cess.672 The Australian response to these factors was twofold. Firstly, the ALP government under 
Bob Hawke (1983-1991) decided to end Australia’s economic protectionism by implementing 
further tariff cuts. The cuts were the most radical in Australian history and the trade-weighted 
average of Australian tariffs were reduced from 9.2% in September 1986 to 6%in November 
1992. As ASEAN also implemented tariff cuts at the same time, trade intensified once again 
further enforcing the notion of dependence on Asia.673 Secondly, the notion of dependency on 
                                                 
670 Ravenhill (1997), p. 14 
671 The Australian public opinion remained negative towards Japanese investment and economic influence well 
into the latter part of 1990s. See: Ravenhill, John and Ian McAllister (1998), “Australian attitudes towards clo-
ser engagement with Asia”, The Pacific Review, Vol.11, No.1, p. 134 (pp.119-141) 
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Asia caused Australia to adopt a policy of ”Facing North” and seeking engagement with Asia 
during the 1991-1996 Paul Keating ALP government. 
1990s: “Facing North” 
Figure 2. Australia’s Two-Way Trade 1990-2006 
 
Source: Malik (2006a) p. 589   
The rapid growth of manufacturing and the adoption of export oriented economic policies in the 
East Asian “Tiger” economies in the 1990s offered new opportunities and a rapid growth in 
intra-industry trade boosted the economic relationship further.674 By 1991, ASEAN had passed 
the EEC and the US as a trade partner and by 1994 ASEAN had become the largest market for 
merchandise exports, even overtaking New Zealand.675 The reorientation of Australia’s trade 
could have hardly been much more drastic. For instance, between 1992 and 1996 the two-way 
trade with ASEAN in machinery, mechanical appliances and electrical equipment tripled in 
value to $US 3 billion.676 The economic relationship with East Asia in general also boomed, to 
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the extent that in 1995 65% of Australian exports went to East Asia and 42% of imports origi-
nated from East Asia.677 
Table 17. Australia's Major Trading Partners (Exports + Imports) 
Rank 1991-1992 Share Rank 2001-2002 Share Rank 2006 Share 
1 Japan 20.2% 1 United States 14.7% 1 Japan 14.6% 
2 United States 16.3% 2 Japan 14.3% 2 China 13.5% 
3 United Kingdom 7.1% 3 China 6.7% 3 United 
States 
10.1% 
4 New Zealand 5.2% 4 United Kingdom 5.8% 4 South 
Korea 
5.7% 
5 Singapore 4.2% 5 New Zealand 5.3% 5 Singapore 4.5% 
6 Germany 3.7% 6 South Korea 5.1% 6 New 
Zealand 
4.2% 
7 South Korea 3.6% 7 Singapore 4.4% 7 United 
Kingdom 
4.2% 
8 Taiwan 3.5% 8 Germany 3.3% 8 Thailand 3.1% 
9 Hong Kong 3.1% 9 Hong Kong 2.9% 9 Germany 3.1% 
10 China 2.7% 10 Indonesia 2.9% 10 Taiwan 3.1% 
 
Source: DFAT trade and economic data 
The Keating government launched an intense process of engagement with Asia, dubbed the 
"push into Asia”. The process of engagement entailed securing access to regional institutions, as 
well as playing an active role in creating new ones. In the context of economic relations, Austra-
lia was instrumental in the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. 
Whilst APEC was initially seen as a competitor to ASEAN, the February 1990 Kuching meeting 
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produced an agreement on the conditions for ASEAN participation in APEC, thus linking South-
east Asia with broader Asia Pacific Regionalism that included Australia’s other major trading 
partners, in particular the United States.678 Moreover, the creation of APEC positioned Australia 
right in the middle of the broader Asia-Pacific region that covered a great majority of its most 
important trade partners. The success to link ASEAN into the APEC framework and ASEAN’s 
endorsement of “open Regionalism” principle also alleviated fears of exclusive Regionalism 
taking hold in Southeast Asia. The decision in 1992 Singapore Summit to create ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) in fifteen years on the other hand amplified the motivation to seek inclusion 
in ASEAN. With little or no chances of ASEAN membership Australia, together with New 
Zealand, promptly begun negotiations to establish a free trade agreement with ASEAN. The 
AFTA-CER Linkage was established in 1995 paving the way for the decision in October 1999 to 
establish an AFTA-CER FTA. Australia also played an instrumental role in the founding of the 
regional security forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. 
Whilst securing inclusion in regional economic integration was a priority for Australia during the 
Hawke and Keating governments, it was ideologically driven by an un-wavered commitment to 
multilateralism. Paul Keating in particular believed that bilateralism was not a viable choice for 
securing Australia’s continuous prosperity.679 
2000-2007: From Multilateralism to Bilateralism 
The third major shift in Australian foreign and trade policy took place under the leadership of 
John Howard and his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer (1996-2007); this time from multilat-
eralism towards bilateralism in the form of a surge of bilateral trade and security agreements 
signed and pursued with East Asian countries. The first bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 
the region, however, was the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agree-
ment (ANZ CERTA) in 1983. The ANZ CERTA, however, was still an exceptional development 
in Australia’s trade policy and was followed by an era of multilateralism in Australia’s foreign 
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and trade policies. The philosophical basis of Australia’s foreign and trade policy under the 
leadership of John Howard and Alexander Downer subscribed to what has been titled as ”posi-
tive realism”680, in comparison to the liberal internationalist outlook of the previous ALP gov-
ernments. The shift from what the Liberals had criticised as an ‘idealistic’ approach to a ’ 
pragmatic’, arguably interests based, approach aimed at maximising national interest was the 
ideological motive behind the shift to bilateralism in trade and foreign policy. Despite its opposi-
tion to American unilateralism during the Keating governments reign, even the liberal interna-
tionalist ALP government felt the pressure to hedge multilateralism with at least some bilateral 
arrangements. What is clear, however, is that the Howard government reacted to the changing 
trade and policy environment from its own ideological perspective.681 
The first impetus for came in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Whereas multilat-
eralism and non-discriminatory trade liberalisation dominated the economic policies in the 
region prior to the crisis, post-crisis Asia turned towards discriminatory bilateral and regional 
trade agreements.682 If intra-ASEAN FTAs are counted in there are currently 17 FTAs in force 
and an additional 60 in the pipeline in Southeast Asia, China and India.683 This combined with 
the loss of markets, also due to the crisis, offered a strong impetus for Australia to follow suit. 
Secondly, the WTO Seattle meeting that had ended in a gridlock in December 1999 was signal-
                                                 
680 The concept of “positive realism” in the context of Australia’s position translated into an approach 
emphasising “pragmatic Regionalism” based on “mutual respect and shared interests,” instead of what Ho-
ward and Downer labelled as “emotional Regionalism”, based on similarities in culture and identity. Taking 
into consideration that Australia’s attempts to integrate had been rejected based on the perceived differences 
between “Australian values” and “Asian values”; the open recognition of the difference was arguably truly 
pragmatic. However, the new emphasis on Australian values and identity soon became to signify a rather radi-
cal repositioning linking Australia more firmly to the culturally similar Anglo-Saxon countries.  
681 The Howard government in this regard returned to a Liberal Party tradition of seeing international relations 
firmly within the Realist paradigm as a matter of material interests and power. See: Dalrymple, Rawdon 
(2003), ”Looking for theory in Australia foreign policy”, Paper presented at the Australian Review of Public 
Affairs symposium Advancing the National Interest?, 28 April, 2003, 
http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2003/04/dalrymple.html, Date accessed: 27 July 2009 
682 Sally, Razeen (2006), “FTAs and the Prospects for Regional Integration in Asia”, ECIPE Working Paper, 
No.1/2006,  European Centre for International Political Economy, Brussels, p.2 
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ling problems emerging in the multilateral trade system. The problems arising in the WTO 
rounds further enforced the Howard government’s increasing scepticism towards global trade 
talks and encouraged it to engage in bilateralism, even if it agreed that these agreements should 
be consistent with WTO provisions. Thirdly, when ASEAN economic ministers decided to 
downgrade the AFTA-CER negotiations in Chiang Mai in October 2000 it appeared that regional 
trade talks could falter as well. Interestingly, the AFTA-CER talks revealed a division within 
ASEAN whereby the resistance to the arrangement was driven by Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Indonesia whilst Singapore, Thailand and Brunei backed it and the Indochinese members re-
mained largely indifferent. Moreover, the meeting actually decided that AFTA-CER was both 
desirable and feasible, whilst Malaysia practically vetoed the decision nonetheless and suggested 
a lighter version with no tariff reductions under a Closer Economic Partnership (CEP).684 Rap-
idly losing its faith in the multilateral talks Australia started FTA negotiations with Singapore 
two months later.685 Finally, it is important to note that the motives for FTAs are often not solely 
economic, but governments tend also view them as means to solidify political and security links 
with strategically important partners.686 
The FTA with Singapore was a logical starting point. Not only was Singapore the most important 
ASEAN partner for Australia, accounting for one third of trade in goods, almost half of trade in 
services, 32% of outward and 61% of inward FDI,687but it also had minimal tariffs. Hence, 
negotiating the removal of remaining tariffs was a relatively easy task. The Australia-Singapore 
FTA talks were soon followed by a spate of bilateral FTA talks and joint studies with a number 
of major trading partners. In a short amount of time Australia entered talks to establish bilateral 
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FTAs with Thailand in April 2001, Indonesia in July 2003, China in October 2003, Malaysia in 
July 2004 and Japan February 2005.688 The shift to bilateralism has more recently reached a level 
where most of Australia’s major trading relations either already operate within FTA frameworks 
or such arrangements are being currently negotiated. Australia currently has FTA’s with four of 
its top trading partners: the United States, Singapore, New Zealand and Thailand. Negotiations 
towards establishing FTAs are under way with ASEAN (together with New Zealand) and Malay-
sia, and Australia is pursuing negotiations with Japan, the Gulf Cooperation Council and Chile. 
Finally, Australia is engaged in carrying out joint studies exploring the potential for FTAs with 
South Korea and Mexico. Should all these FTAs materialise, DFAT has estimated that they 
would cover 60% of Australia’s total two way trade in goods and services.689 As a sign of com-
mitment to completing the FTA negotiations Australia with its most important trading partner, 
the government granted market economy status to China in 2005.690 
Whilst the shift from multilateral to bilateral constituted the most dramatic change in the coun-
try’s trade policy since the abandonment of imperial preferences in the early 1950s, it has been 
argued that the move did not secure significant gains for Australia. This also corresponds with 
the view positing that bilateral agreements do not usually produce significant gains as their value 
erodes as the number of agreements increases covering more and more partners, in turn increas-
ing the cost of managing the agreements. In the Australia-Singapore FTA case Singapore already 
had zero tariffs for most products, with few exceptions such as beer and stout, leading the estab-
lishment of a FTA offering little direct trade benefits to Australia.691 The other FTA that has 
been criticised for not producing adequate returns was the Australia-United States FTA that 
entered force in January 2005. The US in general gives few and seeks extensive concessions in 
FTAs and as a major player it tends to get what it wants. This also applied to the FTAs signed 
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with Singapore and Australia.692In the Australia-US FTA case the US held to its principle of 
seeking ‘asymmetric reciprocity’, ferociously protecting the interest of US exporters whilst 
offering minimal concessions to the Australians. It has been argued that the ’dependent ally’ 
allowance did not materialise in conditions, except perhaps in getting FTA through Congress.693 
It has been argued that FTA would have been genuinely advantageous only if the US fully 
liberalised its trade with Australia, which it did not. Exceptions remained in particular in relation 
to trade in pharmaceuticals, but also in sugar and agricultural products in general. Apparently 
Trade Minister Vaile and his team were ready to walk out of the negotiations due to this dead-
lock, but John Howard ordered Vaile to take the deal, allegedly motivated by the upcoming 2004 
elections.694 The benefits from FTAs in general have been said to be doubtful due to the fact that 
Australian merchandise exports continue to be dominated by primary commodities that already 
enjoy free access to foreign markets.695 Even if bilateral FTAs were more effective between two 
partners, what kind of returns would such FTAs produce in comparison to multilateral arrange-
ments? 
                                                 
692 Sally (2006), p. 6 
693 See for instance: Weiss, Linda, Elizabeth Thurbon and John Mathews (2004), How to Kill a Country: Austra-
lia’s Devastating Trade Deal with the United States, Allen & Unwin, Sydney. 
694 Ravenhill (2007),  pp. 202-3 
695 Ravenhill (2007),  p. 206 
R A T I O N A L I S T  A N A L Y S I S  O F  A U S T R A L I A  –  E A S T  A S I A  R E L A T I O N S  
235 
Asymmetry in Trade Relations: Interdependency or just Dependency? 
Figure 3. Australia’s Exports by Region 
 
Source: DFAT 
There can be no doubt that East Asia is critically important for Australia’s economy and prosper-
ity. For instance, between 2004 and 2005 East Asia accounted for 56% of Australia’s total 
merchandise exports.696 In 2006 East Asia’s share of Australia’s total external trade in goods and 
services had declined to 50%, but on the other hand trade with China had been Australia’s most 
rapidly growing trade relationship and China overtook the US as a trading partner the same year. 
697
 In 2007 the share of East Asia had increased to almost two-thirds of Australia’s total external 
trade, valuing AUD 200 out of the total of AUD 350 billion.698 ASEAN, on the other hand, 
accounted for 32% of the total two way trade with East Asia with its share of Australia’s total 
                                                 
696 Ravenhill (2007),  p. 194 
697 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2007), Australia’s Trade with East Asia,  Market Information and 
Analysis Section, Canberra, p.2 
698 Stephen Smith, Minister for Foreign Affairs, speech at the Lowy Institute , 18 July 2008 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
236 
exports doubling in 30 years699 In 2006 alone the bilateral trade grew by 20% year-on-year.700 
Japan, Australia’s largest trading partner, as well largest market for exports of goods and services 
since 1966 is responsible for 13% of Australia’s total external trade.701  
However, whilst Asia’s importance to Australia became more visible each year the development 
of trade relations with Asia were also becoming increasingly uneven. At the same time as Asia’s 
importance to Australian economy was steadily growing, Australia’s importance to ASEAN was 
simultaneously diminishing both as a market and a source for investment, 702producing an 
increasingly asymmetrical relationship. 
Table 18. Australia´s Ranking and Share of Exports and Imports 
Export Destination Source of Imports 
Trade Partner 
Rank Share (%) Rank Share (%) 
ASEAN 6 4.6% 8 2.9% 
China 15 1.4% 7 2.4% 
Hong Kong 11 1.2% 18 0.6% 
Indonesia 8 2.7% 7 4.9% 
Japan 12 1.9% 5 4.8% 
Philippines 14 1.0% 16 1.2% 
Malaysia 10 2.8% 12 1.8% 
Singapore 8 3.7% 18 1.60% 
South Korea 14 1.4% 7 3.7% 
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Export Destination Source of Imports 
Taiwan 14 1.3% 8 2.6% 
Thailand 7 3.4% 11 2.7% 
 
Source: DFAT Country Fact Sheets 
Whilst the region has been steadily becoming more important to Australia, its share of trade in 
the region has been simultaneously decreasing as a percentage of total external trade. 703 Subse-
quently, whereas the East Asian countries feature prominently in ranking of Australia’s trade 
partners, Australia is considerably less important as a partner for East Asian countries. This, of 
course is not unexpected given the sizes of the respective economies, but even proportionally 
speaking it should be acknowledged that Australia is clearly more dependent on East Asia than 
vice versa. Whilst Australia’s abundant natural resources are in high demand in the region, in the 
context of total trade, Australia does not rank especially high. For example, Australia’s share of 
imports for ASEAN was 2.9% in 2006, only 0.6% for Hong Kong, 1.8% for Malaysia and 1.6% 
for Singapore. In exports a similar situation applies to some of the major partners: China 1.4%, 
Indonesia 2.7%, South Korea 1.4% and Taiwan 1.3%. As a relatively small market with histori-
cal patterns of trade directed to Europe and United States Australia is not a priority to regional 
states in their foreign trade and investment relations.704 Finally, Australia runs a relatively large 
balance of payments deficit with major trading partners in the region. The total value of this 
deficit in 2006 was approximately AUD 12.5 billion, of which AUD 5.2 billion was with China 
and AUD 16.4 billion with ASEAN705 
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Figure 4. Australia's Top 10 Export Markets 2006 
 
Source: DFAT Trade Statement 2007 
Investment: The Missing Link 
Outward FDI by region
-10000
-5000
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Year
A
UD
 
(m
ill
io
n
s)
East Asia
EU
US
Other
 
Source: DFAT and ABS 
R A T I O N A L I S T  A N A L Y S I S  O F  A U S T R A L I A  –  E A S T  A S I A  R E L A T I O N S  
239 
Whilst Australia’s trade with East Asia has steadily increased, the investment record with the 
region has been more mixed. Australian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in East Asia shrunk 
considerably in the late 1970s after a somewhat promising start and moved to more familiar 
markets in Britain and the United States.706 
Figure 5. Direction of Australian Investment - 1992 and 2003 
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Source: DFAT and ABS 
In the 1980s Australia turned the other way again, encouraged by a major disinvestment in 
Southeast Asia reducing the region’s share from 39% of total outward investment to less than 5% 
by the end of the decade. DFAT suggested that outdated perceptions of poor profitability and 
difficulty in repatriating profits were at least partly to blame. As DFAT pointed out “it was 
during the latter half of the 1980s that the main ASEAN economies flourished. Ironically, Aus-
tralian investors seemed to be among the least interested in the profound economic transforma-
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tions occurring so close to home”.707Moreover, as the DFAT’s report pointed out the relationship 
between investment and trade is relatively strong; "investment in the region should be more of a 
component of Australia’s trade strategies for the region. It can lock us into regional production 
plans, drive exports and promote access to the most cost-effective imported inputs and consumer 
goods”.708 In the early 1990s signs of recovery and reinvigorated interest in investing in South-
east Asia emerged again, but the recovery ended abruptly with the 1997 financial crisis causing a 
major disinvestment from the region again in1998.  
Top Sources of FDI AUD Billion Share 
United States $ 362.8 25% 
United Kingdom $ 352.7 24% 
Japan $ 51.4 4% 
Hong Kong $ 38.5 3% 
Switzerland $ 35.3 2% 
New Zealand $ 32.4 2% 
Singapore $ 26.9 2% 
Note: US, UK, NZ 51% of total 
 
Top Destinations of FDI AUD Billion Share 
United States $ 320.80 38% 
                                                 
707 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1994b), Changing Tack: Australian Investment in South-East Asia, 
Economic Analytical Unit, Canberra, AGPS, “Executive Summary”, available online: 
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Top Destinations of FDI AUD Billion Share 
United Kingdom $ 133.30 16% 
New Zealand $ 65.30 8% 
Japan $ 39.80 5% 
Netherlands $ 31.20 4% 
Note: US, UK, NZ 62% of total 
 
Source: ABS 53520 International Investment Position, Australia, supplementary data 
From 2000 onwards, investment relations with China and Japan were growing substantially. The 
levels of two-way FDI, however, still were no match for the levels of growth experienced in the 
trade of goods and services. In general, statistics clearly support the view that Australians prefer 
investing in more familiar markets, primarily in English speaking markets and the European 
Union. 
As a testimony to this trend, Australia’s top investment partners in 2005 were the United States, 
Britain, Japan, New Zealand and the EU. The United States was by far the most important 
partner, accounting for 25% of the total inward FDI flows to Australia and an astonishing 45% of 
outward FDI from Australia. Britain, the traditional source of FDI accounted for 18% of the total 
inward flows, worth AUD 51.3 billion. Britain was also major destination for Australian FDI, 
worth a total of AUD 42.4 billion. The investment relations with Japan were rapidly growing, but 
also highly asymmetric. Whilst Japan was Australia’s 3rd most important investment partner it is 
mainly in the inward flow, totalling AUD 23.8 billion, the levels of Australian investment 
outflows to Japan were conspicuously low. 
6.3 Political and Diplomatic Engagement with East Asia: 
Australia in East Asian Regionalism 
Australia’s diplomatic relations with Asia, when most regional states were still colonies of 
Britain, the Netherlands, France or the United States, were naturally conducted within the 
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framework of Britain’s Far Eastern Policy.709Even when Australia became a federation in 1901 
by an act of the British Parliament, this state of affairs did not alter dramatically. 
The Statute of Westminster in 1931 granted formal sovereignty to Australia amongst other 
British dominions, which motivated the formation of an independent foreign policy. In general 
the focus of the newly found Australian foreign policy was focused towards economic rather 
than political relations and Canberra had little interest in establishing formal diplomatic relations 
before WWII.710 When in 1939 Australia finally established its own diplomatic missions in 
Northeast Asia, the development was soon to be disrupted by the outbreak of the Pacific War. 
Through the experiences of the Pacific War, however, Australia discovered a newly invigorated 
interest in the near region and foreign policy focus started gradually shifting away from the 
interests of the British Empire towards dealing increasingly independently with the region.711 
The Post-WWII era produced the golden years of Australian foreign policy with an emerging 
independent position under the custodianship of legendary E.V. “Doc” Evatt, Minister for 
External Affairs 1941-49. Evatt’s internationalist outlook and small and middle power advocacy 
produced a foreign policy characterised by active diplomacy, including in Asia, although “en-
gagement” with the region was hardly on the agenda. On the other hand new geopolitical reali-
ties in the region were emerging when the civil war in China ended with Mao’s communist 
forces forcing the Kuomintang to take refuge in Formosa in 1949. Australia recognised the 
Republic of China (ROC) rather than the newly formed People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
following the lead of the United States. The emergence of a communist China was viewed as a 
major concern in Australia with fear over the threat of communism spreading in the region 
largely taking the primacy in foreign and defence policy making. 
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In the 1950s and 1960s Australia’s foreign relations with Asian countries in general were re-
strained by the intensifying Cold War and the increasing fear of communism spreading in the 
region, resulting into Australia engaging in a number of Western alliances, e.g. SEATO, Five 
Power Defence agreement and ANZUS, in order to contain the threat. The number of Cold War 
conflicts over the two decades, e.g. Malayan Emergency, Korean War and Vietnam War, drove 
the country into conflict with its regional neighbours and the relations with a number of regional 
states consequently remained tense, although officially Australia pursued healthy relations with 
pro-Western and non-aligned countries. In practice though, Australia’s main partners in South-
east Asia were Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. Australia’s partnerships in 
Northeast Asia on the other hand were mostly limited to South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, which 
had by now converted from an enemy to a valued ally, whilst China and North Korea remained 
major threats.712 The extent of Australia’s diplomatic relations in the region, however, grew more 
extensive with the initiative of Richard Casey, who in the 1950s built Australia’s diplomatic 
network in Asia covering 14 countries by 1960.713. 
Australia was also becoming increasingly active in development assistance to the region. When 
the Commonwealth foreign ministers’ meeting in Colombo in January 1950 established ”the 
Colombo Plan”- Australia immediately became one of the major donors of development assis-
tance, education and training provided within the framework of the plan.714 
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The Tiger Economies Emerge: Building Comprehensive Engagement 
with the Region 
By the 1970s a markedly different region was developing. The formerly impoverished, and in 
many cases unstable countries, were emerging as developed states poised to become export 
oriented economic powerhouses. Moreover, by the mid-1970s regional conflicts were largely 
over, the Vietnam War having ended. Consequently the Whitlam government begun a reorienta-
tion towards the region, recognising the PRC in 1972 and thus, taking the first independent 
stance toward the region.715 Moreover, Whitlam decisively modernised attitudes and policies 
towards Asia, as well as domestic politics by ending the White Australia policy in 1973.716 
Relations with Southeast Asia under the Whitlam government, however, were less than cordial. 
Part of the reason may have been that the focus was mainly on political and security interests and 
supporting the emergence of a stable Southeast Asia and thus, although the style had changed the 
substance remained relatively unchanged from the Menzies years. Moreover, Australia’s eco-
nomic interests in Southeast Asia were still relatively insignificant in real terms and the approach 
in these matters tended to be focused towards development assistance.717 As John Ravenhill has 
suggested, Australia consequently tended to subscribe to, and in particular project an image of, 
paternalistic attitudes towards the region. 718 Economic relations, however, started to show 
considerable potential and indeed expanded considerably during the 1970s719and consequently 
economic issues received more attention from the late 1970s onwards.720 
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Following the successive electoral victories by consecutive ALP governments in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, Australia’s diplomatic approach towards the region changed considerably towards 
seeking to engage Asia systematically. First of all the Hawke government deepened the process 
started by Whitlam and pioneered Asia Pacific Regionalism through the foundation of APEC. 
Secondly, Bob Hawke’s foreign ministers Bill Hayden and Gareth Evans carried out reforms in 
Australian foreign policy. Consequently Australia also played a prominent role, at times even a 
pioneering one, in the foundation of regional institutions, in particular in the creation of the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organisation in 1989 and the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) in 1994. The Paul Keating ALP government (1991 to 1996), expanding Hawke’s agenda, 
launched a programme of “comprehensive engagement” with Asia as a primary strategic objec-
tive of the Australian government.721 Gareth Evans, who continued as the Foreign Minister, was 
in the forefront of these efforts with a barrage of institutional initiatives and regional diplomatic 
activity. The focus of Evans’ activity in engaging with Asia was primarily on Southeast Asia and 
the South Pacific, but also with Northeast Asia through the concept of ”East Asian Hemisphere”, 
which Evans actively promoted in order to link Australia to the wider East Asia, whilst including 
North America and the United States in particular, in this regional design. Keating, on the other 
hand, adopted APEC as his brainchild and pushed the concept of the Asia-Pacific to the regional 
leaders, as well as to the United States, at times making ASEAN leaders apprehensive about 
APEC undermining ASEAN’s importance and influence in regional politics. Keating, with his 
straight-talking and sometimes controversial style angered regional leaders on more than one 
occasion. 
“The Howard Paradox” 
The John Howard era from March 1996 until November 2007 produced at times contradicting 
policies and mixed results in regional engagement. When elected into office in 1996 the Howard 
Coalition government pledged to continue with the established policies towards the region. 
However, soon after Howard and his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer remarked that, whilst 
they intended to continue to place great importance to regional relations, they would do so in the 
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context of ”pragmatic Regionalism”, seeking to maximise the Australian national interest, 
instead of doing so at any cost, as the ”Asia first” policies of the ALP had allegedly done. This 
would be achieved through interests based engagement without the rhetoric of Hawke and 
Keating and without compromising Australian identity. 
In terms of foreign policy focus in practical though, the focus was largely on bilateral relations 
with major partners, through the establishment of FTAs and other bilateral treaties. Moreover, 
the Howard government was particularly keen to achieve an especially close relationship with 
the United States, arguing that shared values and culture constitute a much more reliable base for 
close cooperation than “fleeting material interests”. Howard or Downer, however, never ques-
tioned the importance of the region to Australia’s economy and security, rather arguing that these 
interests need to be looked after in a pragmatic manner whilst it would not be worth sacrificing 
Australia’s national culture and identity. In other words, the Coalition government wanted to 
differentiate itself from the preceding ALP governments, who allegedly wanted to make Austra-
lia an Asian country in order to gain access to regional institutions. Howard and Downer, on the 
other hand, argued that there was no need to pretend being Asian, but instead being proudly 
Australian whilst working closely with its regional partners. Or as Howard famously claimed 
Australia should not be forced to "choose between its geography and history”.722 Nonetheless, 
the common perception was that a bilateral relationship with the United States was taking prece-
dence in the Howard agenda. The problem with this approach was the image of a “deputy sher-
iff” conveyed to the region, enforcing the view in Asia that Australia was geographically 
dislocated Western bastion that fit ill into the region. This seemed to correspond to what Keating 
predicted that Asian leaders would not meet, or deal on equal basis, with Howard. Nonetheless, 
Howard did what Keating had not been able to achieve, and despite the verbal hostility from 
Asian leader, did eventually access to ASEAN Plus Three (ATP) Summit in Vientiane in 2004 
and the inaugural East Asia Summit in 2005. This paradox of a government that was perceived 
of being almost exclusively US minded and even hostile to Asia, but nonetheless gained un-
precedented access to regional institutions, prompted Michael Wesley call it ”the Howard Para-
dox”; 
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This is the Howard paradox. How has a government that has been so rhetorically 
uncompromising in its relations with its neighbours, that has done so many things 
that critics have claimed would damage Australia’s relations with its region, 
managed to build such strong links with Asian countries?723 
Whilst there have been many reasons for this paradox to materialise, one reason may have been 
that after the 1997 financial crisis the value of rhetoric declined whilst the value of Australia’s 
pragmatic economic policies increased and were generally warmly welcomed in the region as a 
stabilising factor.724 The Howard government focused primarily on bilateral relationships as the 
cornerstone of Australia’s foreign policy.725 
Australia and Southeast Asian Regionalism 
The pivotal moment in Southeast Asian Regionalism was the foundation of Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand in August 1967, after failed attempts with SEATO726, the Association of Southeast Asia 
(ASA)727 and Maphilindo.728The foundation of ASEAN was welcomed by Australia, albeit 
perhaps mistakably, as a bulwark against communism in the region. Contrary to Australia’s 
expectations, however, ASEAN was never meant to become a defence or a regional security 
                                                 
723 Wesley (2007a),  p, 24 
724 Wesley (2007a), p. 35 
725 Michael Wesley (2007), “Planning Australia’s Future in Asia”,  Speech at the Lowy Institute for International 
Policy on 28 November 2007, available as a podcast: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Podcast-Library.asp, Date 
last accessed: 25 September, 2008 
726 The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty 
(“the Manila Pact”) in 1955, was planned to become an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizati-
on (NATO), but was dissolved as defunct in 1977. 
727 ASA was formed by Thailand, the Philippines and the Federation of Malaya in 1961. Although ASA remained 
dormant through regional conflicts, and paralysed during the Konfrontasi, it provided a basis for the foundati-
on of ASEAN in 1967. 
728 Maphilindo was an attempt to create a non-political confederation of Malay races, involving Indonesia, 
Malaya and the Philippines in 1963. Maphilindo, however, was scrapped due to political infighting between 
the newly created Malaysian Federation and Indonesia that eventually led into the Konfrontasi. 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
248 
organisation. On the contrary, ASEAN countries agreed to stay outside the super-power rivalry 
as much as possible, as later explicitly spelled out in the declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971. Australia did not openly oppose ZOPFAN, but worried it 
would undermine US presence in the region. Moreover, Indonesia, the leading country in the 
organisation, became a leader also in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), thus adding to the 
anxiety. Whitlam, on the other hand, ignored this apprehension and endorsed ZOPFAM in 
1972.729 
Despite the initial anxiety of concerns over ASEAN’s perceived non-commitment towards anti-
communism, Australia endorsed ASEAN unlike any other state. In 1974 Australia became the 
first country to recognise ASEAN formally as a multilateral organisation, as well as becoming 
ASEAN’s first dialogue partner, making it a pioneer in relations with the regional group. En-
dorsement also came in form of dollars, with Australia launching an economic assistance pro-
gram in the context of the ASEAN-Australian Economic Partnership Program.730 In yet another 
first, in 1978 it became the first country to establish a formal consultative structure on trade 
matters with ASEAN; within the context of ASEAN – Australia Forum from 1977731(The 
ASEAN Australia Consultative Meetings from 1978 onwards).732 The Fraser Coalition govern-
ment (1975-1983), however, won elections riding on the public’s detestation of Whitlam’s 
reforms and tariff cuts, of which concessions to ASEAN formed a considerable component. 
Consequently the Fraser government adopted a far less accommodating approach to the region 
and adhered to a policy of not granting new trade concession. The price for this position, on the 
other hand, was that consequently Fraser got rebutted from attempting access to ASEAN meet-
ings.733 
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The Hawke Labour government, elected into power in 1983, on the other hand implemented a 
complete reorientation towards the region. Gareth Evans, Hawke’s Foreign Minister since 1988, 
was particularly instrumental in launching policies designed to engage Asia to an extent and 
depth not seen before. Launching the new policy line Evans announced in 1989 the govern-
ment’s decision to seek “comprehensive engagement” with the region, thus formalising what had 
been a practice since 1983 when the Hawke government assumed power.734 The “engagement” 
policy produced a surge of activity towards the region, including a plethora of proposals for 
regional institutions. One of these was the proposal to establish a Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) in 1990, modelled after the European confidence-building organisa-
tion the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later enforced into an 
organisation and renamed OSCE).735Evans was also pushing multilateral security talks within the 
context of APEC, but ASEAN states worried their organisation could be undermined and argued 
ASEAN PMC meetings were adequate for achieving the same function. Moreover, Tokyo and 
Washington were not enthusiastic about a new regional security initiative and after rounds of 
bargaining the ASEAN ministerial meeting in Singapore in July 1993 decided on establishing the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), incorporating much of Evans’ ideas in it. ARF came into being 
in 1994 and included the ASEAN member states, China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos, PNG and 
ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the 
United States).736 Evans was nonetheless still pushing his agenda on regional security and sug-
gested institutionalisation of non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), trans-
parency of military doctrines and preventive diplomacy.737 Whilst these were not met with 
considerable enthusiasms, Evans did in number of ways nonetheless contribute to the improving 
regional security environment, e.g. by being active in mediating the Cambodia peace agreement 
and promoting CSPAC and other Track II diplomacy forums. 
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When in 1996 John Howard’s Coalition government settled into the office, it initially pledged to 
continue engaging Asia. Alexander Downer, the coalition government’s Foreign Minister made a 
point of emphasising in one of his early speeches that “engagement with Asia was still the most 
important component of Australia’s foreign policy.”738 However, soon after scepticism within 
Australian policy-making circles over ASEAN’s utility was settling in, in particular following 
the 1997 financial crisis, leading into a reluctance to adopt, or at times at least even to respect, 
the ‘ASEAN Way” of doing things. Also, differences in entangling the East Timor problem 
provided another instance where ASEAN’s passiveness became a major disappointment for the 
Australian government. Alexander Downer, clearly frustrated over this and other differences in 
approach, started referring to ASEAN being emotional and avoiding problems, not solving 
them.739 Moreover, he stated that there is two types of Regionalism: “practical” and ”cultural”; 
and that Australia would engage only in “practical” aspects of Regionalism “as enduring cultural 
differences between Australia and ‘Asia’ mean that Australia was inevitably prevented from 
developing closer ties [with Asian regional organisations]”740 
Part of the reason for this frustration was that Australia also continued to face fierce resistance 
towards its attempts joining regional institutions. In particular Australia’s role in East Timor, 
whilst perhaps boosting Australia’s confidence as a regional power, greatly angered Indonesia 
and Malaysia, who blocked Australia’s attempt to join e.g. ASEAN+3 (ATP). Moreover, no 
member state was actually willing to actively support Australia in this matter, albeit some re-
mained sympathetic.741 
The Howard government’s approach to East Asian Regionalism provides another reason. John 
Howard rejected the opposition from the region, noting that “Australia does not have to choose 
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between its history and geography”.742 Downer, on the other hand, took the argument even 
further by stating that Australia has a stake in a stable and prosperous Southeast Asia, and that 
Australia will support Regionalism, as long as it does not become exclusive in nature.743 More-
over, he clearly resented the culturally motivated opposition in the region by stating that Austra-
lia would not be interested in “emotional Regionalism”, but would instead be willing to promote 
“pragmatic” Regionalism: 
“If we describe Regionalism on basis of what you might broadly describe as an 
emotional community of interests, then Australia doesn’t have those types of emo-
tional associations with the region, and ethnic and cultural associations, very ob-
viously…For us, Regionalism is always going to be practical Regionalism looking 
at ways that we can work with our region to secure our own economic and secu-
rity objectives”744 
However, despite these bitter statements and an emphasis on bilateralism, the Howard govern-
ment continued the push to join regional institutions. For instance, the DFAT 2003 foreign and 
trade policy whitepaper Advancing the National Interest nonetheless clearly indicated that 
Australia was very interested in joining ATP745, despite the frustrating rejection by regional 
leaders. 
From 2001 onwards, as Michael Wesley put it, ASEAN “entered a period of reduced cohesion 
and clarity”746 Firstly, Indonesia had lost its leadership position as a result of the 1997 regional 
financial crisis and 1998 domestic economic and political crisis, and no replacement could be 
found .747 Secondly, the enlargement from six to ten members in the latter part of the 1990s 
produced ASEAN its version of deepening versus widening crisis, the efforts directed to integrat-
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ing the new members distracting attention away from institutional development. Finally the East 
Timor crisis exposed the weakness of ASEAN in dealing with regional problems with regional 
institutions bypassed by bilateral agreements in economic relations and security taking over. 
Consequently the Howard government’s emphasis on bilateralism received increasingly positive 
response in the region. As a testimony to this approach, Australia completed a number of bilat-
eral agreements with regional countries between 2001 and 2005. In addition to a number of 
FTAs, these included Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, India and Fiji in counter-terrorism.748 Australia also cooperated 
with Indonesia in launching the “Bali processes”, by jointly arranging a conference on illegal 
immigration in February 2002 in Bali and then in December 2002 a conference on combating 
money laundering and terrorism financing.749 
However, despite the scepticism of how effectively ASEAN institutions operate, Australia 
supported the efforts to build regional institutions with considerable enthusiasm, culminating in 
the ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program (AADCP) launched in 2002, and 
valued at 45 million dollars over six years and directed towards aiding regional projects.750 
Moreover, in the latter part of the Howard government an emerging generation of new leaders 
took over in major Southeast Asian states in 2004 and 2005, turning the tide in Australia’s 
regional relations. The pragmatic Abdullah Badawi replaced the main opponent of Australia’s 
engagement with Asia - Dr. Mahathir in Malaysia in 2005, Lee Hsieng Loon replaced Goh Chok 
Tong in Singapore in August 2004 and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly known as SBY) 
was elected president in Indonesia in 2004.751 
Yet another reason for the turning tide was probably China’s ASEAN ‘surge’, a policy of active 
diplomacy to increase China’s influence in Southeast Asia. Worrying of China’s rapidly increas-
ing influence ASEAN states have engaged in counter-balancing by increasing engagement with 
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the US, Australia and New Zealand. As a consequence John Howard was invited into ASEAN 
leaders’ summit in Vientiane in November 2004, materialising a major breakthrough towards 
gaining access to the East Asia Summit and ATP.752 Howard, however, refused to sign the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which was considered a prerequisite for joining the EAS (and 
which New Zealand immediately signed), quoting concerns that it would conflict with the 
obligations of Australia - US alliance. The refusal immediately angered ASEAN states and 
derailed Australia’s East Asia Summit access. In mid-2005, however, Howard and Downer had a 
change of heart and signed TAC without further references to the earlier motives for the initial 
refusal to do so. Consequently EAS doors opened again and Howard got his invitation to the 
inaugural summit. 753 The China card could not have played for Australia’s advantage again, as 
China did not appear very keen to admit Australia and India. 
Finally, however, contrary to Howard’s and Downer’s preferences for “pragmatic Regionalism”, 
it should be noted that ASEAN is becoming more “exclusive” in terms of moving towards 
enhanced community building based on shared values and culture. The ASEAN Vision 2020, 
adopted in December 1997 in ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, envisioned an ASEAN Com-
munity that was outward looking and united by pursuit for peace, stability and prosperity, 
bonded together in partnership in dynamic economic development and in a community of caring 
societies. Moreover, in October 2003 the ASEAN leaders agreed to adopt the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) announcing the establishment of an ASEAN Community 
by 2020 to be based on three pillars: ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Commu-
nity and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.754 The ASEAN Concord II is an important devel-
opment in ASEAN’s evolution in the sense of elevating political and socio-cultural aspects on 
par with economic matters as basis for further integration. The strategic objective of ASEAN 
Concord II was to achieve deeper integration and accelerate regional identity building. 
                                                 
752 Wesley  (2007b), p. 68 
753 Ibid 
754 ASEAN Secretariat (1997), Declaration of ASEAN Concord II ( Bali Concord II), available online: 
http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm, date last accessed: 01.08.2008 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
254 
Australia and Asia-Pacific Regionalism 
The development of Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, as well as Australia’s role in this process, 
has been a long road paved with a series of proposals for regional institutions. The beginning of 
this journey started in n the early 1960s when the Japan Economic Research Center (JERC) 
began to explore the opportunities for regional integration. Its first report “Economic Coopera-
tion in the Pacific Area” argued that there was indeed sufficient potential in the region to pro-
mote regional cooperation and proposed the establishment of annual ministerial meetings 
between Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States.755 Based on these find-
ings, Japanese economist Kiyoshi Kojima first sketched an idea of a Pacific Community in 1966. 
The idea was take further by the Japan-Australia Business Cooperation Committee that estab-
lished the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967 to promote study and discussion 
regarding regional trade and investment, as well as to promote public – private sector coopera-
tion in economic matters.756 Whilst this did not result into the establishment of regional institu-
tions as such, the idea of Asia-Pacific Regionalism had been born. 
The idea of Asia-Pacific Regionalism was taken significantly further by the creation of the 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1980, initiated by Japan’s Prime Minister 
Masayoshi Ohira and Australia’s Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser.757 PECC was much broader in 
membership and involved twenty Asia Pacific nations in national member committees.758 The 
most significant contribution of PECC, however, was paving the way for the establishment of the 
first genuine regional institution in the Asia-Pacific: the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
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(APEC) organisation in 1989. The role of Australia in the establishment of APEC was significant 
and culminated in an inaugural meeting in Canberra at the initiative of Australia’s Prime Minis-
ter Bob Hawke. 
The major breakthrough with APEC, however, was reached only when in early 1990 ASEAN 
Economic Ministers adopted the “Kuching Consensus”, which produced an agreement on the 
terms of ASEAN’s participation in APEC and thus, making the organisation truly region-wide in 
reach.759 APEC’s membership also expanded to cover a total of 21 member economies after four 
waves of enlargement in 1991 (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan), 1993 (Mexico, and Papua New 
Guinea), 1994 (Chile) and 1998 (Peru, Russia and Vietnam).760 
As with prior initiatives, economic cooperation was the key motive and mission for the founda-
tion of APEC and it was at least partly a response to the perceived need to promote a rules based 
non-discriminatory international trading system and to lack of regional institutions in the Asia 
Pacific,761 thus promoting the principles of ”open Regionalism”. The basic guiding principles of 
open Regionalism for the organisation, on the other hand, were accordingly set out in the 1991 
Seoul APEC Declaration, whilst the 1994 Bogor meeting clarified APEC’s objectives as to 
“strengthen the open multilateral system; achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia 
Pacific region by a process of facilitation and liberalisation; and intensify development coopera-
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tion in the region”.762 Moreover, the leaders attending the Bogor meeting agreed on the removal 
of barriers for trade and investment in the region by 2020.763 
Institutional development of APEC, however, was a commonly perceived weakness until it took 
a new dimension following the 1993 Seattle summit as a consequence of the Clinton administra-
tion’s endorsement of APEC in general and a push for a transformation of APEC from a purely 
consultative body into an international organisation with a small secretariat in Singapore.764 The 
1995 Osaka Summit, on the other hand, produced the ”Osaka Action Agenda”, detailing how 
APEC as an organisation and its member economies planned to reach these targets and support 
the non-discriminatory trading system. In the Manila 1996 Summit the leaders agreed on the 
Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA), reaffirming the organisation’s commitment to trade 
liberalisation and facilitation through following ”the principles of open Regionalism”765, signify-
ing that APEC was to be open to any economy with strong economic linkages to the region and a 
demonstrated will to adhere to shared principles.766 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis, in particular the speed and extend of the contagion spread in the 
region, reminded the regional states of their interdependency and the weakness of cooperation 
between them. The crisis, as unfortunate as it was, produced a major turning point in APEC’s 
development. As Naoko Munakata has suggested the opportunity to fill the perceived gap offered 
a major opportunity to APEC and following the crisis "APEC became the primary vehicle for 
regional cooperation”.767Boosted by the newly found enthusiasm towards APEC, The Eminent 
Persons Group was tasked to produce a new vision for APEC that included APEC FTA 
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(PAFTA).768 PAFTA, however, failed to attract widespread support and the APEC leaders 
decided instead stick to Bogor principles of voluntary liberalisation and peer pressure.769 Another 
setback was a decisive attempt by ASEAN to increase its influence in the region through the 
establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three (ATP), involving ASEAN and the major East Asian 
powers China, Japan and South Korea.770 Nonetheless, pioneering a regional organisation that 
involves 21 countries, covering approximately 41 % of the world’s population, 49% of world’s 
GDP and 49% of world trade, is solid proof that Australia can play a major role in regional 
institution building and integration. 
Australia and East Asian Regionalism 
Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohammad, Malaysia’s long-serving Prime Minister, concerned about 
the poor progress made in the GATT Uruguay Round for multilateral trade liberalisation, as well 
as the increasing discriminatory Regionalism in the EU and NAFTA, proposed in late 1990 an 
Asian economic block -East Asian Economic Group- comprising ASEAN, Indo-China, China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan.771 Mahathir’s intention was that the new block 
would be exclusively an "Asians only” grouping to countervail the “Western” blocks. Moreover, 
Mahathir was vehemently opposed to Australia’s and New Zealand’s membership in any Asian 
regional institutions because of their position as “proxies to the United States” and because they 
were “ethnically and culturally unfit to be part of an Asian community”.772Japan, however, 
immediately vehemently opposed to the notion of an exclusively Asian block. The United States 
and ASEAN also were hostile towards the idea; United States because it would have been totally 
excluded and ASEAN because it was concerned for losing its centrality in East Asian Regional-
ism. 
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Due to the fierce opposition a more informal version of the EAEG, the East Asian Economic 
Caucus (EAEC) was put forward in 1991.773 EAEC, however, was soon dubbed as the "caucus 
without Caucasians” and was dismissed due to opposition by Japan since it would have excluded 
Australia and New Zealand. When Mahathir was replaced by Abdullah Badawi in 2003, the new 
Prime Minister began rapidly repairing ruptured bilateral relations with Singapore, the United 
States and Australia.774 Badawi also resurrected the idea of East Asian Regionalism and sug-
gested the establishment of an East Asian Summit in 2004 ATP meeting. The major East Asian 
powers, however, were still not unified in what kind of Regionalism they wanted to promote. For 
instance, China wanted exclusive form of Regionalism and was strongly opposed to India’s and 
Australia’s membership, whilst Japan preferred a more inclusive approach supporting the inclu-
sion of Australia and New Zealand in particular. Being confronted with strong support for 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s inclusion by Japan, China then demanded That ATP forms the 
basis for East Asian region building within the context of emerging East Asian Community 
(EAC).775 The Badawi proposal nonetheless took wind under its wings in the ASEAN+3 Lead-
ers’ Summit in November 2004, which decided on the establishment of an “East Asian Commu-
nity” along the lines of a report by the East Asia Vision Group issued in 2001. The report 
envisioned the formation of the East Asian Community with ASEAN as the core and the 
enlargement of the ATP process to include more countries, including Australia. In this spirit the 
report made a number of far-reaching recommendations in economic, financial, political and 
security, environmental, social and cultural and institutional cooperation in East Asia, including; 
● Establishment of an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and faster liberalisation 
of trade well ahead of APEC Bogor goals 
● Formation of a East Asia Business Council to stimulate private enterprise activity in 
the region 
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● Expansion of the Framework Agreement on an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) to 
all of East Asia and East Asian Investment Information Network to stimulate intra-
regional investment 
● Financial cooperation to include intra-regional lending arrangements with the most 
far-reaching goal being the establishment of an East Asian Monetary Fund, as well 
as regional exchange rate coordination 
● Code of Conduct in lines with UN Charter and ASEAN Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) 
● Promotion of development and technological cooperation among regional countries, 
to provide assistance to less developed countries; 
● Realisation of a knowledge-based “New Economy” and establishment of a future-
oriented economic structure throughout the region 
● The evolution of the annual summit meetings of ASEAN+3 into the East Asian 
Summit776 
Australia’s responses to attempts to promote East Asian Regionalism have been somewhat cool 
in general. The ALP government of Paul Keating and Gareth Evans mainly responded to Ma-
hathir’s initiatives by promoting APEC as the building block for Regionalism and mobilising the 
rest of ASEAN, as well as China, Japan and the United States, behind it. Even Evans’ vision of 
Australia as part of the rather mythical “East Asian Hemisphere”, designed to tie Australia 
geographically to East Asia, was designed to provide a counterweight to definitions of the region 
that sought to exclude it. 
The Coalition government tended to follow the bipartisan commitment to APEC. Even Koi-
zumi’s vision of EAS that included Australia failed to raise the government’s enthusiasm and 
Howard remained reserved to the point of at times downplaying the importance of EAS and 
instead emphasising APEC’s centrality in the regional architecture. Nonetheless the 2003 For-
eign and Trade Policy White Paper “Advancing the National Interest” declared Australia’s 
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interest in joining the ATP.777 Following Japan’s initiative in November 2004 Howard was 
invited to ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in Vientiane, the first time Australia participated in such an 
event, to discuss Australia’s participation in EAS. The condition for participation was set to be 
signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Howard, however, refused signing 
TAC referring to the concern that it could contradict Australia’s ANZUS obligations. The re-
fusal, infuriating many regional leaders, derailed Australia’s EAS access until in mid-2005 
Howard changed his mind, signed TAC and the doors opened again and Howard was promptly 
invited in to the EAS inaugural summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 and later on in the 
second summit in Cebu (the Philippines) in January 2007.778 
The East Asian regional architecture is likely to continue to consist of multiple institutional 
arrangements for the foreseeable future. ASEAN, however, is likely to remain a core in most of 
region building projects. For instance the emerging ASEAN Economic Community is likely to 
form the centre of East Asian economic integration779and EAS is in equal to ASEAN+6 in terms 
of membership (ASEAN + Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand). The 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) again is likely to remain the dominant regional security institu-
tion. Whatever the exact institutional architecture of the emerging EAC will be, it will cover 
approximately half of the world’s population, a combined GDP greater than the EU and a trading 
volume larger than NAFTA.780 Consequently it is essential for Australia’s future to secure 
participation in the evolving East Asian Community. 
Bilateral Relations with Major East Asian Powers 
The previous sections have analysed Australia’s relations with the predominant regional organi-
sations and its participation in regional institutions. This section will focus on Australia’s rela-
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tionship with the major East Asian powers. Due to the immense diversity of the region, relations 
with major powers that dominate and shape the regional cooperation and integration initiatives is 
a critical factor in Australia’s integration with the region. 
Australia’s testy relationships with Indonesia 
Australia’s relationship with independent Indonesia has been a cycle of highs and lows, ranging 
from cordial to serious tension. 
Jamie Mackie has suggested that the history of relations between Australia and independent 
Indonesia could be seen within the context of four distinct phases: 1945-49, 1950-66, 1966-1998 
and 1999-2007. 781 
The early independence years from 1945 to 1949 were mostly characterised by cordial relations 
between the two countries. Australia had supported Indonesian independence and the formation 
of an Indonesian state. The second period, on the other hand, was one of increasingly tense 
relations. The two leaders, Sukarno and Menzies, had conflicting personalities and the conserva-
tism of Menzies, including his sense of threat from the region, did add to the dangerous mix in 
this period of communism spreading in Southeast Asia, culminating in the Malayan Emergency. 
More importantly, the 1962-63 dispute over West New Guinea (a.k.a. West Irian or Irian Jaya) 
was resolved in accordance with Jakarta’s wishes and thus, another source of potential conflict 
was averted. The policy of confrontation with Malaysia produced a period of open hostilities – 
the Konfrontasi (1963-66) - between Indonesia and Malaysia over control of the Kalimantan in 
the island of Borneo created real potential for wider hostilities between the two countries. This 
particular period created possibly the worst potential for open conflict between the two, when 
Australian troops stationed in Kalimantan during the Malayan Emergency occasionally entered 
into sporadic exchanges of gunfire with Indonesian troops. The diplomatic efforts, however, 
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continued during the conflict and eventually cool heads prevailed. Sukarno in particular assumed 
a conciliatory position and a major conflict between the two countries was averted.782 
The period from 1966 to 1998 represented another high in Australia-Indonesia relations. With 
the exception of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1974-75, the period of these Suharto years 
were an era of cordial, or even exceptionally good, relations between the two countries. One 
reason for the cordiality was that in the Australian foreign policy elite Indonesia was largely seen 
as a bulwark against communism in the region.783 Moreover, the contentious issue of control 
over off-shore oil fields to the east of Timor in the Timor Sea was settled for a 40 years period in 
Timor Gap negotiations of 1989 between foreign ministers Gareth Evans and Ali Alatas.784 
In the 1990s a regional economic boom and the policies of the Paul Keating government (1991-
1996) focusing on “engagement” with Asia produced the heydays of Australia – Indonesia 
relations in the mid-1990s. During this period of “engagement” Australian foreign policy priority 
was to consolidate a partnership with Indonesia in order to facilitate Australia’s engagement with 
ASEAN.785 The Keating – Suharto personal relationship was also warm and Keating visited 
Indonesia on numerous occasions, as a welcomed and respected partner he was given quarters in 
the presidential palace during his stay. 
In terms of bilateral treaties completed during this period, the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining 
Security (AMS), signed by Keating and Suharto, was a particularly significant achievement, 
being the first ever bilateral agreement with an Asian country and first of its kind for Indone-
sia.786 
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During its first two years the John Howard government continued roughly on the same policy 
lines established by the previous ALP government. The Howard government also promptly 
completed the negotiations for the Maritime Delimitation Treaty (DMT) Arafura and Timor seas 
and eastern Indian Ocean in 1997.787 When the Suharto regime fell in 1998 amidst economic, 
social and political turmoil, a new era in Australia- Indonesia relations quickly unravelled. 
The 1999 to 2007 period produced an exceptional roller coaster of highs and lows. The period 
begun with the East Timor crisis and Australia’s leadership role in the international intervention 
force (INTERFET), which regardless of being officially endorsed by Jakarta, nonetheless be-
came a major test to the relationship. The AMS, for instance, was terminated as a result of the 
crisis, Indonesian officials citing Australia’s actions in relation to the crisis being inconsistent 
with the letter and spirit of the agreement as a reason.788 Moreover, the East Timor crisis left a 
lingering suspicion amongst Indonesians that Australia would intervene in other break away 
provinces, such as Aceh and West Papua (Irian Jaya), allegedly motivated by a wish to break 
Indonesia into smaller more manageable parts.789 
This period of negative relations continued with the 2002 Bali bombings, where 88 Australians 
died. Moreover, the targeting of Australian interests in Indonesia continued by a suicide bombing 
against the Australian embassy in 2004 and a popular bar frequently populated by Australians in 
Bali in 2005. Whilst Jakarta collaborated with Australian officials, primarily from the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP), the treatment of suspects and the lenient treatment of the alleged master-
mind behind the bombings, Abu Bakar Bashir created negative and increasingly hostile feelings 
towards Indonesia amidst the Australian public. The bad publicity continued with the Schapelle 
Corby case, a Gold Coast beautician convicted of drug smuggling in Bali, based on charges not 
entirely convincing to the Australian public and her treatment that did not adhere to Australian 
standards of justice. 
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The years of 2004 and 2005 produced a slightly more positive environment for bilateral rela-
tions, The first, a celebrated positive change, came in late- 2004 when Susilo Bambang Yud-
hoyono (popularly known as SBY), a pragmatic Western educated career soldier was elected as 
the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Following his acute political instincts, John Howard 
sensed an opportunity to mend relations with Indonesia, as well as score some points in domestic 
politics against pundits criticising his government for ruining Australia’s relations with the 
region, and consequently made a point to attend the inauguration of SBY in Jakarta. Australia 
and Indonesia co-chaired an inter-faith dialogue conference arranged in Jakarta in December 
2004.790 
The tragic events that followed soon, the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004 in Aceh, had a positive 
impact on Australia – Indonesia relations. Australia rapidly emerged as the largest donor an-
nouncing an AUD 1 billion aid package and thus, setting an example to the ASEAN countries 
and the international community in general, earning a bounty of goodwill in exchange. 
The good fortunes continued for awhile with close and frequent contact between Canberra and 
Jakarta, culminating to SBY’s 2005 visit to Australia, which some celebrated as “the most 
successful ever undertaken by an Indonesian head of state”.791 Consequent to these positive 
developments in bilateral relations, the two signed an ”Australia-Indonesia Joint Declaration on 
Comprehensive Partnership” on 2 April 2005, re-establishing security relations between the two 
and broadening economic and technical cooperation and people-to-people links.792 
In January 2006 43 Papuan asylum seekers arrived in Australia receiving wide publicity and 
citing the brutality of the Indonesian administration there as their motive for fleeing Papua. 
When 42 of them were granted temporary protection visas, the Indonesians reacted furiously and 
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called the move a violation of Indonesian sovereignty and politically motivated favourable 
treatment. The actions taken in response by Jakarta were extreme. First SBY withdrew Indone-
sia’s ambassador from Canberra and then announced a critical review of all aspects of coopera-
tion with Australia793. The close bilateral relationship that had been recovering surprisingly well 
from the dent caused by the East Timor crisis, was suddenly put into jeopardy again. Moreover, 
previously considered as voice of reason, SBY disappointingly embarked on using strong nation-
alist rhetoric, suggesting that he aspired to make Indonesia so strong politically, economically 
and militarily that its neighbours would hold it in awe and would not dare to “play” with Indone-
sian sovereignty, such as Australia had done in the case of the Papuan refugees.794 
In May the already complex situation was made worse by intensifying fighting between the 
military and the police in East Timor and riots in Dili, causing yet another political and security 
crisis in East Timor in May-June 2006. Once again Australia took an active role and swiftly 
deployed 2600 military personnel to support the government in upholding law and order. Austra-
lia also contributed to the United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNIMIT) in order to 
secure preparations for elections in East Timor.795In June yet another issue of contestation 
emerged when Jemaah Islamiyah leader Abu Bakar Bashir, the suspected mastermind behind 
Bali bombings, who had been charged on immigration rather than terrorism offences, was 
released after serving only 30 months of his sentence. 
However, once again the bilateral relationship bounced back and towards the end of the year 
turned towards cordial once again, signing the “Comprehensive Partnership” declaration in April 
2005. One of the major achievements was the new security agreement to replace the previous 
scrapped in the aftermath of the East Timor crisis: 796”Agreement between the Republic of 
Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation”, signed in Lombok in 
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November (and consequently also known as the “Lombok Treaty”) and reaffirming “mutual 
respect and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity and political inde-
pendence of each other, and also non-interference in the internal affairs of one another”. It also 
established cooperation in defence, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, maritime security, 
emergency response and intelligence sharing. 797 
The China Factor 
Australia’s relationship with the communist China since its inception in 1949 has evolved from 
outright hostility towards a constructive and strategic partnership. Australia’s response to the 
formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 was a denial of granting diplomatic 
recognition to the PRC and instead, following the US policy line, Canberra recognising the 
Kuomintang in Taipei as the legitimate government for all of China. The UK, on the other hand, 
followed a more conciliatory approach and recognised the PRC in 1950.798 
Trade, however, did not follow the pattern established in political relations and Australia has 
been a main supplier of agricultural commodities exports to China from the early 1950s, primar-
ily in wheat, wool and sugar. When the Nixon administration begun its diplomatic engagement 
with the PRC in a spirit of détente, Australia reacted by switching diplomatic recognition from 
Taipei to Beijing in 1972,799although the United States did not formally recognise the PRC until 
1979800 This represented a significant change in Australian foreign policy towards China as a 
formal commitment towards a ”One China” policy recognising the PRC as the sole legal gov-
ernment of China and Taiwan a province of the PRC. The shift in diplomatic recognition also 
initiated the beginning of a very substantial relationship between the two countries. This time 
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also trade did follow politics and exports to China grew considerably over the following years, in 
particular following the economic reforms from 1978 onwards Australia was expected to become 
a trusted supplier for mineral resources801 
In general since 1972 the bilateral relationship advanced rapidly towards a constructive strategic 
relationship through the conduct of frequent high-level visits, cooperation in multilateral institu-
tions (e.g. APEC and ARF) and rapidly multiplying two-way trade. The exception to the rule was 
provided by two major crises that caused rifts in the relationship. The first crisis was created by 
the violent suppression of demonstrations in June 1989 at Tiananmen Square by Chinese security 
forces that caused the loss of hundreds of lives. Australia, like most of the world, expressed its 
shock and disappointment of the conduct of the Chinese government and its security forces. The 
second crisis emerged when in reaction to the 1996 Taiwan presidential elections the Chinese 
government responded by military manoeuvres and firing missiles in the Taiwan Strait in close 
proximity to Taiwan.802 
Whilst Australia followed the United States in its policy towards China in the early years of the 
PRC, a different approach to China has emerged since the late 1990s in particular. In general, 
Australia has differences in approach with its Western allies, being perhaps more accommodat-
ing towards China than the United States in particular. For example, Australia refrained from 
condemning China in the UN Commission on Human Rights, lifted the Tiananmen arms em-
bargo early in comparison to some others and imposed a moratorium on ministerial level visits to 
Taiwan. All these policy decisions were aimed towards avoiding Beijing gaining the perception 
that Australia is party in the US and Japan led multilateral containment of China together with 
other regional states, such as India.803 Australia also continued the sale of uranium to China, 
satisfied with guarantees that it would not be used towards manufacturing of nuclear weapons. 
Why then did Australia implement all these policy decisions despite Beijing’s attempts to block 
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Australia, India and New Zealand from the East Asia Summit and other regional organisa-
tions?804 The basis for this accommodating aspect of Australia’s relations with China is the 
somewhat different perception of the nature of the rise of China and in particular the ever in-
creasing economic importance of China to Australia. In contrast to the views held by its main 
allies, particularly the United States, Australia appears to be a firm believer in a “peaceful rise 
“doctrine. China also happens to have an enormous booming economy and the matching demand 
for energy and mineral resources. Consequently the economic relationship achieved phenomenal 
growth within a decade from 1993 to 2003 and China was elevated from tenth most important 
partner for Australia in merchandise trade to third.805 The economic relationship was further 
strengthened when the two countries entered negotiations for FTA in May 2005.806 
The Howard government, whilst being often accused of acting as a vassal of the United States, 
placed particular importance to China in its foreign policy making. Its first white paper in 1997, 
for instance, made China a foreign policy priority, whilst the second white paper in 2003 ele-
vated the Australia-China relations to strategic level.807 China too values Australia highly in its 
foreign relations priorities, probably due to the economic relationship and Australia’s role as a 
key US ally in the region. As a testimony to Australia’s strategic importance to China, it ranked 
sixth after the United States, Japan, Russia, European Union and ASEAN.808 Consistent with its 
policy of positive engagement with China, Canberra supported China’s WTO membership and 
2008 Olympics bids, albeit probably motivated by trade aspirations, in particular the potential 
LNG contract to supply the Guangdong Province.809 In terms of high-level visits, Howard’s 
frequent visits to China were followed by a historic visit to Canberra by President Hu, during 
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which he became the first non-elected leader to address to the Parliament just a day after Presi-
dent Bush had done the same.810 
The Howard government’s engagement with China, however, was not entirely unproblematic. 
The issues of Tibet, Dalai Lama’s visits to Australia and the Falun Gong continued to place a 
strain on the relationship. Moreover, the defection of Chen Yoglin, the first secretary for political 
affairs in Chinese Consulate-General in Sydney in June 2005, was a major embarrassment for 
both governments, in particular after mounting public pressure the Howard government had to 
consider his case and eventually granted him a protection visa in July. However, whilst Beijing 
protested strongly, nonetheless the bilateral relationship suffered only a minor blow.811 
In terms of strategic interests, Australia faces a challenge of balancing its relations with China 
and the United States. The differences between the US and Australia over perceptions of China 
and its future regional and global conduct is potentially the most important issue (and one of the 
very few) that separates the two allies, as well as one that has the greatest potential for a conflict 
of interests to emerge. Where as in the US the administration sees China as strategic competitor 
and a future challenger for hegemony, in Australia the belief in China’s "peaceful rise” is the 
norm. The most serious source of potential problems, however, is the US commitment to defend 
Taiwan. Should a war emerge between PRC and ROC it would present a real nightmare for 
Australia. Such a conflict would essentially force Australia to choose sides between joining the 
US in military action against China in line with its ANZUS treaty obligations or attempt to stay 
neutral. Given the potential impact on Australia’s economy and security the government has 
attempted to argue the latter approach. In August 2004 Australian Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer commented that ANZUS treaty would not apply to the event and that consequently there 
would be no obligation to join the US in military action against China. The US State Department 
reacted angrily and stated that Articles IV and V clearly state that this was exactly what was 
expected within the context of the alliance obligations. Having been confronted with such a 
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strong response Downer needed to take back his words.812 Arguably Howard and Downer were 
proverbially “bending over backwards” to cover both its alliance commitments to the United 
States and relations with its most important trading partner. With Japan also concerned about 
China’s rise Australia is increasingly in a tough spot, having to concern itself about a second 
triangle of relations in addition to the Australia-China-United States one. The pressure has 
certainly been mounting with Condoleezza Rice indicating that the United States would like 
Canberra to coordinate its China policy with Tokyo and Washington.813 The challenge this 
creates, however, is how the Australia-Japan-China and the Australia-US-China triangles can be 
balanced in practice. Taking into consideration the animosity that prevails in China-Japan rela-
tions and the champion versus contender nature of Beijing-Washington relationship, the question 
how Australia can remain friends with these three countries that may become enemies is a 
significant challenge to cope with.814 In particular should China further challenge the US hegem-
ony in the region, Australia will be in serious trouble.815 
Australia’s relations with Japan 
Japan, the former arch enemy, particularly during WWII has rapidly become one of Australia’s 
most important trading partners and allies. Since the Australia-Japan peace treaty in 1952 and a 
commerce treaty in 1957, the relationship has grown and matured to a level of mutual strategic 
importance. Bulk of the importance is of course in the economic realm, but the political and 
security aspects of the relationship have also grown deeper and more extensive over the years. 
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In terms of the economics of the relationship, Japan became Australia’s most important export 
destination already in 1957, a position that it retained in 2004-05. In the same period approxi-
mately 450 000 Australian jobs were directly linked to trade with Japan.816 
In the political context bilateral relations have been conducted within the framework of annual 
prime ministerial meetings initiated by Prime Ministers John Howard and Ryutaro Hashimoto in 
1997.817 Moreover, from 2001 to 2005 much of the activity was conducted within the context of 
Howard-Koizumi Prime Ministerial diplomacy.818 The Howard government in general placed 
significant foreign policy attention on Japan, the Prime Minister stating in his speech at the Lowy 
Institute; ”Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan.”819Whereas John Howard visited 
Japan six times over a ten year period, only two Japanese prime ministers visited Australia.820 
Australia, moreover, did not rank particularly high in the Japanese agenda and Howard’s visits to 
Japan attracted little media attention, mostly in context of Australia’s bourgeoning relationship 
with China and its implications for Japan.821 Since 2002, however, the bilateral relationship 
accelerated to "frantic” activity; culminating in three inter-governmental conferences that were 
arranged in 2001, 2002 and 2005 to enhance cooperation in economic, security, cultural af-
fairs.822 The issues raised in inter-governmental conferences, as well as a number of other issues, 
were also followed up in frequent Track II discussions.823 The most important of these recent 
numerous initiatives for increased bilateral cooperation was the Sydney Declaration on Australia 
– Japan Creative Partnership in November 2002, reaffirming; 
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● Cooperation in counter-terrorism and shared commitment to support Afghanistan 
● Australia’s strong support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council 
● Australia’s support for Koizumi’s vision of a “community that acts together and 
advances together” for East Asia that includes Australia 
● Cooperation to support East Timor’s transition to independence 
● Expansion of bilateral security dialogue and direct defence links 
● Enhancement of economic cooperation in East Asia through FTAs 
● Continuation of annual Prime Ministerial meetings824 
In terms of regional institutions, Japan has supported Australia’s EAC membership, along the 
lines of Koizumi’s speech in Singapore in January 2002, where he launched his vision for an 
inclusive East Asian Community (EAC) in which Australia was to be included as a natural ally, 
despite Malaysian wholesale opposition to Australia’s membership.825 Howard, however, ini-
tially remained half-hearted towards the concept and did not proceed towards membership due to 
concerns about signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which was consid-
ered as a prerequisite to membership, allegedly potentially violating or contradicting Australia’s 
alliance commitments, specifically ANZUS. The Japanese had thought that Australia had been 
unnecessarily aggressive towards Indonesia in East Timor crisis, and that in general it lacked 
substance and style in its regional diplomacy.826 This added to reasons for Koizumi turning 
lukewarm to Australia’s proposal for Australia- Japan FTA, despite the fact that economic 
modelling carried out in both countries supported the assumption that full bilateral liberalisation 
would produce additional GDP gains worth of AUD $ 39 billion for Australia and AUD $ 27 
billion for Japan over 20 years. Nonetheless, instead of committing to the FTA Japan only agreed 
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to a joint two-year feasibility study. The most likely reason for these differences lies in economic 
policy, not political; whilst the most pressing issue for Australia is to eliminate or lower trade 
barriers for agricultural products, the Japanese agricultural lobby wants to exclude these from the 
proposed FTA.827 
Since 9/11 in particular the relationship has had a growing security emphasis with cooperation in 
counter-terrorism and regional security considerably enhanced between the two countries. Much 
of this cooperation, however, is a direct consequence of Japan’s growing role in security in 
general. The new role for the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) has now produced its first 
overseas deployments since WWII, SDF participating in a number of UN missions and the 
Coalition operations in Iraq. The cooperation between Australian and Japanese armed forces has 
consequently also now been established also in an operational sense. Concrete examples of this 
new form of cooperation includes the deployment of SDF engineers to East Timor to participate 
in INTERFER, and in 2005 when the ADF was assigned to protect SDF engineers in Al-
Muthanna Province in Iraq from April 2005 onwards.828 As stated in the previous section though, 
the greatest challenge to Australia in its relations is in the trilateral security dialogue between 
Australia, Japan and the United States and in finding ways to balance the relationship between 
China and Japan.829 
6.4 Australia’s Regional Security Interests and Engagement 
The Potentially Hostile Seas 
As John Ravenhill has pointed out, Australia’s relations with the region have been traditionally 
dominated by attitudes of paternalism and patronage, Australian policy-makers primarily focus-
ing on the issues of security, defence and aid in the conduct of relations with the region.830 Much 
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of this defence and security focused view towards the region derived from historical experiences, 
in particular from World War II, and created a deeply rooted discomfort with the region. This 
was certainly true up until the Post-Cold War era from the late 1980s onwards, whilst economic 
preoccupations dominated the following era until 9/11 and the events following it. From 9/11 
onwards Australian regional policy-making and thinking again took a turn towards a defence and 
regional security focused model. 
Australia’s defence thinking in the post-WWII era was largely shaped by the dramatic events of 
the Pacific War, in particular the traumatic year of 1942. First the ‘invincible’ Singapore was 
taken by the Japanese in eight days in February, then the Battle of the Coral Sea in May the same 
year and the Kokoda Track campaign in New Guinea from July onwards, brought the Imperial 
Japanese forces uncomfortably close to the Australian shores, representing the first major direct 
threat to the country. These events combined with direct attacks on the Australian territory, such 
as the bombing of Darwin in February 1942 and the Japanese submarine incursions to Australian 
waters, including to Sydney harbour, left a deep sense of insecurity in the Australian psyche.831 
In the early post WWII era Australia welcomed the independence of the Philippines, India, 
Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon and supported the Indonesian independence struggle against the 
Dutch.832 The emergence of the Cold War in the region, however, and the fear of Southeast 
Asian states falling to communism one-by-one, as envisioned by the ‘Domino Theory’, drove 
Australia to seek security in alliances with likeminded powers, in particular with the United 
States. The defence treaty between the United States, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) 
signed in 1951 soon dominated Australia’s defence planning.833 Moreover, following the lessons 
of WWII and the realities of Australia’s strategic geography the basic assumption of Australia’s 
defence doctrine was that the enemies must be defeated before they reach its shores, prompting 
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the adoption of the concept of ”forward defence” as its primary defence doctrine.834The creation 
of the People’s Republic of China as a result of the Chinese civil war in 1949 stimulated the 
spread of Communism in the region, eventually in form of Chinese backed up insurgencies in 
Southeast Asia. As a consequence of the heightened threat of Communism and the forward 
defence doctrine, Australian troops were engaged in a number of major conflicts in the region; 
the Korean War (1950-53), the Malay Emergency (1950-60), the Konfrontasi between Indonesia 
and Malaysia (1963-66) and the Vietnam War (1962-72). 
In the latter part of the 1960s the regional security environment again took a radical turn to worse 
following the British disengagement from the region beginning with the decision to withdraw 
from east of Suez in 1968. The message was further reinforced when in July 1969 Nixon de-
clared the ‘Guam doctrine’, entailing the principle that the US would avoid entanglement in Asia 
and that the allies in the region should take care of their own security. The prospect of the UK 
and the US limiting military commitments in the region signified to Australia that it could not 
rely on great and powerful friends for its defence, but would rather need to fend for itself. This 
signified a radical readjustment as the continuous reliance on a ”great and powerful friend” based 
on a common heritage, history, language, shared strategic interests and political values has 
traditionally been central to Australia’s security doctrine.835 
Australia’s position in Southeast Asia’s regional security environment 
Southeast Asia was mainly seen through a Cold War prism by Australia during this period of 
bilateral power balancing. Influenced by the ’domino theory’ the region was seen as a source of 
insecurity if not direct threat. ASEAN’s formation in 1967 was welcomed by Australia in the 
Cold War context as an anti-communist bloc that could provide an arc of stability in the near 
region. In addition to ANZUS Australia entered all anti-communist security alliances in the 
region, including SEATO, ASPAC and the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA). When it 
became clear that the non-aligned component in ASEAN was becoming dominating and the 
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group with the establishment of the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and 
the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), Australia quickly became con-
cerned that such efforts would threaten to undermine US presence in the region.836 When the 
Gough Whitlam government came into power in 1972, however, a change of direction took 
effect. First Whitlam initiated a pullout from Vietnam and established diplomatic relations with 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He then went on to realign Australia’s defence thinking 
by distancing the country from SEATO and ASPAC, whilst simultaneously endorsing ZOPFAM 
and seeking to engage ASEAN.837 Moreover, the Indochinese states were under communist rule 
but the non-communist states appeared secure with little tangible evidence of domino theory 
being realised. Consequently Australia began building good relations also with the non-aligned 
countries signifying a reorientation in attitudes towards the region, emphasising engagement 
instead of confrontation.838 This engagement became concrete when Australia became ASEAN’s 
first dialogue partner in 1974. 
However, Australia was also rapidly building independent military capabilities and defence 
spending increased considerably. A defence whitepaper -”Review of Australia’s Defence Capa-
bilities (“the Dibb Report 1986-87”) - recommended a doctrine of “self-reliance” as essential for 
Australia’s future security.839 A 1987 Whitepaper - The Defence of Australia followed on the 
same lines, whilst the 1989 DFAT security whitepaper “Australia’s Regional Security” under-
lined that Australia’s primary security interest were to be found in the stability of the near-
regions Southeast Asia, South Pacific and the eastern parts of the Indian Ocean.840 
With such underlining assumptions in mind Australian foreign and security policy under Gareth 
Evans took a major turn towards multilateralism. In the context of foreign and security policy it 
came to signify an independent security strategy from the US and a strategy of ’comprehensive 
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engagement’ with the region. Moreover, Evans envisioned a regional security community based 
on shared interests being formed in Southeast Asia and proposed the founding of a Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), inspired by the CSCE (now OSCE) in 
Europe, in order to facilitate the development of such a community.841 Whilst ASEAN was 
initially cool towards the idea and argued that the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences were 
adequate venue for regional security talks, the ASEAN-PMC security element transferred into 
ARF in 1994, which incorporated much of Evan’s original ideas. Also, military cooperation with 
ASEAN countries started growing rapidly by the early 1990s. In fact, ASEAN national defence 
forces were by this time carrying out more joint exercises with Australia than with each other.842 
The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) again was conducting more joint exercises with ASEAN 
forces than with the US forces.843 The relationship with the Indonesian military has also been 
long running. Military aid to Indonesia was suspended in 1986, but military links were re-
established in 1993 when ADF Special Forces organised counter-terrorism exercises with Indo-
nesian Special Forces (Kopassus), despite the concerns over its human rights abuses in East 
Timor and Aceh, of which in particular the Kopassus were suspected of.844The Australian-
Indonesian security agreement, “Agreement on Maintaining Security’, signed in 1995, however, 
was suspended following the 1999 East Timor crisis.845 
“The Arc of Instability” 
If there has been a prevailing concept in Australian strategic discourse in the post-Cold War era, 
it probably is "the arc of instability”. The “arc” concept became into the fore to reflect the radical 
and rapid changes in the strategic outlook of the region in the early post-Cold War that arguably 
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continue shaping Australia’s strategic environment.846. The Asian region’s fast moving Tiger 
economies were predicted to surpass Europe, and even the United States, in GDP per capita 
income levels. Whilst some of the enthusiasm has since dissipated somewhat, the rapid economic 
growth, accompanied by relatively rapid social development, arguably produced encouraging 
levels of stability in the region and with regional and international cooperation booming 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the outlook was generally positive. The 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, however, hit the region so hard that all this seemed to become in a sudden halt. 
The financial crisis, whilst extending throughout the region, and in fact impacting the global 
economy, caused an economic meltdown in Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea in particular. 
Out of the so-called "Tiger” economies only Singapore escaped the crisis relatively unscathed in 
Southeast Asia, whilst Hong Kong and Taiwan also remained relatively strong throughout. The 
perhaps most drastic impact from the crisis was the social and political instability it triggered in 
Indonesia. The following breakdown of social order in form of riots and widespread violence 
caused a chain of events that brought and abrupt end to the thirty two years of uninterrupted rule 
by the Suharto “New Order” regime. The rapid changes in the country’s political and social 
fabric and the emergence of the weak interim administration lead by B.J. Habibie caused con-
cerns over the survivability of the Indonesian state at large. The spreading ethnic and religious 
violence in the Moluccas, Lombok, Kalimantan and elsewhere across the Indonesian archipel-
ago, combined with secessionist aspirations in Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, caused wide-
spread concern over the possibility of an ”balkanised” Indonesia, threatening to spread the 
violence into Australia’s near neighbourhood. Consequently some observers have suggested that 
the “arc of instability” in a reality should be considered "a polite way of talking about Indone-
sia”847 
Although the immediate region, in particular Indonesia and the Southern Pacific were the pri-
mary source of concern, many observers thought the region at large seemed to be getting less 
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stable The development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by India, Pakistan and North 
Korea and the tensions in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea influenced Australian defence 
analysts and planners to conclude that dramatic changes in the strategic outlook in the region 
were potentially forming an ”Arc of Instability” around Australia.848 In this spirit, defence 
strategy experts, e.g. Paul Dibb, David Hale and Peter Price ominously declared in 1999 that the 
”Asian century” had given away to Asian insecurity. 849 The ALP opposition used to argue that 
the Howard government was neglecting Australia’s immediate region at the cost of a deployment 
to Iraq, whereas the real priority should have been establishing stability in the immediate 
neighbourhood, the Southwest Pacific.850 The former ALP opposition foreign affairs shadow 
minister, now Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, interestingly was one of the most enthusiastic 
spokespersons for the ‘arc’, and largely influenced the “Dibb report” 1986 defence review that 
inspired the ”Regional School” in strategic analysis in Australia.851 
The argument was that there was a string of weak states, and potentially “failed states”, to the 
north and east of Australia. Some analysts were also suggesting that Indonesia was possibly 
about to break up and thus, becoming “Balkanised”. Moreover, the potential conflict over Papua 
and a militarily increasingly weak New Zealand arguably added to the strategic pressure to 
Australia.852 Interestingly New Zealand was at the same time far less pessimistic about the 
immediate neighbourhood, potentially due to being a genuine Pacific country and feeling less 
“different” and isolated from the region than Australia did. 853 In a broader strategic context, 
however, the ‘arc of instability’ was also argued to exist along the southern rim of Eurasia/from 
the Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia and maybe even the Persian Gulf as well’, backing 
the Howard government’s decision to deploy troops to Iraq and Afghanistan .854 Regardless of 
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the scope of the ‘arc’ one subscribes to, it reflects continuation of the strategic perception that the 
threat to Australia emanates from the region surrounding it. 
The ALP line of criticism, however, dissipated somewhat with the government’s interventions in 
the South Pacific and East Timor in 2003.855The action was a result of a strategic policy change, 
formulated in the 2000 Defence White Paper, following the 1999 East Timor crisis, and raising 
the possibility of increasing instability in neighbouring countries one of Australia’s strategic 
policy priorities.856 Consequently the government sent military and police forces to the region on 
several occasions, e.g. the 2003 Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and 
Enhanced Cooperation Program in Papua New Guinea, followed by deployments to East Timor, 
Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006857. The government also imposed sanctions on Fiji after a 
military coup in 2006-.858 
                                                 
855 Ayson (2007),  p. 215  
856 Ayson (2007), p. 216 
857 Ayson (2007), p. 216 
858 Ayson (2007), p. 216 
R A T I O N A L I S T  A N A L Y S I S  O F  A U S T R A L I A  –  E A S T  A S I A  R E L A T I O N S  
281 
Figure 6. The Direct Area of Australia’s Military Interest 
 
Source: Australia’s Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century859 
The East Timor Crisis 
One of Australia’s most serious foreign policy issues in the Post-Cold War era was the East 
Timor crisis from 1999 onwards. East Timor, a former Portuguese colony had been occupied by 
Indonesia in 1975 after an independence minded FRENTIL group had won control there. Austra-
lia was appalled by the Indonesian invasion to the same extent as the international society in 
general, but wanted to maintain its strong bilateral relationship with its most important regional 
neighbour. In general, Australia remained critical towards the means of annexation whilst re-
maining careful not to antagonise Indonesia.860 Even the so-called “Balibo Five” affair, when 
five Australian journalists were killed during the Indonesian invasion, and the negative affect it 
had on the public opinion, did not alter the course of policy-making, although the matter contin-
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ues to haunt Australia’s relationship with Indonesia. The concern not to antagonise Indonesia 
materialised in foreign policy to the extent that Australia voted against United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions supporting the East Timorese right for self-determination.861Australia also 
adopted a policy of de facto recognition, like much of the international community, immediately 
following the invasion. Australia, however, “slipped into” de jure recognition in 1978.862 The 
UN, in comparison, never formally recognised the annexing of East Timor. 
The decision to accept the “irreversible truth” of the Indonesian occupation, however, did not 
initially have a domestic consensus behind it. The Australian Labour Party (ALP), in opposition 
at the time (1977-1983), vehemently opposed the recognition of the Indonesian rule and sup-
ported the right to self-determination for the East Timorese. 
Once the Hawke ALP government was elected in 1983, however, the ALP started signalling a 
change in its position, instigated by Hawke’s first foreign minister Bill Hayden. In August 1985 
the ALP national conference approved a policy change and Indonesian sovereignty over East 
Timor was recognised as a fact of life that was not going to change, particularly though antago-
nising Indonesia.863 The new foreign minister Gareth Evans stated in 1988 that Indonesia’s 
occupation of East Timor was ”non-reversible” and that the question of human rights in East 
Timor, as well as elsewhere in Indonesia, would be easier and more effective to promote if 
Australia had a good and consultative relationship with Jakarta. It was also thought that antago-
nising the gigantic neighbour of more than 200 million in population over a relatively minor 
piece of territory would not be prudent.864 
The prelude to the 1999 crisis took place within the context of dramatic events in Indonesia and 
the region. The 1997 Asian financial crisis had hit the country particularly hard causing the 
economy to stagnate to a point of practically ending a period of 30 years of rapid economic 
growth and development. The economic crisis was promptly followed by a political crisis and 
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started testing the credibility of the Suharto’s New Order regime. In May 1998 amidst economic, 
social and political turmoil resulting from the double crisis, Suharto was forced to step down. His 
successor the interim president B.J. Habibie, a veteran of the ruling Golkar party, turned the tide 
of Jakarta’s tight grip on the provinces by implying his willingness to consider granting auton-
omy to East Timor.865 
These new developments in Indonesia offered new opportunities for a new future for East Timor 
and for the Australian government to play a new role. This re-activation also brought a new 
policy approach with it. The first major sign of a policy change came in the form of "the Howard 
letter” in December 1998 softly pushing the autonomy option to the Indonesian government.866 
The suggestion was to follow the example of “the Matignon Accords” settling the long-running 
dispute between the indigenous and the French population in New Caledonia. Habibie, however, 
remained initially non-committed until January 1999 when he suddenly conceded that East 
Timor would be offered autonomy within Indonesia and possibly even independence. The true 
concession, however, was offering the East Timorese to choose the future of their country in a 
“popular consultation” (Jakarta vehemently opposed the term “referendum”).867 
In the early months of 1999 the province plunged into a cycle of escalating violence between 
pro-independence FALINTIL forces and the Indonesian military and militias supported by it,868 
prompting urgent need for action if a peaceful solution was to be found. In particular the April 
massacres in Dili, and the rumoured Kopassus (Indonesian Special Forces) involvement sug-
gested Jakarta’s sponsorship for the violence, or at the minimum indifference to it. The violence 
in any case grasped the attention of public opinion in Australia with large public demonstrations 
taking place in major cities. Consequently, the ALP started pressing the government to intervene 
and press for the deployment of UN peacekeepers869 John Howard reacted to the pressure by 
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stating that East Timor represented Australia’s most serious foreign policy crisis since the 1960s 
and pledged to act accordingly.870 Consequently, in the Bali conference on 2 April 1999 John 
Howard asked Habibie whether he would accept an international peacekeeping force in East 
Timor in order to stabilise the situation. Habibie’s response was an unequivocal no.871 
Already in May, however, Indonesia and Portugal agreed to a UN administered popular consulta-
tion on East Timor’s future. Consequently, the United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET) opened its headquarters in Dili in early June.872 The popular consultation, however, 
originally planned for June was postponed until August due to violence initiated by pro-
Indonesian militias frustrated by the increasing prospects of the province declaring independ-
ence. 
The 30 August 1999 “popular consultation” produced an unequivocal majority decision. When 
the results were released on 4 September it turned out that only 21.5% of voters supported the 
autonomy option, whilst78.5% voted against it. Since the “popular consultation” was set in such 
a manner that a vote against autonomy translated into a vote for independence, the East Timorese 
had clearly chosen to become an independent country. Rather predictably this sent the pro-
Jakarta militias into frenzy and extreme violence broke out once again. Whilst the responsibility 
for law and order was with the Indonesian military (TNI), it was clearly unable, or rather unwill-
ing, to uphold order, a fact that increased the pressure for international intervention.873 
It has been argued that geopolitically Australia had more at stake than any other country than 
Indonesia.874 In line with this argument, it appeared that the Howard government was not able to 
stand by and do nothing.875 Whilst the domestic pressure was certainly an important factor 
driving the government into action, external conditions also contributed. First of all, there was no 
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clear leadership from ASEAN, most member countries in fact preferring to remain passive in 
order to avoid antagonising Indonesia and adhering to the organisation’s principles of absolute 
sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters of other members. Secondly, the United 
States remained relatively passive being preoccupied with the Kosovo conflict. The Clinton 
administration indicated that escalating violence in East Timor was a concern to it, but would not 
contribute military forces in forms of combat troops, pledging logistic support only.876 The 
combination of such domestic and external conditions created the pressure and opportunity for 
Australian leadership in the crisis that proved too hard for the Howard government to pass on. 
Hence, the government continued its efforts to press for international intervention in East Timor, 
but strictly under an explicit UN mandate. 
The mandate for international intervention came in the form of UN Security Council resolution 
1264 on East Timor on 15 September 1999, clearing the way for establishment of the Interna-
tional Force East Timor (INTERFET) with Australia in the leadership and as the largest single 
contributor providing 5500 troops of the total of 9900.877 However, it was felt that a UN mandate 
alone was not enough and Australia in particular set a precondition to deployment that Indonesia 
endorses the mission. Consequent to such Indonesian endorsement INTERFET led by Major-
General Peter Cosgrove was deployed on 20 September 1999 with a landing of Australian 
Defence Forces (ADF), New Zealand and Ghurkha units in Dili. The fear that INTERFET could 
be drawn into confrontation with the Indonesian forces, did not fortunately materialise and the 
mission proved largely a success. The Howard government was triumphant and declared that the 
mission was clear evidence for Australia’s capability in leading a regional intervention force and 
”the role that Australia is capable of playing in a regionally based coalition”.878 One could of 
course argue that perhaps the mission was successful due to the minimal participation by 
ASEAN member states’ forces. Moreover, the Howard government did not present the Austra-
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lian-led intervention as “good international citizenship”, but rather as a “projection of Australian 
values”, a statement that was hardly pleasing to the ASEAN partners.879 
The INTERFET operation ended with the handover of control to United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on 23 February 2000. Australia, however, continued 
its pivotal role in the country contributing personnel and funds to subsequent UN missions 
(UNMISET, UNOTIL and UNMIT) to support the independent East Timor, as well as further 
military deployments in 2006 to provide stability ahead of elections.880 
Following the East Timor crisis, a major dispute between Australia and East Timor emerged 
(2002-2006) over seabed boundary in the Timor Sea. The dispute emerged over the fact that East 
Timor did not recognise the boundary that was agreed between Indonesia and Australia prior to 
East Timorese independence and the area contained rich in oil and natural gas reserves. A set-
tlement for the next 50 years was reached in January 2006 to East Timor’s benefit.881 
“The Deputy Sheriff” in the Post-911 Era 
The 9/11 attacks produced rapid and drastic changes in Australia’s foreign and defence policies. 
Prime Minister John Howard, who was in Washington at the time of the attacks to participate in 
the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS treaty, announced days after returning to Canberra that 
ANZUS treaty mechanisms would be activated for the first time since it was signed in 1951, 
signifying that the attack against the US was now considered equal to an attack against Austra-
lia.882 The pledge to stand by its big and powerful friend was not confined to words and Austra-
lian troops were soon deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq under the auspices of the ’coalition of 
the willing’ in the newly declared ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT). Australia also became a 
stern supporter of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and numerous other American lead 
initiatives, prompting allegations by the critics that the Howard government was turning Austra-
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lia into a US satellite or a “client state”.883. Consequently the new approach signified a return to 
“forward defence” through adopting a pre-emptive doctrine increasing Australia’s military 
involvement to the highest levels since the 1960s. 
The new security doctrine of the post-911 world produced a somewhat confused approach by 
Australia towards regional security in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, Australia intensified its 
efforts to secure cooperation from its regional members, in particular Indonesia which had been 
the site of direct attacks against Australians and Australian interests. As a result of intensified 
efforts, a number of bilateral Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) in counter-terrorism were 
signed, including with Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, East Timor and 
Cambodia. A joint Australian-Indonesian initiative - Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Coop-
eration- was established in 2004 for training regional police forces in combating transnational 
crime and counter-terrorism. The Australian government supported the centre by donating AUD$ 
36.8 million for the development and operational costs until 2009. On the other hand Australia 
also started showing signs of becoming an interventionist power, sending military and police 
forces to East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Moreover, in late-2002 John 
Howard implied he would consider launching pre-emptive strikes against terrorist targets in the 
soil of foreign countries if that was necessary to prevent a terrorist strike against Australians. The 
statement angered Malaysia in particular and Prime Minister Mahathir retorted angrily that any 
such attack on Malaysian soil would be considered an act of war.884 Malaysia and the Philippines 
also threatened to pull out from bilateral counter-terrorism agreements.885 The Howard govern-
ment also stepped up the deployment of representatives of Australian security agencies in the 
region, e.g. from the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Security Intelligence Organisa-
tion (ASIO) and the Department of Immigration Multicultural Affairs (DIMIA), as well as sent 
military aid to the Philippines to combat MILF and the Abu Sayeef Group in Mindanao.886 
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Such approaches earned Australia to be considered the” deputy sheriff” to the US in the region 
and caused a drastic change in its policy towards regional security. Whereas in the 1990s Austra-
lia emphasised multilateral cooperation in regional security, the post-911 regional security 
outlook was dominated by transnational threats, primarily terrorism and illegal immigration, as 
well as a notion of ”weak states” in Southeast Asia that together constituted an ”arc of instabil-
ity” around Australia.887 However, the government did not entirely drop the ball in multilateral 
cooperation, contrary to some of the harshest criticism, but in fact was relatively active in pro-
moting regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia in particular, albeit arguably in rather 
limited and self-interest serving fields such as counter-terrorism and illegal immigration. The 
most notable of these efforts were the so-called ‘Bali Processes’ established when Australia co-
chaired with Indonesia a Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in 
Persons and Related Transnational Crime in Bali in 2002. 
6.5 To be or not to be? Costs and Benefits of Exclusion versus 
Inclusion 
The objective of this section, much like the equivalent in Chapter 4, is to provide an assessment 
of the costs and benefits of further integration to regional institutions by Australia. Unlike in the 
case of Turkey – EU, for instance budgetary considerations do not exist as a level of analysis in 
East Asia, nor do the issues with voting and decision-making as decisions in East Asian institu-
tions are mainly made on consensual basis, nor is there an established formal membership 
criterion such as the “Copenhagen Criteria” in Europe. Nonetheless, according to Rationalist 
approaches the logic is the same: Australia would be inclined to join and would be accepted as 
an equal member in East Asian institutions based on whether the benefits override the costs of 
such a venture, for both Australia and the region. This again usually implies well established 
levels of material interdependency between a region and the country in question. Consequently, 
much like in the Turkey-EU case the scope of the analysis would be primarily whether an ade-
quate level of interdependency exists, and as Mattli’s “logic of integration” would dictate what 
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the costs and benefits of exclusion versus inclusion would be in terms of economics, politics and 
security. Finally, according to the so-called ”Club Theory” exclusion from a regional organisa-
tion would result in exclusion from “Club goods”(common goods exclusive to members).888 
Currently Australia’s participation in regional institutions and agreements is mixed, as is the case 
with Turkey, i.e. Australia is accepted in some whilst excluded from others. The significant 
regional institutions where Australia is included are APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
and the East Asia Summit (EAS), which is forming the basis for an emerging East Asian Com-
munity (EAC). Australia is also an ASEAN dialogue partner and has been negotiating an 
AANZFTA agreement with ASEAN, which would directly link Australia and New Zealand to 
regional economic cooperation. Whilst the region’s attitude towards Australia’s inclusion in 
regional institutions has varied somewhat over the decades since ASEAN’s establishment in 
1967, Australia’s position towards Regionalism has also varied depending on the ideological 
position of each individual government in power. The ALP governments, generally international-
ist in nature, have tended to emphasise the importance of Asia and have argued that economic 
and security related benefits from participating in regional institutions would justify realignment 
of policy emphasis from traditional culturally similar partners to the near region. The govern-
ments ran by Liberal – National parties coalition have tended to use the rhetoric of ”pragmatic” 
approach towards Regionalism, whilst simultaneously emphasising Australia’s cultural differ-
ence from its neighbours and similarity with Britain and the United States. Consequently, the 
latest Coalition government in particular has emphasised bilateral treaties, in both economics and 
security, in its relations with the region. 
Costs and Benefits of Further Economic Integration 
As already pointed out, East Asian Regionalism differs from its European counterpart rather 
significantly. Unlike in Europe where a single regional organisation dominates regional coopera-
tion, in East Asia a myriad of organisations and proposals exist. Consequently, in particular in 
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the field of economic cooperation a ”noodle bowl” of preferential trading agreements, both 
regional and bilateral, complicates the architecture of regional economic cooperation. Moreover, 
formation of a customs union in the lines established in European integration, where members 
would have the same tariff and commercial policy towards non-members, is not on the agenda of 
the Vientiane Action Programme. Subsequently, even if ASEAN’S conception of an Economic 
Community is realised, Australian goods will continue to face different duties for the same good 
in each ASEAN country”.889 In terms of access to markets, Australia currently enjoys ‘most 
favoured nation’ treatment in most ASEAN markets, whereas in case of Singapore and Thailand 
better than MFN status through bilateral FTAs.890 
Another difference to Turkey is that Australia has sought to compensate its exclusion from the 
region by pursuing a number of bilateral agreements with regional countries, as well as empha-
sising traditional markets in Europe and the United States in particular. Economic relations with 
East Asian states on the other hand have been conducted increasingly under the umbrella of 
bilateral FTAs, specifically under the eleven-year reign of the Howard government, whereas 
multilateral cooperation was used as a supportive secondary strategy. Hence, given that majority 
of its trade relations with the region are governed within the context of bilateral FTAs, the 
critical question becomes what would Australia gain from increased integration to regional 
multilateral economic cooperation? Given this specific background, a comparison between costs 
and benefits to Australia from bilateralism versus multilateralism as a prevailing strategy towards 
managing relationships with East Asia would probably best serve the efforts to estimate whether 
Australia would benefit from closer integration with the region. 
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Bilateralism versus Multilateralism in managing relations with East 
Asia 
As John Ravenhill has pointed out: ”In a world in which barriers to trade in manufactured goods 
have been substantially reduced, bilateral trade agreements would be expected a priori to gener-
ate at best modest benefits for the participants”891 However, it needs to be recognised that in 
comparison to regional FTAs bilateral FTAs tend to go beyond trade extending to issues relating 
to ‘deeper’ integration; investment, intellectual property rights and services trade.892 He also 
argues that the real economic impact of such agreements is particularly difficult to measure and 
that estimating the direct economic impact ”through economic modelling have served largely to 
demonstrate that everything depends on the initial assumptions that modellers make.”893 Rather 
than being determined by economic modelling for success, Ravenhill argues that the success or 
failure of such an agreement depends on how private firms and investors react to the opportuni-
ties created by a FTA.894Such FTAs tend to be sought after for other than pure economic bene-
fits, namely to advance political, both domestic and foreign policy, as well as security 
objectives.895 
Why then would Australia seek inclusion in regional FTAs if it already either has or is negotiat-
ing a bilateral FTA with most of its main trading partners in the region? One line of argument is 
that the benefits from PTA’s are in general relatively limited and disappear with the increase in 
number of bilateral agreements.896 In support of this line of argument it has been established that 
”cost-benefit calculations faced by countries increasingly tilt from bilateral to multilateral 
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agreements as the number of bilateral agreements expands”, as benefits from exclusivity disap-
pear the more participants are involved.897 Moreover, the cost of maintaining multiple agree-
ments are relatively high, as these are not one time affairs, but rather have to be constantly 
monitored, adjusted and eventually renegotiated when they expire. Finally, even if the cost-
benefit ratio of an individual agreement can be proven to be positive in general, bilateral FTAs 
can have negative implications; ”Besides the direct economic impact of the agreements them-
selves, any assessment of costs and benefits must raise broader issues relating to the opportunity 
costs of the agreements for other dimensions of foreign economic relations, particularly for 
negotiations at the regional and global levels”. 898 Consequently, it could be argued that 
AUSFTA has had a negative impact on Australia’s trade relations with Asia, if not otherwise at 
least through sending a negative message to trade partners in East Asia about Australia’s priori-
ties899 
The economic benefits from increased access to the regional markets, on the other hand, would 
primarily derive from the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, restrictions on investment and 
from services trade. Currently Australian companies face a range of trade and investment restric-
tions in ASEAN markets, in services sectors in particular, and tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade in goods, investment, services and labour are still in place.900 In many cases Australian 
firms and investors face stringent foreign equity limits, employment restrictions, requirements 
for joint ventures, restrictions for foreigners from practising professions, non-recognition of 
Australian qualifications and bans on land ownership by foreigners.901 Also, in addition to trade 
in goods, services trade is increasingly important. Currently in services trade sense ASEAN still 
consists of ten separate markets, whereas deeper integration with the development of ASEAN 
Economic Community would create one regional market, in which Australia’s inclusion could 
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produce significant gains in these sectors. Centre for International Economics estimated in its 
report in 2000 that AFTA-CER FTA (AANZFTA) would create gains equal to 0.27% of the 
combined GDP (US$ 25.6 billion) for ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand) countries by 2010 and 0.25% of GDP (US$ 19.1 billion) for Australia and New 
Zealand, as well as additional capital inflows worth of US$ 7.7 billion in the same period.902 In 
comparison a broader East Asian Summit based FTA would boost Australia’s annual GDP by an 
estimated 1.4 %.903 
Within the broader context of the debate and estimating the costs and benefits from Regional 
Trade Agreements (RTA) one of the most basic topics of contention is over the efficiency of 
RTAs in comparison to multilateral trade liberalisation in general.904 The critics argue that RTAs 
have sidelined global trade liberalization in East Asia and questioned whether such agreements 
facilitate global trade and genuinely produce benefits to the economies participating and their 
trading partners more efficiently than liberalised multilateral trade. Ultimately, however, the 
cost-benefit balance of such agreements depends on whether the agreements predominantly 
result into trade creation or trade diversion.905According to some economists this depends on 
whether the participating countries are “natural trading partners” or not. The argument is that 
Preferential Trading Agreements (PTAs) consisting of “natural trading partners” are more likely 
to be predominantly trade creating. The geographic distance makes particular difference when 
trade volumes are high, as geographically distant partners pay higher transportation costs, which 
diverts trade from comparatively lower cost trade partners that are geographically closer. Natural 
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trading partners often also share a land border and a common language.906 However, even if 
trade increases between member countries following a formation of a RTA, it does not necessar-
ily mean this is because the RTA has enhanced the efficiency of bilateral trade between RTA 
partners. Moreover, trade creation can increase at the expense of decrease in imports from 
trading partners not party to the RTA,907creating essentially a form of an opportunity cost 
through trade diversion. 
Using a gravity model, data from 175 countries between 1948 and 1999 and examining 17 RTAs 
in their research Lee and Shin (2006) suggest that if the RTA partner are natural trading partners 
the effects would be primarily trade creating and would not divert trade from other trading 
partners. Based on the above criteria Lee and Shin (2006) conclude that East Asian economies 
are indeed natural trading partners.908The crucial question in the context of this research, how-
ever, is whether Australia and East Asian countries are natural trading partners? Historically 
Australia’s trade and investment was linked to the Commonwealth, in particular the United 
Kingdom until it joined the EEC, and the United States, supporting an argument that a cultural 
divide existed in Australia’s external trade. More recently, however, the direction of Australia’s 
external trade has taken a major turn towards East Asia to the extent that in 2007 two-thirds of its 
total foreign trade was with East Asia and the region accounts for approximately 60% of Austra-
lia’s total exports. Consequently, it can with a fair amount of confidence be argued that currently 
there is no cultural divide in trade in Australia’s external trade. In terms of geographical distance, 
however, a particular characteristic of Australia is that it is quite remote from most of its current 
and potential trade partners, whilst only the Pacific Islands, Indonesia and New Zealand are 
relatively close. On the other hand it is even more removed from culturally similar countries: the 
United States, United Kingdom and Europe, New Zealand being the only exception to the rule. 
Consequently, in relative terms Australia is closer to the East Asian markets than its “traditional” 
markets in Europe and North America, making trade with East Asia relatively more efficient that 
with those markets, despite the fact that Australia has no land border with its partners. Moreover, 
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the composition of Australia’s economy and trade is focused towards raw materials, e.g. alumin-
ium, copper, crude petroleum, gold and dairy products, products that are in high demand in East 
Asia and for which Australia is a natural supplier. 
In conclusion, the choice between bilateral versus multilateral approaches to manage economic 
relations with the region is not as yet entirely clear. The bilateral approach has been a logical 
path to follow in the situation where no regional arrangement that covers the whole East Asia is 
in effect and where East Asian trading partners have been implementing bilateral FTAs with 
each other and external trading partners. As John Ravenhill has commented, what choice did 
Australia really have under these circumstances?909 Moreover, the web of bilateral FTAs that 
Australia has negotiated, or is in the process of doing so, will soon cover most of the region and 
most of Australia’s major trading partners in the region. Why would Australia then choose to 
change direction and seek multilateral solutions instead of merely extending the web of bilateral 
FTAs? 
One potential consideration is that the bilateral strategy will most likely run its course due to the 
cost of maintaining such a web of agreements, in comparison to maintaining one regional agree-
ment that has also has a wider coverage of trade partners and sectors. Moreover, the web of 
bilateral FTAs will most likely lose its utility in not so distant future and may not be required for 
much longer. Taking into consideration that ASEAN is negotiating a number of “plurilateral” 
FTAs with major East Asian partners and India (AFTA-India by 2008, AFTA – China by 2010 
and AFTA – Japan by 2012) the formation of AANZFTA would in practical terms link Australia 
into much more coherent regional infrastructure than what exists now. In such environment some 
of the bilateral FTAs will become unnecessary as a regional agreement would most likely pro-
duce improved benefits from “deeper integration” to issues such as investment and intellectual 
property. Moreover, when the East Asian Free Trade Area becomes in effect the benefits will 
surely surpass those of bilateral agreements. 
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In terms of the risks involved with signing up to a regional agreement, the critical question 
would be whether doing so would endanger trade relations with external trading partners, e.g. the 
United States and the European Union? Currently it would seem that such a risk is quite remote 
as the planned regional agreements pledge to follow the principles of “open Regionalism”, and 
are thus supportive of multilateral trade liberalisation, yet another benefit in comparison to 
bilateral FTAs. 
Political and Security Costs and Benefits 
Estimating the costs and benefits for Australia from closer political integration with the region is 
harder and less precise than in Turkey’s case, simply due to the fact that it involves a greater 
amount of speculation, in particular considering the fact that the regional architecture is less rigid 
and still evolving. The reality is that regional institutions in East Asia are very different from 
their European counterparts. In fact, East Asian regional infrastructure does not even aim at 
creating European style deep integration that would require institutions such as the European 
Commission or the European Parliament. Consequently the existing and planned institutions in 
East Asia are in fact not political at all but rather “soft” informal institutions that are designed to 
facilitate voluntary cooperation and at the most coordination of efforts. Moreover, decision-
making is based on consultation and consensus (mushawara and mufakat) instead of formalised 
procedures and complicated voting rules. The existing secretariats, both in ASEAN and APEC, 
are small and perform the role of a coordination office rather than that of a regional rule-making 
and enforcing bureaucracy. Finally, in terms of security there is no equivalent to NATO, and 
consequently no unified military command to facilitate joint deployment of national forces in 
regional operations or operations conducted in cooperation with regional partners outside the 
region. Correspondingly there is no regional foreign and security policy but the political and 
security architecture in East Asia is rather composed of a number of separate alliances that 
divides major regional states. Consequently the region is characterised by lack of coherence and 
even animosity between major regional powers. Regional institutions, such as the ARF and ATP 
in particular, however, are already useful initiatives and hold great promise of developing politi-
cal and security cohesion and interdependency in the region as a whole. In conclusion, a similar 
cost-benefit calculation to the Turkey – EU case in this area is not possible. Instead, estimating 
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the security and political gains and the associated cost for Australia involves a great deal of 
speculation. 
What is clear is that the outdated Cold War alliance arrangements such as the Five Power De-
fence Agreement (FPDA) and attitudes of paternalism and patronage are simply not adequate 
any longer. Moreover, ANZUS, whilst still important to Australia’s strategic interests, can 
potentially draw Australia once again into regional conflicts in opposing side to its major re-
gional partner – China. On the contrary, the fact of the matter is that Australia gains little from 
playing the role of a US “deputy sheriff” and it is detrimental to the security and stability in 
Australia’s near region in Southeast Asia and potentially also in Northeast Asia. Moreover, it is 
possible to argue that there is no viable military solution to the ”arc of instability” problem and 
that rather stability needs to be created through other means and in close cooperation with 
regional partners. Whilst bilateralism can be a useful vehicle towards creating a base for regional 
cooperation and serves as an adequate short- to medium-term solution, it is running its course as 
a useful strategy as Regionalism advances in East Asia. Consequently, in the long-term integrat-
ing into a regional approach based on shared security interests and interdependency rather than 
relying on short-term bilateral and “flying solo” through the means of unilateral intervention, 
would probably serve Australia’s strategic interests better. This applies in particular to pacifying 
regional hot spots such as the “South China Sea triangle” where tri-party China, Japan and the 
United States dominated approach could really get Australia into grave trouble, in particular 
taking into account that China is one of the major recipients of Australian exports. Consequently 
Australia’s strategic policy making should aim towards advancing deeper regional integration 
based on deeper interdependency not just in economics, but in political and security realms as 
well. This would create a strategic environment with less security and defence concerns and 
more stability. 
In order to maximise the benefits from regional multilateral security cooperation, besides con-
tinuing with active participation in the ARF, Australia should support East Asian Community 
and both instigate and influence the establishment of a regional code of conduct in East Asia in 
the lines of TAC. It should also seek to address the ”arc of instability” together with ASEAN, 
China, Japan and New Zealand, assuming a leading role in bringing an end to the “arc”. More-
over, the objective of Australia’s security and foreign policy in the region should be moulding 
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the evolution of the regional multilateral security cooperation, if not towards a common foreign 
and security policy, then at least through strengthening the ARF and supporting a code of con-
duct that would rule out the use of force in regional disputes, perhaps evolving into an East Asian 
OSCE. 
Hence, the evolving regional architecture represents not a problem but instead a rare opportunity 
to influence the shape of regional institutions, community building and principles of regional 
decision-making. However, this can only be achieved if Australia is fully integrated into the 
regional institutional structure as a fully fledged regional power. Kevin Rudd’s Asia Pacific 
community (APc) proposal is a good example of this, albeit also carries the risk of being seen as 
an attempt by Australia to define the region to suit its interests, rather than doing so for the 
common good. 
As for the potential costs that deeper involvement in regional political and security integration 
could incur, the most plausible and serious would be any adverse impact on the Australia-US 
alliance. Recognising that the United States plays a major role in the region as the only global 
hegemony and has an instrumental role in maintaining stability in the region, especially in 
Northeast Asia, ANZUS is still of paramount importance to Australia. Assuming a more inde-
pendent role in the region would benefit Australia in gaining independent credibility in the eyes 
of the regional states, which would be required for accommodating closer integration to the 
region, but it could also have an adverse impact on Australia – US alliance by threatening the 
credibility of Australia’s commitment to its ANZUS obligations. However, given the paramount 
importance of the region and regional stability to Australia, it could be argued that it would be 
worth the risk. Finally, securing Australia’s inclusion in ASEM would solidify its position as a 
regional state, as it would signal a formal acceptance of Australia as an East Asian state by both 
the regional states and the outside world. In fact this could benefit Australia by improving its 
position towards two regions, not only East Asia but also Europe through inclusion in inter-
regional policy-making, potentially cementing Australia’s negotiation position towards the 
European Union in multilateral discussions. 
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6.6 Conclusion: Strengths and Weaknesses of Rationalist 
Approaches 
As this chapter has established, Australia does indeed enjoy high levels of material interdepen-
dency with East Asia. The region as a collective is by far the most important trading partner for 
Australia accounting for two-thirds of Australia’s total external trade. The regional states on the 
other hand require the abundant natural resources that Australia offers for their continuous 
economic growth. Australia not only has the goods in demand, but also is a natural trading 
partner for East Asian states. Hence, although not a particularly important export destination for 
East Asian states, a sense of deep economic interdependency prevails between Australia and East 
Asia. 
The same sense of interdependency also applies to regional security. Australia’s security is 
highly dependent on regional stability in East Asia and Australia is largely a respected partner in 
regional security cooperation. Consequently the region has played a central role in Australia’s 
strategic decision-making, resulting into active multi- and bilateral security cooperation with 
East Asian states. Australia has also contributed in regional institution building and played an 
instrumental role in the establishment of regional institutions, e.g. APEC and the ARF. The 
security agreement between Indonesia and Australia and the fact that two fundamentally differ-
ent societies choose to cooperate also in sensitive areas of security and defence supports the 
credibility of a rational approach to international relations910 and the Howard government’s 
notion of ”pragmatic Regionalism”. 
The conclusion of this chapter is thus that Australia not only has extensive levels of material 
interdependency with East Asia, but it has also played an active, even a pioneering role in re-
gional institution building. Moreover, the benefits of further integration into the region would 
appear to override the costs, for both Australia and East Asia, albeit predicting what the costs and 
benefits from enlargement and deeper integration are always somewhat speculative. Nonetheless, 
a Rationalist analysis would support Australia’s inclusion into the region beyond the extent that 
                                                 
910 Dibb et al (1999), p. 17  
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is the case currently, and certainly does not reveal any significant reasons for excluding Australia 
from regional institutions. Yet, it has been established that Australia has encountered significant 
opposition to its inclusion in regional institutions and cooperation by a number of regional 
countries, but in particular by Malaysia and Indonesia. Some of this opposition can be explained 
by political differences and conflicting strategic interests between Australia and the two 
neighbours, but a significant amount of this opposition has also been openly culturally and 
ethnically motivated, claiming that Australia is not an Asian country and thus is ethnically unfit 
to be “genuinely of region”. It would thus appear that the “Rationalist” approaches serve well for 
establishing the motives for inclusion, but that “Ideational” approaches may serve better for 
revealing the motives for exclusion. 
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Chapter 7: Ideational Analysis of Australia – East 
Asia Relations 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since European settlement Australia has experienced a tension between its Euro-
pean origins and its geographical position.911 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, much like Turkey, Australia has deep and extensive 
economic, political and security interests in the neighbouring East Asian region. Both also 
participate in regional institutions and have a status of a “strategic partner. In Australia’s case 
this is undeniable: 2/3 of Australia’s trade is with the region, it is clearly dependent on the region 
in terms of its national security and it has been an active partner to and member in regional 
institutions, for instance becoming ASEAN’s first Dialogue Partner in 1974, was one of the 
founding members of the ASEAN Regional Forum, was a founding member of APEC and was 
accepted as a member of the East Asia Summit in 2005. Clearly both have a special relationship 
with their respective regions912 that profoundly differentiates them from states external to the 
region. Yet, in Turkey’s case formal membership application has been met with considerable 
opposition, whilst Australia has not submitted any such application, but has nonetheless faced 
significant opposition towards its attempts to acquire recognition as a genuine member of the 
region through a program of "comprehensive engagement” Moreover, the main argument being 
used against their inclusion is Ideational; that they are not “genuinely of region”. In Australia’s 
case this has meant that it has been recognised as a valuable partner, but not as a genuinely 
regional state for reasons of not being “Asian”. 
                                                 
911 Wesley, Michael (1997), “The politics  of exclusion: Australia, Turkey and definitions of Regionalism”, The 
Pacific Review, Vol.10, Issue 4, p. 531 
912 Ravenhill, John (1997), “ From Paternalism to Partnership: Australia’s Relations with ASEAN”, The World 
Economy, Vol. 23, Issue 3,  p. 333 
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The relationship with Asia has also been problematic for Australia domestically, caught in a 
proverbial crossfire in a search for a unique Australian identity, a process that has been a balanc-
ing act between its geographical position in the periphery of Asia and its British and European 
cultural heritage. From the 1980s onwards, however, the Asia Pacific region has been a focus 
area, indeed in the 1990s the primary focus area, of Australian foreign and trade policy, moti-
vated by the ”East Asian ascendancy” and the widely accepted notion that Australia’s economic 
future was dependent on its relationship with Asia. Consequently, the Hawke and Keating 
Labour governments in particular made ”comprehensive engagement” with the region their first 
priority. The Liberal-National Party coalition government under the leadership of John Howard 
(1996-2007), however, was widely criticised for sacrificing Australia’s relationship with Asia for 
the sake of an ever closer alliance with the United States. Howard maintained that Australia does 
not have to choose between its geography and history that its alliance with the United States did 
not come at a cost of its relations with Asia. The Howard government also insisted that Austra-
lian identity and values and national interest were the primary drivers for foreign and trade 
policy and bilateralism the primary strategy for maximizing Australia’s national interests. Con-
sequently, the Howard government’s position towards East Asian Regionalism was that Australia 
would have a role in ”pragmatic Regionalism” built around advancing shared interests, but not in 
”emotional Regionalism” built around regional identity, culture and values. Yet, the Howard 
government, whilst widely considered as even hostile to Asia, secured membership in the East 
Asia Summit thus gaining access to emerging East Asian Regionalism, a paradox that Michael 
Wesley has called the Howard Paradox”. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an Ideational analysis of Australia’s engagement with 
the region and the challenges for its inclusion in East Asia. The analysis thus covers topics such 
as cognitive mapping, which has involved cultural geography, geopolitical positioning and 
cognitive mapping by regional states. 
In cultural terms Australia meets the definition of a "borderline state”. Whilst an immigrant 
country by origin and nature, immigration was dominated by British and European settlers until 
the 1970s when Australia ended its racially based immigration program under the “White Aus-
tralia policy”. Nonetheless, regardless of increased Asian immigration and multiculturalism 
since, Australia still remains overwhelmingly European and Christian in terms of heritage, 
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ethnicity and culture. Moreover, due to anti-immigration debate created by the Pauline Hanson’s 
One Nation Party phenomena and the allegedly racially motivated attacks against Asian students 
more recently, the image of “White Australia” has persisted in the region, contributing towards 
the resistance for Australia’s inclusion in the region. Finally, the Howard government was 
accused of sacrificing Australia’s relations with Asia with the focus on its alliance with the 
United States and rapidly earning a reputation of the "US Deputy Sheriff” in the region. 
Other central topics in this chapter include the analysis of the relevance of immigration, people-
to-people contacts, education, identity and values and Regionalism discourses in East Asia and 
Australia. Education, for instance, in addition to immigration and increasing people-to-people 
contacts, has been often referred to as one of the major vehicles for increasing Australia’s re-
gionness, in particular through increasing Asian students studying and living in Australia. Gov-
ernments have also promoted making Australia an “Asian literate” due to seeing it as a 
competitive advantage. Yet another significant factor in terms of Australia’s engagement with 
the region has been the issue of Australian values and identity. Whilst the “Asian values” debate 
has been somewhat controversial, heavily contested and subject to considerable over generalisa-
tion, it has nonetheless been used as an argument against Australia’s regionness. However, this 
chapter also considers the differences in political cultures as a potentially more significant 
challenge than the questions over identity and values. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an 
analysis of Regionalism discourses in East Asia and Australia in order to determine whether 
Australia is perceived as a regional state. In terms of Australian discourses, the chapter argues 
that support for Regionalism in Australia is high, but a battle in approaches (Rationalist versus 
Ideational) is evident in the context of "comprehensive engagement” and "pragmatic Regional-
ism” discourses. 
7.2 “Cognitive Mapping” of East Asia: Is there space for 
Australia? 
“Rarely can any region be understood as delimited by simple geographic or po-
litical lines on a map. Instead, regions are fluid and complex mixtures of physical, 
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psychological, and behavioural traits continually being re-created and rede-
fined”913 
“The outer boundaries of any “East Asian” region have been fuzzy”....Because 
they are on the periphery, the republics of central Asia, Mongolia, the DPRK, 
Myanmar, Australia and New Zealand are periodically “in” but just as often 
“out” of East Asian institutions and networks”914 
As stated in Chapter 2: Regionalism in International Relations Theory, there are no natural 
regions. In this regard East Asia is no exception; definitions of East Asia are numerous, and 
continue to be contested.915 Perhaps the most imprecise, but also one of the most common, 
definitions of “East Asia” is that it is the geographical area “south of China and east of India”. 
Another similar, but even more imprecise definition is that “East Asia” is “larger than Southeast 
Asia but smaller than all of Asia”.916 The problem with definitions such as these is that they are 
so vague that they leave massive room for interpretation and political manipulation. In particular, 
such definitions are problematic to countries such as Australia, India, Russia and New Zealand, 
all which have expressed interest in being treated as regional countries.917 As a consequence of 
this vagueness these countries are sometimes treated as being part of the region and at other 
times are not. In many ways this ambiguity is a reflection of the fact that East Asia lacks a single 
unifying regional architecture and consequently the geographical definition is adapted based on 
the focus and intensity of cooperation. As a Japanese scholar has suggested the geographical 
definitions are so varied and weak in justification that East Asia in practice” is more a functional 
                                                 
913 Pempel, T.J. (2005), “Emerging Webs of Regional Connectedness”, in Pempel, T.J. (Ed) (2005), Remapping 
East Asia: The Construction of a Region, Cornell, University Press, Ithaca,  p. 25 
914 Pempel (2005), p. 265 
915 Pempel (2005), p. 25 
916 The definition of East Asia adopted here is the one used by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) that East Asia consists of North Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan) and Southeast Asia, comprising the ASEAN-
10 (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) 
and East Timor.  
917 Pempel (2005), p. 26 
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concept than a geographical one...its geographical scope may be expanded or narrowed, depend-
ing upon the intensity of interactions in a specific issue area”.918 
 
Map: CIA World Book 
                                                 
918 Evans, Paul (2005), “Between Regionalism and Regionalization”, in Pempel, T.J. (Ed.) (2005), Remapping 
East Asia: The Construction of a Region, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, p. 208 
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For East Asian region-building purposes, in their current form and function, the three most 
vigorously competing definitions are aligned with or based on either 1) ASEAN Plus Three 
(ATP), comprising the ten ASEAN member states and China, Japan and South Korea, or 2) 
ASEAN +6, which also includes Australia, India and New Zealand. These two, however, are 
mainly focused on economic cooperation aspects of Regionalism and to a degree ignore the third 
relevant aspect of regional security.919 Should regional security aspects influence the definition, 
it becomes increasingly problematic to exclude the United States.920The third definition is that of 
“Asia-Pacific”, which is institutionalised in APEC and covers North and South American Pacific 
Basin countries in addition to East Asia and Oceania. 
The Pacific Basin countries, however, are not members in the East Asia Summit and thus “Asia-
Pacific”921 is beyond the scope of the emerging East Asian Community. 
As Alison Broinowski has stated: "in the cognitive mapping process of these Asian societies, 
Australia has long been constructed as either absent, unknown or distant.”922 Such “othering” has 
often resulted into a complete denial of Australia’s geographic position in the region. Prime 
Minister Mahathir for instance has stated that geographically “Australia forms a continent on its 
own”923 and later in 2004 that "I don’t know whether Australia is Asia, but it may change the 
geography. Actually they are Europeans, they cannot be Asians”924 The same sentiment has been 
echoed also by other Malaysian officials. For instance, Malaysia’s foreign minister commented 
                                                 
919 the ASEAN Regional Forum is supra-regional in a sense that includes extra-regional states and entities, such 
as the United States and the European Union 
920 Pempel (2005), p. 26 
921 
”Asia-Pacific” is generally considered to comprise East Asia and the Pacific Rim countries. In Japanese 
academia the common notion has been that the “Pacific” is code for the liberal countries of the Pacific Rim, 
specifically Australia, United States and New Zealand 
922 Broinowski, Alison (2003), About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, p. 41 
923 Broinowski (2003), p. 35 
924 Sydney Morning Herald (2004), “Mahathir: Australia can’t be part of East Asian group”, 7 December, 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Mahathir-Australia-cant-be-part-of-East-Asian-
group/2004/12/06/1102182222051.html, Date accessed: 13.1.2009 
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on Gareth Evans’ “East Asian Hemisphere” map in 1995 by stating that ”if I look at a map I will 
immediately say that Australia is not part of Asia”.925 
On the other hand, at times Australia is considered as being geographically located in Asia, but is 
not “of” Asia.926 For instance within the context of the Japanese WWII concept of ”Greater East 
Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” Australia was considered as a valuable treasure house of natural 
resources required for its war efforts and its vision, and which by right belonged to the Asian 
people, due to its location in the periphery of Asia.927 
The implication to Australia of such a “cognitive mapping” process in East Asian Regionalism 
has been that Australia’s position is in a constant state of flux where it sometimes is the ”odd 
man in” and other times the “significant other”. The general statement about Australia’s place in 
the region tends to be along the lines of "Australia should belong in Asia but Australians do not 
qualify”.928 
                                                 
925 Speech by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans to CEDA Asian Region International Association of Cooperating 
Organisations (ARIACO) Roundtable, Melbourne, 11 September 1995 
926 Darwall, Rupert (2005), “John Howard’s Australia”, Policy Review, Issue 132, August-September 2005,  pp. 
59-60 
927 Broinowski (2003),  p. 41  
928 Broinowski (2003), p. 33 
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Writing Australia into the Region: Australian Definitions of the Region 
 
Source: Wesley (1997),  p. 534 
The most common geographical definitions for Australia’s location are Australasia and Oceania. 
According to the Webster online dictionary Australasia refers to ”Australia, New Zealand and 
the neighbouring islands in the South Pacific” and Oceania to ”A large group of islands in the 
south Pacific including Melanesia and Micronesia and Polynesia (and sometimes Australasia and 
the Malay Archipelago).”929 
                                                 
929 Webster Online Dictionary  
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According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) East Asia comprises North-
east and Southeast Asia, and consequently excludes Australia. However, Australia’s ‘regionness’ 
in Australia has in the past been occasionally argued in geographical terms, whilst the region is 
increasingly defined in terms of culture and identity. The most radical attempt to ‘write’ Austra-
lia into the region was by the former Hawke and Keating governments’ Foreign Minister Gareth 
Evans, who invented Australia as ‘an East Asian Hemisphere nation’. Evan’s argument that 
Australia is geographically part of the ”East Asian Hemisphere” and shares the time zone with 
East Asia, makes it a fully fledged member of the region,930 did not receive particularly wide 
support from regional leaders. Speaking to ASEAN leaders at the ASEAN PMC 7+1 in August 
1995 Evans argued Australia’s place in East Asia in the context of East Asian Hemisphere by 
stating that: 
“The second relevant concept is that of the "East Asian hemisphere". We are all 
familiar with the expression "American Hemisphere" or "Western Hemisphere" to 
describe North and South America together, even though these continents do not 
stretch literally half way around the globe: the segment of the earth's sphere 
stretching from longitudes west of China to east of New Zealand is a similarly 
large slice of the globe. And there are similarly strong ties binding Australia to-
gether with North and Southeast Asia, notwithstanding all the obvious differences 
between our various countries”931 
Australia has also been described as a “South Asian country”, “ Pacific Ocean country”, “Pacific 
country in the East Asian region”, “Southern Asian continent”932, as well as part of an ”Asiatic 
Mediterranean”, “part of Asia”, ”an Asian country” and finally, a country forming ”a bridge to 
                                                 
930 Wesley (1997), p. 532 
931 Statement by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans to ASEAN PMC 7+1, Bandar Seri Bagawan, 2 August 1995, 
http://www.aseansec.org/4377.htm, Date accessed: 4.6.2009 
932 Broinowski (2003), pp. 72-74 
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Asia”.933Most commonly, however, Australia has referred itself to as "an Asia-Pacific country”, 
perhaps because "Asia-Pacific” appears to be more marketable in Australia and Asia than the 
somewhat artificial "East Asian Hemisphere country”. Finally, the Howard government, critical 
of the efforts to redefine Australia’s place in the region, declared an end to the process of self-
examination about the perceived dichotomy between the country’s geographical location and its 
identity in 1997 by stating that ”Australia does not need to choose between its history and its 
geography.”934 
How should Australia define itself in relation to the region? If Australia was inhabited by Asians, 
its inclusion in the region would hardly be contested in the first place. Consequently, as Stephen 
FitzGerald observed in 1997 "Australia should not define the region, the region should define it”, 
or alternatively Alison Broinowski formulated the same argument “it is the region that will 
define us, not us it”.935 One possible way of facilitating a positive notion in the region in relation 
to Australia’s place in it is through genuine and extensive participation in regional cooperation. 
As the previous chapter demonstrated Australia has managed to establish a reasonable track-
record in this regard. The other option is, in the spirit of the “comprehensive engagement” 
program, to create a sense of belonging through utilising the multicultural nature of the Austra-
lian society as an argument towards regionness, as well as the active people-to-people contacts, 
education and Australia’s Asia literacy as sources of convergence. The following sections will 
examine the main elements of such “comprehensive engagement” and their impact on Australia’s 
regionness. 
                                                 
933 Broinowski (2003), p. 219 
934 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1997), In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade 
Policy, White Paper, Canberra, p. iv 
935 Broinowski (2003), p. 219 
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7.3 Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnicity 
It has been said that out of all the factors involved immigration is the one that has had the most 
profound impact on “engagement”. 936 The impact of immigration and the emergence of multi-
culturalism policy have indeed had a significant impact on the ethnic and cultural make-up of the 
country, essentially transforming Australia from what still in the 1970s could have been de-
scribed as predominantly “white, protestant and British”, to a country with one of the largest 
immigrant populations in the world with approximately 24% of the total population having born 
overseas937and hailing to over 100 ethnic backgrounds. Moreover, the proportion of the Asian 
population has steadily grown from 276,000 in 1981 to well over a million in 2000 comprising 
approximately 6% of the total population,938making it proportionally one of the largest Asian-
born migrant populations in the world, although greater numbers of people who were born in 
Asia are found in countries such as the USA and Canada. Whilst the main driver for their share 
of the total population has been immigration, Asian-born Australians are also demographically 
one of most rapidly growing ethnic groups in Australia.939Nonetheless, the ethnic “Asianness” of 
Australia is still quite far from Mahathir’s benchmark of "perhaps at least 75% Asian”. 
Table 19. Asian-born Population in Selected Countries 
Country Of total population Of immigrant population Total Asian-born '000 
Australia 5.6% 23.9% 1077.8 
Canada 5.2% 31.4% 1562.8 
New Zealand 3.3% 15.3% 117.8 
                                                 
936 Quilty, Mary (2003), “Immigration and Multiculturalism”, in Edwards, Peter and David Goldsworthy (Eds.), 
Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia – Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, Melbourne Univer-
sity Press, Melbourne,  p. 297 
937 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007),  ABS 1301.0 Yearbook Australia 2007, Canberra 
938 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001), ABS 4102.0 – Australian Social Trends, 2001, Population Composi-
tion: Asian-Born Australians, Canberra, p.1 
939 ABS 4102.0 p. 6 
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Country Of total population Of immigrant population Total Asian-born '000 
USA 2.0% 25.2% 4979.0 
Sweden 1.0% 17.3% 90.3 
UK 0.8% 23.7% 490.0 
France 0.4% 6.3% 227.0 
Italy 0.4% 18.2% 225.5 
 
Source: ABS4102.0 Australian Social Trends 2001 
History of Immigration to Australia: Policy of Isolation from 1880s to 
1960s 
Australia, in its modern form, is essentially a product of waves of settlers. The influx of settlers 
has moulded the society, culture and economy of Australia since the founding of the colonies, 
but in particular since at the end of World War II, when Australia’s population was still around 
only 7 million and 90% of the inhabitants were born in Australia.940 Since the beginning of mass 
immigration programs from 1945 onwards 6.8 million new settlers have arrived and the coun-
try’s population has multiplied to over 21 million, transforming Australian society and culture 
radically. Consequently, modern Australia is a multicultural settler society on par with the 
United States and Canada with almost a quarter of its population having been born overseas. 
The Discovery of a Nation: Convicts and Free Settlers 
Prior to the arrival of European settlers, Australia was inhabited by Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples, who arrived approximately 40,000 to 50,000 years ago via the islands of the 
Malay Archipelago and New Guinea. European settlement in Australia began soon after 1770 
                                                 
940 Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2008), “Fact Sheet 4 - More than 60 Years of Post-war Migrati-
on”, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/04fifty.htm, Date accessed: 15.1.2009 
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when Captain James Cook arrived and claimed Australia for the British Crown. The first settlers 
from Britain, approximately 1500 people, half of them convicts, arrived in Sydney Harbour on 
26 January 1788 on board the 11 ships of the First Fleet. More convicts and free migrants, 
altogether 160 000 men and women, arrived between 1788 and1868 in the duration of the penal 
transportation program, almost exclusively from the British Isles.941 
Following the penal transportation program the convicts were rapidly replaced by free settlers 
and Australia increasingly earned an image as a land of opportunity. The social upheavals of 
industrialisation in Britain further motivated settlers to seek better life in Australia. The Gold 
Rush of 1851 to 1860 was also a major driver for migration and produced the peak in settler 
arrivals, up to 50,000 per year. Significantly, the Gold Rush also altered the ethnic composition 
of settler arrivals, albeit temporarily, making Chinese immigrants the largest ethnic group after 
the British.942 
With the exception of the Gold Rush era, however, majority of settlers prior to 1960s had a 
European background. The convicts, who represented a bulk of the early settlers to Australia, 
were almost exclusively from the British Isles followed by free settlers who were largely British, 
arriving as part of the official assisted immigration programs from 1831 to 1982. Moreover, from 
1880s to 1970s Australia adhered to a policy that deliberately isolated itself from the geographi-
cal region surrounding it, motivated by theories and ideology of racial superiority. 
The White Australia Era 
This ideology of racial supremacy lead into the creation of the Commonwealth Immigration 
Restriction Act of 1901, popularly known as ”the White Australia Policy”, soon after the creation 
of the Federation. The “While Australia Policy” was specifically intended to protect Australia 
                                                 
941 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2009), “Ancient heritage, modern society”, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/aib/history.html, Date accessed: 09.02.2009 
942 Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2008), “Fact Sheet 4 - More than 60 Years of Post-war Migrati-
on”, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/04fifty.htm, Date accessed: 15.1.2009 
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from non-European immigration,943and specifically towards restricting Asian immigration 
motivated by the growing presence of Chinese workers in the gold fields. Its ultimate aim was 
creating an ethnically homogenous society: white, protestant and British. The Aboriginal popula-
tion was expected to die out relatively fast paving way for this vision.944 As a consequence of 
these laws non-European population was barred from obtaining citizenship,945 own property and 
practice certain occupations. Moreover, these laws were allegedly specifically targeted against 
Chinese Australians.946 The racial justification of excluding non-European races from migrating 
to Australia was based on concerns over social harmony and the inability of non-European 
migrants to integrate into Australian society. The Deputy Prime Minister Alfred Deakin vocal-
ised this sentiment by stating that Australians and non-Europeans were divided by a “gulf which 
we cannot bridge”, and that they "do not and cannot blend with us, we do not, cannot and ought 
not to blend with them”.947 The first minister for immigration - Alfred Caldwell – mirrored this 
spirit by declaring that for each “foreigner” (signifying non-British) at least ten British migrants 
would be "recruited”.948 As a consequence of the “White Australia Policy”, Australia remained 
almost exclusively British and Irish until 1947, although the “Nordic cousins” - Germans and 
Scandinavians – were also favoured from 1870s to 1914,949 and then subsequently almost exclu-
sively European until well into the 1970s. 
                                                 
943 Jupp, James (1995), “From White Australia to Part of Asia: Recent Shifts in Australian Immigration Policy 
Towards the Region”, International Migration Review, Vol. 29, No. 1,  p. 207 
944 Jupp (1995), p. 208 
945 Australians were British subjects until the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, which created a separate 
Australian citizenship. In theory the new act applied to the indigenous Australians as well, but in practice they 
were offered citizenship only on selected basis. In the May 27, 1967 referendum Australians overwhelmingly 
voted to finally grant indigenous Australians citizenship rights in their own country.  
946 Jupp (1995), p. 208 
947 Quoted in Jordan (2006), “The Reappraisal of White Australia Policy against the Background of a Changing 
Asia, 1945-67”, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Volume 52, Issue 1, p. 228 
948 Ibid 
949 Jupp (1995), p. 211 
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Following the Second World War the policy towards immigration started changing somewhat, 
albeit slowly. The prevailing immigration policy, however, was not welcoming towards Asian 
migrants. The Japanese interned during the war were deported soon after and war refugees 
returned home to various parts of Asia. Moreover, Japanese and other Asian brides of Australian 
servicemen were treated a cold shoulder by immigration officials and effectively barred from 
entry until 1952.950 
One of the most drastic changes after the Second World War, however, was the significant 
downturn in British immigration to Australia. Yet the prevailing feeling amongst Australian 
policy-makers was a conviction of “populate or perish”; that the country relied on steady influx 
of settlers for its economic success and security and that its economic transformation from an 
agrarian economy with only small-scale industry to a modern industrial economy with emphasis 
on heavy industries required a large-scale skilled migrants program. Consequently, in order to 
maintain adequate inflows, mass migration programs were launched in 1947 targeting especially 
non-English speaking Europeans to compensate the downturn in British immigration. As a result 
of these programs Australia accepted a growing number of refugees and displaced persons from 
war-torn Europe, totalling 200,000 already by 1950.951 In total more than two million Europeans 
moved to Australia in the two decades following WWII. Significantly, a great number of these 
migrants were not British, but a significant amount of other Europeans and in particular Dutch, 
German, Italian, Greek, Turkish and Yugoslavian migrants were received during the 1950s 
and1960s.952 Whilst the purpose of the mass immigration programs was largely to maintain the 
European outlook of Australia, it was soon noticed that the new migrants were nonetheless 
culturally different and that “assimilation” of non-British migrants into Anglo-Australians was 
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not realistic. Consequently, it was realised that if the ethnic homogeneity of the country could 
not be maintained, cultural homogeneity should be the new objective.953 
In terms of Asian migration, the only significant development in the period immediately follow-
ing the World War II was the establishment of the Colombo Plan of 1951, within which context 
government sponsored Asian students, mainly from Malaya and Singapore, were admitted on 
temporary basis to study in Australia.954 In general, only selected business, educational and 
distinguished visitors were allowed temporary entry and these were few in numbers. Conse-
quently, whilst the “White Australia Policy” mostly did its job in keeping Australia “White, 
Protestant and British” it also effectively isolated Australia from the increasingly economically 
vibrant region surrounding it. 
From abolishment of the White Australia Policy to Asian Influx 
During the 1960s and 1970s the “White Australia Policy” had run its course and was abolished 
as a result of this. Externally, the political elite held concerns over the “White Australia Policy” 
causing an international backslash from the UN and regional states. These concerns were empha-
sises following the 1961 UN “Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion and when South Africa was forced to withdraw from the Commonwealth due to its 
Apartheid policy the same year.955Consequent to this external pressure and the policy losing its 
support domestically, the state and federal laws were gradually revised towards banning racial 
discrimination, beginning with the South Australian Act of 1966. The reform of state laws was 
soon followed by changes in policy when the Cabinet decided in October 1967 to admit ”well 
qualified” non-Europeans as permanent residents on equal basis, resulting into 5000 such per-
sons being admitted already by the end of the year.956 Finally, the Whitlam government abol-
ished the “White Australia Policy” officially in 1973, enacted the Racial Discrimination Act and 
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declared Australia to be a multicultural society, declaring that; ”as an island nation of predomi-
nantly European inhabitants situated on the edge of Asia, [Australia] cannot afford the stigma of 
racialism”957. The abolition of the “White Australia Policy”, however, created a much less direct 
impact on migrants from Asia than was thought and no mass exodus from Asia took place, 
despite the “floodgates“ having been opened.958 
The impact was nonetheless significant in the medium- to long-term, starting with an influx of 
refugees from Asia. Among the first to arrive were 1100 Indochinese refugees from 1975 on-
wards, primarily from Vietnam and Cambodia. Consequently, Vietnam and Cambodia became 
the main source countries of Asian immigrants already by 1977-78 and by the end of 1988 
approximately 120 000 refugees from Indochina had permanently settled in Australia.959 
The rapid growth in Asian immigration continued and accelerated throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, increasing by 30% in the period from 1983-84 to 1999-2000. In the peak years 1990-91 to 
1991-92 Asian immigration increased by over 50%.960 The proportion of Asian-born immigrants 
of the total migrant arrivals also increased from 24% in 1981 to 34% in 1991.961 
By 2000 the Asian population in Australia had multiplied to approximately one million Asian-
born Australians, just over half of whom were born in Southeast Asia, slightly under one-third in 
Northeast Asia and one-fifth in Southern Asia. The most common countries of birth amongst 
Asian-born Australians were Vietnam (174, 400), China (168,100) and the Philippines (123,000), 
together comprising 43% of the total Asian-born population and 10% of the total overseas-born 
populations.962 
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Table 20. Growth of Asian-born Population 
 
Source: ABS 3412.0 Migration, Australia 2006-07 
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Table 21. Permanent Population by Region of Birth in 2007 
 
Source: Author’s adaptation from ABS 3412.0 Migration, Australia 2006-07 
Not Quite Asian Yet – Ethnic Composition of Australia 
Regardless of the relatively rapid growth in Asian immigration, Australia is still predominantly a 
European nation. Whilst the proportion of immigrants born in North-West Europe has declined 
from 8.2% in 1997 to 7.3% in 2007 and Southern and Eastern Europe for 4.8% in 1997 to 4.0% 
in 2007, immigrants born in the United Kingdom are still the largest single group accounting for 
5.5% of Australia’s total population. Another growing group is immigrants born in New Zealand, 
who account for 2.2% of the total population. The remaining two of the top five are: China 
(1.3%), Italy (1.1%) and India (1.0%).963 
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Table 22. Place of Birth by Region 1997 – 2007 
 
Source: ABS Migration 34120, p. 48 
Table 23. Top 5 Countries of Birth at 30 June 2006 
Country of Birth Estimated Number  % of Overseas-born  
United Kingdom  1 140 263  22.4%  
New Zealand  443 606  8.7%  
China (excl. SARS and Taiwan ) 259 095 5.1%  
Italy  227 344 4.5%  
Vietnam  185 879 3.6%  
Other  2 837 233 55.7%  
Total Overseas-born  5 093 420 100.0%  
 
Source: Migration Australia (ABS Cat 3412.0) 
Also in terms of migrant arrivals Britain, Europe and New Zealand still remain high in number. 
Europe still accounts for 20.6% of immigrants and Oceania for 21.2% (primarily New Zealand). 
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Consequently immigration from Europe and Oceania accounts for 41.8% of the total in compari-
son to Asian immigration, which accounts for 41% of total immigration flows. 964 
Ancestry, Religion and Language 
In terms of ancestry Australia is still predominantly Anglo-Australian. In the 2006 Census a total 
of 270 different ancestries were registered, with up to two self-reported ancestries allowed for 
each individual resident. Whilst the diversity of the Australian populace is thus obviously high, 
most commonly people reported various combinations of “Australian”, “English”, “Irish”, or 
another Anglo-Celtic-Australian ancestry. The most common ancestries in the Census were: 
Australian (37%), English (32%), Irish (9%), Scottish (8%), Italian (4%), German (4%) and 
Chinese (3%).965 
Diversity was also high in terms of languages spoken in Australian homes with over 200 “com-
munity languages” recognised by the government in the 2006 Census, in addition to the 60 or so 
languages spoken by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Australians. However, only a total of 16% of 
the population spoke another language than English at home, top six being Italian, Greek, Ara-
bic, Cantonese, Mandarin and Vietnamese.966 
In terms of religion967, Australia is clearly predominantly Christian, stemming from early settlers 
who brought their traditional Christian churches to Australia; Anglican Church, Methodist, 
Catholic, etc. In more recent waves migrants have also hailed to Muslim and Buddhist religious 
backgrounds, but nonetheless the dominance of the various Christian churches is still firmly 
secured; the 2006 Census reports that 63% of Australian’s consider themselves Christian (26% 
Catholic, 19% Anglican, 19% other Christian denominations), 6% had non-Christian religions 
                                                 
964 ABS Migration 34120 
965 ABS 1301.0 
966 ABS 1301.0 
967 Australian Bureau of Statistics defines religion as “a set of beliefs and practices, usually involving acknow-
ledgement of a divine or higher being of power, by which people order the conduct of their lives both practi-
cally and in a morale sense”. 
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and 31% had no religion. Non-Christian religions, however, exhibited strong growth with a 55% 
increase for Hinduism, 21% for Islam and 17% for Buddhism since the 2001 Census.968 
The Emergence of Multiculturalism 
In the 1960s and the 1970s the death of “the White Australia Policy” produced a radical change 
in Australian immigration policy. The racial discrimination legislation in South Australia in 1966 
and by the Commonwealth in 1975 paved way for emergence of multiculturalism as the domi-
nant policy.969 In fact, already by 1966 all major political parties had removed “White Australia” 
from their platforms and by mid-1970s all of them had replaced it by multiculturalism.970 More-
over, multiculturalism rapidly became a universally accepted bipartisan national policy for the 
governments following the Whitlam Labour government (1972-75), which officially declared 
Australia as a multicultural country. The subsequent governments; the Fraser coalition govern-
ment (1975-83), the Hawke Labour government (1983-91) and the Keating Labour government 
(1991-96), all had a strong commitment to multiculturalism, as well as institutionalised and 
strengthened its application in Australian society. The only significant exception was the Howard 
coalition government (1996-2007), which was clearly less enthusiastic supporter of multicultur-
alism and rather had the tendency to emphasise social cohesion that entailed integration of 
immigrants into society, and specifically the acceptance of Australian identity and values and 
English language as basis for national unity. The Howard government, however, never explicitly 
challenged multiculturalism or suggested it should be abandoned. 
Multiculturalism as a National Policy 
The evolution of multiculturalism as a national policy was moulded by a number of government 
strategy and white papers, starting with the 1977 white paper “Australia as a multicultural 
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society”, followed by the “Galbally Report” of 1978, both of which emphasised the benefits of 
cultural heterogeneity, in comparison to the emphasis on cultural homogeneity that had been the 
standard line of thinking for the much of the country’s history. In order to further stimulate the 
newly found interest in multiculturalism as a major contributor to Australia’s future, based on the 
recommendations of the Galbally Report the government established “Australian Institute of 
Multicultural Affairs (AIMA) in 1979, tasked to enable various cultural and ethnic groups to 
fully participate in the Australian society by raising awareness of cultural diversity and promot-
ing social cohesion, tolerance and understanding. 971 
Multiculturalism was further strengthened from 1983 onwards by Bob Hawke, who as a strong 
advocate of ”consensus” politics wanted to include all parts of the society in nation building and 
declared Australia a nation of immigrants. In 1987 Hawke took matters a notch further and 
replaced AIMA with the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) in the Department of the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet to direct the national efforts to embed multiculturalism into the Austra-
lian society.972 After two years of contemplation and consultation in 1989 OMA produced the 
National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia,973 setting the short- and long-term objectives for 
strengthening multiculturalism, including e.g. community campaigns to promote, social cohe-
sion, expansion of multicultural television and radio programming of the Special Broadcasting 
Service (SBS), enhancing immigrant English language teaching and increasing efficiency in the 
recognition of overseas qualifications.974 
The passing of the Hawke government and emergence of the Paul Keating was accompanied by 
not only an increase in the heterogeneity of the nation and increasing public endorsement of 
multicultural aspects of life, but multiculturalism also genuinely became a centre piece of gov-
ernment focus along with the “engagement” project. Keating firmly believed that multicultural-
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972 Quilty (2003), p. 308 
973 Curran, James (2002), “The ‘Thin Dividing Line’: Prime Ministers and the problem of Australian nationalism, 
1972-1996)”, Australian Journal of Politics and History,  Volume 48, Issue  4,  p. 481 
974 National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia is available online: 
http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/agenda/agenda89/executiv.htm 
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E  ‘ B O R D E R L I N E  S T A T E S ’  I N  R E G I O N A L I S M   
324 
ism was essential for political and economic engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and scrupu-
lously promoted the country’s multicultural credentials as an argument for joining the region and 
proclaiming Australia as a "multicultural country in Asia”.975The Keating government also 
established a National Multicultural Advisory Council to review and update multicultural poli-
cies and introduced quotas for ethnic minorities in public services. In 1996 the Department of 
Immigration was restructured into the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
(DIMIA), producing both symbolic and practical changes in immigration and multiculturalism 
policies.976 
The Backslash to Multiculturalism and Emergence of an Anti-
Immigration Debate 
The first backslash to multiculturalism came about during the mid-1980s within the context of 
the “Blainey debate”. Professor Geoffrey Blainey, a respected historian and the author of The 
Tyranny of Distance977, delivered a controversial speech in 1984, in which he criticised ”dispro-
portionate” immigration and called multiculturalism a “sham”, “anti-British” and threatening to 
break Australia into a ”cluster of tribes” if allowed to continue unchecked. Blainey was particu-
larly distressed about what he saw as a denial of Australia’s British heritage, even going to the 
extent of lamenting that ”the department of immigration and ethnic affairs could well be called 
the department of immigration and anti-British affairs’.978 Given the centrality of British heritage 
in Australia’s history, its identity and culture, Blainey argued that the contemporary immigration 
policy was unwise, a claim he expanded upon in the book All for Australia in 1984.979 
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The “Blainey debate” was followed by an outrage created by the then Liberal Party opposition 
leader John Howard in 1988 in a speech that quickly became infamous suggested that ‘Asianisa-
tion’ and ‘multiculturality’ were causing a “cultural identity crisis”, and that he might limit Asian 
immigration if elected into office. According to Howard "Australia made an error in abandoning 
its former policy of encouraging assimilation and integration in favour of multiculturalism”.980 
Howard, however, accepted no blame for racism, clarifying that he did not oppose Asian immi-
gration directly, or specifically, but did favour a more controlled form of immigration in order to 
maintain ”social cohesion” in the country. The episode probably had an important role in How-
ard’s loss of leadership in 1989,981 indicating that political support for multiculturalism was still 
strong. 
The third debate was sparked by the rise of One Nation party led by a Queensland fish and chips 
shop owner - Pauline Hanson – who had recently become a local council member for the Liberal 
Party in Ipswich in 1994. Encouraged by the success of her early political career Hanson ran in 
federal elections as a Liberal Party candidate in 1996, but her comments about Aborigines cost 
her party endorsement. Nonetheless, Hanson was technically elected as a Liberal Party represen-
tative, although as a consequence of her controversial comments she was shunned from Liberal 
Party parliamentary group and had to become an independent representative. The hour of Han-
son’s notoriety in the national arena came in her maiden speech in the House of Representatives, 
where she infamously declared her fear that Australia was becoming “swamped by Asians”982 
and suggested that immigration policy had to be reviewed and multiculturalism abandoned in 
favour of national unity.983 
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Whilst Hanson’s and her party’s support waned almost as quickly as it appeared, there was 
without a doubt a certain amount of social demand for an anti-immigration platform. In the 1996 
Australian Electoral Survey, for instance, a total of 64% of respondents agreed with the state-
ment that “immigration has gone too far”.984 Consequently it should not have been any surprise 
when Hanson’s One Nation party, a populist movement with demand among socially and eco-
nomically marginalised Australians, especially in rural areas, in June 1998 captured 23 % in 
Queensland state elections. Moreover, whilst only four months later Hanson lost her House of 
Representatives seat and the popularity of her party proved equally short lived, it should be 
acknowledged that nonetheless approximately a million Australians voted for One Nation in 
federal elections in October 1998,985 capturing 8.4% of the total vote. 
7.4 Australian versus Asian Values and Identity 
One of the most common arguments against, as well as occasionally for, Australia’s regionness 
is the incompatibility (/compatibility) of Australian values and identity in comparison to regional 
counterparts. This section will examine the development and character of Australian values and 
identity and contrast the findings with the analysis of the “Asian values” debate, which argued 
for the existence of universal East Asian values. Although the existence of such universal Asian 
values has been credibly contested a number of times, the debate has provided a significant base 
for the “othering” of Australia in the region, a process that continues today despite the disappear-
ance of the Asian values debate. 
Development of Australian Nationalism and Identity 
Since its inception and up until the 1960s Australia considered itself as an inseparable part of a 
community of British peoples united by blood, history, language and tradition.986Following 
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WWII, however, a gradual loss of “Britishness” started to root itself into Australian society, 
following Britain’s withdrawal from East of Suez from the 1960s onwards, but in particular by 
the downturn in British immigration and the growth of non-British immigration. By 1960s the 
change had become so profound that it in effect caused an identity crisis and eventually system-
atic building of a unique Australian nationhood. One of the staunchest advocators of a separate 
Australian nationhood was Whitlam who symbolically replaced “God Save the Queen” with 
“Advance Australia Fair” as the national anthem.987 There was, however, no significant push 
towards an independent nationhood and Whitlam favoured "new nationalism”, which he posi-
tioned was healthy nationalism instead of divisive and dangerous nationalism.988 Fraser, also a 
critic of dangerous nationalism, praised Australia’s multiculturalism as a major achievement and 
saw it as a healthy source for a distinctive Australian culture. Hawke, a strong supporter of 
multiculturalism viewed Australia as a "nation of immigrants”, where “Australianness” was not 
defined by ancestry alone. However, whilst Hawke supported the existence of a uniquely Austra-
lian identity, he also pledged gratitude to Britain for heritage that included important Australian 
institutions such as parliamentary democracy, rule of law and system of liberal education.989Fi-
nally, although the Australia Act of 1986 formally removed the constitutional links with Britain, 
Hawke emphasised that this was not a declaration of independence and that the emotional bond 
with Britain remains strong regardless.990 
Whilst Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke had been principally against “aggressive nationalism”, 
Keating practically made it his platform.991Having been deeply disappointed of the delays in the 
development of a unique Australian identity, Keating actively promoted Australian self-interest 
over British interests.992 The Keating era also consequently produced the high point of the 
Australian republican movement, which entailed proposals to cut the remaining links to Britain 
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by appointing a President as the head of state instead of the Queen, who is represented by the 
Governor-General, thus creating an independent nation on par with other Western parliamentary 
democracies. The ties to Britain, however, proved stronger than anticipated and the Australian 
republic was defeated in a referendum held in November 1999. 
The government led by John Howard (1996-2007) resurrected a debate around Australian na-
tionalism, but in particular in regards to Australian identity and values as unifying national 
forces. Howard had already as an opposition leader in 1995 criticised that Keating had “engaged 
in an attempted heist of Australian identity, lamenting that it was not the government’s business 
to promote national identity. Moreover, Howard argued that the process of self-examination was 
not necessary: “We no longer navel gaze about what an Australian is. We no longer are mesmer-
ized by the self appointed cultural dieticians who tell us that in some way they know better what 
an Australian ought to be” , referring to Keating and the “elites”.993 
Howard, however, did it himself and emphasised Australian values and national identity con-
stantly in domestic political discourse.994 Moreover, Howard’s Liberal Party embarked on a 
values-driven election campaign in 1996, 995driven by a strong belief in common values underly-
ing an Australian identity.996Again, however, the emphasis was on a concept of ”new national-
ism”, which was argued as being ”healthy nationalism”, not the kind of dangerous nationalism 
that caused WWII.997 Consequently, the key features of Howard’s “healthy nationalism” were 
basic Australian values, such as a positive view of Australian history, mateship, “fair go” and 
individualism.998 However, subscribing to a socially conservative version of Christianity, How-
ard also wanted to restore Judeo-Christian values and the Anglo-Celtic heritage as cornerstones 
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of Australian identity.999 Moreover, Howard believed that multiculturalism undermines common 
values that are the key to social cohesion was thus integration of immigrants into the Australian 
society based on universal Australian values and the English language.1000 
However, whilst in rhetoric the government was aiming to create unity in diversity, the Howard 
era was in practice divisive and hosted a number of heated debates about controlling immigration 
and entry of asylum seekers, in particular following the “Tampa affair” and the ”children over-
board” incident, and culminating into the implementation of the ”Pacific Solution”.1001 Finally, it 
also witnessed the emergence of exactly the kind of unhealthy nationalism that Howard himself 
warned about, producing incidents between “Australians” and “ethnic” members of the commu-
nity, e.g. the Cronulla riots in December 2005, which witnessed pitch battles between the ”An-
glos” and the “Wogs” over an incident at Cronulla beach. Regardless of whether such incidents 
would have taken place without the emphasis on Australian values and identity by the govern-
ment, clearly the issue of values and identity was elevated into the forefront of political dis-
course, both in the domestic context, as well as in the regional context. 1002 
Every nation requires unique and shared national legends. Since the creation of the Australian 
nation involved no war of independence, the source of national legends had to come from other 
historical experiences symbolising the creation and character of the nation. One of the most 
fundamental of these has been the ANZAC legend, referring to the war achievements of the 
Australia-New Zealand Army Corps during WWI, serving as the historical turning point for 
                                                 
999 Johnson (2007), pp. 197-199 
1000 Johnson (2007), p. 198.  
1001 The ”Tampa affair” erupted when the Norvegian operated  MV Tampa rescued a group of Afghan refugees 
from a distressed vessel in international wates and wanted to transport them tot he Christmas Islands. The 
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1002 Clark, Juliet (2007), “Perceptions of Australian Cultural Identity among Asian Australians”, Australian 
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Australia as nation; “Australia was born on the shores of Gallipoli”.1003 In an embodiment of this 
spirit, practically every town in the country has a war memorial, the National War Memorial in 
Canberra is one of the most visited places in Australia and the country celebrates ANZAC Day 
as a national public holiday 25 April every year. 
As such, WWI and the ANZACs had little to do with the creation of the Australian nation, but 
nonetheless the ANZAC legend was significant in the formation of Australian nationalism 
through the heroism and persistence of the “Diggers”, who were considered to represent the 
national character of Australia.1004 
There were little or any popular efforts to disassociate Australian identity with “Britishness”, 
despite the fact that the Whitlam government actively promoted a unique Australian national 
identity, work carried out subsequently by Bob Hawke and later on by Paul Keating, who proba-
bly had the most ambitious plans for creating a unique Australian identity. Keating not only 
wanted to prioritise a unique Australian identity, but also wanted to redefine Australia’s place in 
the world, convinced of Australia’s ”destiny as a nation in Asia and the Pacific”.1005 
What are the Australian Values? 
“The values which Australia brings to its foreign policy are the values of a liberal 
democracy. These have been shaped by national experience, given vigour through 
cultural diversity, but reflect a predominantly European intellectual and cultural 
heritage. They include the rule of law, freedom of the press, the accountability of 
the government to an elected parliament, and a commitment to a ‘fair go’”. 1006 
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Given the cultural background and heritage of the country, it is fair to ask what Australian values 
are and how are they unique, for instance in comparison to British values? At first glance one 
would conclude that Australian values are equal to typical European/Western values; egalitarian-
ism, secularism of government and freedom of religion, parliamentary democracy and freedom 
of speech, respect of rule of law, freedom of assembly, with nothing obviously uniquely distinct 
about them. Moreover, if one examines the national holidays, three underlining themes become 
apparent: Christianity, British/European heritage and sports. The national holidays reflecting the 
first two are; Australia Day, Good Friday, Easter Sunday, Easter Monday, ANZAC Day, 
Queen’s Birthday, Christmas and Boxing Day, whilst the importance of sports is commemorated 
by e.g. : Melbourne Cup Day, Geelong Cup Day, Adelaide Cup Day and Foundation Cup Day. 
Another source determining the composition of Australian values are government statements. 
The Howard government in particular was, in its view corresponding to public opinion of the 
“ordinary battlers”, active in promoting Australian identity and values through government 
policy. One of the significant initiatives towards this end was based on the notion that migrants 
must adopt Australian civic values in order to successfully integrate into the society and thus, 
from 2007 onwards required to pass a citizenship test of their knowledge of Australian cul-
tural/history values and English. In addition, since 15 October 2007 all residence visa applicants 
18 years and over have been required to sign a value statement pledging that they understand and 
respect Australian values before the visa can be granted. These values are presented in the Life in 
Australia booklet, which all applicants are expected to read and certify that they have understood 
the significance of these statements. Since it represents the government’s official definition of 
Australian values, the “values statement” is worth quoting in full: 
I confirm that I have read, or had explained to me, information provided by the Australian 
Government on Australian society and values. 
I understand: 
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● Australian society values respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual, 
freedom of religion, commitment to the rule of law, Parliamentary democracy, 
equality of men and women and a spirit of egalitarianism that embraces mutual 
respect, tolerance, fair play and compassion for those in need and pursuit of the 
public good 
● Australian society values equality of opportunity for individuals, regardless of their 
race, religion or ethnic background 
● The English language, as the national language, is an important unifying element of 
Australian society. 
I undertake to respect these values of Australian society during my stay in Australia and to obey 
the laws of Australia. 
I understand that, if I should seek to become an Australian citizen: 
● Australian citizenship is a shared identity, a common bond which unites all 
Australians while respecting their diversity 
● Australian citizenship involves reciprocal rights and responsibilities. The 
responsibilities of Australian Citizenship include obeying Australian laws, including 
those relating to voting at elections and serving on a jury. 
If I meet the legal qualifications for becoming an Australian citizen and my application is ap-
proved I understand that I would have to pledge my loyalty to Australia and its people.1007 
Another relevant example of the official government view of Australian values is that given by 
the National Capital Authority, the government body overseeing planning in Canberra, has 
issued instructions that the capital should reflect “national values and aspirations”, which are1008: 
 
                                                 
1007 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, “Australian Values Statement – Provisional and Permanent”,  
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Australian Values and Aspirations 
Egalitarianism 
Social Responsibility 
Freedom 
Civility 
Humour 
Democratic Principles 
Civic Awareness 
Peace 
Order 
Respect of the Rule of Law 
Mateship 
Diversity and Tolerance 
Irreverence 
Fairness 
 
Asian Australians and Australian Identity and Values 
One useful test towards determining the validity of Australian values and their conformity with 
the so-called Asian values that will be addressed in the next section is to examine how Asian 
Australians have adopted them. 
A study by Juliet Clark of the 2003 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes data, examined the 
importance of various statements in the 2003 survey. The statements measured were: having 
been born in Australia, having Australian citizenship, having lived in Australia for most of one’s 
life, having adequate English skills, to be Christian, respecting Australian political institutions 
and laws, feeling Australian and having an Australian ancestry.1009 As Clark notes, in general 
past ”research suggests that Asian Australians tend to identify with a complex and fragmented 
hybrid identity” 1010, suggesting that they may only subscribe to certain statements regarding 
national identity whilst rejecting others. Clark, however, found that Asian Australian respondents 
were generally supportive of key elements of Australian identity and had a strong sense of 
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belonging, whilst noting that the second generation Asian Australians were more likely to sup-
port Australian identity than the first generation.1011 
The most supported elements were citizenship, feeling Australian and respect of political institu-
tions.1012 Also, the study found that amongst Asian Australians sport was considered the strong-
est source of national pride, followed by scientific achievements, whilst only 19% rated historic 
achievements very important.1013 
The Asian Values Debate 
“The region, furthermore, is exceptionally diverse culturally, linguistically, and 
religiously. It is a pastiche of Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Buddhist, Muslim, and 
Christian traditions. None provides a significantly unifying cultural-religious co-
hesiveness across the region, despite the efforts of many to claim the existence of 
certain overarching Asian values”1014 
The other major component in the alleged cultural and social incompatibility of Australian and 
Asian societies is the potential existence of distinctive “Asian values” that would be in conflict 
with “Australian values”. The general observation regarding the existence of some form of 
universal values in ”Asia”, or ”East Asia” in the context of this thesis, however, is that the region 
is so diversified in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture that it makes a little sense to make any 
serious claims regarding the existence of any such ”Asian values”. 
The “Asian values” campaign, since its inception, largely revolved around, and was fuelled by, 
two Southeast Asian patriarchs; Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mohammad Mahathir of 
                                                 
1011 Clark (2007), pp. 312-314 
1012 Clark (2007),  p. 309 
1013 Clark (2007), p. 3112 
1014 Pempel (2005), p.1  
I D E A T I O N A L  A N A L Y S I S  O F  A U S T R A L I A  –  E A S T  A S I A  R E L A T I O N S  
335 
Malaysia, both of whom vigorously promoted an Asian alternative to western norms.1015 The 
first thrust for the creation of “Asian values” has been credited to Lee Kuan Yew, who already in 
the 1960s started advocating the virtues of Confucian “social discipline”, later making it a central 
concept in the Singaporean nation-building project.1016 The main component of Lee’s agenda 
was arguably Confucianism, which has been defined as ”an ethnical system and humanistic 
world view that places great emphasis on forms of conduct within relationships, and on personal 
virtue, obedience to authority, family, loyalty, social harmony and education”.1017 The first actual 
reference to universalistic “Asian values”, however, Lee made in an academic seminar in 1977 
discussing Asian values and modernization, where he attributed Singapore’s success to its 
“Asian-Oriental- hardworking, thrifty and disciplined society”.1018 Lee also juxtapositioned 
Asian and Western values, stressing the superiority of the Asian family unit and social discipline 
in comparison to break up of traditional values in the West, which he viewed as the negative side 
of modernity. Lee’s argumentation further intensified during the 1997-98 Asian financial crises 
towards praising the core “Asian values” of hard work and entrepreneurial spirit, ability to 
sacrifice for the future and respect for education and elders.1019 
The other “grand champion” of Asian values was Malaysia’s Mohammad Mahathir. Much like 
Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir had become concerned about the moral degradation that he saw as 
endemic in the Western societies from the 1960s onwards, and feared that these corrupting 
“Western values” would be an ill fit to Asia’s economic development. Within this spirit in the 
1982 UMNO General Assembly he promoted the notion of more traditional Asian values and 
urged Malaysians to ”rid ourselves of the Western values that we have absorbed”.1020 Mahathir’s 
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revulsion at “Western values” did not, however, end there but rather gathered strength as his 
conviction of the strength of “Asian values” increased as Malaysia economic development 
boomed. In 1995 he attacked ”Western hedonism”, which in his mind was characterized by for 
instance homosexuality, drugs, pornography, promiscuity and civil disobedience, among other 
vices.1021 He also criticized Western-style democracy and defended the virtues of more authori-
tarian/illiberal style democracy that would suit Asian societies better and would offer stable and 
strong governments that he considered a prerequisite for economic development and which 
would serve national interest better than the “ultra-liberal” Western approach.1022 
Beyond Lee and Mahathir: the Relevance of “Asian values” for East Asian 
Regionalism 
Whilst the “Asian values” debate was largely initiated and fuelled by the two champions Lee and 
Mahathir, and despite the fact that the debate was declared dead in the mid-1990s, it has held 
some universal credence in Asia. The 1993 “Bangkok Declaration”, which convened in prepara-
tion for the UN World Conference on Human Rights in conjunction with the caucus of Asian 
countries meeting in Bangkok, adopted a relativist view of human rights. The Bangkok Declara-
tion argued that whilst universal human rights are a positive concept, their application should be 
considered relative to culture, history and level of economic development, basically implying 
that human rights do not accord with ”Asian values”. The “Western” concept of universal human 
rights was, it argued, ignorant in relation to state sovereignty and non-interference in internal 
affairs of other states, which should not be overwritten by a concept of universal human rights. 
Above all, however, the Bangkok Declaration was a clear manifestation of the incompatibility of 
the classical Western concept of human rights, that are principally based on the rights of the 
individual, and ”Asian values” view to human rights, which emphasises more the importance of 
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collective interests and individual’s responsibilities towards other members of the society, rather 
than individual rights.1023 
The Impact of ‘Asian Values’ on East Asian Regionalism 
What are the implications of “Asian values” on Regionalism, and in particular in terms of inclu-
sion/exclusion of new members? Peter Moody has argued that “the Asian values” are essentially 
an artificial (political) construct, since Asia is merely a geographic reference instead of a cultural 
collective, referring to the diversity of the region”. Instead, Moody argues, the “Asian values” 
may rather reflect a contrast between “modernity” (West) and “tradition” (Asia) than values per 
se.1024 T.J. Pempel, moreover, points out that a number of empirical studies of national and 
regional values have shown that East Asians differ much more in terms of the major components 
of culture and values that the proponents of “Asian values” would like to acknowledge.1025 As 
examples of this, he points out to the “allegedly Confucian commonalities, most notably anti-
individualism”, that are often referred to as the universal core of “Asian values”, and argues that 
Japan for instance is closer to Western European countries in terms of individualism and secular-
ism than it is to countries that are identified as Confucian (i.e. China, Taiwan and South Korea). 
Moreover, Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia are 
much more traditional than the Northeast Asian countries.1026 The Philippines again is a majority 
Catholic country with a major Muslim minority. As such, Pempel argues, it is hard to see any 
universal system of values that transcends across regional boundaries.1027 In terms of pan-Asian 
cultural communalities, however, Pempel sees a rapid emergence of an East Asian popular 
culture contributing towards sorts of a shared component of regional identity, mostly being 
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created by the spread and popularity of Japanese Manga cartoons, Anime animated movies, 
Karaoke, Korean pop music, Star television, multinational Asian pop groups and the like.1028 
“Throughout the world, some people also see themselves as belonging to a trans-
national group (such as Asian, people of Chinese ethnicity, people who speak the 
same language or practice the same religion). Do you identify with any transna-
tional group?” 
 
Impact on Regional Institutions 
Nonetheless, “Asian values”, or perhaps more suitably- the "Asian way”, concept is clearly 
aimed at reaffirming the regions identity and differentiating itself from the West, thus engaging 
in a process of ‘othering’. The implications of this process of identity building through the 
process of ‘othering’ could potentially have drastic implications for Australia’s regional aspira-
tions. The European Union, for instance, has adopted democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights as de jure shared regional values, and Christianity as de facto common value base. As 
ASEAN aims to become a more EU-style (albeit rejecting supranationalism) regional organisa-
tion, it is also moving towards defining its shared regional values, norms and identity. In fact, 
this project is ongoing in ASEAN and is being performed in preparation for the ASEAN Com-
munity, which includes in addition to economic and security communities a Socio-Cultural 
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Community. Even more significantly, the organisation has embarked on a mission to codify 
these norms and values by establishing an ASEAN Charter. The Charter, adopted in November 
2007, sets official norms for ASEAN, perhaps surprisingly exactly the same as the EU’s: democ-
racy, the rule of law and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Taken into 
consideration Australian values, as reported in the previous section, this is good news for Austra-
lia. It would seem that least officially cultural relativism should not hinder closer relations with 
ASEAN. Moreover, the Charter also establishes a formal admission criteria for new members, 
which has a geographic criteria, i.e. that the candidate states are considered geographically 
Southeast Asian. However, unless a fixed definition of “Southeast Asia” accompanies this 
criteria, its enforcement will be subjective. Moreover, should “Southeast Asia” refer to the 
current definition, which includes the ten ASEAN states plus East Timor, it would practically 
close the door from new candidates. 
Table 24. ASEAN Admission Criteria 
1 Location in the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia; 
2 Recognition by all ASEAN Member States; 
3 Agreement to be bound and to abide by the Charter; and 
4 Ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of Membership 
 
Source: ASEAN Charter, p. 9 
The emerging East Asian Community is also in the process of developing a common identity and 
culture, as stated earlier. How much this will be based on a collection of supposedly universalis-
tic “Asian values” and how it impacts the inclusivity and exclusivity of the regional institutions, 
remains to be seen as this process is still in its early stages. Nonetheless, once again, it can be 
postulated that a strong emphasis on Asian values or “East Asian” identity and culture would be 
detrimental to Australia’s quest for inclusion. However, the inclusion of Australia in the East 
Asian Summit would suggest that, the East Asian Community is likely to be constructed as 
inclusive rather than exclusive, albeit probably being limited to the current ASEAN Plus Six 
setup in order not to dilute the organisation any further than necessary. In this case Australia’s 
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(and to a lesser extent New Zealand’s) participation could received added importance as a 
compensation for the exclusion of the United States. 
Differences in Political Culture as a differentiator 
Given the apparent weakness of "Asian values” in terms of forming an universalistic regional 
culture and identity, the importance of political values and culture may be more important for 
Australia’s inclusion in regional institutions. Whilst the opposition of some ASEAN members 
for including Australia in the regional institutions has been largely geographically or racially 
framed, it has been suggested that the difference in political values is the real problem.1029 Since 
political culture normally refers to a set of values and beliefs that provide a basis for a particular 
political system and political activity within it, this cannot be completely detached from the 
values debate that has just been covered. On a superficial level one could argue that the political 
cultures in ASEAN in particular and Australia are somewhat different. As has been suggested 
before, the political culture in ASEAN has resulted into a decision-making system that empha-
sises informality and consultation and consensus,1030 constituting a distinctive political culture 
that is commonly referred to as the “ASEAN way”.1031 
The Australian political system on the other hand is distinctively a Westminster parliamentary 
system accompanied by a political culture that is distinctively Western. As a result, Australian 
politics is characterised by process oriented and rules based decision-making, and perhaps also a 
more outspoken, critical and confrontational political activity. 
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Political values, in East Asia and Australia have clashed on multiple occasions, most frequently 
over human rights in general and the death penalty in particular. The death penalty is a widely 
spread practice in East Asia for serious crime such as drugs smuggling and murder. Australia 
categorically opposes the death penalty for any reason, which has led it into conflict with Singa-
pore and Malaysia in particular (but also with Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam). For instance, 
the Howard government launched an unsuccessful campaign against the execution of convicted 
Australian drug smuggler Nguyen Tuong Van in Singapore in 2005, going to an unusual length 
and angering the Singaporean government who blamed Australia for meddling in its internal 
affairs and the functioning of its judicial system. The ALP opposition at the same time blamed 
the government for ‘inconsistency’ in its policy towards death penalty in the region and in 
particular not condemning the executions of the Bali bombers in Indonesia, endorsing the execu-
tion of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden if caught. In comparison, the ALP pledged to 
pressure the 14 Asian countries where the death penalty is enforced if elected, in order to “regain 
Australia’s reputation as a good international citizen”1032. Whether the ALP government elected 
into power in November 2007 will do this remains to be seen. 
There is, however, a curious paradox in the different approaches of Coalition and ALP govern-
ments in dealing with Asia; the Howard government emphasised the difference of Australian 
culture and values from the region but also called for, and largely implemented, a policy of 
‘mutual respect’, advocating non-interference in internal affairs; whilst in comparison, the ALP 
governments, under Hawke and Keating first, and since November 2007 onwards under Kevin 
Rudd, have not only exercised ’comprehensive engagement’ in order to integrate with Asia but 
interestingly also advocate ’universal values’, including criticising the Asian neighbours for their 
human rights violations and deficiencies. 
The election of the Rudd ALP government in November 2007 indeed proved to give birth to a 
renewed program of comprehensive engagement with Asia as one of three pillars of Australian 
foreign policy, in addition to the special relationship with the United States and the emphasis on 
the United Nations. This was hardly surprising as Kevin Rudd had a well known and established 
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career as an Asian expert, having completed a Asian studies degree in the university, being a 
Mandarin speaker and having served as a diplomat in China. Rudd has also been an active 
advocate of Asian studies in Australia and increased understanding of Asia for many years 
before becoming the Prime Minister. Thus, when Rudd proposed the establishment of an Asia 
Pacific community (APc) in 2008, few observers were surprised. The APc, according to Rudd, 
would become a regional institution that would span the entire Asia Pacific region, including the 
United States, India and China, in practical terms bringing existing institutions - APEC, ASEAN 
and the East Asia Summit under a universal regional architecture. The APc proposal, however, 
received cool reception from leading ASEAN states; in particular Indonesia and Singapore, and 
concrete developments are yet forthcoming. APc has also once more remained us of the diversity 
of regional states in terms of economic and political systems, as well as culture and religion, 
which makes it challenging to receive adequate backing for such grand schemes. In addition to 
the tremendous diversity within the region, the implementation of the APc idea has been further 
complicated by increasing tensions between China and the United States and China and India. 
Thus, what, if anything, will become of the APc, remains to be seen at the time of writing. 
Rudd government’s comprehensive engagement has also met some difficulties, in particular due 
to growing tensions with China following the Stern Hu case and the publishing of an Australian 
defence white paper portraying China as a potential threat. 
Regardless of the APc proposal’s outcome, the Rudd government era will offer an interesting test 
to the balancing act of interests based drive to seek inclusion in the region, whilst adhering to the 
liberal-internationalist ideological base. It will also strengthen the case for comparing Australia’s 
position in East Asian Regionalism under different governments, i.e. Hawke-Keating ALP 
government, eleven years of Howard’s Coalition government and the possible continuation of 
“engagement” under Rudd ALP government. 
7.5 People-to-People Contacts and Education in Engagement 
Another aspect, and a useful tool for engagement, is the active people-to-people contacts be-
tween East Asia and Australia, in the form of tourist and business visitors from and to the region, 
as well as an increasing amount of Asian students attending vocational and higher-education 
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courses in Australia. Finally, Australia’s Asia literacy, the knowledge of Asian business prac-
tices, culture and languages has been consistently labelled as one of the most important forms of 
engagement, both in Australia and in the region. This section will examine the extent, nature and 
impact of these aspects of Australia’s regionness. 
Tourism and Business 
In addition to immigrants and students, people-to-people contacts with Asia have been signifi-
cantly promoted by tourists and business people travelling to and from Asia. Since the 1960s in 
particular there has been a steady increase in people-to-people contacts between East Asians and 
Australians. 
Inbound Asian Tourism to Australia 
Whilst New Zealand and Britain have been the traditional sources of tourists, an increasing 
amount of inbound tourist arrivals today come from Asia, primarily from East Asia, Japan being 
the most important source market of international visitors to Australia. .1033Asian tourism in 
general experienced tremendous growth in the 1990s and in 1995-96 a total of 2,017,000 Asians 
visited Australia, accounting for approximately 50% of the total short-term visitors. In 1996-97 
the position of Asia as the most important source region for tourism became further solidified 
with over 50% of short-term visitors originating from the region.1034 Japan’s share of the Asian 
tourism, as well as share of overall tourist arrivals, also increased further in the 1990s. Japan had 
already become the largest Asian source market in 1980, accounting for 35.2% of all Asian 
visitors, further increasing to 58.6% in the peak year of 1991, but by 1995-96 the Japanese 
already accounted for 20.5% of the total international arrivals.1035 By 2003 Japan had become the 
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most important source market in overall, accounting for 588,000 (13%) of total international 
visitors and vast majority (80%) of holiday visitors 
China has become a major growth market, in particular since Australia was made an approved 
destination in 1998, to the extent that in 2003 it accounted for 4% of total international visi-
tors.1036 Indonesia, Australia’s close neighbour, is also an important market accounting for 2% of 
international visitors. The numbers of Indonesian visitors peaked in 2001, reaching 89,000 for 
the year, but have since then decreased. In 2003, for instance, the total number of arrivals was 
80,000, 21% of whom were here for education.1037 
Outbound Australian Tourism to Asia 
Although it is hard to travel to or from Australia without at least passing through Asia, the region 
has not been a traditional destination for Australian tourists, who have rather traditionally merely 
transited via Asia to their final destinations in Europe or North America. However, when the 
Australian dollar was floated in 1983, the traditional destinations in Europe and North America 
became more expensive and Australian holiday-makers were motivated to discover 
Asia.1038Once the Australian holiday-makers had discovered Asia (Bali in particular), however, 
they were hooked. Correspondingly, by 1995 a total of 939,000 Australians had travelled to Asia 
on holidays, twice the number in comparison to 1985.1039 By the late-1990s, the trend had be-
come permanent; in 1997 322,000 Australians travelled to the UK, but already 311,000 chose 
Indonesia as their travel destination. In 1998 Indonesia (mostly Bali) already overtook the UK 
and the US and became the second most popular travel destinations after New Zealand.1040 
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Education as Engagement: Overseas Students and Asian Studies in 
Australia Asian Students in Australia 
The first significant influx of student arrivals from Asia took place within the context of the 1951 
Colombo Plan, in which Australia was one of the most active participants in particular in terms 
of educational aid, taking in thousands of Asian students.1041Besides the humanitarian motiva-
tions, the Colombo Plan student scheme was justified by an idea of creating “ambassadors” for 
Australia in Asia. However, many cited discrimination, bitterness and estrangement as primary 
sentiments, rather than any sort of deep connection with Australia.1042 Malayan, Singaporean and 
Indian Colombo Plan students complained that Australians did not think about Asia at all, except 
in demeaning stereotypes, and that Australians were condescending and ignorant about Asian 
countries presuming that all of them were underdeveloped.1043 At least part of the reason for the 
feeling of disappointment was the stereotypes the Asian students brought with them. For in-
stance, “Indonesian students were prepared for Australia by a school history textbook, Sari 
Sedjarah, which emphasised Australia’s convicts, fear of Asia, restricted migration, and depend-
ence on Western powers”.1044 Consequently, although many warm personal relationships were 
indeed formed between the plan students and individual Australians, the Colombo Plan did not 
assure Australia of the thousands of lifelong friends among well-placed alumni that it was 
expected to do.1045 
Moreover, where as the Colombo Plan certainly was significant in its time, the program did not 
remain the primary source of Asian student for long and by 1962 only 250 of the total 5000 
Malayan students were actually plan students.1046 Finally, the plan came to the end of its life with 
the restructuring of Australia’s aid program in the 1970s, within which education was made part 
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of developmental assistance and Asian students were largely admitted as government sponsored 
students in relatively small numbers. 
In the 1980s Australia executed a shift from “educational aid” to “educational trade”, ending the 
sponsored studentship policy and establishing a full fee paying system. When the fee paying 
system was established many feared that establishing a fee paying system would deter overseas 
students from coming, but the reverse happened.1047In fact the growth was rather spectacular 
with the number of overseas students studying in Australia growing from 9654 in 1987 to 38,011 
in 1989 and 53,000 in 1996. By mid-1990s over 90% of these students originated from Asia – 
Malaysia, China and Japan being the largest source countries.1048 The reasons behind Australia’s 
popularity were simply its relative closeness to the main Asian source countries and competitive 
cost of Australian degrees: “in 1992 an Australian report found that students in 11 Asian coun-
tries were attracted by the proximity and relative cheapness of education in Australia, but were 
put off by the businesslike promotion of education, and by concerns about racism.”1049 
Following the 1997 financial crisis the overseas students numbers declined somewhat, but it 
proved to be temporary, Australia was still attractive in a sense that it remained relatively 
cheaper and closer than the UK, the US and Canada, albeit the latter were considered more 
prestigious destinations.1050 In fact, since passing of the financial crisis Asia has become the 
primary source of overseas students in Australia. For instance in 2007 of the total of 371,691 
student visas granted, Chinese students were the largest single group, comprising 22% of all 
international student visas, followed by Indian (14%), Korean (7%) and high numbers of Malay-
sian and Indonesian students.1051 
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Table 25. Top Source Countries of Overseas Students 2004-2008 
Countries 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
India 10 000 15 396 28 949 39 015 
China, People's Republic of 17 506 15 877 24 915 31 511 
Korea, Republic of 9 328 11 657 12 910 12 013 
United States of America 10 367 9 635 9 289 9 167 
Malaysia 6 609 6 446 7 175 8 004 
Nepal 361 835 4 471 7 879 
Brazil 3 118 4 439 5 223 6 857 
Thailand 4 818 5 391 5 986 6 709 
Indonesia 4 751 5 059 5 403 5 933 
Vietnam 4 838 4 561 4 609 5 648 
 
Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/50students.htm#h 
The Impact of Asian Overseas Students on Engagement 
How then has the influx of Asian students contributed to the process of “engagement”? Whilst a 
large portion of the Asian overseas students have become permanent migrants after completing 
their studies, the experiences have not been exclusively positive. For instance, surveys in the 
1980s and 1990s amongst Chinese students in Australia not only revealed displeasure in terms of 
feelings of being cheated of fees, but also general negative images of Australia as underdevel-
oped, isolated, expensive and unwelcoming.1052 
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A relatively high number of graduates from Australian institutions, for instance, were in highly 
influential positions in Indonesian elite, e.g. Ratih Hardjono and Dewi Fortuna Anwar as advi-
sors for presidents Habibie’s and Abdurrahman Wahid (“Gus Dur”), at the time Australia’s 
reputation hit the bottom. In fact, in 2002 a total of four Indonesian cabinet members were 
Aussie graduates, one of the worst years in the record of bilateral relations.1053 
Another fairly popular line of criticism is that the mass recruitment of Asian students has en-
couraged them to sticking together, living, studying, and socialising in groups with minimal 
contact with their Australian peers.1054 Nonetheless, it is quite hard to provide credible arguments 
that the time spent in Australia has not left any permanent impressions, at least some of them 
positive, in the minds of bright young Asian students who often become successful and influen-
tial in their respective fields in their home countries. 
Asian Studies and Study of Asian Languages in Australia 
“Australians know less about Asian than other parts of the world, yet Asia’s Role 
in Australia’s trade, security and culture is inescapable – and growing”1055 
It has been suggested numerous times that creating a good level of knowledge of Asian cultures, 
economy, history, politics and languages in Australia is essential for closer engagement with 
East Asia. Reflecting this notion, in particular amongst the elites and officials, between 1969 and 
1994 alone altogether sixteen officially commissioned reports urged an increase in the offering 
of Asian studies and languages in Australian schools and universities,1056 most of them published 
in the heydays of the “engagement” project in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Whilst the specific 
focus of these reports differed somewhat they all promoted the notion that having a more “Asia 
literate” population would significantly boost Australia’s economic performance and re-
                                                 
1053 Broinowski (2003), p. 129 
1054 Broinowski (2003), p. 128 
1055 Asian Studies Association of Australia (2002), Maximizing Australia’s Asia Knowledge: Repositioning and 
Renewal of a National Asset,  Canberra, p xv 
1056 Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003),  p. 280 
I D E A T I O N A L  A N A L Y S I S  O F  A U S T R A L I A  –  E A S T  A S I A  R E L A T I O N S  
349 
gional/international standing. Some of the significant reports to this effect were the Auchmuty 
Report of 1971, FitzGerald Report of 1980, the Ingleson Report (Asia in Australian Higher 
Education) in 1989, Garnaut’s “Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy” in 1989 and the 
“Rudd Report” in 1994. 
One of the first reports linking Asian knowledge directly to Australia’s strategic interests was 
Ross Garnaut’s "Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy” commissioned by Prime Minis-
ter Bob Hawke in 1989. The report highlighted the need for increased understanding of Asian 
history, geography, economics, politics, culture and languages, suggesting that this would be 
more important for Australia’s future than understanding of “few countries” in Europe or having 
German or French as second languages. The report, however, recognised that achieving this 
would take time, perhaps generations and that thus, the emphasis should be on establishing a 
base for better understanding of Asia by promoting Asian studies in primary and secondary 
schools.1057 The report referred to the findings of the Asian Studies Council strategy paper 
indicating that 97 % of university and college graduates completed their degree courses without a 
single unit focused on Asia and agreed with the objective of 5 % of tertiary students studying 
Asian language by 1995. Moreover, Garnaut endorsed as “reasonable and feasible” the objec-
tives of the council’s report suggesting that by 2000 the study of an Asian language would be 
considered normal in schools, Year 12 students would have an understanding of Asian cultures, 
geographies and economies by 2000 and that by 2010 most Australians would have a reasonable 
understanding of Asian culture, geography and economics.1058 Emphasising the importance of 
education in the efforts to capture the benefits of the East Asian economic miracle, it promoted 
the establishment of students exchange programs with East Asian countries, strengthening 
teacher training in Asian studies and taking Asia related research and teaching in tertiary educa-
tion beyond languages and social sciences to other areas of study. 
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By 1992 it was becoming obvious that the goals from the Garnaut report were not going to be 
met. In an annual Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting in December 1992 the 
state premiers and the Prime Minister representing the Commonwealth debated the need to 
increase the study of Asian languages and cultures in Australia, deciding to commission a high-
level working group led by Kevin Rudd to draft a strategy for enhancing Asian languages and 
studies in Australia. The “Rudd Report” of 1994, officially known as "Asian Languages and 
Australia’s Economic Future”, suggested a direct link between Asian language skills and Austra-
lia’s export performance. The report promoted a strategy focusing on four priority languages in 
second language provision, based on their perceived economic significance to Australia; Japa-
nese, Chinese (Mandarin), Indonesian and Korean. Perhaps the most ambitious target the report 
set was the objective that 15% of Year 12 students should be studying one of these priority Asian 
languages and an additional 10% of students studying other languages by 2006.1059 The report 
and its implementation as the National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools 
(NALSAS) Strategy, which commenced in 1995, arguably set the basis for Asian languages until 
the Howard government terminated the Commonwealth’s commitment to the strategy in 2002. 
How well have these objectives been met? Almost as often as the reports have promoted the 
importance of Asian languages and knowledge, they have also conveyed a sense of frustration 
over the current state of affairs. Indeed, establishing Asian studies and languages in Australian 
schools and tertiary education has been a rocky road with varying degrees of success along the 
way. In the 1960s and 1970s the emphasis and interest was on Southeast Asia, probably sparked 
by the Vietnam War, with a particular focus on more general knowledge and social sciences 
programs, such as Bachelor of Arts (Asian Studies) degree programs.1060 In 1976 the Asian 
Studies Association of Australia was established to promote the study of Asia in Australia. 1061 
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One of the first higher-education institutes promoting Asian studies beyond social sciences was 
the Asian Business Research Programme in University of Melbourne established in 1979.1062 A 
spike of initial interest in Asian studies, however, was soon turning into decline in the early 
1980s, possibly due to the improving regional security situation, until the “East Asian Miracle” 
in the late 1980s reinvigorated at least the elites’ interest. In particular the ALP governments of 
Hawke and Keating were vigorously promoting Asian studies and combining them with profes-
sional and functional skills in areas such as law, commerce, engineering, etc.1063The subsequent 
government funding spree produced an increase in the establishment of Asian institutes in 
Australian universities in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the late 1980s an Asian Law Centre 
was established in the University of Melbourne whilst the Research Institute of Asia and the 
Pacific was set up in University of Sydney. In the 1990s also an Asia-Australia Institute was set 
up in the University of New South Wales and an Asian Business Centre in the University of 
Melbourne.1064 Eventually by mid-1990s all self-respecting universities had established Asia 
institutes and/or Asian studies programs. 
Asian Languages Teaching in Australia 
The development of the study of Asian languages from the 1980s to late-1990s was quite posi-
tive and already in the 1980s 2.2 % of Year 12 students were taking an Asian language.1065 The 
positive trend further increased in the 1990s and between 1994 and 1997 the amount of secon-
dary school students learning Japanese increased by 50 000, Chinese by 20 000 and Indonesian 
by 100 000. By 1999 Japanese had become the number one foreign language in Year 12 assess-
ments.1066 
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The situation of Asian languages training in institutions of higher education, however, has not 
been quite as encouraging. According to the report "Maximizing Australia’s Asia Knowledge”, 
produced by the Association of Asian Studies in Australia, fewer Asian languages were offered 
by fewer universities in 2001.1067 Moreover, the languages considered as “major” Asian lan-
guages; Japanese, Chinese and Indonesian, were all available only in one university. Signifi-
cantly, and in contrast to the ambitious goals of the earlier reports, the report concluded that 
fewer than 3% of students enrolled in Australian universities studied an Asian language.1068 If 
the findings of the 2001 report were not depressing enough, the further downturn in Asian langue 
studies from 2001 onwards depressed the final remaining optimists. In 2007 reports about Asian 
language studies in Australia - Languages in Crisis: A Rescue Plan for Australia by Go8 univer-
sities and Call for Action, produced jointly by Australian Academy of Humanities, the Go8 
universities, the Australian Council for State School Organisations and the Australian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, found that 90-95% of Australian undergraduates did not undertake 
any language study and less than 13% completed a full Year 12 language program. Significantly, 
the growth of European languages was such that the number of Australian undergraduates 
enrolled in French and Spanish equalled the total first year enrolments in all Asian language 
courses. The trends in European and Asian languages, in fact, could hardly be more different: 
whilst there was a 12% increase in European languages in the beginner’s level between 2005 and 
2007, there was a simultaneous 11% decline in Asian languages1069 
Moreover, undergraduate study of Asia decreased in 2001 with less than 5% of students enrolled 
in Asian studies programs, which was nowhere near the “Ingleson Report” target of 20% by 
2000.1070 In fact, whilst there arguably had been reasonable improvement towards the goals, it 
was assessed that 95% of Australian students still completed their courses without a single unit 
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focused on Asia.1071 The expert pool was also noted to be in decline with no more than 400 “Asia 
specialists”, defined as ”people who have spent considerable periods of time in Asian countries, 
know languages, do research and write about aspects of Asia”. One particular reason for the 
declining numbers was that due to the good reputation of Asian studies in Australia, Asia experts 
were being increasingly headhunted overseas.1072 
Some positive developments, however, had also occurred, not the least in terms of course offer-
ings in the higher education sector. Chinese language was offered in 26 institutions across 
Australia and between 2001 and 2005 and growth rate for enrolments reached 62% (further 
increasing to 711 enrolments in 2007). However, as a general trend, native speakers of Mandarin 
Chinese made up only half of the enrolments.1073 Japanese, on the other hand, was offered in 32 
institutions, attracting a total of 2135 enrolments in 2007. Korean, the third priority language 
identified in the Rudd Report, was taught in 7 institutions, attracting only 158 enrolments in 
2007.1074 
7.6 Regional Discourses: Asian Images of Australia and 
Australian Images of Asia 
In addition to having perceived differences in values and identity and political cultures, Australia 
and the region have quite different discursive practices, which further complicate Australia’s 
inclusion in the region. Some of these discourses include "othering” within the context of politi-
cal discourse, in both the region and Australia. What complicates the situation even more is that 
the relevant discourses in Asia are dominated by the elites, whereas in Australia there is a very 
lively public participation in Regionalism discourse. Also, in terms of public opinion, feelings 
towards Asia are polled in Australia frequently, whereas Australia’s image in Asia much less so. 
The fact that the onus of interest is with the Australians, is perhaps a sign of Australia being 
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somewhat more interested in the region than vice versa. Mutual perceptions also matter. Austra-
lia’s images in the region vary from favourable to one of a racist country and a regional bully, 
whilst the images of Asia in the perceptions of Australians vary from a source of threat to one of 
opportunity. Negative mutual perceptions could well hinder Australia’s integration into the 
region, whilst positive mutual perceptions would be beneficial. 
Asian Views of Australia 
According to Alison Broinowski Australia’s image in the region’s countries tend to fall under 
two rough categories: “1) a land of freedom and responsible government, a working man’s 
paradise of prosperity and equality and a ‘friend and neighbour to the region’, and 2) White 
Australia policy, racism and oppression of Aborigines.”1075 Alternatively, Australia has been 
perceived in the region as a distant and unknown country, attracting little interest, sometimes 
with a negative connotation, described as “uninteresting”, “isolated”, “distant”, “peripheral” and 
“innocuous”.1076 Also, in a similar spirit but with a more negative connotation, Australia has at 
times been characterised as ”third rate Western country”, for instance by Lee Kuan Yew, proba-
bly reflecting the country’s image as a primary producer Western country without the techno-
logical or cultural sophistication of major Western counterparts. 
However, whilst Australia’s image in the region is not necessarily negative in general, it is the 
negative images and stereotypes that arguably have hindered Australia’s engagement with the 
region, as well as may continue to do so in the future. Of these, two particularly negative and 
recurring topics are evident: 1) that of a racist Australia and the perception of discrimination 
against Asians in particular, and 2) a client state to the United States, playing the role of a re-
gional deputy sheriff under the direction of a global policeman. 
White Australia 
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The image of White Australia has been a historical burden for Australia’s relations with the 
region, as perceptions of oppression of aborigines and hostility towards Asian immigrants has 
been relatively common, in particular in the midst of elites. In fact, although the White Australia 
was officially abolished already in the 1970s, this image is not only a historical burden, but the 
stereotype has remained persistent also in the contemporary regional discourse on Australia. The 
race topic has been a particularly popular topic to the East Asian elite and thought leaders, 
especially to the long-serving former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, who as the minister 
for education in 1974 commented about student riots in Kuala Lumpur and blamed Australian 
influence as a source of unrest: “We don’t need any advice from them on how to run this coun-
try…..They should learn how to solve their own problems first; They solve their problems by 
shooting Aborigines and having a White Australia policy”.1077 Australian racism has also been 
occasionally in the focus of East Asian media, mainly in printed news media, but also on national 
TV. The Malaysian TV3 for instance aired a four-part documentary series “The Ugly Face of 
Australia” in 1991, which portrayed a country of racial discrimination of Aborigines and 
Asians.1078 
However, what really elevated the issue to the attention of the masses in Asia was the media 
attention revolving around Pauline Hanson’s short but intense political success and the debate it 
created in Australia. The Southeast Asian press in particular published series of articles about 
racism in Australia, generally arguing that individual Aussies were perhaps not racist, but collec-
tively as a society Australia was.1079The Northeast Asian media also noted the race issue and 
stories of racism were also published in Japanese, Chinese and Taiwanese newspapers. The 
South China Morning Post for instance reported that Taiwanese students were among the victims 
of racially motivated attacks.1080 Similarly the purportedly racially motivated attacks against 
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Singaporean soldiers attending joint exercises in Shoalwater Bay area in October 1996 received 
extensive media attention in the region.1081 
The governments of Southeast Asian countries in particular took the fear of “out of control” 
racism in Australia so seriously that they communicated their concerns regarding the safety of 
their citizens studying, working and visiting in the country in very blatant terms to the Australian 
government, and in some cases even calling their citizens to return home if they were discrimi-
nated against or felt threatened. Two members of the Singaporean Parliament also raised a 
motion for the Singaporean government to seek formal assurances from the Australian govern-
ment to ensure that Singaporean citizens would be properly protected whilst in the country.1082 
The Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong later admitted that bilateral ties between the 
two countries had indeed been damaged by the race row, followed by a similar assessment by the 
Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas.1083Fearing further impact on regional relations the Aus-
tralian government launched a diplomatic PR campaign to counter the impact of the race debate. 
Deputy Prime Minister Tim Fisher, whilst on a visit to Singapore assured the local media that 
Australia is very much a racially-tolerant country.1084 
Regardless of the Australian government’s attempts to lessen the impact of the negative media 
attention, Australia’s image in the region suffered and the White Australia legacy resurfaced 
once again. Moreover, the race debate resulted in a negative economic impact as business and 
investment confidence towards Australia in the region took a downturn. The Asia Pulse poll of 
senior Asian executives in December 1996, for instance, revealed that 67% of respondents were 
not satisfied with the Australian government stance and 80% of South Korean respondents 
believed the race debate had made Australia less attractive for Asian investment. The results 
were also dismal across the region; 64.7% of executives in Malaysia, 61.3% in Hong Kong, 
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53.8% in Taiwan and on average 51% of all respondents thought Australia had become less 
attractive for Asian investment and business. Moreover, 55.8% believed Australians were racist 
(70% in South Korea). In Singapore 88.2% believed Singapore treated immigrants better than 
Australia Asians.1085 
Whilst having been relatively dormant for the most recent years, the White Australia image was 
again resurfacing in 2009 due to a spike in allegedly racially motivated attacks against Asian 
students. The attacks not only motivated demonstrations by Asian students, but also prompted 
the Indian, Indonesian and Chinese governments to demand their citizens are protected whilst in 
Australia. Moreover, the Indian government took the manner so seriously that the Indian Prime 
Minister Singh took up the issue in his meeting with Kevin Rudd and the Indian High Commis-
sioner to Australia appealed the officials to guarantee the safety of Indian students in Austra-
lia.1086. 
Deputy Sheriff & America’s Dancing Monkey 
Another topic that has raised significant doubt regarding Australia’s regionness is its alliance and 
particularly close relationship with the United States. The Australia-US alliance has been a 
source of suspicion about Australia’s true intentions in particular toward China, where the rather 
common suspicion is that Australia is part of a US-led coalition aiming to contain China’s rise. 
Whilst Australia has alliance partners in Southeast Asia, the image of Australia being a client 
state of the United States, or in popular terms “America’s dancing monkey”1087, is far from 
uncommon. Moreover, whilst a number of East Asian states are also allies of the United States, 
as well as Australia, at least two particular issues have reinforced the suspicions towards Austra-
lia’s intentions towards the region and its place in it. 
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The first of these two was sparked by John Howard’s 1999 interview in the Bulletin, where he 
indicated that Australia might consider pre-emptive strikes outside of its borders. This, as has 
been pointed out earlier, greatly angered a number of countries in Southeast Asia, but in particu-
lar Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The second was Australia’s role in the East Timor crisis. Whilst Japan officially praised Austra-
lia’s leadership in INTERFET and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested that Australia 
should be accepted as an Asian country for its role,1088 many Southeast Asian states were none-
theless upset by this show of force in their region. Once again, the anti-Australian rhetoric was 
headed by Malaysia and in particular Indonesia, which reportedly even considered declaring war 
on Australia.1089Whilst no drastic conflict between Australia and the regional states actually took 
place as a consequence of the East Timor crisis, it did nonetheless lead into what Broinowski has 
described as ”image wars”, a battle between an image of Australia as a good international citizen 
and Asian neighbour and that of an aggressor and a bully.1090 
Moreover, these ”image wars” also involved the construction of ”othering”, essentially suggest-
ing that as an outsider Australia should not have meddled into the affairs of a regional state. 
Once again Mahathir was in the frontline, arguing for Australia’s otherness by stating that "it 
was better for the peacekeeping duty to be assumed by our own kin than unrelated persons”.1091 
An Malaysian military commander, mirroring Mahathir, elaborated about Australia’s regionness: 
“it is not an accepted fact in this part of the world”….”the hearts and minds of Australians were 
thousands of miles away on another continent”.1092 
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1089 Broinowski (2003), p. 178 
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1091 Broinowski (2003), p. 188 
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Indonesian Public Opinion towards Australia 
According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Global Views 2006 Australia is generally 
positively viewed in the region, albeit it is not considered particularly influential in Asia, con-
trary to the belief of many Australians.1093In fact, it would seem that in general Australia is 
considered rather inconsequential in the minds of Asian populations and it does not usually 
inspire emotional responses, unlike major powers such as the United States or Britain. The most 
plausible exception to this rule would be Australia’s closest neighbour Indonesia. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly the Lowy Poll 2006 found that in general the Indonesian public 
opinion towards Australia is relatively positive, Indonesian respondents rating Australia at 51° in 
the thermometer scale. In line with the Global Views 2006 survey, Indonesians did not find 
Australia particularly influential in Asia, rating it at 6.1 (on a 0-10 scale), behind e.g. the Euro-
pean Union (6.5) and Indonesia (6.9). Nonetheless, a clear majority of Indonesian respondents 
agreed with the statement that ‘Indonesia benefits from having Australia as a stable and prosper-
ous neighbour (7.4), and that ‘Australia has shown itself to be a reliable long term friend of 
Indonesia’ (7.0). Consequently the importance of good bilateral relations was rated quite high, 
77% of respondents agreeing with the statement ’it is very important that Australia and Indonesia 
work to develop a close relationship’. Finally, whilst acknowledging the cultural and other 
differences between the two countries, only 22% thought they were too different to cooperate 
and improve relations.  
 
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 14 
                                                 
1093 Global Views 2006, p. 8 
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However, the majority of Indonesian respondents also thought that Australia’s policy towards 
Indonesia is too much influenced by its alliance with the United States (6.6). Perhaps because of 
the East Timor crisis and the Papuan asylum seekers issue, Indonesians were also still suspicious 
of Australia’s intentions and conduct towards Indonesia, with the majority of the respondents 
agreeing with the statement "Australia has a tendency to interfere in Indonesia’s affairs too 
much" (6.7), and even that “Indonesia is right to worry that Australia is seeking to separate the 
province of West Papua from Indonesia” (6.8). Indonesians were also not too convinced that 
Australia had the right to be concerned about an Indonesian military threat (5.0).1094 
 
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 19 
Australian Views of Asia 
“For most of the two centuries since the first white settlement, Australians have 
been uneasy about their geography. Rather than viewing their proximity to Asia 
as a potential advantage, they perceived the region as a source of insecurity.”1095 
The traditional argument is that Australians have been rather uneasy about their geographical 
location, and thus their neighbours, mainly seeing the region as a source of threat rather than 
opportunities. One of Australia’s most legendary prime ministers Sir Robert Menzies famously 
declared in his book published in 1970 that Australia was ‘being washed on our western and 
                                                 
1094 Lowy Institute for International Policy (2006),The Lowy Institute Poll 2006 ,Sydney,  pp. 19-20 
1095 McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), pp 119-120 
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northern shores by potentially hostile seas’.1096 A former head of Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade and a distinguished diplomat, Alan Renouf, critical of such notions published a book 
titled “The Frightened Country” in 1979, criticising that Australia was unnecessarily obsessed 
with a fear of invasion by its neighbours.1097 On the other hand, the critics of Hawke’s and 
Keating’s policies argued that their “Asia only” policies surrendered the country’s future entirely 
to the mercy of its neighbours. Moreover, the argument was that the “Asia only” policies were a 
creation of the elites, enjoying little backing from ordinary Australians (‘battlers’). 
Australian Views on Regional Security 
It has been argued that the historical fear of the region has dominated Australian discourses and 
public opinion regarding East Asia and Australia’s place in the region. Historically this has 
arguably been the case. Immediately following WWII Japan held the questionable honour of 
being the greatest threat in the minds of Australians until communist China took over Japan in 
the 1950s and held the questionable mantle in public opinion until mid-1970s. Most likely 
influenced by Australian experiences of Indonesian aggression during the Malay Emergency, the 
Konfrontasi and the invasion of East Timor in 1975 China was replaced by Indonesia in the early 
1980s as the major concern for the Australian public.1098However, due to the rapidly growing 
Japanese investment in the late 1980s Japan once again caused a public outcry and elevated fears 
of Japanese domination of the Australian economy.1099 These fears, however, were mostly 
alleviated towards the 1990s and coinciding with the high point of the engagement project public 
opinion also turned more positive towards economic cooperation with the region. 
McAllister and Ravenhill, in their study of data from the 1996 Australian Election Study survey, 
found that by 1996 perceptions of Asia in Australia had changed from a sense of threat and 
suspicion into admiration of the region’s economic dynamism. The sense of potential threat, as 
                                                 
1096 See: Menzies, R.G (1970), The Measure of the Years, Cassell Australia, Melbourne, p. 44 
1097 Renouf, Alan (1979), The Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne  
1098 McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), p. 124 
1099 McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), p. 126 
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suggested by the ‘frightened country’ thesis, did not receive significant backing from the study. 
Out of the ten countries nominated none posed a credible threat according to 64% of the respon-
dents. Only Indonesia, China and Japan were seen ‘very likely’ to pose a threat to Australian 
security by more than 10% of the respondents, Indonesia and China receiving the highest rat-
ings.1100 
Country Very Likely Fairly Likely Not Very Likely 
China 17% 37.6% 36.9% 
Indonesia 22% 33.4% 37.7% 
Japan 9.7% 19.2% 61.9% 
 
Source: AVS 1996 data 
Moreover, the passing of the Cold War and emergence of the Post-Cold War order had appar-
ently convinced the public that cooperation with the region was vital to Australia’s future, to the 
extent that 28% of the respondents indicated that Australia should cooperate with Asia rather 
than the United States.1101 The majority of respondents also backed the view that defence coop-
eration with regional states, specifically China, Indonesia and Japan, was either ‘important’ of 
‘fairly important’: 
Country Very Important Fairly Important Not Important 
China 34.6% 40.9% 17% 
Indonesia 40% 40.2% 12.6% 
Japan 38.3% 43.2% 11.8% 
United States 61.8% 27.7% 5.3% 
 
Source: AVS 1996 data 
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1101 McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), p. 130 
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The motive behind the support for engagement was almost certainly mainly economic; 2/3 of 
respondents believed that Australia’s trading future lies with Asia, whilst only 9% disagreed.1102 
Also, the opposition’s claim that “engagement” was exclusive an elite project received little 
backing, 54% of the respondents declaring that they backed the Keating government policy of 
engaging with Asia.1103 Yet, Keating lost the actual election in 1996 to the coalition of Liberal 
and National parties led by John Howard, though this may be inconsequential as domestic topis 
tend to have a much more importance for the outcome of elections and thus, the election result 
probably had very little to do with opposition to “comprehensive engagement”. 
Contemporary Public Opinion: The region as a source of opportunities 
The Lowy Institute Polls (2005-2008) surveyed Australian public opinion regarding contempo-
rary foreign policy issues, including Australia’s security. In the 2005 poll respondents were 
asked to rate a number of international security threats according to the level of concern ranging 
from ‘very worried’ to ‘not at all worried’. The number one concern for the respondents was 
nuclear weapons proliferation, 51% of the respondents saying they were “very worried” and 20% 
“fairly worried” about the issue. Nuclear proliferation was closely followed by global warming 
(46/24) and international terrorism (41/22) as top security concerns for Australians. Topics that 
were closely associated with the region, such as illegal immigration (23/21), failing states in the 
region (17/29) and China’s rise (16/19), were in the bottom of the list. By 2006 international 
terrorism had, however, become the number one threat, 73% of the respondents rating it as a 
critical threat, whilst nuclear proliferation (70%) and global warming (68%) were also identified 
as major concerns. Islamic fundamentalism (60%) also appeared on the list for the first time as a 
major concern. Significantly, only 25% reported that they viewed China’s rise as a critical threat 
to Australia’s security. The 2008 poll saw little significant changes in threat perceptions, except 
that water security took over the position as the number one threat, most likely driven by domes-
tic concerns. Food shortages also emerged as a new source of threat. 
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Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2008, p10 
The Lowy Polls also test the public’s feelings towards other countries, including the major 
regional powers. In the 2005 poll Australians unsurprisingly displayed particularly positive 
feelings towards New Zealand and the United Kingdom, but also towards a majority of regional 
states. From 2006 onwards the polls have measured feelings towards other countries in a format 
of a "thermometer” on the scale where above 50° corresponds to “warm” and under 50° to 
"cooler” feelings towards the tested countries. In 2007, again rather unsurprisingly, New Zealand 
(81°) and the United Kingdom (75°) once again topped the list, whilst feelings towards the 
United States (60°) were warm, but considerably less so. Moreover, feelings towards the United 
States were somewhat cooler than towards Singapore (64°) and Japan (63°). Other regional 
states, such as Vietnam (60°), Malaysia (58°) and China (56°) inspired mainly warm feelings 
amongst the respondents. Indonesia was the only East Asian country that attracted cooler (47°) 
feeling, doing so constantly from poll to poll. Whilst Australians were somewhat reserved 
towards Indonesia, the Global Views 2006 by Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs reveals that 
Australians are on average more positive towards China and Japan than Americans and some of 
the other regional states, as the following tables demonstrate. 
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Source: Global Views 2006, p. 39 
 
Source: Global Views 2006, p. 46 
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However, the attitudes of Australians towards China are not exclusively positive and by no 
means complacent. Instead, it would seem that whilst the rise of China as a phenomenon per se 
does not overtly concern Australians, perhaps because of economic benefits the booming Chi-
nese economy is reaping for Australia’s mining sector in particular, a slight majority of the 
respondents nonetheless worried that China’s objective was to dominate Asia and that Australia 
should seek to cooperate with other countries to contain China. A certain level of anxiety is also 
evident from the Australian government’s decision to block a Chinese government owned firm 
from making a majority investment in the Australian resource sector. The 2009 defence white 
paper, which emphasised long-range power projection capabilities, prompted the Chinese gov-
ernment to protest that it was confrontational by identifying China as a potential major threat to 
Australia in the future. 
 
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2008 p. 8 
Australians are also still relatively suspicious of Indonesia. In particular issues such as the role of 
the military in Indonesian politics, Islamic terrorism and even persistent image of a potential 
military threat seem to still be major concerns for the Australian public. Moreover, few respon-
dents in 2006 Lowy Poll were optimistic about bilateral relations, 47% indicating that they 
believed that relations between the two were worsening and only 19% thought they were improv-
ing. However, a majority of Australians also believe that Indonesia is an emerging democracy 
and that counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries is very important for Australia. 
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The pessimism towards the state of bilateral relations had also somewhat alleviated by 2008, this 
time only 16% stating that relations were worsening and 26% that they were improving. 
 
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 14 
The Importance of the Region for Australia’s Future 
The economic importance of the region for Australia has been particularly topical in the political 
discourse, in particular in the 1980s and 1990s when the Bob Hawke and Paul Keating ALP 
governments made “comprehensive engagement” a central platform for foreign and trade policy. 
However, what has the level public support for engagement been in Australia from the 1990s 
onwards? In the 1996 Australian Electoral Survey the level of support was certainly strong, 
overwhelming majority of the respondents agreeing with the statement that Australia’s trading 
future lies with Asia, whilst only 9 % disagreed.1104 The ALP policy of engagement also received 
strong backing, 54% agreeing that the policy had been ’about right’.1105 However, as already 
pointed out, nonetheless the Keating ALP government lost the elections to the openly more ‘Asia 
sceptic’ Howard-led Coalition government, which also soon after scrapped the ‘comprehensive 
engagement’ policy and replaced it with a more ‘pragmatic’ policy of balancing Regionalism 
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with a policy of bilateral trade agreements with major trading partners, led by an agreement with 
the United States. 
Did popular opinion, however, change to correspond with the policy shift? Judging from the 
Lowy Institute Poll 2005 Australians Speak results, it did not. When asked to rate the importance 
of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) under negotiation with the United States and China, majority 
of the respondents rated the FTA with China as more important than that with the United States. 
In fact only 35% thought the FTA with the United States was good for Australia, in comparison 
to 51% that thought one with China was. Moreover, 32% of the respondents thought a FTA with 
the United States was bad for Australia, whilst only 20% thought the same about one with 
China.1106 
 
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2005, p. 21 
However, when the same question was tested in the 2007 Lowy Institute Poll, the popular sup-
port for a FTA with China had dropped significantly to 38%, whilst 27% thought it was actually 
bad for Australia. On the other hand, 47% of the respondents thought a FTA with Japan was a 
good idea, whilst only 15% considered it bad.1107The importance of East Asia for Australia’s 
future also still received popular backing; when questioned about the economic importance of 
                                                 
1106 Lowy Institute for International Policy (2005), The Lowy Institute Poll 2005: Australians Speak, Sydney, pp. 
20-21 
1107 Lowy Institute for International Policy (2007), The Lowy Institute Poll 2007: Australia and the World, 
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I D E A T I O N A L  A N A L Y S I S  O F  A U S T R A L I A  –  E A S T  A S I A  R E L A T I O N S  
369 
five major powers to Australia on a scale 0-10, China (7.17) came on top, ahead of the United 
States (6.99) and the European Union (6.09). Japan (6.91) was third. 1108However, the growing 
importance of East Asia became apparent when the respondents were asked which countries 
would be the five most important economic partners 25 years from now. Again China (7.76) was 
the number one, this time with a larger margin, Japan second (7.01) and the United States third 
(6.72).1109 
Whilst popular opinion does not seem to support a cultural divide in Australia’s foreign trade, the 
respondents were much more ambivalent towards foreign investment in Australia in the 2008 
Lowy Institute Poll. Moreover, the respondents were clearly negative towards investment from 
East Asia, whilst somewhat more receptive towards investment originating from Great Britain 
and the United States than from Singapore, Japan or China. 
 
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2008, p. 6 
America’s Deputy Sheriff? 
As it has been established, Australia’s image in the region is that of an America’s deputy sheriff. 
However, public opinion in Australia does not support a foreign policy that is so tied into the 
United States that it would support such an image. First of all, the Lowy Institute polls show that 
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1109 Lowy Institute Poll 2007, p. 13 
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Australians have warmer feelings towards Japan and Singapore than the United States, and 
towards China are almost equally warm. Secondly, in the 2005 poll US foreign policy was 
ranked a threat to Australia by 32% of the respondents, ahead of the ‘Arc of Instability’ (17%) 
and China’s rise (16%).1110Thirdly, the polls constantly show that Australians agree that the 
United States has too great of an influence on Australia’s foreign policy.1111 
 
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2008, p. 4 
Fourthly, the trust on the United States to act responsibly was certainly not unequivocal, the 
majority of respondents seeing Japan as the most trustworthy (73%), followed by India (68%) 
and China (60%) at par with the United States. Moreover, the United States attracted the largest 
proportion distrust, 39% of the respondents indicating that they trusted it ‘not very much’ or ‘not 
at all’.1112 
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1111 Lowy Institute Poll 2008, p. 4 
1112 Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 8 
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Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 8 
Finally, the respondents were ambivalent about the prospects of lessening American power, a 
slight majority of respondents thought decreasing American political power in the world would 
be mainly a positive development, whilst an equally slight majority thought that decreasing 
economic power would be mainly a negative development.1113 
 
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2007 p. 14 
However, when asked how powerful selected major powers should be, the United States was 
ranked second, behind the European Union, but closely trailed by China and Japan.1114 
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Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 8 
Nonetheless, despite the views Australians hold towards US foreign policy and its influence on 
Australia’s own, the ANZUS alliance has been consistently rated as important for Australia’s 
security. It would seem that whilst Australians tend to value multilateralism and be quite critical 
of other aspects of US influence and power, they continue to value the security guarantees the 
alliance with the United States provides to the country. 
 
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2008, p. 11 
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Regionalism Discourse in East Asia and Australia 
Regionalism Discourse in East Asia 
The scope of analysis here is that of East Asian Regionalism discourse, specifically in relation to 
nature of Regionalism in ASEAN and the emerging East Asian Community that is evolving 
around the Southeast Asian core, as well as the position of Australia in East Asian Regionalism. 
Firstly, the analysis shows that ASEAN has combined a Rationalist core of advancing the bene-
fits from material interests; interdependency with an Ideational core of common ideas, identity, 
culture and values. The organisation, however, has also experienced an evolution from advanc-
ing the level of socio-economic development in the region to seeking deeper integration not only 
through institution building but also through a process of community building, aiming at estab-
lishing a unique regional identity held together by common values and norms, embodied in the 
discourse from the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 to the ASEAN Charter over three decades later. 
The Bangkok Declaration (1967), the foundational document of ASEAN, envisioned interest 
based regional cooperation, acknowledging the existence of interdependency between Southeast 
Asian states: 
“MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among 
countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the 
existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation”1115 
However, the Bangkok Declaration also envisioned a community brought together by common 
ideas and norms, as well as historical and cultural ties: 
“CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals 
of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by 
fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation 
                                                 
1115 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Bangkok 8 August 
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among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and 
culture”1116 
The evolution of ASEAN was envisioned in the Bali Concord II with a stated objective to 
achieve deepening integration and further community building: 
“ASEAN shall continue its efforts to ensure closer and mutually beneficial inte-
gration among its member states and among their peoples, and to promote re-
gional peace and stability, security, development and prosperity with a view to 
realizing an ASEAN Community that is open, dynamic and resilient”1117 
The Bali Concord II also established a further focus towards the creation of common socio-
political values and regional norms as basis for regional cooperation: 
“ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss 
political issues and the willingness to share information on matters of common 
concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security cooperation, the 
enhancement of defence cooperation among ASEAN countries, develop a set of 
socio-political values and principles, and resolve to settle long-standing disputes 
through peaceful means.”1118 
Community building and Ideational aspects of Regionalism, however, were given central focus 
only in the ASEAN Charter, introduced in November 2007, with a firm commitment towards 
promoting shared regional identity, values and norms as major forces in regional integration: 
                                                 
1116 Ibid 
1117 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali 7 October 
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1118 Ibid 
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“Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and interdependence among the 
peoples and Member States of ASEAN which are bound by geography, common 
objectives and shared destiny”1119 
“Respecting the fundamental importance of amity and cooperation, and the principles of sover-
eignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, consensus and unity in diversity”1120 
Moreover, the Charter for the first time defined the shared regional values as democracy, rule of 
law and human rights. The decision to add human rights as a regional value is particularly 
significant, as it signals an acceptance of universal human rights, a major shift from the earlier 
opposition to such a concept: 
“Adhering to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, 
respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”1121 
Finally, the extensive cultural diversity of Southeast Asia is acknowledged in the Charter, but not 
seen as excluding the possibility to have common values, quoting a EU-style commitment to 
”unity in diversity”: 
“Respect for the different cultures, languages and religions of the peoples of 
ASEAN, while emphasising their common values in the spirit of unity in diver-
sity”1122 
The spirit of the Charter also promoted a further building of ASEAN symbols, that thus far 
include e.g. a flag, English as working language, a motto, an emblem and ASEAN Day cele-
brated on 8 August each year, as well as a commitment to come up with a ASEAN anthem in the 
near future. 
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In summary, the evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism has progressed from focus on interest 
interdependency to a quest towards achieving deeper integration that involves emphasis on 
shared socio-political values. This community building exercise involving focus on regional 
identity, values and norms is increasingly seen as a necessary precondition to deepening integra-
tion, which also includes (modest) political integration. Whilst this could be seen as a sign of 
ASEAN becoming more exclusive by nature, in fact the development is good news for Australia, 
as ASEAN is establishing political values that are shared with Australia. In addition to the 
emphasis on democracy, rule of law and human rights, ASEAN’s ”unity in diversity” approach is 
an open acknowledgement that cultural diversity does not make the establishment of shared 
identity, values and norms impossible, but on the contrary more necessary. 
The discourse relating to the evolving East Asian Community follows mostly identical path with 
that of ASEAN. The East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) final report proposed the formation of an 
East Asian Community of peace, prosperity and raising the socio-economic standards in the 
region, thus referring to the same interest interdependency as ASEAN. However, in addition to 
common interests, the formation of a unique regional identity was also seen as necessary in order 
to “expedite genuine regional cooperation” in East Asia.1123How the East Asian Community will 
turn out exactly is still obviously somewhat of an open question, but it is very likely that it will 
closely follow the principles of ASEAN in its architecture and approach to Regionalism, thus 
considering interest interdependency as the core motivation for Regionalism, but necessarily 
augmented by more Ideational aspects in order to establish deeper integration and moving 
beyond economic regional cooperation. 
Australia’s Place in the Region 
As it has already been established, the opposition to Australia’s regionness has mainly emanated 
from elite opinion, which has for most of the time been personalised in a few Southeast Asian 
patriarchs, in particular the Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, clearly the 
most dedicated opponent of Australia’s regionness. Mahathir not only attempted to block the 
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establishment of APEC, but he managed to block Australia’s membership in ASEM and pro-
moted exclusively Asian form of Regionalism for East Asia that by default would also exclude. 
Singapore’s patriarch Lee Kuan Yew, who is also well-known of being critical of Australia, has 
nonetheless been in fact also encouraging Australia to seek inclusion in the region. In particular 
Australia’s role in the East Timor crisis and its leadership in the INTEFET forces impressed Lee 
so much that he said Australia passed a defining test of its regionness as a result. Moreover, Lee 
also indicated that Australia does not have to become culturally Asian to be accepted in the 
region. Instead the excellent level of Asian literacy, understanding the region’s business prac-
tices, cultures and languages were enough to prove its regionness. 1124Finally, Lee has indicated 
that the acceptance of Australia’s regionness in Asia was growing constantly; implying that in 
the long-term Australia could be seen as being genuinely of region.1125 
Also other Southeast Asian members of the political elite, in particular in Thailand, Singapore 
and Indonesia, have been supportive of Australia’s inclusion in the region. The foremost pro-
moter of Australia’s inclusion in regional institutions, however, has been the former Japanese 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, also a very active promoter of East Asian Regionalism: 
“Finally, let me turn to how cooperation between Japan and ASEAN should be linked to coop-
eration with all of East Asia. I believe that East Asia's whole can be greater than the sum of its 
parts.” 1126 
“Through this cooperation, I expect that the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, 
the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand will be core members of such 
a community.” 1127 
                                                 
1124 Lee Kuan Yew interview on ABC’s 7.30 program, 20 November 2000. Transcript available online: 
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/stories/s214903.htm, Date accessed: 9 July, 2009 
1125 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the luncheon hosted by the Prime Minister of Australia in 
Canberra on 15 April 1986 
1126 Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, “ Japan and ASEAN in East Asia - A Sincere and 
Open Partnership”, Singapore, January 14 2002 
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As established earlier, the opposition to Australia’s regionness has been said to be Ideationally 
based. However, the regional discourse in the region does not appear to be particularly focused 
on Ideational aspects, rather it appears to mix a strong rational core of material interdependency 
with a focus on common values and identity as integration deepens. Moreover, despite the 
increasing focus on regional identity and values, the discourses portray an open and inclusive 
form of Regionalism that acknowledges the considerable regional diversity in cultures, ethnicity 
and religion. Finally, the Regionalism discourse in East Asia actually appears to be becoming 
more open to Australia’s involvement, as the regional values are identical to the universal Euro-
pean values - democracy, rule of law and human rights – values that are the core of Australian 
values. 
Regionalism Discourse in Australia 
Whilst the motivation or need to establish and maintain a close relationship with the region is 
now rarely contested, the approach and depth of this cooperation have become the dominating 
focus of Regionalism discourse in Australia. This contemporary Regionalism discourse has 
involved two competing, but also converging, sub-discourses: 1) one promoted by Keating and 
Evans, promoting “comprehensive engagement” with the region that goes beyond Rationalist, 
mainly economic cooperation, extending to arguing Australia’s regionness in Ideational terms, 
aiming at earning recognition as a genuine member of a regional community, and 2) another 
promoted by Howard and Downer, still arguing for commitment to the region, but on different 
terms, arguing for pragmatic regional cooperation that aims at maximising national interest, 
promoting Regionalism that is largely in line with the ”club theory”, but yet contributing to the 
“othering” by emphasising Australian ”self” by promoting unique values and identity that de-
rives from the British heritage, ANZUS alliance and Judeo-Christian traditions. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1127 Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, “ Japan and ASEAN in East Asia - A Sincere and 
Open Partnership”, Singapore, January 14 2002 
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“Comprehensive Engagement” as the Dominant Discourse 
The first dominant discourse, is that of “comprehensive engagement” with the region, or some-
times alternatively titled as "enmeshment” with the region. Since the highpoint of the “engage-
ment” discourse coincided with the era of the Keating ALP government (1991-1996), this section 
focuses specifically on the construction of the discourse by its two primary advocates; Prime 
Minister Paul Keating and Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. 
The first element of the discourse was to argue Australia’s regionness in geographical terms, 
arguing that whilst Australia was not exactly Asian geographically, it was part of a broader 
concept of the “East Asian Hemisphere”. The core motivation of the argument was probably not 
to rewrite geography, but rather to profoundly change Australia’s international standing by 
constructing a reorientation in thinking away from considering Australia’s geographical position 
as a burden, broadly based on a notion of Australia being a Western society detached from its 
peers and displaced in the midst of a turbulent region comprised of societies radically different 
from its own, as dictated by the “tyranny of distance” thesis. Moreover, rather than being based 
on only an Ideational notion, or as the opponents claimed – idealistic notion, the argument had a 
distinctively rational choice core which argued that “comprehensive engagement” was required 
for not only accepting the geographic reality, but essentially reversing the “tyranny of distance” 
by embracing Australia’s geographical position as an advantage. Consequently it argued that it 
was in the country’s interest to reorientate its foreign and trade policy to match this reality, 
removing the burden of history and heritage and the notion of thinking of the geographical 
position as a source of threat. This line of thought was made explicit in a speech by Gareth Evans 
in 1995: 
“Partly it is a matter of geography: we may not be part of the Asian land mass 
geologically, but we are closer to it than anyone else, and longitudinally we share 
broadly the same time zones as East Asia. As the centre of world economic action 
shifts to East Asia, we find ourselves physically closer to the action than we have 
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ever been: it has become a cliché now that the tyranny of distance for Australia 
has become the advantage of proximity.”1128 
The second element of the discourse’s core was culture. Whilst Evans explicitly recognised that 
in cultural terms Australia was categorically not Asian, he also argued this would not hinder 
Australia’s engagement with the region. Moreover, he argued that “engagement” would not 
entail Australia denying its history and heritage, but rather it would simply have to become more 
independent and adhere to a unique Australian identity that corresponded better with its multicul-
tural society than to one based on British heritage. This way the Australian identity would not be 
in conflict with the region. Finally, as a multicultural nation Australia would be a good fit with 
the region; 
“The old preconceptions or paradigms, based on "Asian" and "European" identi-
ties, are losing their utility. Australia may not be an "Asian" country anymore 
than it is "European" or "North American", but it is definitely part of the East 
Asian Hemisphere. Our culture and society are uniquely Australian, but they en-
compass qualities which are increasingly influenced by the cultures of our near 
neighbours. These influences will inevitably grow as economic, defence and peo-
ple-to-people contacts accelerate the interaction between us. The term "East 
Asian Hemisphere" captures not only the geographical reality, but a good deal of 
this culture and social flavour as well.”1129 
Paul Keating, however, constructed “engagement” beyond rational choice stemming from the 
East Asian ascendancy as the main motivation, arguing that it was not driven by only material 
interests and interdependency with the region, but also needed to extend to a more Ideational 
goal of reaching a measure of genuine regionness: 
                                                 
1128 Speech to the CEDA Asian Region International Association of Cooperating Organisations (ARIACO) 
Roundtable by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Australia’s Role in East 
Asia’s Future”, Melbourne, 11 September 1995  
1129 Statement by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans to ASEAN PMC 7+1, Bandar Seri Bagawan, 2 August 1995, 
http://www.aseansec.org/4377.htm
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“But our engagement with the region around us is not just commercial. And is not 
just the result of some crude economic determinism. It goes - and must go - much 
deeper than that. It goes to a genuine desire for partnership and real involve-
ment.”1130  
In fact, advocating such genuine regionness, Keating went as far as arguing that Australian and 
Asian values had points of convergence, in particular in that the typical Aussie value of mateship 
in fact was a communitarian value in line with the regional concept; 
“In many - perhaps most - respects, the values I believe in and most Australians 
believe in are precisely those that are often referred to in this debate as "Asian". 
The importance of family, the benefit of education, the need for order and public 
accountability, the inherent value of work - most Australians I know would de-
scribe these as Australian values. Indeed the word most Australians would very 
likely choose to describe as the core Australian value is 'mateship' - and 'mate-
ship' expresses an ethic of communitarianism and mutual obligation which in 
other contexts is called ‘Asian’.”1131 
In effect it was this type of value laden approach that provided the opposition with a basis for 
criticism that Keating was in fact aiming at turning Australia into an Asian country. Instead, in 
his view Australian history had elements that contributed towards its regionness, rather than 
hindered it; 
“I have never believed that Australians should describe themselves as Asians or that Australia is 
or can become part of Asia. We are the only nation in the world to inhabit a continent of our 
own. I have said more than once before, we can't be Asian any more than we can be European or 
North American or African. We can only be Australian and can only relate to our neighbours as 
Australians. Our history, including the 40,000 year history of our indigenous people and the 
                                                 
1130 Speech by Prime Minister Paul Keating at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, “Australia, Asia and the 
New Regionalism”, Singapore, 17 January, 1996 
1131 Speech by Prime Minister Paul Keating at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, “Australia, Asia and the 
New Regionalism”, Singapore, 17 January, 1996 
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histories of the 150 different cultures from which Australians derive, make us unique in the 
world. Our somewhat unlikely history and geography should not change this fundamental con-
viction and this irrevocable commitment - that Australia is and must always be an integral part of 
the region around us.” 1132 
The primacy of “comprehensive engagement”, as has been demonstrated earlier in this thesis, 
was also evident in the making and execution of the Australian foreign and trade policy. Thus, 
instead of having been mere rhetoric, the Keating government was transforming the discourse 
into action – from language to social change. 
Howard and Downer: Pragmatic Regionalism in terms of Australian 
national interest, values and identity 
The other significant sub-discourse about Regionalism and Australia’s place in it was mainly 
constructed by the Liberal-National Party coalition, initially firmly within the framework of the 
“engagement” discourse during the time spent in opposition and the first year in office, and 
focusing on attacking “comprehensive engagement” as a betrayal of Australia’s heritage and 
values. The Coalition, however, soon embarked on constructing its own discourse, which could 
be titled as "pragmatic Regionalism”, mainly advocated by John Howard and Alexander 
Downer. 
The initial attack against “comprehensive engagement” was launched by John Howard as the 
opposition leader, arguing that Australia should not seek inclusion by pretending to be Asian. 
Howard postulated that this honesty would earn the respect of the region and would thus work 
better than futile “Asianisation” of the country. Finally, he attacked republicanism, both in 
principle and specifically as a tool for engagement: 
                                                 
1132 Speech by Prime Minister Paul Keating at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, “Australia, Asia and the 
New Regionalism”, Singapore, 17 January, 1996 
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“Australia must meet the regional challenges of the future, in Asia and elsewhere, 
with the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances but with pride in our his-
tory, our values and our institutions. The dynamically successful economies of 
East Asia have done precisely that in terms of their own national histories, values 
and institutions. Once we start disavowing our history, or disowning our values 
or changing our institutions simply because we think regional countries will re-
spect us more for doing so, then we will be badly mistaken. Future constitutional 
arrangements or national symbols are exclusively a matter for Australians. It both 
trivialises relations with the region and is an unwarranted act of national self-
abasement to believe particular changes can win or lose friends in the region.” 
1133
 
Nonetheless, Howard also acknowledged the fundamental importance of the East Asian ascen-
dancy to Australia and consequently, much like the ALP government, pledged reversing the 
tyranny of distance: 
“Third, a Coalition Government will work to ensure that the tyranny of distance 
works in reverse -- in favour of our national interests.” 1134 
However, soon after elected into office the Howard government began constructing its own 
alternative discourse around ”pragmatic Regionalism”, in the spirit of Rationalism revolving 
around maximizing the benefits to Australia’s national interests from regional cooperation. 
Moreover, the “pragmatic Regionalism” discourse constructed a different ”self” for the country 
in comparison to “comprehensive engagement” by arguing that Australia should act in agreement 
with its unique identity and values in the conduct of its foreign and trade policy. This ideological 
position was first made explicit in Australia’s first foreign and trade policy white paper In the 
National Interest (1997): 
                                                 
1133 The Fifth Asialink Lecture by John Howard, “ Australia’s Links with Asia: Realising opportunities in our 
region”, Melbourne, 12 April 1995 
1134 The Fifth Asialink Lecture by John Howard, “ Australia’s Links with Asia: Realising opportunities in our 
region”, Melbourne, 12 April 1995 
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“A country’s perception of its national interests is shaped by its geography, his-
tory, strategic circumstances and economic profile, as well as by its values. In 
Australia’s case these elements combine in a distinctive way”1135 
Another Rationalist aspect, in addition to the maximization of national interest, was the linking 
foreign policy to domestic politics: 
“In a democracy, governments must also act to give expression to the aspirations 
and values of their national communities in foreign policy as much as in other ar-
eas of government”1136 
Although “pragmatic Regionalism” clearly had a Rationalist core, it had a distinct Ideational core 
as well, one revolving around culture, identity and values as fundamental forces in policy-
making, and arguing that Australia was by nature a Western country and as such should take 
pride in its European intellectual and cultural heritage, which has given it liberal democracy and 
economy: 
“The values which Australia brings to its foreign policy are the values of a liberal 
democracy. These have been shaped by national experience, given vigour through 
cultural diversity, but reflect a predominantly European intellectual and cultural 
heritage”.1137 
Howard and Downer also introduced an ideological approach to foreign policy arguing that 
Australia’s relationship with the region was not a zero sum game, as it did not come at the 
expense of Australia’s relations with the United States or vice versa. Moreover, due to the 
considerable level of regional diversity, Howard and Downer argued that Regionalism should be 
based on interdependence and common interests to work properly. Thus Australia could also 
                                                 
1135 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1997), In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade 
Policy, White Paper, Canberra, p. 1 
1136 In the National Interest,  p. 11 
1137 Ibid 
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seek a role in interest based “pragmatic” Regionalism without compromising its values by 
attempting to “Asianise” the country: 
“Australia’s values strengthen its foreign and trade policies. They enable Austra-
lia both to sustain traditional links to Europe and North America and to forge 
stronger ones with Asia. The pursuit of Australia’s interests in the Asia Pacific 
does not require a surrendering of Australia’s core values. The ethnic, religious, 
historical and cultural diversity of the Asia Pacific region shows that differences 
in values do not preclude the effective pursuit of common interests”1138 
Howard and Downer also steered a departure from a bipartisan foreign policy tradition of multi-
lateralism and middle –power advocacy towards a special emphasis on the alliance with the 
United States and bilateralism, as well as a stronger emphasis on forming issues based coalitions 
with “likeminded states”, arguing that the only correct objective of foreign and trade policy was 
to maximize national interests: 
“Over the next fifteen years, Australia’s trade strategies will continue to draw on 
bilateral, regional and multilateral means. Each has a contribution to make. None 
offers the only way ahead. All three will be needed if Australia is to improve its 
trade performance and thereby increase the living standards of Australians”1139 
However, foreign and trade policy was not to be exclusively bilateral, but rather bilateralism was 
supposed to complement regional and multilateral policies: 
“Effective bilateral relationships are the building block for Australia’s foreign 
and trade policies. They contribute to and complement regional and multilateral 
efforts” 1140 
                                                 
1138 Ibid  
1139 In the National Interest,  p. 41 
1140 In the National Interest, p. 53 
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Nonetheless, the government set its objective to join ASEM. This, however, was not intended as 
a reflection of identity, but rather as recognition that Australia’s interests were intimately tied 
into those of the region: 
“Active participation in APEC and other regional institutions demonstrates Aus-
tralia’s recognition that its future is inextricably linked to the future of the Asia 
Pacific region. It reflects the government’s commitment to being closely involved 
– from the inside – in shaping the region’s future. Over the next fifteen years, 
Australia’s already extensive regional links, especially to countries of East Asia, 
will grow even further. As they do, the Government will seek even closer links to 
regional groups and institutions. Australia’s interest in participating in the Asia-
Europe summit process (ASEM) should be seen in this light”1141 
The Howard government also judged that bilateralism was a necessary strategy due to the East 
Asian cultural diversity and to counter the potential evolution to a more exclusive form of 
Regionalism: 
”The growing strength of Regionalism means in turn that Australia’s bilateral 
partners will increasingly view issues through a regional prism, and with an eye 
to regional solidarity. This has certainly been the pattern among member states of 
the European Union, and it is likely to become more of a feature of Australia’s re-
lations with the members of ASEAN”1142 
Alexander Downer reiterated the government’s commitment to the Asia Pacific region, whilst 
again emphasising that the government’s main motivation to do so was to maximise Australia’s 
national interests, not for any idealistic reasons: 
“We said unequivocally that closer engagement with Asia would be our highest 
foreign policy priority. The Asia Pacific region is our highest foreign policy pri-
                                                 
1141 In the National Interest , p. 45 
1142 In the National Interest, p. 54 
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ority for one very simple and enduring reason: It is the vital sphere of our eco-
nomic and strategic interests. The Government has ensured that Australia’s na-
tional interest is advanced in an ambitious yet pragmatic and clear-minded 
fashion. Because if we don’t…no one else will. To borrow the words of English 
realist Martin Wight, ‘A foreign minister is chosen and paid to look after the in-
terests of his country, and not to delegate for the human race.”1143 
Speaking at the launch of the second foreign and trade policy white paper Advancing the Na-
tional Interest in 2003, Downer again responded to the growing criticism that the government 
was neglecting relations with Asia at the expense of its focus on the alliance with the United 
States by stating that the government was still committed to the region’s primacy in its foreign 
policy, but that it had an Asia first approach instead of an Asia only approach that the Keating 
government had: 
“The big lie perpetrated by some about our Government is that somehow we have 
not paid enough attention to the Asia Pacific region. The fact is that since 1997 
we sought to restore some of the balance in our foreign policy and to get away 
from an Asia-only focus to an Asia-first focus. We have achieved this objective 
without any erosion of our core interests in the region.”1144 
Moreover, Downer also conveyed the government’s belief that international relations were not a 
zero sum game and thus, Australia’s relations with the United States did not come at the expense 
of its relations with Asia, or vice versa: 
“In pursuing relations with Asia, we must continue to find the right balance and 
interplay between Australia’s engagement with Asia and our broader interna-
                                                 
1143 Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Alexander Downer at the National Press Club, Canberra, 
7 May 2002 
1144 Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Alexander Downer at the National Press Club, Canberra, 
7 May 2002 
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tional relations. This is not about choosing between regions…it is about maximis-
ing our strengths.”1145 
Finally, Downer emphasised Australia’s European heritage over its geography, portraying 
Australia as a Western country that just happened to be geographically located in the Asia-
Pacific region. The same notion was also central theme in the white paper: 
“Australia’s interests are global in scope and not solely defined by geography. 
Australia is a Western country located in the Asia-Pacific region with close ties 
and affinities with North America and Europe and a history of active engagement 
throughout Asia.”1146 
Thus in summary, Regionalism discourses in Australia display a continuous commitment to-
wards the Asia Pacific region as a priority for foreign and trade policy, albeit the Keating and 
Howard governments held differing views with regard to Australia’s place and role in East Asian 
Regionalism and thus, also implemented different policy approaches. In any case, the Keating 
government’s “comprehensive engagement” principally took into account the material interests 
and focused on seeking to earn Australia recognition as being "genuinely of region”, whereas the 
Howard government stood for a realist understanding of international relations, emphasised the 
maximisation of national interest but also interestingly also promoting Australian identity and 
values as the primary mission of the government. Consequently, the Howard government dis-
played little or no interest in "emotional Regionalism” and whether Australia was considered “of 
region” or not. 
Also, East Asia and Australia have had differences in discursive practices over time, emphasis-
ing different aspects of Regionalism much of the time. The Keating government perhaps empha-
sised the Ideational aspects somewhat early whilst ASEAN was focused on material interests and 
pragmatism, whilst the Howard displayed hostility towards “emotional Regionalism” when 
                                                 
1145 Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Alexander Downer at the National Press Club, Canberra, 
7 May 2002 
1146 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2003),  Advancing the National Interest, Canberra, p. viii 
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regional identity, values and norms were becoming focus areas in the region. However, it would 
appear that East Asia and Australia are drawing closer to each other again, in particular since the 
emerging regional values are same as Australia’s, as well as the ”unity in diversity” approach 
that should leave adequate room for Australia despite its perceived cultural divergence from the 
regional mainstream. Thus, most likely Australia will gradually “slip into” the region, despite 
fears by the Howard government that the increasing focus on “emotional Regionalism” may lead 
into Australia’s exclusion. 
Finally, the conclusion of the Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis (FPDA with regard to the 
nature of Regionalism and Australia’s place is that it does not appear to support a notion that the 
nature of Regionalism in East Asia would be particularly Ideational. On the contrary, the analysis 
of East Asian discourses revealed that Regionalism in Australia seems to have a persistent 
rational core, specifically to establish practical regional cooperation towards raising the socio-
economic levels in the region through economic cooperation and securing regional peace and 
security through both practical cooperation and shared norms. In fact a clear majority of the 
coding references in sources both in the region and Australia were Rationalist. 
 
Moreover, out of the top 10 nodes, in terms of references covereed, only one (values) was 
Ideational, whilst the top nodes were related to economy, trade and security topics. The focus on 
values, however, seems to be on increase, probably correcponding to the efforts to establish 
deeper integration, in particular in ASEAN. 
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Much of the same applied to Australian discourses. The phenomena of ”East Asian ascendancy” 
has clearly resulted in a widely accepted realisation that Australia’s economic future and national 
security is dependent on the region, to the point that this has been taken for granted and is rarely 
contested. The differences, however, relate to the terms of Australia’s inclusion in the region, in 
particular to whether Australia would end up sacrifycing its European cultural heritage and 
values on behalf of gaining a status of “genuinely being of region” and whether such regionness 
is at all necessary for participation in East Asian Regionalism. Judging from the nature of East 
Asian discourses, it is quite possible this is not necessary, as long as Australia subsrcibes to 
regional norms, which Australia clearly does. The unknown factor, however, is how the nature of 
Regionalism will develop in East Asia following ASEAN’s deeper integration, which increas-
ingly emphasises the necessity of regional identity and values, as well as the evolutionary course 
the emerging East Asian Community will take. Ideational approaches could still prove to be 
indispensable. 
I D E A T I O N A L  A N A L Y S I S  O F  A U S T R A L I A  –  E A S T  A S I A  R E L A T I O N S  
391 
7.7 Conclusion: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Ideational 
Approaches 
In conclusion, the main weakness of the Ideational approaches is downplaying the rational 
(/pragmatic) nature of Regionalism in East Asia and perhaps over-emphasising the significance 
of elite opinion, which in terms of opposition to Australia’s regionness has in fact been mostly 
personalised to a handful of Asian patriarchs in the media, and the “Asian values” debate. More-
over, the analysis does not support a trend towards exclusive Regionalism and so-called Asian 
values as being particularly prominent in the East Asian Regionalism discourse. In fact, the core 
of East Asian Regionalism has been, and still continues to be, largely based on a rational choice 
in the sense that Regionalism appears to be primarily motivated by an overarching objective to 
raise the levels of socio-economic development and maximising the benefits from trade, as well 
as to maintain peace and security in the region. Furthermore, so far at least, EU-style civiliza-
tional project (uniting European peoples under the flag of shared identity and values) has not 
materialised in East Asia. Instead, the civilizational, “Asians only” Regionalism promoted by 
Mahathir appears to have lost, as demonstrated by Australia’s admission into the EAS. Further-
more, Australia has also been generally seen as a valuable partner in East Asian Regionalism, 
despite the fact that Australian identity and values derive from British and European heritage and 
despite the apparent differences in political cultures. Moreover, public opinion in East Asia and 
Australia does not appear to support the view that cultural differences between East Asia and 
Australia would be too great for cooperation to be possible, differentiating it somewhat from 
Turkey’s position. Thus, rational choice in form of pursuit to maximise material interests appears 
to override questions of identity and culture. In terms of public opinion in Australia, the region’s 
importance is now rarely contested and the anxiety referred to by Renouf seems to have mostly 
dissipated. Australians appear to harbour quite warm feelings and trust towards regional states, to 
the point that Singapore and Japan attract warmer feelings than even the United States. Even 
China’s rise causes little anxiety in the minds of Australians, in comparison to the Western world 
in general and even in comparison to some other regional states. 
However, much like in Turkey’s case, resistance to Australia’s regionness has been primarily 
motivated by the perceived differences in identity, culture and values (as well as ethnicity) 
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between East Asia and Australia. This has also resulted in exercises of ”othering”, within which 
context Australia has been seen as a “misplaced European country”, a ”deputy sheriff” of the 
United States and blamed for colonial attitudes in its regional conduct. In this regard Ideational 
analysis has contributed to a more holistic understanding of the research topic, whilst Rationalist 
analysis tends to neglect such aspects. Yet, this process of “othering” has arguably hindered and 
slowed down Australia’s access to regional decision-making, although it is not quite as promi-
nent as in the Turkey – EU case. Moreover, Australian Regionalism discourses have emphasised, 
a dilemma between the country’s geography and history, in particular in reference to its British 
and European heritage and the culture and values deriving from this heritage. The result has been 
a battle between material interdependency with East Asia and an emotional connection with 
Europe and the United States. Moreover, the analysis here has shown that the focus on values 
appears to be increasing as integration deepens. 
Ideational analysis is also very helpful in terms of assessing the importance and impact of “soft” 
aspects, such as immigration, people-to-people contacts and education to Australia’s acceptance 
as a regional state that deserves a seat in regional institutions. Australia’s Asian literacy, i.e. the 
understanding of Asian politics, business, cultures and languages, has also been referred to as 
important to Australia’s regionness by its East Asian partners. Finally, the application of Idea-
tional approaches is necessary for a holistic understanding of the nature of Regionalism in East 
Asia and Australia’s place within it, much like in the Turkey – EU case. The significance of 
Ideational approaches also increases as the nature of East Asian Regionalism evolves towards 
political integration and community building based on regional identity, values and norms. Thus, 
Ideational approaches can produce valuable insight into policy-making through providing a more 
holistic and realistic evaluation of the importance and impact of norms, values and culture to 
Australia’s access to regional decision-making. 
In any regard, if one considers the results of both Rationalist and Ideational analysis, it would 
seem that the famous "push into Asia” is no longer necessary, but will likely be replaced by a 
“pull into Asia” as over time, perhaps in the next 10-15 years, Australia’s regionness becomes 
considered natural as interests interdependency ensures not only policy convergence between 
Australia and East Asia but probably also a gradual convergence in terms of norms and values. 
Australia’s further integration into the region seems likely, in particular since Australia will also 
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be joining the ASEM on the Asian side of the table at the next Summit (ASEM 8) in Brussels in 
2010, which could well be considered as a major breakthrough in Australia’s quest to be consid-
ered “genuinely of region”. It still remains to be seen how Kevin Rudd’s APc proposal will 
shape Australia’s place in the region. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion of Findings 
8.1 Introduction 
As promised in Chapter 1, the objectives of this chapter are to provide a discussion of the find-
ings, establish the respective strengths and weaknesses of the Rationalist and Ideational ap-
proaches and where they possibly intersect. It also provides a suggestion for a new definition of a 
region and potential new areas of analysis suitable for analytical eclecticism. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the objectives of this thesis are to test, challenge and further develop 
explanatory models in the theory of Regionalism. In particular the thesis aims to add to the 
understanding of the process of enlargement, as well as its motives, by applying those models to 
the problem of the ‘borderline states’. The problem of the ”borderline states” is illustrated by two 
case studies: Australia and Turkey, in the context of their relationship to their respective regions 
– the European Union and emerging Regionalism in East Asia, and in particular their position in 
European and East Asian Regionalism. They are labelled ‘borderline states’ not for their geo-
graphical properties, but for the permanent partiality of their inclusion within their regions. Such 
states are in constant flux, varying their degree of belonging depending on the criteria of enclo-
sure. 
As stated in Chapter 2, even though there exists a plethora of literature on Regionalism, this 
thesis argues that the definitions related to Regionalism still remain contested, and that no single 
theory or approach, Rationalist or Ideational, adequately explains Regionalism, and particular 
aspects of enlargement; these aspects include motives for states to join regional institutions, and 
the formation of criteria for membership, and thus the overarching factors involved in inclu-
sion/exclusion. Furthermore, th chapter demonstrated that the majority of the Regionalism 
literature focuses on the phenomenon of Regionalism in the global context, and particularly the 
economic context. This can be further elucidated as how and why regional integration projects 
are implemented in the international system. Moreover, European integration has traditionally 
dominated the studies of integration. Comparisons to other regions have usually been considered 
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weak because of the highly institutionalised nature of the European Union (EU). Finally, it was 
argued that there is a shortage of systematic work on the issue of enlargement. 
8.2 Findings: Answers to the Research Questions 
This section presents answers to the research questions based on the empirical research carried 
out in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
As indicated in Chapter 3, the following assumptions were made about the research topic: 
1 Material or cognitive interdependency alone cannot explain the problem 
2 If material interdependency between the case countries and regions is high, and the 
benefits from full integration are high, it would seem reasonable to assume that if 
such integration is not taking place then this is because of a lack of cultural similar-
ity 
3 Emphasis on regional identity increases with further vertical (deepening) integration 
and successful regional identity building creates further boundaries for horizontal in-
tegration (enlargement) 
With these assumptions in mind, and considering the original research questions of the thesis, the 
following conclusions were reached: 
1 What is the current level of interdependency (material and cognitive) between the case 
countries and regions? How are these measured? 
In both case studies the case countries and regions have well-established and extensive material 
interdependency, which tends to be mutually acknowledged by both the case countries and the 
case regions. This interdependency is particularly obvious in terms of economy and trade, but 
also in terms of security and political issues, a fact that is demonstrated by Turkey’s and Austra-
lia’s long-term participation in regional institutions. The perceived importance of access to 
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energy and raw material resources that both countries offer to their respective regions comple-
ments this. 
Both countries also have a deep sense of commitment towards the region, even though the terms 
of their inclusion have been subject to domestic debates, and given different levels of attention in 
policy-making by different governments in office along the way. Moreover, the source of this 
commitment appears to be principally materially motivated in both cases, albeit in Turkey’s case 
“Europeanization”1147 has been a stated objective since the establishment of the republic. 
However, as hypothesised in the beginning of the research, both have indeed been excluded on 
the same basis: Turkey and Australia are generally not considered as being “genuinely of re-
gion”. The opposition to their membership has thus been framed in the context that Turkey is not 
a “European” state and Australia is not “Asian”. Consequently, the two are still kept arms length, 
having been allowed higher levels of integration than states external to region but nonetheless 
kept short of full membership. This is particularly evident in Turkey’s case, in which, unlike in 
the CEEC-10 enlargement, Turkey’s “Europeanness” is contested, and consequently much of the 
opposition is Ideationally motivated. Moreover, it was argued that the “othering” is part of EU’s 
soul-seeking process which, motivated by the prospect of Turkey’s membership, has produced a 
debate regarding the EU’s ultimate borders and its regional identity. 
Whilst in the Australia-East Asia case the influence of rational choice based decision-making 
was found more significant than in the Turkey-EU case, as demonstrated by Australia’s access to 
the East Asia Summit and potentially to ASEAM, nonetheless Australia’s access to regional 
institutions has been in the past hindered by perceptions of Australia as a “misplaced European 
country” (and thus being perceived as “non-Asian” state), as well as negative public and elite 
perceptions of Australia’s image in the region. Moreover, it was established that the dilemma 
between the country’s geography and history, particularly in reference to its British and Euro-
pean heritage, has resulted into a battle between material interdependency with East Asia and its 
                                                 
1147 
“Europeanization” and ”modernization” would appear to be treated as synonymous in this respect 
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emotional connection with Europe and the United States, as the guiding principles for making of 
foreign policy. 
Measurements of interdependency, both material and cognitive, reflect the dichotomy between 
Rationalist and Ideational approaches. Measurement of material interdependency is monopolised 
by Rationalist approaches, which focus on measuring economic, political and security aspects of 
the problem, unified by rational choice based basic ontology. The Turkey-EU case is a primary 
example of this. The strict Rationalist thinking on Turkey’s EU prospects correspond with the 
official line of the EU: Turkey has been an official candidate since the 1999 Helsinki Summit 
and the December 2004 Copenhagen European Council decided to begin official negotiations 
towards accession with Turkey, following a positive assessment by the European Commission. 
As long as Turkey fulfils the requirements set out in the Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession 
Partnership it will eventually become a full member of the EU. Disagreement amongst Rational-
ists is pivots on whether Turkey meets the set political and economic criteria 
Another central theme in Rationalist analysis is the, often highly speculative, cost/benefit calcu-
lations modelled on Mattli’s logic of integration or the economic “club theory”. The most com-
mon topics for such analysis are assessments of the impact of Turkey’s membership on economic 
integration, trade, the EU budget, working of regional institutions, common foreign and security 
policy and migration. In general, the Rationalist approach dictates that accession will only occur 
if benefits are higher than costs;1148 this criterion also dictates the prospects for a successful 
accession. Again the basic assumption is that the EU (and its member states) is a rational agent 
and thus, so long as the benefits of the Turkish accession are perceived to override the cost, 
Turkey will be permitted entry to the Union. The debate about Turkey’s ”Europeanness” and its 
conformity to European values is considered to be of secondary value in Rationalist analysis and 
is not given significant attention beyond questions such as democracy and human rights, which 
are part of the membership criteria. 
                                                 
1148 However, as established earlier in the thesis, Mattli argues that in some cases the existence of negative 
externalities resulting from turning down a candidate can override this logic even if costs are deemed higher 
than benefits 
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In the Australia – East Asia case, a similar research agenda prevails. Rationalist approaches 
focus on economic, security and strategic choices as primary topics for research. The focus on 
institutional analysis is largely absent, however, due to the different regional architecture and 
nature of Regionalism in East Asian compared to Europe. The cost/benefit analyses are a simi-
larly popular topic in this research area, albeit even more speculative in nature due to the lower 
level of integration in East Asia in comparison to Europe. Comparisons between the costs and 
benefits of bilateralism versus Regionalism are also a distinct feature that does not present itself 
in the Turkey-Europe research agenda. 
Cognitive interdependency, on the other hand, is measured by establishing whether a sense of 
“we-ness”, or notion of a shared destiny, exists between the members of a regional organisation 
and thus, whether Regionalism is driven by a shared “idea” of the region rather than material 
interests alone. As such, Ideational analysis is particularly interested in the potential for shared 
regional identity and values, as well as the processes by which these are “constructed”. The 
existence of similarity, however, necessarily entails difference in comparison to others; construc-
tion of “self” requires a process of “othering” against which the “self” is constructed. Thus, the 
analysis of regional identity is interested in whether and why Turkey and Australia serve as the 
regions’ “others” in the process of building a regional identity in Europe and East Asia; this 
posits questions of whether these elucidations would explain their positions as “borderline 
states”. Thus comparisons of “Asian values” against “Australian values” and “European values” 
against “Islamic values” have received increasing attention in Ideational analysis. 
Consequently, Ideational approaches focus on qualitative analysis of factors contributing towards 
convergence between the case countries’ identity and culture and those of the region, such as 
geography, history, culture, values and people-to-people contacts. The investigation of “other-
ing” is increasingly encapsulated within discourse analysis. 
2 What should the level of interdependency be according to each approach (rational vs. 
Ideational) to accommodate further integration? 
The levels of material interdependency in both cases arguably meet the required benchmarks in 
terms of economy, although these benchmarks lack specification. Nonetheless, economic inter-
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dependency is not generally disputed in either the case countries or wider region. In the Turkey-
EU case, however, the Copenhagen Criteria sets the specific economic, political and institutional 
requirements for membership (in particular with regards to democracy, rule of law, and protec-
tion of minorities) and the Accession Process, in the form of the acquis communitaire - the 
formal criteria for the implementation of community legislation. The primary question from a 
Rationalist point of view is thus whether Turkey meets these official criteria. 
The level of cognitive interdependency is, in both cases, albeit to a different degree, perceived as 
problematic by the incumbent membership, as demonstrated by elite and popular opinion, as well 
as Regionalism discourses in each of the regions. Thus, the fact that that Turkey is not popularly 
perceived as a European state, despite the fact that its candidacy status is at least de facto, if not 
de jure, illustrates a distinct lack of acknowledgment of its “Europeanness”. In this sense the 
much criticised “Clash of Civilizations” thesis by Huntington earns a level of credibility. It 
would indeed appear that elites and the population in the “host civilization” are not receptive to 
these ideas, whilst popular backing in Turkey for EU membership has also simultaneously 
declined. Based on this research it is justifiable to argue that a clear majority of EU citizens and 
the elite would need to perceive Turkey as “European” for accession to be guaranteed. Explana-
tions of how exactly this could be achieved is problematic, as Turkey’s “Europeanness” appears 
to be tied to process of constructing the European identity in which Turkey plays the role of 
Europe’s “other”. The nature of European Regionalism also displays some signs of a civiliza-
tional project: uniting the European peoples under a common set of values and identity. The 
possible fast-tracking of financially bankrupt Iceland’s membership application is another 
development which strengthens this assumption. 
Australia has faced identical rejection as a result of not being “Asian” and external perception 
that it is not “genuinely of region”, despite the widely acknowledged material interdependency 
between Australia and East Asia. However, recent developments would suggest that the signifi-
cance of regionness has declined in value, due to Australia’s admission to the East Asia Summit 
in 2005 and especially its possible admission to ASEM in the Asian side of the table. Should this 
happen, it would suggest that the emerging East Asian Regionalism project (aiming towards an 
East Asian Community) is not exclusive by nature and is based more on rational choice than 
hypothesised. Thus, it would seem that building a regional identity in East Asia appears to 
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accommodate a greater variance of culture, ethnicity, religion and political systems than the 
European project. Nonetheless, in order to ensure further integration Australia will have to 
continue to reduce its negative image and role as the “other” for certain regional states. As long 
as Australia is significantly perceived as the ‘US deputy sheriff’ and until it truly manages to rid 
itself of the ”White Australia” image, it will not be fully accepted as an independent regional 
actor that has genuine commitment to common interests with its regional neighbours. 
3 What are the benefits and costs of inclusion vs. exclusion in each case? 
In both cases there is little doubt that the case countries would be the primary beneficiaries, 
whilst the regions would benefit marginally. 
Whilst the exact economic impact of Turkey’s membership is impossible to assess due to the fact 
that even the best projections are essentially speculative and subject to a number of changing 
conditions in Turkey and the EU, it is quite clear that Turkey would be the net beneficiary in 
short- to medium-term at least. Turkey would directly benefit from increased trade and in re-
ceipts from EU budget funds, specifically from CAP and Structural Funds. The economic impact 
on the EU would likely be relatively minor, due to the relatively small size of the Turkish econ-
omy. From the perspective of the EU, economic motives from therefore have little backing in 
terms of factual evidence. From Turkey’s point of view, however, the economic motives are 
quite clearly substantiative and thus are likely to constitute a genuine – and significant - source 
of motivation to join the EU as a full member. 
The budgetary impact of Turkey’s accession would be significant at approximately €15 to €35 
billion, but manageable in scale (maximum of 0.20% of EU-28 GDP), roughly matching the 
commitment made towards the “Eastern enlargement”. Considering the EU’s decision to com-
mence membership negotiations with Turkey, it is only fair to assume that - in principle at least - 
the Union has already committed itself to Turkey’s membership and hence, the costs it will 
entail. 
Unlike in the case of Turkey /EU debate budgetary considerations do not exist as a similar level 
of necessary analysis in East Asia; similarly issues surrounding voting and decision-making are 
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less problematic as decisions in East Asian institutions are mainly made on consensual basis. In 
the case of East Asia, neither does there exist an established formal membership criterion such as 
the “Copenhagen Criteria” in Europe. As also pointed out, East Asian Regionalism differs from 
its European counterpart rather significantly Unlike Europe where a single regional organisation 
dominates regional cooperation, East Asia displays a myriad of organisations and proposals. 
Consequently, in particular in the field of economic cooperation a complex tangle of preferential 
trading agreements, both regional and bilateral, complicates the architecture of regional eco-
nomic cooperation. Moreover, formation of a customs union along the lines of those established 
in European integration, where members have the same tariff and commercial policy towards 
non-members, is not on the agenda of the Vientiane Action Programme. Subsequently, even if 
ASEAN’S conception of an Economic Community is realised, Australian goods will continue to 
face different duties for the same good in each ASEAN country.1149 In terms of access to mar-
kets, Australia currently enjoys ‘most favoured nation’ treatment in most ASEAN markets, and 
in case of Singapore and Thailand it enjoys better than MFN status through bilateral FTAs.1150 
A further difference with Turkey is that Australia has sought to compensate its exclusion from 
the region by pursuing a number of bilateral agreements with regional countries, as well as 
simultaneously emphasising traditional markets in Europe and the United States. Economic 
relations with East Asian states on the other hand have been conducted increasingly under the 
umbrella of bilateral FTAs, specifically under the eleven-year reign of the Howard government, 
during which multilateral cooperation was used as a supportive secondary strategy. Hence, given 
that a majority of its trade relations with the region are governed within the context of bilateral 
FTAs, the critical question becomes what would Australia gain from increased integration to 
regional multilateral economic cooperation? Given this specific background, a comparison 
between costs and benefits Australia would incur from bilateralism versus those incurred if a 
strategy of multilateralism was pursued as a prevailing strategy towards managing relationships 
                                                 
1149 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2006), ASEAN Building an Economic Community, East Asia 
Analytic Unit, Canberra,  p. 80 
1150 Ibid 
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with East Asia, would best serve as good estimation of whether Australia would benefit from 
closer integration with the region. 
The economic benefits from increased access to the regional markets would primarily derive 
from the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, restrictions on investment and from services 
trade. Currently Australian companies face a range of trade and investment restrictions in 
ASEAN markets, in services sectors in particular; tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, 
investment, services and labour are, for example, still in place.1151 In many cases Australian 
firms and investors face stringent foreign equity limits, employment restrictions, requirements 
for joint ventures, restrictions on foreigners practising certain professions, non-recognition of 
Australian qualifications, and bans on land ownership by foreigners.1152 Also, in addition to trade 
in goods, services trade is increasingly important. Currently in the areas of services trade 
ASEAN still consists of ten separate markets; deeper integration with the development of 
ASEAN Economic Community would create one regional market, in which Australia’s inclusion 
could produce significant gains. The Centre for International Economics estimated in its 2000 
report that AFTA-CER FTA (AANZFTA) would create gains equal to 0.27% of the combined 
GDP (US$ 25.6 billion) for ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thai-
land) countries by 2010 and 0.25% of GDP (US$ 19.1 billion) for Australia and New Zealand, as 
well as additional capital inflows worth of US$ 7.7 billion in the same period.1153 In comparison, 
a broader East Asian Summit based FTA would boost Australia’s annual GDP by an estimated 
1.4.%.1154 
In terms of the risks involved with signing up to a regional agreement, the critical question 
would be whether doing so would endanger trade relations with external trading partners, e.g. the 
                                                 
1151 Op.cit. p. 70 
1152 Op.cit.  p. 81 
1153 Davis, Lee, Warwick McKibbin and Andrew Stoeckel (2000), Economic benefits from an AFTA-CER free 
trade area, Centre for International Economics, Canberra, pp. 22-24 
1154 Cook, Malcolm (2007), “Incoming Government Brief: East Asian Regionalism”, The Interpreter, 4 December 
2007, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2007/12/East-
Asian-Regionalism.aspx, Date last accessed: 25 September 2008 
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United States and the European Union? Currently it would seem that such a risk is remote as the 
planned regional agreements pledge to follow the principles of “open Regionalism”, and are thus 
supportive of multilateral trade liberalisation - yet another benefit in comparison to bilateral 
FTAs. 
4 Which set of theories (rational vs. Ideational) provides a better explanation for the 
problem in terms of greater explained variance? 
First of all, it needs to be acknowledged that any direct comparison between the approaches is 
difficult due to their different focus in terms of research topics, stemming from ontological and 
epistemological differences. The “Rationalist” approach focuses on material interdependency as 
the main driving force behind integration. Thus, Regionalism is seen as a consequence of rational 
calculations and bargains by rational agents. In contrast, the “Ideational”, or Social Constructiv-
ist approach, emphasizes shared regional identity and culture as the main driving forces that 
produce levels of “cognitive interdependence”. Hence, testing the explanatory powers of the two 
approaches is difficult due to their inherited ontological and epistemological differences. This 
difficulty, however, does vary according to context and it is possible to make observations on 
how well the two approaches explain a particular puzzle, or a complex problem, such as the 
problem of the borderline states in Regionalism. Whilst the main strength of the Rationalist 
approaches lies in explaining the “process” of enlargement, including Turkey’s accession proc-
ess, the main strength of the Ideational approaches attacks the area where Rationalist approaches 
are at their very weakest: explaining the underlining motives for enlargement, and thus also 
Regionalism in general. 
Firstly, the Rationalist approaches have a particular strength in explaining the process of integra-
tion, as well as providing valuable input in terms of motivation for Regionalism. Material bene-
fits are, after all, commonly used as primary justification for regional integration towards 
domestic polities, albeit Ideational motives also feature prominently.1155 One failure of the 
                                                 
1155 For instance in the EU Eastern Enlargement the reunification of Europe and the European peoples was 
prominently used as a justification for enlargement 
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Rationalist approach, however, is in explaining the opposition to, and thus the EU’s motives for, 
Turkey’s membership. In either case, whether we are interested in the EU’s motives for realising 
Turkey as a candidate or in the opposition to its full membership, material interests and rational 
choice models have very limited explanatory power. 
Another major weakness of the Rationalist approach in analysing Turkey’s position in European 
Regionalism is that it does not sufficiently account for the “hidden agendas” behind the “Eastern 
enlargement”. These “agendas” were evident in the reunification of Europe and Turkish acces-
sion, and effectively function as a “cross-civilizational” project creating a “bridge across civiliza-
tions.” A similar weakness extends to assessments on the impact on EU institutions, which 
arguably is much more modest than feared in worst case scenarios. In fact, the EU has discov-
ered from its past enlargement experiences that institutional reform can moderate the adverse 
impact of enlargement on deeper integration. Whilst the arguments based on the population size 
of Turkey and its proportional share of votes are arguably better analysed using a Rationalist 
framework, without carrying out an Ideational analysis we cannot reasonably conclude that the 
main concern in this context is a neo-functional concern over the technical functioning of institu-
tions, rather than a concern motivated by a hidden agenda, i.e. that due its cultural (or even 
“civilizational”) differences Turkey would utilize its power in EU institutions in a manner not 
corresponding with “European values”. 
Explaining the prospects of Turkey’s membership in the EU is not possible without analysis of 
the impact of factors such as history, culture, geography, religion, values and identity. Moreover, 
the prospect of Turkey’s potential membership has clearly prompted a process of self-
examination of the European project, in particular in terms of what a “European identity” entails 
and what will comprise the “final” borders or boundaries of the European Union. Significantly 
Turkey’s membership has become, if not a focal point, then at least a vehicle for the process of 
defining these borders/boundaries, both geographically and mentally. Geographically the out-
come of Turkey’s membership negotiations will significantly contribute towards determining the 
EU’s eastern boundaries; mentally the outcome will circumscribe the boundaries of the idea of 
the “European project”, where aspects of culture, values and identity are considered the glue that 
tie the “European” nations together. It therefore becomes evident that providing credible expla-
nations for Turkey-EU relations is simply not possible without Ideational analysis 
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The assumption that the financial/economic benefits of Turkey’s accession must be higher than 
the associated costs is seriously discredited by the CEEC-10 enlargement. Claiming that this 
needs to be the case in Turkey’s accession, therefore, is neither sustainable, nor does it withstand 
empirical testing. In this respect Rationalist approaches fail in their own regard. The fact that 
Turkey stands as an official candidate already poses a serious challenge to Rationalists, but 
should Turkey not be permitted to accede the credibility of rational choice based on cost/benefit 
approaches would be all but crushed. 
The security agreement between Indonesia and Australia and its repercussive implication that 
two fundamentally different societies choose to cooperate in sensitive areas of security and 
defence supports the credibility of a rational approach to international relations1156 and the 
Howard government’s notion of “pragmatic Regionalism”. Furthermore, Australia has is also 
generally regarded as a valuable partner in East Asian Regionalism, despite the fact that Austra-
lian identity and values derive from British and European heritage, and despite the apparent 
differences between the two political cultures. Moreover, public opinion in East Asia and Austra-
lia does not appear to support the view that cultural differences between East Asia and Australia 
would be too great for cooperation to be possible. Thus, rational choice as a pursuit to maximise 
material interests appears to override questions of identity and culture. 
Yet, it has been established that Australia has encountered significant opposition to its inclusion 
in regional institutions and cooperation by a number of regional countries, particularly Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Some of this opposition can be explained by political differences and conflicting 
strategic interests between Australia and the two neighbours, but a significant amount of this 
opposition has cultural and ethical motivations that claim that Australia is not an Asian country 
and thus is ethnically unfit to be “genuinely of region”. Ideational analysis was also found 
helpful in assessing the importance and impact of “soft” aspects, such as immigration, people-to-
people contacts and education on Australia’s acceptance as a regional state that deserves a seat in 
regional institutions. Australia’s Asian literacy, i.e. the understanding of Asian politics, business, 
cultures and languages, has also been referred to as important to Australia’s regionness by its 
                                                 
1156 Dibb , Paul, David Hale and Peter Prince (1999), ”Asia’s Insecurity”, Survival, Vol. 41. Issue 3,  p. 17  
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East Asian partners. Finally, it was established that the application of Ideational approaches is 
necessary for a holistic understanding of the nature of Regionalism in East Asia and Australia’s 
place within it. The significance of Ideational approaches also arguably may increase as the 
nature of East Asian Regionalism evolves towards political integration and community building 
based on regional identity, values and norms. Thus, analysis concludes that Ideational ap-
proaches can produce valuable insight into policy-making through providing a more holistic and 
realistic evaluation of the importance and impact of norms, values and culture to Australia’s 
access to regional decision-making and its role in regional institutions. 
In conclusion, rational approaches have a particular strength in terms of analysing the process of 
enlargement. This is particularly relevant to the Turkey-EU case, where the process of accession 
is in accordance with the logic of rational choice, being built on pre-determined criteria (albeit 
partly Ideational). Consequently, a Rationalist approach is better equipped and more appropri-
ately focused towards objectively measuring Turkey’s progress against these criteria. However, 
in theory at least, Turkey is now “an ordinary candidate”, officially destined to become a full 
member in the EU, albeit with an indefinite timeline. Nonetheless, each and every country that 
has presented as an official candidate has become a full member. From a Rationalist perspective 
there is no reason to expect this will alter in the case of Turkey, unless it fails to meet the above 
mentioned criteria. 
With regards to the cost/benefit research agenda, it seems justifiable to argue that this was 
important until the Accession Partnership (with the earlier mentioned caveat about their accuracy 
in mind), but perhaps not subsequently. In fact, it would appear that cost/benefit analyses are 
now of little use, as according to a Rationalist ontological point, view, cost/benefit ratios should 
by now have little or no bearing on the result of Turkey’s accession process. 
However, the Turkey-EU case is also a powerful demonstration of how enlargement decisions 
are disconnected from rational choice, and operate under clear Ideational motives. It should 
therefore be recognized that not only is the opposition to Turkey’s membership Ideational in 
nature, but also the justification for enlargement as a process is directly connected to the idea of 
the European project. Thus, it matters immensely that the process of construction of European 
identity involves Turkey as Europe’s “significant other”. Yet, Rationalist approach is unable to 
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allow for this in its ontology, which also makes it somewhat ignorant for its implications, and 
lacking in holistic consideration. The significance of this weakness is paramount; evidence 
illustrates that even if Turkey fulfils the specified official criteria there is no guarantee of success 
as only one vote, motivated by “othering” can prevent the accession process. This can be argued 
as partly an institutional weakness in EU’s enlargement process, as accession requires full 
consensus and is not based on majority voting as other issues are. This also reveals a policy 
option; a majority vote for accession could at least partially override the Ideational concerns and 
therefore make the process a more rational choice in nature. 
Nonetheless, one significant factor can be revealed only by Ideational analysis: Turkey’s acces-
sion is directly linked to the battle for the European idea. For some Turkey’s accession would 
complete the European project, whilst for others it would ruin it. Thus Turkey’s accession cannot 
be credibly analysed in isolation and must be considered alongside the European idea and iden-
tity building process, which are both particularly strong points of Ideational approach. An Idea-
tional approach should be considered as the primary tool for analysis of motives of enlargement; 
no explanation of Turkey’s position in European Regionalism can be complete without the 
investigation of variables such as values, culture and identity. Moreover, Ideational approaches, 
specifically Social Constructivism, also contribute to the investigation of the process of enlarge-
ment, particularly with regards to whether Turkey adheres to “European values” or has a “Euro-
pean vocation”. Finally, albeit the evolving Regionalism in East Asia appears to be less 
Ideational in nature, motivations for opposition to Australia’s participation are clearly a case for 
Ideational analysis; this approach is especially relevant in terms of why this opposition emerged 
and why it appears to be in withdrawal now. Theoretically there are at least two options to 
consider in this regards: either the idea that “Asians only” Regionalism was never considered 
important in the region, or that the regional states made a rational choice to cooperate with 
Australia regardless of its divergent identity and culture. Perhaps ironically, this implied that 
rational choice was a driving force in East Asian Regionalism and was confirmed by Ideational 
research. 
As for other potential points of convergence, this thesis argues that the stability of enlargement is 
a topic worthy of further investigation. Doing so, however, as this research would suggest 
involves both motives and a process. It would require a synthesis, or evolution of at least one of 
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the approaches to incorporate variables from the other. Alternatively, it would require a “third 
way” such as analytical eclecticism. Nonetheless, it is evident that such an investigation would 
have policy relevance for the candidate countries and host regions. The process, in the case of the 
EU, would involve two aspects, first of which is integration capacity, referring to the institu-
tional and financial capacity of the EU to absorb new members. This would necessitate applica-
tion of rational choice, Neo- Liberal Institutionalism and perhaps Neofunctionalism, towards 
measuring the economic, financial and institutional impacts of accession in order to establish a 
more reliable cost/benefit assessment of enlargement. However, judging on the basis of Turkey’s 
accession, one could easily argue that enlargement decision also involves a hidden agenda of 
cognitive capacity, referring to the EU’s capability to socially integrate new members, whilst 
dealing with a shift from homogeneity to heterogeneity. I would once again stress the importance 
of adding this to the research agenda; even if we argue that this topic came to the fore due to 
institutional challenges experienced as a result of the Eastern enlargement, the fact that integra-
tion capacity was not a major concern when the decision was taken to include the Central and 
Eastern European states into the EU (or at least it was made regardless of such concerns), en-
forces the proposition that enlargement has a strong Ideational base. Furthermore it suggests that 
enlargement can have significant impact on the idea of the region. In order to gain an improved 
understanding of the interplay between such considerations, we should consider this a potential 
case for analytical eclecticism. 
5 What constitutes regional identity? What impact do notions of regional identity have 
on the problem? How do the identities and cultures of “borderline states’ compare with 
those of the respective regions? 
As Chapter 5 argued a “European identity” does not really exist independently, but rather as 
supplementary to national identities.1157 Moreover, a study commissioned by the European 
Commission which examined the emergence of a European identity from a wide variety of 
theoretical perspectives found that whilst such an identity may be forming, it is still far from 
                                                 
1157 Rehn, Olli  (2006), Europe’s Next Borders, Nomos, Baden-Baden,  p. 38 
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coherent.1158 The Eurobarometer studies have also consistently found that EU citizens prioritise 
their own nationality over European identity, thus supporting the idea that European identity 
functions as a supplement 
Whilst a common European identity shared by its citizens is still under construction, the regional 
identity of the EU is, by some commentators, arguably constituted through European values, 
suggesting the existence of a value community united by common ideas of democracy, rule of 
law and respect for human rights. One such commentator is the EU’s Commissioner for 
Enlargement, Olli Rehn, who argues in his recent book “Europe’s Next Borders” that it is the 
shared values that make the European borders, not geography alone: "The map of Europe is first 
and foremost defined in the minds of Europeans. Geography sets the frame, but essentially it is 
our common values that make the borders of Europe.”1159 Others, however, as Chapter 5 demon-
strated, consider geography and history as the primary determinants, and define European culture 
by the experience of Renaissance and Enlightenment and its Judeo-Christian heritage. 
Regardless of which of the aforementioned criteria dominates, Turkey’s real and perceived 
inability to conform to the European ideal and practices, combined with perceptions of cultural 
divergence, have been reflected in a generally negative public opinion towards Turkey’s acces-
sion. As such Turkey is said to have become Europe’s significant “other” replacing the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Block, thus acting as the “other” in European identity construction. 
Identity and culture are, therefore, clearly very important variables in determining Turkey’s fate 
and for gaining a better understanding of enlargement; the type of union into which the EU 
evolves over the next 10 to 15 years determines the type of borders it will have and how candi-
dates are selected and treated. This is an area of primary interest to Turkey. Should the EU 
evolve into an exclusive “club” based on history and geography, Turkey should expect trouble. 
On the other hand, should the EU evolve into an open ended community based on a political and 
                                                 
1158 Jansen, Thomas (Ed.) (1999), “Reflections on European Identity”, Working Paper 1999, European Commissi-
on Forward Studies Unit, Brussels 
1159 Rehn (2006), p. 45 
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economic project which has room for potential candidates with “divergent identities”, Turkey 
has a relatively good chance of being accepted. 
In comparison to Europe, the building of a regional identity in East Asia is clearly less advanced, 
has received less attention and (currently) has lesser importance to the regional project. More-
over, the region is perhaps even more diverse in terms of culture, ethnicity, religion and values 
than Europe. Consequently, despite a vibrant “Asian values” debate in the past, a universal East 
Asian identity has not thus far emerged. In the absence of universal Asian values, Australia’s 
values tend to be compared to Confucianism, which has been defined as “an ethnical system and 
humanistic world view that places great emphasis on forms of conduct within relationships, and 
on personal virtue, obedience to authority, family, loyalty, social harmony and education.”1160 
Australia’s identity in the region is on the other hand perceived as a typically Western identity, 
characterised by egalitarianism, secularism of government and freedom of religion, parliamen-
tary democracy and freedom of speech, respect of rule of law, and freedom of assembly. In 
contrast to the Australian identity which is seen as individualistic, East Asian societies are 
perceived as communitarian. 
Whilst there is no clear independent regional identity as such, the emerging East Asian Commu-
nity is, however, in the process of developing a common identity and culture. How far this will 
be based on a collection of supposedly universalistic “Asian values”, and how it impacts on the 
inclusivity and exclusivity of the regional institutions, remains to be seen as this process is still in 
its early stages. The adoption of democracy, rule of law and human rights by ASEAN Charter, 
however, may lead to the development of a regional identity that is compatible with Australia’s 
Western identity. 
                                                 
1160 Barr, Michael (2002), Cultural Politics and Asian Values: The Tepid War, Routledge, London,  p. 5 
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8.3 Eclectic Analysis of the Problem of the Borderline States: 
Why are Turkey and Australia in the borderlines of 
European and East Asian Regionalism? 
The question arises of how analytical eclecticism can contribute towards a better understanding 
of Regionalism? The first contribution I would argue, is its topic; the Rationalist approach is 
focused towards material factors and a rational choice-based pursuit of economic, security and 
political gains with little or no interest towards identity and culture as variable; interests are a 
priori to identity whilst the Ideational approach assumes the opposite. Thus neither approach is 
especially contributory in assessing “the problem of the borderline states in Regionalism”, where 
material interests and identity are arguably complimentary rather than conflicting. Moreover, as 
this thesis has shown, neither approach can actually explain the problem, even if they focus on it. 
Thus, analytical eclecticism can be useful in terms of identifying and framing problems that are 
significant, but for ontological and epistemological reasons have a tendency to be ignored by the 
paradigmatic approaches. Secondly, “the problem of the borderline states” has clear policy 
relevance; Turkey and Australia have for decades sought ways to gain full access to their respec-
tive regions, but have failed to do so regardless of their high level of material interdependency 
and the lack of any official criteria in regards to identity and culture. Thus, it would appear that 
neither strictly Rationalist nor Ideational analyses can provide sufficient guidance for strategic 
decision-making. Opting between applying “pragmatic” policies and strategies supporting 
Europeanization/Asianization in serration has obviously not had an optimal outcome for either 
country. 
Thirdly, a more holistic view of the problem can help identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
the two approaches objectively and thus, contribute to the development of Rationalist and Idea-
tional approaches as well. Undertaking comparisons by applying eclecticism can also assist in 
the clarification of the research agenda in terms of Regionalism studies. As this thesis has dem-
onstrated, for instance, the Rationalist approach has a particular strength in analysing the process 
of enlargement, whilst an Ideational approach is required for analysing the motives of enlarge-
ment. Moreover, a potential point of convergence between the two approaches is in analysing the 
stability of enlargement: the Rationalist approach contributes to the analysis of integration 
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capacity, whilst the Ideational approach contributes to the analysis of cognitive capacity. They 
function together to establish the need and means to integrate and socialise new members in 
regional institutions and their compatibility in regards to the decision-making culture and mode 
of operation of the regional organisation. This would not necessarily require a synthesis between 
the two, but rather establishing a division of labour and mode of cooperation in a shared research 
agenda. As Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein have argued, the relationship between 
various causal factors and the order of sequence in which variables interact need not be the same 
in all situations: 
“Furthermore, analytical eclecticism leaves room for disagreement about the 
shape of particular causal arguments and the sequence in which variables inter-
act. While instrumental rationality and identity as well as material and social fac-
tors are intertwined, the particular combination of these factors in various 
concrete situations need not be the same. In the aggregate, these ’explanations 
are complementary rather than mutually exclusive, may be hard to distinguish 
emprirically, and in some cases there might not even be any fact of the matter to 
distinguish at all.”1161 
Thus, the primacy of Rationalist or Ideational causalities and variables may vary according to the 
nature of the problem under investigation. 
Finally, how can analytical eclecticism assist in understanding Turkey’s and Australia’s position 
as “borderline states” in European and East Asian Regionalism? One example would be to 
investigate how material interests and perceptions of strategic interests shape the focus of re-
gional cooperation and membership of regional institutions, and how these are shaped by the 
agents’ identity and culture, including political culture and culture of strategic decision-making. 
Katzenstein’s example of the decision to include Portugal and Italy in NATO are a case in point: 
                                                 
1161 Hemmer, Christopher and Peter J. Katzenstein (2002), ”Why is The No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, 
Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism”, International Organization, Volume 56, Issue 3, (pp. 575-
607) p. 599 
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“Italy’s inclusion among NATO’s founding members, along with that of undemo-
cratic Portugal (given the strategic importance of the Azores), underscore the im-
portance of eclectic explanations that encompass both strategic calculations and 
regional identities. In these two cases, the geographically defined region and the 
sense of identification with fellow democracies proved less decisive than strategic 
calculations in determining membership.”1162 
Essentially the same could be argued about Australia and Turkey, which could be considered as 
contemporary examples of this type of compromise between strategic importance based on 
rational choice and identity. After all, Australia is an important partner in the US alliance with 
Asia, and for the global war on terrorism, whilst Turkey is an important NATO member and US 
ally with significant influence in the Middle East, Caucasus, the Black Sea region and the Bal-
kans. Thus, both are important players in the strategic environment of their respective regions. 
Such strategic importance in combination with economic interests could explain why elites in the 
region may be pushing the inclusion of such countries despite historical animosity and perceived 
cultural divergence. However, just as strategic interests can override identity and culture, the 
strategic importance of Australia and Turkey can also be overtaken by concerns over identity and 
culture. 
One possible explanation for the ongoing conflicts in explanations and for resolutions is the role 
of elites versus popular opinion. It should not be taken as given that strategic interests are obvi-
ous to the masses or that popularity necessarily follows a rational explanation of these strategies. 
This may be particularly significant in East Asian Regionalism as political elites have the mo-
nopoly over regional decision-making; in contrast, in Europe popular opinion significantly 
constrains elite decision-making. This observation is not a criticism of participatory democracy 
and transparency in regional decision-making; it ignores, for example, that East Asia too has 
participatory democracies (e.g. Japan, Thailand and the Philippines). Rather, this observation 
adds another aspect to the differences in regional projects between the two regions. Nonetheless 
it can be argued with a reasonable confidence that the ”bridge” argument is neither convincing 
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nor helpful when it implies civilizational divisions. The strategic value of Turkey and Australia 
does not override the perceived damage to regional cohesion caused by increased heterogeneity. 
If nothing else, this type of discourse opens up the possibility that the two should/could remain 
on the other side of the bridge, as strategic/privileged partners, which could ensure maintenance 
of strategic benefits whilst not sacrificing cohesion. Thus, the ”bridge” argument is not a credible 
justification for full membership. 
In conclusion, an eclectic analysis of Turkey’s and Australia’s position as “borderline states” is 
helpful for testing ontologically different approaches, in identifying variables and causalities that 
Rationalist and Ideational approaches miss, and thus contribute to development of theory within 
these approaches. Alternatively analytical eclecticism could develop its own loose empirical 
approach, applying compatible parts of the two approaches in parallel if not in synthesis. 
8.4 Defining “Regionalism” and “Regions” 
It firstly needs to be recognized that the challenge of suggesting a definition that encompasses 
both Rationalist and Ideational is daunting due to ontological and epistemological divergence. 
The following definition may thus be criticized for this weakness. However, as stated earlier, the 
main motive for suggesting a new definition is to accommodate a more eclectic understanding of 
what constitutes a region, what drives Regionalism and in particular how a region’s membership 
is determined. 
As stated in Chapter 2, a definition of a region should encompass at least: 1) geographic prox-
imity; 2) material interdependency; 3) cognitive interdependency; 4) agency. Thus, I would 
suggest the following definition, which attempts to capture these elements to a relevant degree: 
“International regions are institutionalized manifestations of interest communi-
ties, based on mutually shared perceptions of common geography or geographic 
proximity, history, cultural affinity and material interdependence. Region build-
ing assumes the willingness to pool resources and decision-making powers into 
regional institutions, which develop regional norms, values and rules that govern 
policy- and decision-making at least in economic, political and security areas and 
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thus, effectively govern the intra- and inter-regional interactions in these issue 
areas. Ultimately such interest convergence leads into a regional identity, consti-
tuted by a shared idea of the region and a shared collective destiny. Institutionally 
such cognitive interdependency should lead into the pooling of sovereignty, ad-
vancing from Intergovernmentalism into supranationalism as regional institutions 
and identity mature.” 
Thus, Regionalism as a research area focuses on the phenomena of regional cooperation and 
should include the analysis of both material and Ideational interests that act as drivers to varying 
degrees in different phases of a Regionalism project. Rationalist and Ideational approaches 
should thus cooperate under a shared research agenda to understand and explain the process of 
regionalization in an attempt to reach the desired outcome of forming an international region 
meeting the abovementioned criteria. Such cooperation is not only possible, but necessary if we 
recognize that the emphasis on Rationalist and Ideational factors may vary in different phases of 
region-building and between regions that have a different idea, which then determines the 
balance between material and cognitive factors. 
8.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis has argued that more systematic research of enlargement and comparative work of the 
nature of Regionalism in different regions should be carried out in order to discover, test and 
discover variables and causalities that would otherwise go unnoticed. It has also argued the 
importance of searching for other new research topics that would further challenge the paradig-
matic approaches and highlight the importance of eclecticism. 
As argued earlier the stability of enlargement should be further investigated, in particular under 
the conditions of increased heterogeneity. One good candidate would be NATO, which has long 
since passed its geographical limits and has lost its “significant other” that was the justification 
for its formation. Yet NATO has managed to reinvent itself as a value community – an alliance 
of democracies – and a crisis management organization instead of a collective defence organiza-
tion. This gives rise to the question of whether NATO can survive without a significant “other”, 
which terrorism arguably is not, whilst maintaining cohesion of the organisation. Moreover, 
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many democracies in the world are not members of NATO, so one could quite justifiably ask for 
clarification of the membership criteria and what the balance between strategic benefits and costs 
and identity and values (democratic states) is when determining membership. In this regards, 
Georgia and the Ukraine could be interesting as potential “borderline states” by weighting their 
strategic importance and cost, and assessing how they match the identity and values of NATO. 
After all, the United States is advocating for Georgia’s NATO membership despite the potential 
cost of deeply angering Russia, a risk that the (Western) European members are not willing to 
take. Yet NATO denies that Russia is, or could be, NATO’s significant “other”. Thus, it should 
be investigated whether including them would make rational sense, or what Ideational motives 
are behind advocating and opposing their membership respectively. Another interesting aspect, 
and linked to the EU, is that not all EU members and “European” countries are NATO members. 
Finally, if both are primarily organisations of democratic states, why is it that Turkey is a valued 
NATO member, but its democratic credentials for EU membership are challenged? This may be 
seen as raising doubt assumptions that NATO is a value community. On the other hand, if NATO 
is just a military alliance, it begs the question “against whom”? Thus investigating the Rationalist 
and Ideational aspects of NATO could reveal interesting information about these factors and 
their roles in international organisations. 
Secondly, risking criticism of triangulation, it could be useful to assess Australia’s compatibility 
to EU membership criteria, removing geography and culture as variables, and then compare it to 
Turkey’s accession case to test Peter Katzenstein’s argument that regions are not fixed in geog-
raphy.1163 
Finally, the role of elite opinion and in particular their perception of strategic interests versus 
identity and culture as determinants for membership or partnership should be further investi-
gated. In order to establish the decision-making determinants for the elites, public opinion should 
be removed as a variable in order to avoid deceptive political correctness in the responses. The 
best available method for achieving this is the Delphi method. 
                                                 
1163 Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002),  p. 575  
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The Delphi Method was originally developed in the RAND Corporation during the early years of 
the Cold War in the 1950s after a the request of the US military to “systematically solicit” the 
views of a selected group of experts in order to generate scenarios and forecasts in “controversial 
socio-political areas of discourse”.1164 This - Project Delphi – as it became known as - mainly 
involved pooling expert opinion to produce long-range forecasts on the development of Soviet 
military technology and war strategy. 
Whilst the first Delphis were limited to forecasting future military strategy, technology and the 
economic and social impact of technological change, the applications of Delphi have since 
spread into numerous fields, covering areas as disparate as scientific inquiry, such as public 
health management (HIV/AIDS etc.), education (curriculum design, etc), business management 
(strategy, sales forecasting, human resources management, etc.), political risk, public policy 
making and foreign policy. Moreover, the use of the Delphi method is no longer limited to 
producing forecasts but is now widely also used to develop, identify and validate variables and 
discover new ones, as well as to validate research areas, hypotheses and test emerging research 
themes. 
Moreover, Delphi has also undergone significant methodological development since its incep-
tion. The Policy Delphi was developed by Murray Turoff in the 1970s in order to facilitate 
decision analysis. Unlike the original Delphi, which focused on reaching a consensus amongst a 
homogenous group of experts on the most likely and/desirable future, the Policy Delphi rests on 
the assumption that in policy-making decision-makers are more interested in alternative viable 
solutions to a major policy problem rather than reaching a consensus on one exclusive direction 
or option. On the contrary, Policy Delphi is used to “generate the strongest possible opposing 
views on the potential resolutions of a major policy issue”, which enables the positioning of 
experts and advocates in opposing positions.1165 Moreover, Turoff argues that in policy issues 
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“there are no experts, only informed advocates and referees”.1166 Other new methods of Delphi 
include the Argument Delphi and the Disaggregative Policy Delphi (DPD). The Argument 
Delphi was developed by Osmo Kuusi in 19991167 and focuses on identifying the most relevant 
arguments and their merits, rather than focusing on creating a consensus around any particular 
argument. Hence the quality of the argument is what matters, not the outcome.1168 The Disaggre-
gative Policy Delphi developed by Petri Tapio1169 utilises cluster analysis as a systematic tool to 
produce relevant future scenarios, separating the probable and the preferable scenarios proposed 
by the expert panel.1170 
The four key features of Delphi studies are anonymity, iteration, controlled feedback and the 
statistical aggregation of group responses.1171 In practical terms this means that Delphi studies 
are conducted under conditions of anonymity of the panellists in order to avoid the typical 
problems associated with working in groups or conducting focus groups. These problems are: 
group think (falsified consensus), dominant personalities that hijack the process; and fears of 
challenging superiors or ‘eminent persons’. Secondly, it means that each questionnaire that takes 
place after the first round is based on the results of the analysis of the previous questionnaire. 
Hence, a system of continuous feedback presenting the moderator’s anonymised summary 
analysis of responses and arguments, often statistically summarised, encourages the panellists to 
confirm or modify their positions and arguments by giving them an opportunity to consider other 
positions and to defend or change their earlier positions. It also allows them the option of pre-
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senting new arguments for consideration. This process continues until the research question has 
been answered or a sufficient amount of information has been gathered with little or no prospects 
of any new significant discoveries.1172 
In the line of the ethos of this thesis, it is my firm belief that the quest to seek new puzzles and 
identifying the best ways for explaining these without the unnecessary constraints of paradig-
matic approaches, whilst still maintaining empirical vigour is the most effective way of enhanc-
ing our understanding and explaining social life in international context. Such a quest requires 
systematic analytical testing a great variety of methods, even those that are not mainstream 
methods, such at the Delphi Method. Enabling this analytical freedom of eclecticism is probably 
the most significant contribution of analytical eclecticism towards further development of the 
study of Regionalism and international relations. 
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Appendix A: List of Data Sources – Chapters 4 & 6 
Chapter 4: Main Sources 
The foundational texts and main data sources analysed for Chapter 4 were as follows. 
Foundational Texts 
The following foundational texts establishing and regulating relationship between Turkey and 
the European Union were analysed: 
Association Agreement of 1963 (”Ankara Agreement”) 
The Additional Protocol (AP) of 1970 
The Treaty of the European Union (”Maastricht Treaty”) of 1992 
The Declaration of the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 
The Customs Union Treaty of 1995 
The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 
The Declaration of the 1999 Helsinki European Council 
Turkey – European Union Accession Partnership (2001, 2003 and 2005) 
Trade Statistics 
European Commission, Trade Statistics 
European Commission, “Trade Statistics - Turkey 
OECD International Trade Statistics 
World Bank International Trade Research 
World Bank International Development Indicators 
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World Trade Organization - Trade Profiles 
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European Union Official Documents 
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European Commission, “Financial Programming and Budget 
European Commission Turkey progress reports (1998-2006) 
European Commission (2004), ”European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper”, Brussels 
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The European Council, “Council Decision of 23 January 2006 “on the principles, priorities and 
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Growth and Convergence with the European Union 
Chapter 6: Main Sources 
The foundational texts and main data sources analysed for Chapter 6 were as follows. 
Foundational Texts 
The following foundational texts establishing and regulating relationship between Australia and 
East Asian regional organisations were analysed: 
The ASEAN Declaration (”Bangkok Declaration”) of 1967 
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord (”Bali Concord”) of 1976 
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South-East Asia, Economic Analytical Unit, Canberra 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1997), Advancing the National Interest, Canberra 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2003), “Advancing the National Interest”, Canberra 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2007), Trade Statement 2007, Canberra 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2007), Australia’s Trade with East Asia, Market 
Information and Analysis Section, Canberra 
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Appendix B: List of Data Sources – Chapters 5 & 7 
This appendix lists the data sources utilised in Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis (FPDA) 
carried out in chapters 5 and 7. Appendices C, D, E and F provide summaries of nodes, coding 
structure and coding statistics for the FPDA carried out in these chapters. 
Chapter 5: Main Sources 
Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey 
(signed at Ankara, 12 September 1963) 
Speeches and statements 
Keynote Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, at the 
Symposium "Turkey and the EU-Looking Beyond Prejudice", Maastricht, 4-5 April 2004 
Address By Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gül on “The 
Turkish Point of View Regarding Turkey-EU Relations” (5th Annual North South Europe 
Economic Forum, Vilnius-Lithuania, 13 September 2004) 
Closing Remarks by H.E. Abdullah Gül, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, International Symposium on “Civilization and Harmony: Values and 
Mechanisms of the Global Order” (Istanbul, 3 October 2004) 
Hirch Ballin, Ernst (2004), “Europe’s Border and Basics: Where to Situate Turkey?”,Lecture for 
the Center for European Studies, Boğaziçi University, and the Foreign Policy Forum, Istanbul, 
17 December 2004 
Opening statement by the Turkish State Minister Ali Babacan in the 5th European Union – 
Turkey Annual Conference, Madrid, 19 May 2005 
Opening statement by the Turkish State Minister Ali Babacan in the 5th European Union – 
Turkey Annual Conference, Madrid, 19 May 2005 
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Speech by Mr Olli Rehn Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement 
“EU and Turkey together on the same journey” Visit to Erciyes University Kayseri, 7 October 
2005, Speech/05/587 
Address by H.E. Mr. Abdullah Gül, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to 
the Informal Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers, Salzburg, 11 March 2006 
Remarks by H.E. Ali Babacan, Minister of State in Charge of Economic Affairs, and Chief 
Negotiator for the European Union, Global Financial Imbalances - A conference organized by 
Chatham House in association with the Foreign Policy Association New York, April 24, 2006 
Speech by Mr Olli Rehn Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement 
“Turkey: state of play of the accession process” European Parliament, AFET committee Ex-
change of Views with Commissioner Rehn Draft report on Turkey presented by Mr Camiel 
Eurlings Brussels, 20 June 2006, SPEECH/06/392 
Speech by Mr. Ali Babacan, Minister of State and Chief Negotiator for the Republic of Turkey, 
“The Process of Negotiations: Turkey on the way to EU Accession”, Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, Hague, 5 September, 2006 
Statement By The Turkish Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Abdullah Gül, at the Breakfast Meeting of 
the "Group of Friends" of The Alliance of Civilizations, Co-Hosted By The Spanish Foreign 
Minister H.E. Mr. Moratinos, New York, 22 September 2006 
Speech by Mr Olli Rehn, Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement, 
“Europe’s Next Borders”, the European Policy Centre, Brussels, 10 October 2006, Speech-06-
586-EN(1) 
Speech by Mr. Olli Rehn, Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement, 
“Turkey’s Accession Process to the EU”, the University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 27 November 
2006, Speech-06-747-EN(1) 
SPEECH/06/561 Mr Olli Rehn Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlarge-
ment Europe's Next Frontiers Lecture at Bilkent University Ankara, 4 October 2006 
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SPEECH/06/747 Olli Rehn Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement 
Turkey's accession process to the EU Lecture at Helsinki University Helsinki, 27 November 
2006 
Message Issued BY H.E. MR. Abdullah Gül, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, on the Occasion of May 9 Europe Day, 9 May 2007 
European Union Official Documents and Reports 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Issues Arising from Turkey’s 
Membership Perspective, COM(2004) 656 final, Brussels, 6.10.2004 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission: 2005 enlargement strategy paper 
Brussels, 9.11.2005 COM (2005) 561 final 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards 
Accession, Brussels, 6.10.2004 COM(2004) 656 final 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007, Including annexed special 
report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members ,COM (2006) 649 Brussels, 08.11.2006 
European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the principles, priorities and condi-
tions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey and repealing Decision, 2006/35/EC 
Brussels, 6.11.2007 COM (2007)661 
European Commission, Regular Reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession 2000-2007 
Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, The Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Turkish National 
Programme for the adoption of the Acquis, Ankara, 2002 
Public Opinion Surveys and Data 
European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, European Values Survey 
1999 
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European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Perceptions of discrimination and 
Islamophobia - Voices from members of Muslim communities in the European Union, Vienna 
European Commission (2002), Standard Eurobarometer EB 56, Brussels, April 2002 
European Commission (2002), Standard Eurobarometer, EB58, Brussels, December 2002 
European Commission (2005), Special Eurobarometer 225: Social Values, Science and Technol-
ogy, EBS 225, Brussels, June 2005 
European Commission (2005), Standard Eurobarometer EB 64, Brussels, December 2005 
European Commission (2006), Special Eurobarometer 255: Attitudes Towards Enlargement, 
EBS 255, Brussels, July 2006 
European Commission (2006), Standard Eurobarometer EB65, Brussels, July 2006 
European Commission (2006), Standard Eurobarometer 66, Brussels December 2006 
The PEW Global Attitudes Project, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and 
Western Publics”, July 14, 2005 
The PEW Global Attitudes Project,” Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about 
Religious and Cultural Identity”, July 6, 2006, Washington D.C 
Newspapers and Media 
BBC 
Deutche Welle 
Financial Times 
Hurrieyt 
International Herald Tribune 
Le Figaro 
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The Telegraph 
Turkishpress.com 
Other Sources 
Strauss-Kahn, Dominique (2004), “What Borders for Europe”, European Stability Initiative, 
Brussels 
Chapter 7: Main Sources 
Speeches and Statements 
Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the luncheon hosted by the Prime Minister of 
Australia in Canberra on 15 April 1986 
Speech by Prime Minister Paul Keating, “Australia and Asia: Knowing Who We Are”, 7 April 
1992, Sydney 
Speech by Prime Minister Paul Keating to Foreign Correspondents’ Association, 11 November 
1994, Sydney 
The Fifth Asialink Lecture by John Howard, “Australia’s Links with Asia: Realising opportuni-
ties in our region”, Melbourne, 12 April 1995 
Statement by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans to ASEAN PMC 7+1, Bandar Seri Bagawan, 2 
August 1995 
Speech by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans to CEDA Asian Region International Association of 
Cooperating Organisations (ARIACO) Roundtable, “Australia’s Role in East Asia’s Future”, 
Melbourne, 11 September 1995 
Speech by Prime Minister Paul Keating at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, “Australia, 
Asia and the New Regionalism”, Singapore, 17 January, 1996 
Lee Kuan Yew interview on ABC’s 7.30 program, 20 November 2000 
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Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi Japan and ASEAN in East Asia - A 
Sincere and Open Partnership - January 14, 2002, Singapore 
Speech by Paul Keating, “Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration”, 25 April 2002, 
Jakarta 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's speech at the Asia Society dinner in Sydney, “Japan and 
Australia Toward a Creative Partnership, The Japan Times, May 2, 2002 
Speech by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer at the National Press Club, “Advancing the 
National Interest: Australia's Foreign Policy Challenge”, Canberra, May 7, 2002 
Speech given by Hon Paul Keating on the occasion of the Fifth JCPML Anniversary Lecture 
marking the 57th anniversary of John Curtin's death, Curtin University of Technology, 5 July 
2002 
Address by Prime Minister John Howard to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, “Austra-
lia in the World”, 31 March 2005, Sydney 
Keynote Speech by H.E. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, 
At the ASEAN Forum, “Rethinking ASEAN Towards the ASEAN Community 2015”, Jakarta, 7 
August 2007 
Official Documents, Reports and White Papers 
East Asia Study Group (2002), Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, presented to the 
ASEAN+3 Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 4 November 2002 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1997), In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign 
and Trade Policy, White Paper, Canberra 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2003), Advancing the National Interest, White Paper, 
Canberra 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2009), “Australian Values Statement – Provisional 
and Permanent” 
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Statistical Sources 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001), ABS 4102.0 – Australian Social Trends, 2001, Population 
Composition: Asian-Born Australians, Canberra 
Tourism Australia (2004), International Visitors Survey 2003, Canberra 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007), ABS 3412.0 Migration, Australia 2006-07 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007), ABS 1301.0 Yearbook Australia 2007 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2008), “Fact Sheet 4 - More than 60 Years of Post-
war Migration” 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2008), “Fact Sheet 4 - More than 60 Years of Post-
war Migration” 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2009), “Ancient heritage, modern society”, 
Other Reports 
Asian Studies Association of Australia (2002), Maximizing Australia’s Asia Knowledge: Repo-
sitioning and Renewal of a National Asset, Canberra 
Australian Education International (2008), Research Snapshot: International Student Numbers, 
No. 37, May 2008, Canberra. 
Public Opinion Survey s 
Asia Barometer Survey Data 
Asia Pulse,”Asian Executives Concerned by Australian Race Debate”, 9 December 1996 
Australian Election Study1996 
Global Views 2006 survey by Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs 
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Lowy Institute for International Policy (2005), The Lowy Institute Poll 2005: Australians Speak, 
Sydney 
Lowy Institute for International Policy (2006), The Lowy Institute Poll 2006, Sydney 
Lowy Institute for International Policy (2007), The Lowy Institute Poll 2007: Australia and the 
World, Sydney 
Lowy Institute for International Policy (2007), The Lowy Institute Poll 2008, Sydney 
Newspapers and Media 
Australian Broadcasting Company (ABC) 
The Australian 
South China Morning Post 
Straits Times 
Sydney Morning Herald 
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